Nick V can answer for himself. Reading Mead now in the context of a
communication course is very thought provoking. A good deal i am
struggling with. The following may be of use to the discussion.
These quotes and the entire essay on the self are to be found at.
http://mail.google.com/mail/#inbox/124ad49b8085d7cd
The selection is meant only to index the complexity of ascribing to Mead
any sort of Watsonian style behaviorism and to note places where he
provides an interesting point of translation between LSV and others of
interest on this discussion group.
mike
-----------------
It is the characteristic of the self as an object to itself that I want
to bring out. This characteristic is represented in the word "self,"
which is a reflexive, and indicates that which can be both subject and
object. This type of object is essentially different from other objects,
and in the past it has been distinguished as conscious, a term which
Indicates an experience with, an experience of, one's self. It was
assumed that consciousness in some way carried this capacity of being an
object to itself. In giving a behavioristic statement of consciousness
we have to look for some sort of experience in which the physical
organism can become an object to itself. (p. 21 of my edition).
The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only
indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members
of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the
social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own
experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by
becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first becomes an
object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or in his
experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the
attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social
environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and
they are involved.
We are finding out what we are going to say, what we are going to do, by
saying and doing, and in the process we are continually controlling the
process itself. In the conversation of gestures what we say calls out a
certain response in another and that in turn changes our own action, so
that we shift from what we started to do because of the reply the other
makes.
The conversation of gestures is the beginning of communication. The
individual comes to carry on a conversation of gestures with himself. He
says something, and that calls out a certain reply in himself which
makes him change what he was going to say
On Sun, Nov 1, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
In February, Nikolai Veresov
http://communication.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2009_02.dir/0100.html
posted xmca on this question. See
http://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/veresov/consciousness.htm
where he says "'Methods of reflexological and psychological
investigation' represented the reflexological concept of human
consciousness and Vygotsky called himself a bigger reflexologist
than Pavlov."
On the notion of "social behaviorism" I tend to agree with you
exactly, but http://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/Social_Psychology/Identity
is an example of Mead being defined as "social behaviorism," even
though he is _so_ different from Watson etc.
But I would be more interested in hearing responses to your original
response Mabel, about interactionist theories.
Andy
Mabel Encinas wrote:
Hi, Andy.
I agree with you about the fact that Vygotsky is criticising
reflexology in the excerpt I quoted (below). I disagree though
that Vygotsky was seen as a reflexologist either then or later
(it might be that someone has considered so). Vygotsky was
definitely not a reflexology. He openly criticises the
simplification that Pavlov does to psychology and the
physiological reductionism of his approach, and he is very much
interested in consciousness, a field that is completely out of
the focus of reflexology. Then, I do not agree with your point
that the quote I include has to do with behaviourists, as they
do not consider consciousnes (self or any other) something that
could/should be scientifically studied. Could you please tell me
why do you think so?
Thank you.
Mabel
> Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 23:22:59 +1100
> From: ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> To: liliamabel@hotmail.com <mailto:liliamabel@hotmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
>
> Mabel, it is a very interesting quote, but my thesis is that
> in that speech Vygotsky is conducting an immanent critique
> of reflexology. I am sure that everyone present at the time,
> as well as every interpreter since believes that he was at
> the time a reflexologist. But evidently a reflexologist who
> didn't believe in reflexology. Already in the excert you
> quote we see the unmistakeable reflection of the American
> social behaviorists!!
>
> By the way, since you have this volume, check out pp. 325-28
> on the question of consciousness./
>
> Andy
>
> Mabel Encinas wrote:
> > Hi.
> >
> > I agree with your point, Andy, and actually I think that
the concept of
> > mediation is related (or subsumed) to the concept of
practice. In my
> > view that is what is missing in interactionist theories
(and more
> > generally in communicative theories). Practice implies the
> > transformation of the world/and the subjects, not only
their meaning as
> > such.
> >
> > On the other hand, I agree, Larry, with the importance of
the present
> > moment and its affective load, although I do not know
Stern's work and I
> > do not work with psychoanalisis. What is intriguing to me
is that
> > Vygotsky sets the 'self' perception in quite another way,
Tony (and this
> > is related to the subject of consciousness recently held
here, in which
> > unfortunately I could not participate). He says in Vol 3.
of the
> > Collected works (p. 77):
> >
> >
> > … the mechanism of social behavior and the mechanism of
> > consciousness are one and the same. Speech is, on the one
hand, the
> > system of the ‘reflexes of social contact’ and, on the
other hand,
> > the system of the reflexes of consciousness par excellence,
i.e., an
> > apparatus for the reflection of other systems.
