Re: [xmca] motive/project

From: Haydi Zulfei <haydizulfei who-is-at>
Date: Thu Dec 18 2008 - 04:29:08 PST

Dear Andy,
This just comes to my mind . Go with your critique upon it . I will be more clarified . You want to find the unit of analysis of *activity* , the *germ cell* , The non-analysable entity . Leontiev stresses it's a *molar* , non-additive entity . He stresses at an early stage , we cannot separate the *subject* or *object* from it . Just at the level of abstraction , could we talk about the latter . It's why he marks it as *the unit of life* . You and some other good fellows take it as a combination ; hence stressing on an *interdisciplinary* investigation of it . Is it not the case with the *word meaning* of Vygotsky ? At the level of abstraction and analysis , is it not possible to go seek components or moments thereof for a *word meaning* ? It's the same with all social concepts , even with physical entities , atom once as the smallest unit now containing in it many many particles . I have limits as arrangements made with respect to levels and units of
 analysis . Leontiev , for the better or worse , marks *subject* and *object* (moments) of activity . By moments , a term the meaning of which Michael Roth once admitted has discovered on one specific day in his enduring non-hindered investigations and studies (pardon if this is a non-permissible quote) , is the same as *molar* , non-additive . For him , it's non-additive !! we take it as something having taken for
granted as combinatory . The book is , I think , very very hard to understand . My claim is not I have understood it . I try and try . May you , whose great contributions to science/education is known/admitted to every one , do more favor to present the second great book of him along other ones ? The Problem of ...   I really need to get the meanings first . David Kellog has one copy of it . Just a trip to Korea and force him to surrender :) ..
--- On Wed, 12/17/08, Andy Blunden <> wrote:

From: Andy Blunden <>
Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <>
Date: Wednesday, December 17, 2008, 11:32 PM

Ineresting connection with Marx's conception of use-value,
Geoff, a concept which is ultra-objective in this context.
But ...

I should emphasise that I do not question at all that
motives arise out of activity, activity taken to be
something which is culturally and historically constructed.
And, that a psychology of activity requires a concept of
motive and need and its source. So, as a psychology ANL's
construction works OK.

But the issue raised in Anna and Peter's paper, and the
issue which is of concern to me is: what is a suitable unit
of analysis for this activity, a genuinely interdisciplinary
concept of activity? I don't believe that ANL provides that.
In my opinion, ANL just gives broad gestures to the social
and cultural origins of man's activity. We need a unit of
analysis that works in sociology as well as psychology.


