Re: [xmca] motive/project

From: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei who-is-at>
Date: Thu Dec 18 2008 - 03:34:13 PST

Dear Mike ,
You asked me about which and which and what and what and your confusion !! I replied though I always think if *my replies* could be worth reading ! Exactly when you pointed to the *material/spiritual needs/motives . I alluded to *from eating up to refusal to eat on grounds of selflessness/sacrifice , etc.etc. 

--- On Wed, 12/17/08, Mike Cole <> wrote:

From: Mike Cole <>
Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
To:, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <>
Date: Wednesday, December 17, 2008, 8:37 PM

andy-- "need" is a term that I find no more or less elusive than
"motive." I
feel this need for clarity but having had lunch I don't "want"
more to eat,
but perhaps some sleep, perhaps to dream?

We cannot, can we, define needs in purely biological terms for humans.
Perhaps someone has already clarified this issue in the discussion, but I
missed it. In which case, just point.

No need to reply right away. :-))

On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 6:23 PM, Andy Blunden <> wrote:

> The supposition that for ANL needs define activities is provisional. He
> hints at this sometimes. At other times, he says that he does not have a
> "unit of analysis" for activity. Either way, if we are to
continue in the
> scientific tradition of Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, we need a
"unit of
> analysis," i.e., a concept of, "activity."
> Andy
> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>> No, I don't think you have the idea quite right. The idea is not
>> needs "define" activities. The idea is that unlike other
animals, who are
>> biologically driven throughout their activities, when humans respond
>> their needs, they engage in activities that transform nature, their
>> relations, social structures, cultures, and themselves individually,
>> creating new needs in the process. Human biological needs become at
>> transformed into social needs, meditated by culture, history, tools,
>> ideology, language, architecture, public works systems. Leontiev took
>> discoveries about the basic structure of activity in animals - the
ways they
>> engage their bodies and psyches with nature to fulfill their needs -
>> came up with his activity/motive, action/goal, condition/operation
>> framework. He then tried to find ways to use this activity concept to
>> elaborate on and extend the ideas of first generation CHAT, and that
is kind
>> of where we are at today.
>> This unit of analysis problem has been on my mind, too. There may be
>> methodological problems with the concept 'unit of analysis' in
some of the
>> ways we have been conceptualizing it so far. Perhaps the
'molecule' and/or
>> 'cell' of social science does not look the molecule and cell
of natural
>> science.
>> - Steve
>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 4:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> The only trouble I have with the claim that "human needs
directly and
>>> indirectly drive human activity" is that it is a truism. My
problem, as you
>>> mention, is what is the "unit of analysis" of activity,
or what is *an*
>>> activity, as opposed to "activity." The idea that
"an activity" is defined
>>> by "a need" (if this is indeed what is suggested) is
that problems of
>>> sociology begin from an inventory of human needs: what is x for? x
is for
>>> this. what is y for? y is for that.
>>> Andy
>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>> Andy, I am been puzzled by your problem with the idea that
human needs
>>>> directly, and indirectly, drive human activity.
>>>> You've been bringing up this issue in recent weeks and I
thought that
>>>> maybe the problem was over an individual versus collective
problem, or
>>>> perhaps over the problem of how to differentiate an activity
from an
>>>> activity system, and then from a social system, or just how to
separate "an"
>>>> activity out of many.
>>>> But your message here seems to say you have a problem with the
idea of
>>>> **need**. You seem to be objecting to the idea that human
activities are
>>>> essentially motivated by needs. Are you?
>>>> I would use the term "need" in statements like: the
need for survival
>>>> drove pre-humans to develop social production, creating a new
way to meet
>>>> human needs, which in turn laid the basis for creating many
new kinds of
>>>> needs as society developed ... different social classes have
>>>> needs, and that is the basis of social conflict, including
wars ... human
>>>> need lies at the bottom of the human struggle for existence,
control of
>>>> nature, and society itself ...
>>>> I know you know that statements like these are Marxist
sociology 101, so
>>>> I don't mean to lecture on the obvious ... but if
"need" is not at the
>>>> bottom of human motivation and activity, then what is? Is
this a
>>>> terminological issue, or something more basic?