> >
> > The key to the problem of another person’s Ego, of the
knowledge of
> > another person’s mind lies here. The mechanism of knowledge
of the
> > self (self-consciousness) and knowledge of others is the
same. The
> > usual theories about the knowledge of another person’s mind
either
> > accept that it cannot be known, or they try to build a
plausible
> > mechanism with the help of various hypotheses. In the theory of
> > /Einfühlung/ and in the theory from analogy the essence of
such a
> > mechanism is the same: we know others insofar as we know
ourselves.
> > When I know another person's anger, I reproduce my own anger.
> >
> > In reality it would be more correct to put it the other way
around.
> > We are conscious of ourselves because we are conscious of
others and
> > by the same method as we are conscious of others, because
we are the
> > same vis-à-vis ourselves as others are vis-à-vis us. */I am
> > conscious of myself only to the extent that I am another to
myself
> > /*(I added emphasis in this previous sentence, as you might
not have
> > html). i.e. to the extent that I can again perceive my own
reflexes
> > as stimuli. In principle there is no difference in mechanism
> > whatsoever between the fact that I can repeat aloud a word
spoken
> > silently and the fact that I can repeat a word spoken by
another:
> > both are reversible reflex-stimuli.
> >
> > That is why the acceptance of the hypothesis proposed will lead
> > directly to the sociologizing of all consciousness, to the
> > acceptance that the social moment in consciousness is
primary in
> > time as well as in fact. The individual aspect is
constructed as a
> > derived and secondary aspect on the basis of the social
aspect and
> > exactly according to its model.
> >
> >
> > I think this is not a trivial difference, but I guess this
difference
> > and the issue of practice, are at the core of the
distinction between a
> > sociocultural approach and interactional approaches.
> >
> > Mabel
> >
> >
> >
> > > Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 17:24:34 +1100
> > > From: ablunden@mira.net <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>
> > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
> > >
> > > Larry, I too am interested in the relation between CHAT and
> > > the "intersubjective" people because intersubjective
> > > theories are found in American Hegel interpretation and in
> > > Critical Theory along with appropriations of psychoanalysis
> > > and American Pragmatism, but the ones I've read find very
> > > unsatisfactory. I would like to see Critical Theorists in
> > > particular paying attention to CHAT.
> > >
> > > The main problem I have with the intersubjective stuff I've
> > > read is that they lack any concept of mediation, by which I
> > > mean the use of artefacts in thinking and communicating.
> > > They mistakenly imagine that individual "subjects" can
> > > communicate directly without mediation. What do you mean
> > > when you say "mediated"
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > Larry Purss wrote:
> > > > The topic of the social construction and development of
the self in
> > Mead and the parallels with cultural historical theories of
> > intersubjectivity is fascinating. I have just finished
reading "Daniel
> > Stern's book "The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and
Everyday Life" He
> > is a member of the "Boston Change Process Study Group" which is
> > exploring the potential for change enacted in the moment to
moment (2 to
> > 10 second) intersubjective spaces created in enactements.
This work is
> > embedded in the larger focus on intersubjectivity being
elaborated
> > within "relational psychoanalysis". One of the historical
roots of this
> > approach comes from Harry Stack Sullivan and "interpersonal
> > psychoanalysis" Sullivan's work was a conversation between
Mead's theory
> > of the relational self and psychoanalysis. This
conversation is today
> > transforming all branches of psychoanalytic theory and
practice and
> > there are many books and journal articles focusing on
> > "intersubjectivity" and the quality of
> > > "mutual" recognition to facilitate change. This
perspective can be
> > applied to learning and developmental theory to emphasize
Mead's project
> > of the social self.
> > > > I work in school systems and try to use this
intersubjective
> > relational lens to deepen my understanding of "mediated
learning" as a
> > process of "implicit relational knowing" (see Daniel Stern)
as well as
> > explicit relational knowing and practices. Intersubjectivity as
> > experienced in the moment to moment enactments that are
elaborated
> > within the interactions of mediated learning are grounded
in affective
> > attunement as foundational to cognitive learning.
> > > > I hesitate to bring "psychoanalytic" models to this
website because
> > of the reaction to traditional Freudian models of reified
psychic
> > structure and all that baggage. However I happen to be
intrigued by both
> > "mediated learning" and "intersubjectivity" as ways to look
at the micro
> > units of analysis.
> > > > As an aside Daniel Stern was one of the researches,
with Jerome
> > Bruner, and others who studied "baby talk" and the
development of
> > language in moment to moment transactions. Twenty years
later Daniel
> > Stern and the Boston Change Process Study Group are still
working at
> > this micro unit of the present moment and the creation of
> > intersubjective spaces.