Geoff wrote:
> Does the word "use" help resolve this problem? It evokes
> activity, tools, signs and meaning. It can also be used to define the
> boundaries of an activity system - those that use it and those that
> don't. (I'm thinking here of Bourdieu's Fields). It also
helps to
> understand dysfunction by noting that schema that were once useful,
> perhaps as a child, are no longer useful as an adult. Referring again
> to Bourdieu, habitus can be thought of as an internalised collection
> of activities that predispose us to particular use/acts. In this
> model, agency is a means of extending habitus through use.
> Geoff
> 2008/12/18 Mike Cole <>:
>> andy-- "need" is a term that I find no more or less elusive
than "motive." I
>> feel this need for clarity but having had lunch I don't
"want" more to eat,
>> but perhaps some sleep, perhaps to dream?
>> We cannot, can we, define needs in purely biological terms for humans.
>> Perhaps someone has already clarified this issue in the discussion,
but I
>> missed it. In which case, just point.
>> No need to reply right away. :-))
>> mike
>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2008 at 6:23 PM, Andy Blunden
<> wrote:
>>> The supposition that for ANL needs define activities is
provisional. He
>>> hints at this sometimes. At other times, he says that he does not
have a
>>> "unit of analysis" for activity. Either way, if we are
to continue in the
>>> scientific tradition of Goethe, Hegel, Marx and Vygotsky, we need
a "unit of
>>> analysis," i.e., a concept of, "activity."
>>> Andy
>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>> No, I don't think you have the idea quite right. The idea
is not that
>>>> needs "define" activities. The idea is that unlike
other animals, who are
>>>> biologically driven throughout their activities, when humans
respond to
>>>> their needs, they engage in activities that transform nature,
their social
>>>> relations, social structures, cultures, and themselves
>>>> creating new needs in the process. Human biological needs
become at once
>>>> transformed into social needs, meditated by culture, history,
tools, signs,
>>>> ideology, language, architecture, public works systems.
Leontiev took his
>>>> discoveries about the basic structure of activity in animals -
the ways they
>>>> engage their bodies and psyches with nature to fulfill their
needs - and
>>>> came up with his activity/motive, action/goal,
>>>> framework. He then tried to find ways to use this activity
concept to
>>>> elaborate on and extend the ideas of first generation CHAT,
and that is kind
>>>> of where we are at today.
>>>> This unit of analysis problem has been on my mind, too. There
may be
>>>> methodological problems with the concept 'unit of
analysis' in some of the
>>>> ways we have been conceptualizing it so far. Perhaps the
'molecule' and/or
>>>> 'cell' of social science does not look the molecule
and cell of natural
>>>> science.
>>>> - Steve
>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 4:52 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>> The only trouble I have with the claim that "human needs
directly and
>>>>> indirectly drive human activity" is that it is a
truism. My problem, as you
>>>>> mention, is what is the "unit of analysis" of
activity, or what is *an*
>>>>> activity, as opposed to "activity." The idea
that "an activity" is defined
>>>>> by "a need" (if this is indeed what is
suggested) is that problems of
>>>>> sociology begin from an inventory of human needs: what is
x for? x is for
>>>>> this. what is y for? y is for that.
>>>>> Andy
>>>>> Steve Gabosch wrote:
>>>>>> Andy, I am been puzzled by your problem with the idea
that human needs
>>>>>> directly, and indirectly, drive human activity.
>>>>>> You've been bringing up this issue in recent weeks
and I thought that
>>>>>> maybe the problem was over an individual versus
collective problem, or
>>>>>> perhaps over the problem of how to differentiate an
activity from an
>>>>>> activity system, and then from a social system, or
just how to separate "an"
>>>>>> activity out of many.
>>>>>> But your message here seems to say you have a problem
with the idea of
>>>>>> **need**. You seem to be objecting to the idea that
human activities are
>>>>>> essentially motivated by needs. Are you?
>>>>>> I would use the term "need" in statements
like: the need for survival
>>>>>> drove pre-humans to develop social production,
creating a new way to meet
>>>>>> human needs, which in turn laid the basis for creating
many new kinds of
>>>>>> needs as society developed ... different social
classes have different
>>>>>> needs, and that is the basis of social conflict,
including wars ... human
>>>>>> need lies at the bottom of the human struggle for
existence, control of
>>>>>> nature, and society itself ...
>>>>>> I know you know that statements like these are Marxist
sociology 101, so
>>>>>> I don't mean to lecture on the obvious ... but if
"need" is not at the
>>>>>> bottom of human motivation and activity, then what is?
 Is this a
>>>>>> terminological issue, or something more basic?
>>>>>> - Steve
>>>>>> On Dec 16, 2008, at 3:53 PM, Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>>>>> Thank you for that collection of excerpts Haydi.
As I read them, they
>>>>>>> confirm what I said, that for ANL, a "system
of activity" is defined by
>>>>>>> directly or indirectly meeting a human need. ANL
does say that production
>>>>>>> produces not only objects, but also produces new
needs, but this does not
>>>>>>> resolve the matter in my view. Unless you accept
that society is either
>>>>>>> planned and adaministered by the central committee
to meet human needs, or
>>>>>>> naturally evolved to both meet and produce human
needs then this cannot be
>>>>>>> believed.
>>>>>>> The latter interpretation sounds plausible enough,
in fact it's a
>>>>>>> truism, but I don't see that it helps. For
example, take war. If we set out
>>>>>>> from the idea that war is an activity meeting a
human need, where does that
>>>>>>> leave us? how does it help us with psychology?
Take anything - the Church,
>>>>>>> MacDonald's, News Limited, domestic violence,
.... all we are going to end up
>>>>>>> with is a crass funcitonalism.
>>>>>>> I don't deny at all that a psychology can be
built on this foundation,
>>>>>>> but it cannot, in my view, be taken seriously as a
>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote:
>>>>>>>> Dear all,
>>>>>>>> We are being asked "What is *an*
activity/*a* motive?"
>>>>>>>> I thought some of us at least need more
reading than interpretation .
>>>>>>>> I had to once more go from beginning to end of
*A,C,P* and collect
>>>>>>>> whatever might more or less be related to
these questions .
>>>>>>>> Half the job being done now .
>>>>>>>> Delete if you don't want to share . No way
but to put it in an
>>>>>>>> attachment . Hope David kellog will have time
to have a glance at it without
>>>>>>>> adding to my previously-loaded task.
>>>>>>>> Best
>>>>>>>> Haydi
>>>>>>>> --- On Mon, 12/15/08, Andy Blunden
<> wrote:
>>>>>>>> From: Andy Blunden <>
>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture,
Activity" <>
>>>>>>>> Date: Monday, December 15, 2008, 10:25 PM
>>>>>>>> I think, Monica, you hit the nail on the head
here, from the
>>>>>>>> psychological point
>>>>>>>> of view. On the sociological side, the
problem, as I see it, with
>>>>>>>> Michael's
>>>>>>>> explanation is that not only does the pupil
not know the motive of
>>>>>>>> schooling,
>>>>>>>> but nor does the teacher or the sociologist!
>>>>>>>> In a world where people know about agency and
structure and such
>>>>>>>> terms, does it
>>>>>>>> make any sense to ascribe a 'motive'
to an institution, outside of a
>>>>>>>> managed society like the USSR in which
Leontyev lived?
>>>>>>>> But on the other side, Michael, I think you
are right as against
>>>>>>>> David, because
>>>>>>>> "sleeping" is not Tätigkeit in the
sense in which Leonytev means it.
>>>>>>>> He explicitly means "purpose
actvity", or "doing" or
>>>>>>>> "practice," as I read it. Not just
physiological movement. The
>>>>>>>> activity of an individual is *participation*
is *a* (social) activity.
>>>>>>>> But what
>>>>>>>> is *an* activity, and how can it have a
"motive," as Monica asks,
>>>>>>>> separately from the motives of individuals.
>>>>>>>> Andy
>>>>>>>> Monica Hansen wrote:
>>>>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>>>> Using the term 'motive' for the
objective, goal, or aim of
>>>>>>>> schooling as
>>>>>>>>> cultural reproduction (or transmission) is
misplaced here. Motivation
>>>>>>>>> has
>>>>>>>>> something to do with individual agency,
doesn't it? It cannot be
>>>>>>>> forced from
>>>>>>>>> the outside with 100% effectiveness. When
trying to get an idea of
>>>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>>>> motivates the individual to engage in or
become a participant in an
>>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>>>> that will change the level of his or her
conceptual thinking we have
>>>>>>>>> to
>>>>>>>>> understand the individual's
>>>>>>>>> Mandating the goal of learning from the
outside as in defining the
>>>>>>>> objective
>>>>>>>>> of schooling and trying to force
participation gives us mixed
>>>>>>>>> results,
>>>>>>>> does
>>>>>>>>> it not? Can you really force conceptual
development? Isn't that the
>>>>>>>> problem?
>>>>>>>>> We can only use external motivations so
far in pushing intellectual
>>>>>>>>> development?
>>>>>>>>> Monica
>>>>>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>>>>>> From: [mailto:
>>>>>>>>>] On
>>>>>>>>> Behalf Of Wolff-Michael Roth
>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 15, 2008 8:08 AM
>>>>>>>>> To:; eXtended
Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>>>>>> Cc:
>>>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] motive/project
>>>>>>>>> HI David and others,
>>>>>>>>> I have repeatedly emphasized in my
writings that the problem lies in
>>>>>>>>> part
>>>>>>>> in the English term 'activity', which
collapses the German Tätigkeit
>>>>>>>> and Aktivität into one, unfortunately,
because it also gives rise to
>>>>>>>> problems
>>>>>>>> with motives. I think if you think about what
children do as 'tasks'
>>>>>>>> and that these tasks are completed as part of
the activity
>>>>>>>> 'schooling',
>>>>>>>> which has as motive the reproduction
(transmission...) of collective
>>>>>>>> knowledge
>>>>>>>> then you are getting closer.
>>>>>>>>> But children often don't even know the
goals, in fact, because of the
>>>>>>>> 'learning paradox', cannot know the
goals of the task. This is no
>>>>>>>> more
>>>>>>>> clear than in the frequent student question,
'teacher, am I write so
>>>>>>>> far?' Students CANNOT intend the very
thing that they are asked to,
>>>>>>>> namely
>>>>>>>> learn a concept. To be able to orient
themselves intentionally to the
>>>>>>>> concept,
>>>>>>>> they need to know it, but if they already
know it, they don't have to
>>>>>>>> orient toward learning it.
>>>>>>>>> Holzkamp has a lot to say about this, and
he describes those things
>>>>>>>>> in
>>>>>>>> "Lernen: Subkjektwissenschaftliche
Grundlegung" (Frankfurt: Campus).
>>>>>>>>> If anyone has implemented
Leont'ev's program, it certainly is
>>>>>>>> Holzkamp.
>>>>>>>>> By the way, further to motive, the German
edition of Activity,
>>>>>>>> Consciousness, Personality has an additional