>>>> - Steve
>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 3:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>> Thank you for that collection of excerpts Haydi. As I read
them, they
>>>>> confirm what I said, that for ANL, a "system of
activity" is defined by
>>>>> directly or indirectly meeting a human need. ANL does say
that production
>>>>> produces not only objects, but also produces new needs,
but this does not
>>>>> resolve the matter in my view. Unless you accept that
society is either
>>>>> planned and adaministered by the central committee to meet
human needs, or
>>>>> naturally evolved to both meet and produce human needs
then this cannot be
>>>>> believed.
>>>>> The latter interpretation sounds plausible enough, in fact
it's a
>>>>> truism, but I don't see that it helps. For example,
take war. If we set out
>>>>> from the idea that war is an activity meeting a human
need, where does that
>>>>> leave us? how does it help us with psychology? Take
anything - the Church,
>>>>> MacDonald's, News Limited, domestic violence, ... all
we are going to end up
>>>>> with is a crass funcitonalism.
>>>>> I don't deny at all that a psychology can be built on
this foundation,
>>>>> but it cannot, in my view, be taken seriously as a
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>> We are being asked "What is *an* activity/*a*
>>>>>> I thought some of us at least need more reading than
interpretation .
>>>>>> I had to once more go from beginning to end of *A,C,P*
and collect
>>>>>> whatever might more or less be related to these
questions .
>>>>>> Half the job being done now .
>>>>>> Delete if you don't want to share . No way but to
put it in an
>>>>>> attachment . Hope David kellog will have time to have
a glance at it without
>>>>>> adding to my previously-loaded task.
>>>>>> Best
>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>> --- On Mon, 12/15/08, Andy Blunden
<> wrote:
>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden <>
>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>>> Date: Monday, December 15, 2008, 10:25 PM
>>>>>> I think, Monica, you hit the nail on the head here,
from the
>>>>>> psychological point
>>>>>> of view. On the sociological side, the problem, as I
see it, with
>>>>>> Michael's
>>>>>> explanation is that not only does the pupil not know
the motive of
>>>>>> schooling,
>>>>>> but nor does the teacher or the sociologist!
>>>>>> In a world where people know about agency and
structure and such
>>>>>> terms, does it
>>>>>> make any sense to ascribe a 'motive' to an
institution, outside of a
>>>>>> managed society like the USSR in which Leontyev lived?
>>>>>> But on the other side, Michael, I think you are right
as against
>>>>>> David, because
>>>>>> "sleeping" is not Tätigkeit in the sense in
which Leonytev means it.
>>>>>> He explicitly means "purpose actvity", or
"doing" or
>>>>>> "practice," as I read it. Not just
physiological movement. The
>>>>>> activity of an individual is *participation* is *a*
(social) activity.
>>>>>> But what
>>>>>> is *an* activity, and how can it have a
"motive," as Monica asks,
>>>>>> separately from the motives of individuals.
>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>> Monica Hansen wrote:
>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>> Using the term 'motive' for the objective,
goal, or aim of
>>>>>> schooling as
>>>>>>> cultural reproduction (or transmission) is
misplaced here. Motivation
>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>> something to do with individual agency,
doesn't it? It cannot be
>>>>>> forced from
>>>>>>> the outside with 100% effectiveness. When trying
to get an idea of
>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>> motivates the individual to engage in or become a
participant in an
>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>> that will change the level of his or her
conceptual thinking we have
>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>> understand the individual's motivation.
>>>>>>> Mandating the goal of learning from the outside as
in defining the
>>>>>> objective
>>>>>>> of schooling and trying to force participation
gives us mixed
>>>>>>> results,
>>>>>> does
>>>>>>> it not? Can you really force conceptual
development? Isn't that the
>>>>>> problem?
>>>>>>> We can only use external motivations so far in
pushing intellectual
>>>>>>> development?
>>>>>>> Monica
>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>> From: [mailto:
>>>>>>>] On
>>>>>>> Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth
>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 15, 2008 8:08 AM
>>>>>>> To:; eXtended Mind,
Culture, Activity
>>>>>>> Cc:
>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>> HI David and others,
>>>>>>> I have repeatedly emphasized in my writings that
the problem lies in
>>>>>>> part
>>>>>> in the English term 'activity', which
collapses the German Tätigkeit
>>>>>> and Aktivität into one, unfortunately, because it
also gives rise to
>>>>>> problems
>>>>>> with motives. I think if you think about what
children do as 'tasks'
>>>>>> and that these tasks are completed as part of the
>>>>>> 'schooling',
>>>>>> which has as motive the reproduction
(transmission...) of collective
>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>> then you are getting closer.
>>>>>>> But children often don't even know the goals,
in fact, because of the
>>>>>> 'learning paradox', cannot know the goals of
the task. This is no
>>>>>> more
>>>>>> clear than in the frequent student question,
'teacher, am I write so
>>>>>> far?' Students CANNOT intend the very thing that
they are asked to,
>>>>>> namely
>>>>>> learn a concept. To be able to orient themselves
intentionally to the
>>>>>> concept,
>>>>>> they need to know it, but if they already know it,
they don't have to
>>>>>> orient toward learning it.
>>>>>>> Holzkamp has a lot to say about this, and he
describes those things
>>>>>>> in
>>>>>> "Lernen: Subkjektwissenschaftliche
Grundlegung" (Frankfurt: Campus).
>>>>>>> If anyone has implemented Leont'ev's
program, it certainly is
>>>>>> Holzkamp.
>>>>>>> By the way, further to motive, the German edition
of Activity,
>>>>>> Consciousness, Personality has an additional chapter
where Leont'ev
>>>>>> explicitly addresses questions of learning in schools,
motives, etc.
>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>> On 15-Dec-08, at 7:32 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>>>>>>> Mike, Steve:
>>>>>>> Like you, I am thoroughly befuddled by the word
"motive", and
>>>>>> I've decided that applied to children in general
and to child play in
>>>>>> particular it is anachronistic; children do not yet
have "motives" in the
>>>>>> sense that Leontiev is talking about here. Last week
we had thesis
>>>>>> defenses, and I took mild exception to a thesis which
tried to
>>>>>> ascertain
>>>>>> changes in "motives" for learning English in
children by the use of
>>>>>> Likert-style questionnaires. (My mild exception to
these theses is
>>>>>> really
>>>>>> pro-forma, and a matter of tradition in our
department; nobody ever
>>>>>> fails as a
>>>>>> result.)
>>>>>>> I notice that LSV (at the beginnning of Chapter
Seven of Mind in
>>>>>>> Society,
>>>>>> which I don't have with me just now) talks about
the child's "needs"
>>>>>> and "desires". These he defines
>>>>>> as "whatever induces the child to act". If
he were going to proceed
>>>>>> to construct a Leontiev-like tristratal theory of
activity, this
>>>>>> would lead to something circular: a motive is what
drives the child to act,
>>>>>> and action is
>>>>>> defined by its motive.
>>>>>>> Let me first take a look at Leontiev, A.N. (1979,
1981). The problem
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>> activity in psychology. In Wertsch, J.V. (ed.) The
concept of
>>>>>> activity in
>>>>>> Soviet psychology. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
>>>>>>> On p. 48, ANL's got this:
>>>>>>> "The basic characteristic of activity is its
object orientation. The
>>>>>> expression 'nonobjective activity' is devoid
of sense. Activity may
>>>>>> seem to be without object orientation, but scientific
investigation of it
>>>>>> necessarily requires discovery of its object."
>>>>>>> Already I'm in trouble. Scientific
investigation is sometimes
>>>>>> required to discover the object orientation of an
activity (e.g.
>>>>>> sleep, whose
>>>>>> object orientation we still do not really understand
but which will
>>>>>> presumably
>>>>>> be discovered some day).
>>>>>>> But people who do not have the training or the
time or the
>>>>>>> inclination
>>>>>> can and do conceptualize activities such as sleep or
language play or
>>>>>> daydreaming. They conceptualize these activities as
being without any
>>>>>> tangible
>>>>>> object. Why would an expression that refers to this
>>>>>> non-scientific
>>>>>> conception be devoid of sense? Are non-scientific
expressions devoid
>>>>>> of sense?
>>>>>>> OK, then ANL argues that the object of an activity
emerges "in two
>>>>>> ways: first and foremost in its dependent existence as
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> transforming the subject's activity, and secondly
as the mental image
>>>>>> of the
>>>>>> object, as the product of the subject's detecting
its properties.
>>>>>> This
>>>>>> detection can take place only through the
subject's activity."
>>>>>>> Presumably he's talking about the way in which
>>>>>> investigation determines the object orientation of an
activity, and
>>>>>> not the
>>>>>> everyday non-scientific detection of the object (which
I think of as
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> ethnomethodological motive, the one that participants
are conscious
>>>>>> of). But
>>>>>> empirically both methods are the same: they take
place through
>>>>>> examining the
>>>>>> activity of the subject with the detectionof an
object in mind.
>>>>>>> On p. 49 he's got this: "All activity has
a looplike structure:
>>>>>> afferentationàeffector processes, which make contact
with the object
>>>>>> environmentàcorrection and enrichment, with the help
of feedback to the
>>>>>> initial afferent image."
>>>>>>> This suggests to me that PERCEPTION is in some
sense the archetypical
>>>>>> activity. That would explain the OBJECT orientation!
But it is going
>>>>>> to mean
>>>>>> big problems when Leontiev tries to explain play,
because as LSV
>>>>>> remarks, play
>>>>>> is precisely the moment when children tear their
>>>>>> orientation away
>>>>>> from the perception of tangible objects. (Yes, Lewin
and Lewin's
>>>>>> "field of action" is a big part of this, and
 with respect to the
>>>>>> child and the stone LSV is clearly closer to Lewin
than to ANL!).
>>>>>>> Maybe there's a way out, though. ANL then
argues that the crucial
>>>>>> problem here is not the loop itself but rather that
mental images are
>>>>>> not
>>>>>> produced directly but rather through practical
activity in the world:
>>>>>>> "This means that the 'afferent agent'
that directs activity
>>>>>> is primarily the object itself and only secondarily
its image as a
>>>>>> subjective
>>>>>> product of activity that fixes, stabilizes and
assimilates its object
>>>>>> content.
>>>>>> In other words, a twofold transition takes place: the
transition from
>>>>>> object to
>>>>>> the process of activity and the transition from
activity to
>>>>>> subjective product
>>>>>> of activity. But the transition of the process into a
product takes
>>>>>> place not
>>>>>> just form the subject's point of view; it occurs
more clearly from
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> point of view of the object that is transformed by
human activity."
>>>>>>> Hmmm. When a child picks up a stick and decides to
play horsie the
>>>>>> transformation occurs more clearly from the point of
view of the
>>>>>> stick (or from
>>>>>> the point of view of the horse-play) than from the
point of view of
>>>>>> the child.
>>>>>> This does look a little sticky.
>>>>>>> On p. 50, ANL explicitly goes against LSV's
portrayal of
>>>>>> "needs" and "desires" as
"anything that motivates the
>>>>>> child to act". He differentiates between desire
as a precondition of
>>>>>> activity and "desire as a factor that guides and
regulates the
>>>>>> agent's
>>>>>> concrete activity in the object environment".
Only the latter is the
>>>>>> object of psychology.
>>>>>>> OK, now let me turn to the only text I can find
where ANL really goes
>>>>>> into play, which is a later chapter of his book
"Problems of the
>>>>>> Development of Mind".
>>>>>>> On p. 366 he begins with the rather startling
statement that play has
>>>>>>> no
>>>>>> object (and thus by his previous account does not
constitute an
>>>>>> activity). He
>>>>>> says:
>>>>>>> "Satisfaction of its vital needs is actually
still distinct from the
>>>>>> results of its activity: a child's activity does
not determine and
>>>>>> essentially cannot determine satisfaction of its need
for food warmth etc.
>>>>>> Characteristic of it, therefore is a wide range of
activity that
>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>> needs which are unrelated to its objective
>>>>>>> Curiously, he then uses "object"
activity to differentiate human
>>>>>> from animal play!
>>>>>>> "Where does the specific difference between
animals' play activity
>>>>>> and play, the rudimentary forms of which we first
observe in
>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>> children, consist in? It lies in the fact that it is
not instinctive
>>>>>> activity
>>>>>> but it is precisely human, object activity which by
constituting the
>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>> the child's awareness of the world of human
objects, determines the
>>>>>> content
>>>>>> of its play."
>>>>>>> Now this is starting to look suspiciously like the
thesis I mildly
>>>>>> objected to last week, where the adult's attitudes
are simply
>>>>>> projected
>>>>>> onto the child and then "detected" using
Likert scales. On pp.
>>>>>> 367-368, ANL develops his thesis that play is a
substitute for the
>>>>>> handling of
>>>>>> adult objects. So for example on p. 368 ANL speaks of
"let me" and
>>>>>> "don't", the struggle between the adult
who wants to protect the
>>>>>> child from himself and the child who wants to drive a
car and row a
>>>>>> boat. This
>>>>>> leads, on p. 369, to the idea of a leading activity
which is indeed
>>>>>> equivalent
>>>>>> to a neoformation without the crisis. He then returns
>>>>>> to his
>>>>>> nagging suspicion that that play is an activity
without an object,
>>>>>> and
>>>>>> therefore not an activity at all.
>>>>>>> On p. 370, he's got this: "As we have
already said, play is
>>>>>> characerized by its motive's lying in the process
itself rather than
>>>>>> in the
>>>>>> result of the action. For a child playing with wooden
bricks, for
>>>>>> example, the
>>>>>> motive for the play does not lie in building a
structure, but in the
>>>>>> doing,
>>>>>> i.e. in the content of the action. That is true not
only of the
>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>> child's play but also of any real game in
general. 'Not to win but to
>>>>>> play' is the general formula of the motivation of
play. In adult's
>>>>>> games, therefore in which winning rather than playing
becomes the
>>>>>> inner motive,
>>>>>> the game as such ceased to be play."
>>>>>>> Contrast that with LSV's observation in
Chapter Seven that children
>>>>>> do NOT like running around without any rules or goal,
and in games
>>>>>> the meaning
>>>>>> of the game is entirely to win. Of course, we might be
 talking about
>>>>>> different
>>>>>> children: Leontiev might be talking about pre-
schoolers, and LSV is
>>>>>> certainly
>>>>>> talking about school-age kids. But the gap is
remarkable; something
>>>>>> rather
>>>>>> important is getting lept over.
>>>>>>> OK—so then ANL says that in play there is a
mismatch between
>>>>>>> operation
>>>>>> and action, in that the operation is performed with
the meaning of
>>>>>> the stick
>>>>>> and the action is performed with its sense. He says
that this split
>>>>>> is not
>>>>>> given in advance but only arises in play action and
that children do
>>>>>> not
>>>>>> imagine play without actually playing. If this were
true, of course,
>>>>>> it would
>>>>>> be very hard to see how children are able to plan
play, read about
>>>>>> it, or
>>>>>> reflect upon it, much less day-dream or indulge in
language play.
>>>>>>> No, this isn't going to work. And it gets
worse. Look at this, from
>>>>>> p. 381:
>>>>>>> "Games 'with rules' i.e. like hide
and seek, table games,
>>>>>> etc. differ sharply from such 'role' games as
playing doctor, polar
>>>>>> explorer, etc. They do not seem to be related to one
another by any
>>>>>> genetic succession and seem to constitute different
lines in the devleopment
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> children's play, but in fact the one form develops
from other (sic)
>>>>>> by virtue
>>>>>> of a need inherent in the child's play activity
itself (?), whereby
>>>>>> games
>>>>>> 'with rules' arise at a later stage."