> > > > Stern (p.43 "The Present Moment") quoted William James
as he
> > described the stream of consciousness as like a bird's life
made up of
> > an alteration of flights and perchings. Stern's book
elaborates the
> > present moments are like the perchings. The flights are the
spaces
> > between moments of consciousness. These "flights" are
inaccesible and
> > ungraspable. "Consciousness is thus free to switch focus
from one
> > present moment to the next, and the sense of the self as
experiencer is
> > never felt to be interrupted, even though the perchings are
> > discontinuous. These present moments are the stuff of
subjectivity
> > during ordianary mental states" (p.43)
> > > > Mediated learning in the ZPD can be enriched by
exploring Mead's
> > and Stern's and other scholars who are exploring
intersubjectivity and
> > the development of the self.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > From: Tony Whitson <twhitson@UDel.Edu>
> > > > Date: Saturday, October 31, 2009 7:12 pm
> > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
> > > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>,
"eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
> > > > Cc: Ben DeVane <ben.devane@gmail.com
<mailto:ben.devane@gmail.com>>
> > > >
> > > >> Mead was also my first guess (and it really was a
guess, since I
> > > >> haven't
> > > >> actually read Mead)
> > > >>
> > > >> But I thought the more interesting thing about the
provocation
> > > >> is that
> > > >> even though it seemed like exactly what I would expect
from
> > > >> Mead, I could
> > > >> not be certain, because there are a number of others
we are
> > > >> interested in
> > > >> who could just as well have said the same. That's what
I find
> > > >> most
> > > >> interesting in this.
> > > >>
> > > >> And I do think this is part of Hegel's legacy, such
that even
> > > >> Lacan could
> > > >> have said much the same as this, although with somewhat
> > > >> differing
> > > >> implications.
> > > >>
> > > >> On Sat, 31 Oct 2009, mike cole wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>> Got it first try. Mead got his PhD with Dilthey. My
own guess
> > > >> is that this
> > > >>> goes back to at least Hegel, but others would know
better.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> (Dishes done, snuck away)
> > > >>> mike
> > > >>>
> > > >>> On Sat, Oct 31, 2009 at 7:51 PM, Ben DeVane
> > > >> <ben.devane@gmail.com <mailto:ben.devane@gmail.com>>
wrote:
> > > >>>> We just got done reading Mead in our pragmatism
reading group here,
> > > >>>> and it sounds very Meadish (Vygotsky crossed with
Dewey), so
> > > >> that's my
> > > >>>> guess. Honest I didn't look it up on Google.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> I really enjoyed the Holland & Lachicotte, and Edwards
> > > >> chapters on the
> > > >>>> parallels between Mead and Vygotsky in the Cambridge
> > > >> handbook. Highly
> > > >>>> recommended for anyone unfamiliar with Mead's work.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> -Ben
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> On Sat, Oct 31, 2009 at 8:09 PM, mike cole
> > > >> <lchcmike@gmail.com <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>> wrote:
> > > >>>>> In preparing for class just now i fell across this
sentence.
> > > >> Obvious who
> > > >>>>> wrote it without looking it up on google?
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> “*The self is something which has a development*,
it is not
> > > >> initially>> there
> > > >>>>> at birth, but arises in the process of social
experiences
> > > >> and activity,
> > > >>>> that
> > > >>>>> is, develops in the given individual as a result of his
> > > >> relations to that
> > > >>>>> process as a whole and to other individuals within
that process”
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> My own relations are saying get the hell off the
computer,
> > > >> the doorbell
> > > >>>> is
> > > >>>>> ringing and the goblins are on the move. So off i go.
> > > >>>>> mike
> > > >>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > >>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> --
> > > >>>> ***********************
> > > >>>> Ben DeVane
> > > >>>> Ph.D Candidate
> > > >>>> Games+Learning+Society Research Group
> > > >>>> University of Wisconsin-Madison
> > > >>>> ***********************
> > > >>>>
> > > >>> _______________________________________________
> > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>>
> > > >> Tony Whitson
> > > >> UD School of Education
> > > >> NEWARK DE 19716
> > > >>
> > > >> twhitson@udel.edu <mailto:twhitson@udel.edu>
> > > >> _______________________________
> > > >>
> > > >> "those who fail to reread
> > > >> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> > > >> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > Windows Live Hotmail: Your friends can get your Facebook
updates, right
> > from Hotmail®.
> >
<http://www.microsoft.com/middleeast/windows/windowslive/see-it-in-action/social-network-basics.aspx?ocid=PID23461::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-xm:SI_SB_4:092009>
>
> --
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Windows Live: Make it easier for your friends to see what you’re
up to on Facebook.
<http://www.microsoft.com/middleeast/windows/windowslive/see-it-in-action/social-network-basics.aspx?ocid=PID23461::T:WLMTAGL:ON:WL:en-xm:SI_SB_2:092009>
--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
Ilyenkov $20 ea
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca