Hi, Andy.
I agree with you about the fact that Vygotsky is criticising reflexology
in the excerpt I quoted (below). I disagree though that Vygotsky was
seen as a reflexologist either then or later (it might be that someone
has considered so). Vygotsky was definitely not a reflexology. He openly
criticises the simplification that Pavlov does to psychology and the
physiological reductionism of his approach, and he is very much
interested in consciousness, a field that is completely out of the focus
of reflexology. Then, I do not agree with your point that the quote I
include has to do with behaviourists, as they do not consider
consciousnes (self or any other) something that could/should be
scientifically studied. Could you please tell me why do you think so?
Thank you.
Mabel
> Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 23:22:59 +1100
> From: ablunden@mira.net
> To: liliamabel@hotmail.com
> Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
>
> Mabel, it is a very interesting quote, but my thesis is that
> in that speech Vygotsky is conducting an immanent critique
> of reflexology. I am sure that everyone present at the time,
> as well as every interpreter since believes that he was at
> the time a reflexologist. But evidently a reflexologist who
> didn't believe in reflexology. Already in the excert you
> quote we see the unmistakeable reflection of the American
> social behaviorists!!
>
> By the way, since you have this volume, check out pp. 325-28
> on the question of consciousness./
>
> Andy
>
> Mabel Encinas wrote:
> > Hi.
> >
> > I agree with your point, Andy, and actually I think that the
concept of
> > mediation is related (or subsumed) to the concept of practice. In my
> > view that is what is missing in interactionist theories (and more
> > generally in communicative theories). Practice implies the
> > transformation of the world/and the subjects, not only their
meaning as
> > such.
> >
> > On the other hand, I agree, Larry, with the importance of the present
> > moment and its affective load, although I do not know Stern's work
and I
> > do not work with psychoanalisis. What is intriguing to me is that
> > Vygotsky sets the 'self' perception in quite another way, Tony (and
this
> > is related to the subject of consciousness recently held here, in
which
> > unfortunately I could not participate). He says in Vol 3. of the
> > Collected works (p. 77):
> >
> >
> > … the mechanism of social behavior and the mechanism of
> > consciousness are one and the same. Speech is, on the one hand, the
> > system of the ‘reflexes of social contact’ and, on the other hand,
> > the system of the reflexes of consciousness par excellence, i.e., an
> > apparatus for the reflection of other systems.
> >
> > The key to the problem of another person’s Ego, of the knowledge of
> > another person’s mind lies here. The mechanism of knowledge of the
> > self (self-consciousness) and knowledge of others is the same. The
> > usual theories about the knowledge of another person’s mind either
> > accept that it cannot be known, or they try to build a plausible
> > mechanism with the help of various hypotheses. In the theory of
> > /Einfühlung/ and in the theory from analogy the essence of such a
> > mechanism is the same: we know others insofar as we know ourselves.
> > When I know another person's anger, I reproduce my own anger.
> >
> > In reality it would be more correct to put it the other way around.
> > We are conscious of ourselves because we are conscious of others and
> > by the same method as we are conscious of others, because we are the
> > same vis-à-vis ourselves as others are vis-à-vis us. */I am
> > conscious of myself only to the extent that I am another to myself
> > /*(I added emphasis in this previous sentence, as you might not have
> > html). i.e. to the extent that I can again perceive my own reflexes
> > as stimuli. In principle there is no difference in mechanism
> > whatsoever between the fact that I can repeat aloud a word spoken
> > silently and the fact that I can repeat a word spoken by another:
> > both are reversible reflex-stimuli.
> >
> > That is why the acceptance of the hypothesis proposed will lead
> > directly to the sociologizing of all consciousness, to the
> > acceptance that the social moment in consciousness is primary in
> > time as well as in fact. The individual aspect is constructed as a
> > derived and secondary aspect on the basis of the social aspect and
> > exactly according to its model.
> >
> >
> > I think this is not a trivial difference, but I guess this difference
> > and the issue of practice, are at the core of the distinction
between a
> > sociocultural approach and interactional approaches.
> >
> > Mabel
> >
> >
> >
> > > Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2009 17:24:34 +1100
> > > From: ablunden@mira.net
> > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
> > >
> > > Larry, I too am interested in the relation between CHAT and
> > > the "intersubjective" people because intersubjective
> > > theories are found in American Hegel interpretation and in
> > > Critical Theory along with appropriations of psychoanalysis
> > > and American Pragmatism, but the ones I've read find very
> > > unsatisfactory. I would like to see Critical Theorists in
> > > particular paying attention to CHAT.
> > >
> > > The main problem I have with the intersubjective stuff I've
> > > read is that they lack any concept of mediation, by which I
> > > mean the use of artefacts in thinking and communicating.
> > > They mistakenly imagine that individual "subjects" can
> > > communicate directly without mediation. What do you mean
> > > when you say "mediated"
> > >
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > Larry Purss wrote:
> > > > The topic of the social construction and development of the
self in
> > Mead and the parallels with cultural historical theories of
> > intersubjectivity is fascinating. I have just finished reading "Daniel
> > Stern's book "The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday
Life" He
> > is a member of the "Boston Change Process Study Group" which is
> > exploring the potential for change enacted in the moment to moment
(2 to
> > 10 second) intersubjective spaces created in enactements. This work is
> > embedded in the larger focus on intersubjectivity being elaborated
> > within "relational psychoanalysis". One of the historical roots of
this
> > approach comes from Harry Stack Sullivan and "interpersonal
> > psychoanalysis" Sullivan's work was a conversation between Mead's
theory
> > of the relational self and psychoanalysis. This conversation is today
> > transforming all branches of psychoanalytic theory and practice and
> > there are many books and journal articles focusing on
> > "intersubjectivity" and the quality of
> > > "mutual" recognition to facilitate change. This perspective can be
> > applied to learning and developmental theory to emphasize Mead's
project
> > of the social self.
> > > > I work in school systems and try to use this intersubjective
> > relational lens to deepen my understanding of "mediated learning" as a
> > process of "implicit relational knowing" (see Daniel Stern) as well as
> > explicit relational knowing and practices. Intersubjectivity as
> > experienced in the moment to moment enactments that are elaborated
> > within the interactions of mediated learning are grounded in affective
> > attunement as foundational to cognitive learning.
> > > > I hesitate to bring "psychoanalytic" models to this website
because
> > of the reaction to traditional Freudian models of reified psychic
> > structure and all that baggage. However I happen to be intrigued by
both
> > "mediated learning" and "intersubjectivity" as ways to look at the
micro
> > units of analysis.
> > > > As an aside Daniel Stern was one of the researches, with Jerome
> > Bruner, and others who studied "baby talk" and the development of
> > language in moment to moment transactions. Twenty years later Daniel
> > Stern and the Boston Change Process Study Group are still working at
> > this micro unit of the present moment and the creation of
> > intersubjective spaces.
> > > > Stern (p.43 "The Present Moment") quoted William James as he
> > described the stream of consciousness as like a bird's life made up of
> > an alteration of flights and perchings. Stern's book elaborates the
> > present moments are like the perchings. The flights are the spaces
> > between moments of consciousness. These "flights" are inaccesible and
> > ungraspable. "Consciousness is thus free to switch focus from one
> > present moment to the next, and the sense of the self as
experiencer is
> > never felt to be interrupted, even though the perchings are
> > discontinuous. These present moments are the stuff of subjectivity
> > during ordianary mental states" (p.43)
> > > > Mediated learning in the ZPD can be enriched by exploring Mead's
> > and Stern's and other scholars who are exploring intersubjectivity and
> > the development of the self.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > From: Tony Whitson <twhitson@UDel.Edu>
> > > > Date: Saturday, October 31, 2009 7:12 pm
> > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] guess who
> > > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
> > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > Cc: Ben DeVane <ben.devane@gmail.com>
> > > >
> > > >> Mead was also my first guess (and it really was a guess, since I
> > > >> haven't
> > > >> actually read Mead)
> > > >>
> > > >> But I thought the more interesting thing about the provocation
> > > >> is that
> > > >> even though it seemed like exactly what I would expect from
> > > >> Mead, I could
> > > >> not be certain, because there are a number of others we are
> > > >> interested in
> > > >> who could just as well have said the same. That's what I find
> > > >> most
> > > >> interesting in this.
> > > >>
> > > >> And I do think this is part of Hegel's legacy, such that even
> > > >> Lacan could
> > > >> have said much the same as this, although with somewhat
> > > >> differing
> > > >> implications.
> > > >>
> > > >> On Sat, 31 Oct 2009, mike cole wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >>> Got it first try. Mead got his PhD with Dilthey. My own guess
> > > >> is that this
> > > >>> goes back to at least Hegel, but others would know better.
> > > >>>
> > > >>> (Dishes done, snuck away)
> > > >>> mike
> > > >>>
> > > >>> On Sat, Oct 31, 2009 at 7:51 PM, Ben DeVane
> > > >> <ben.devane@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >>>> We just got done reading Mead in our pragmatism reading
group here,
> > > >>>> and it sounds very Meadish (Vygotsky crossed with Dewey), so
> > > >> that's my
> > > >>>> guess. Honest I didn't look it up on Google.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> I really enjoyed the Holland & Lachicotte, and Edwards
> > > >> chapters on the
> > > >>>> parallels between Mead and Vygotsky in the Cambridge
> > > >> handbook. Highly
> > > >>>> recommended for anyone unfamiliar with Mead's work.
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> -Ben
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> On Sat, Oct 31, 2009 at 8:09 PM, mike cole
> > > >> <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >>>>> In preparing for class just now i fell across this sentence.
> > > >> Obvious who
> > > >>>>> wrote it without looking it up on google?
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> “*The self is something which has a development*, it is not
> > > >> initially>> there
> > > >>>>> at birth, but arises in the process of social experiences
> > > >> and activity,
> > > >>>> that
> > > >>>>> is, develops in the given individual as a result of his
> > > >> relations to that
> > > >>>>> process as a whole and to other individuals within that
process”
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>> My own relations are saying get the hell off the computer,
> > > >> the doorbell
> > > >>>> is
> > > >>>>> ringing and the goblins are on the move. So off i go.
> > > >>>>> mike
> > > >>>>> _______________________________________________
> > > >>>>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>>
> > > >>>> --
> > > >>>> ***********************
> > > >>>> Ben DeVane
> > > >>>> Ph.D Candidate
> > > >>>> Games+Learning+Society Research Group
> > > >>>> University of Wisconsin-Madison
> > > >>>> ***********************
> > > >>>>
> > > >>> _______________________________________________
> > > >>> xmca mailing list
> > > >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >>>
> > > >> Tony Whitson
> > > >> UD School of Education
> > > >> NEWARK DE 19716
> > > >>
> > > >> twhitson@udel.edu
> > > >> _______________________________
> > > >>
> > > >> "those who fail to reread
> > > >> are obliged to read the same story everywhere"
> > > >> -- Roland Barthes, S/Z (1970)
> > > > _______________________________________________
> > > > xmca mailing list
> > > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> > > >
> > >
> > > --
> > >
------------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> > >
> > > _______________________________________________
> > > xmca mailing list
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
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>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov,
> Ilyenkov $20 ea
>
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