>>>>>>> So ANL explicitly denies that whole discussion (in
>>>>>> Leningrad lecture) about the intrinsic link between
games with roles
>>>>>> and games
>>>>>> with rules. (There's a pretty good account of this
lecture, which I
>>>>>> have
>>>>>> always seen as the starting point for his elaboration
of the zone of
>>>>>> proximal
>>>>>> development, in Chapter Seven, but it's well
worth reading the
>>>>>> original
>>>>>> lecture, which is at
>>>>>>> ANL then has to explain why there appears to be a
>>>>>>> sequence
>>>>>> linking role based play and rule-based games. For LSV
this is no
>>>>>> problem: they
>>>>>> ARE genetically linked and in fact the child creates
rule based games
>>>>>> iteratively, by varying the roles in systematic ways.
But for ANL,
>>>>>> who denies
>>>>>> the genetic link, this is rather harder to explain:
>>>>>>> "Why do games with rules only arise at a
certain stage of
>>>>>>> development,
>>>>>> and not simultaneously with the genesis of the first
role games? It
>>>>>> depends on
>>>>>> the difference in their motivation. Initially the
first play actions
>>>>>> arise on
>>>>>> the basis of the child's growing need to master
the world of human
>>>>>> objects.
>>>>>> The motive contained in this action itself is fixed
in a thing,
>>>>>> directly in its
>>>>>> object content. The action here is the path for the
child that leads
>>>>>> it first
>>>>>> of all to the discovery of objective reality; the
human still emerges
>>>>>> for the
>>>>>> child in its objectified form. The role of the
horseman, the play
>>>>>> action of
>>>>>> riding, is playing at horses, the action with a block
of wood that
>>>>>> the child
>>>>>> 'drives' from one chair to another is playing
>>>>>>> And MORE:
>>>>>>> "But during the development of these games
the human relation
>>>>>> included in their object content itself comes out ever
more clearly
>>>>>> in them.
>>>>>> The tram driver not only 'acts with a tram'
but is obliged at the
>>>>>> same
>>>>>> time to enter into certain relations with other
people— with the
>>>>>> conductor,
>>>>>> the passengers, and so on. Therefore, at relatively
early stages of
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> development of play activity, a child finds not only
man's relation
>>>>>> to it
>>>>>> in the object but also people's relations with
one another. Group
>>>>>> games
>>>>>> become possible not only alongside one another but
also together.
>>>>>> Social
>>>>>> relations already come out in these games in overt
form, in the form
>>>>>> of the
>>>>>> players' relations with one another. At the same
time the play 'role'
>>>>>> is also altered. Its content now determines not only
the child's
>>>>>> actions in regard to the object but also its actions
in regard to the other
>>>>>> players in the
>>>>>> game. The latter also become content of the play
activity, for which
>>>>>> its motive
>>>>>> is
>>>>>>> fixed. Games are distinguished in which actions in
regard to other
>>>>>> people become the main thing."
>>>>>>> OK--so the reason why there is no genetic link is
that the child goes
>>>>>> from focussing on material objects in role play to
focussing on human
>>>>>> relations
>>>>>> in rule play? No, that's not right either,
>>>>>>> p. 372: "We already know how play arises in
the preschool child. It
>>>>>> arises from its need to act in relation not only to
the object world
>>>>>> directly
>>>>>> accessible to itself but also to the wider world of
>>>>>>> Mike--it looks like we're not the only ones
befuddled by
>>>>>> Leontiev's "motive" applied to
children; he appears to have
>>>>>> thoroughly befuddled himself. Leontiev's
"motive" applied to
>>>>>> children is a little like the clocks that keep going
off in
>>>>>> Shakespeare's
>>>>>> Julius Caesar, a thousand years before they were
>>>>>>> This is yet another reason for prefering
Andy's term
>>>>>> "project" in describing play: unlike
"activity" or
>>>>>> "motive", it's a real Gestalt, in that
a "project" can
>>>>>> be, for the child, action/meaning, and for the adult,
>>>>>> whence
>>>>>> the possiblity of transforming, outside in, the one
into the other!
>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>> Seoul Natoinal University of Education
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>> Andy Blunden<>+61 3 9380 9435
Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> --
>>>>> Andy Blunden<>+61 3 9380 9435
Skype andy.blunden
>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>> --
>>> Andy Blunden
<>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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<>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
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