chapter where Leont'ev
>>>>>>>> explicitly addresses questions of learning in
schools, motives, etc.
>>>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>>> Michael
>>>>>>>>> On 15-Dec-08, at 7:32 AM, David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>> Mike, Steve:
>>>>>>>>> Like you, I am thoroughly befuddled by the
word "motive", and
>>>>>>>> I've decided that applied to children in
general and to child play in
>>>>>>>> particular it is anachronistic; children do
not yet have "motives" in the
>>>>>>>> sense that Leontiev is talking about here.
Last week we had thesis
>>>>>>>> defenses, and I took mild exception to a
thesis which tried to
>>>>>>>> ascertain
>>>>>>>> changes in "motives" for learning
English in children by the use of
>>>>>>>> Likert-style questionnaires. (My mild
exception to these theses is
>>>>>>>> really
>>>>>>>> pro-forma, and a matter of tradition in our
department; nobody ever
>>>>>>>> fails as a
>>>>>>>> result.)
>>>>>>>>> I notice that LSV (at the beginnning of
Chapter Seven of Mind in
>>>>>>>>> Society,
>>>>>>>> which I don't have with me just now) talks
about the child's "needs"
>>>>>>>> and "desires". These he defines
>>>>>>>> as "whatever induces the child to
act". If he were going to proceed
>>>>>>>> to construct a Leontiev-like tristratal
theory of activity, this
>>>>>>>> would lead to something circular: a motive is
what drives the child to act,
>>>>>>>> and action is
>>>>>>>> defined by its motive.
>>>>>>>>> Let me first take a look at Leontiev, A.N.
(1979, 1981). The problem
>>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> activity in psychology. In Wertsch, J.V. (ed.)
The concept of
>>>>>>>> activity in
>>>>>>>> Soviet psychology. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
>>>>>>>>> On p. 48, ANL's got this:
>>>>>>>>> "The basic characteristic of activity
is its object orientation. The
>>>>>>>> expression 'nonobjective activity' is
devoid of sense. Activity may
>>>>>>>> seem to be without object orientation, but
scientific investigation of it
>>>>>>>> necessarily requires discovery of its
>>>>>>>>> Already I'm in trouble. Scientific
investigation is sometimes
>>>>>>>> required to discover the object orientation of
an activity (e.g.
>>>>>>>> sleep, whose
>>>>>>>> object orientation we still do not really
understand but which will
>>>>>>>> presumably
>>>>>>>> be discovered some day).
>>>>>>>>> But people who do not have the training or
the time or the
>>>>>>>>> inclination
>>>>>>>> can and do conceptualize activities such as
sleep or language play or
>>>>>>>> daydreaming. They conceptualize these
activities as being without any
>>>>>>>> tangible
>>>>>>>> object. Why would an expression that refers
to this everyday
>>>>>>>> non-scientific
>>>>>>>> conception be devoid of sense? Are
non-scientific expressions devoid
>>>>>>>> of sense?
>>>>>>>>> OK, then ANL argues that the object of an
activity emerges "in two
>>>>>>>> ways: first and foremost in its dependent
existence as subordinating
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> transforming the subject's activity, and
secondly as the mental image
>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>> object, as the product of the subject's
detecting its properties.
>>>>>>>> This
>>>>>>>> detection can take place only through the
subject's activity."
>>>>>>>>> Presumably he's talking about the way
in which scientific
>>>>>>>> investigation determines the object
orientation of an activity, and
>>>>>>>> not the
>>>>>>>> everyday non-scientific detection of the
object (which I think of as
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> ethnomethodological motive, the one that
participants are conscious
>>>>>>>> of). But
>>>>>>>> empirically both methods are the same: they
take place through
>>>>>>>> examining the
>>>>>>>> activity of the subject with the detectionof
an object in mind.
>>>>>>>>> On p. 49 he's got this: "All
activity has a looplike structure:
>>>>>>>> afferentationàeffector processes, which make
contact with the object
>>>>>>>> environmentàcorrection and enrichment, with
the help of feedback to the
>>>>>>>> initial afferent image."
>>>>>>>>> This suggests to me that PERCEPTION is in
some sense the archetypical
>>>>>>>> activity. That would explain the OBJECT
orientation! But it is going
>>>>>>>> to mean
>>>>>>>> big problems when Leontiev tries to explain
play, because as LSV
>>>>>>>> remarks, play
>>>>>>>> is precisely the moment when children tear
their meaningful
>>>>>>>> orientation away
>>>>>>>> from the perception of tangible objects.
(Yes, Lewin and Lewin's
>>>>>>>> "field of action" is a big part of
this, and with respect to the
>>>>>>>> child and the stone LSV is clearly closer to
Lewin than to ANL!).
>>>>>>>>> Maybe there's a way out, though. ANL
then argues that the crucial
>>>>>>>> problem here is not the loop itself but rather
that mental images are
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> produced directly but rather through practical
activity in the world:
>>>>>>>>> "This means that the 'afferent
agent' that directs activity
>>>>>>>> is primarily the object itself and only
secondarily its image as a
>>>>>>>> subjective
>>>>>>>> product of activity that fixes, stabilizes and
assimilates its object
>>>>>>>> content.
>>>>>>>> In other words, a twofold transition takes
place: the transition from
>>>>>>>> object to
>>>>>>>> the process of activity and the transition
from activity to
>>>>>>>> subjective product
>>>>>>>> of activity. But the transition of the
process into a product takes
>>>>>>>> place not
>>>>>>>> just form the subject's point of view; it
occurs more clearly from
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> point of view of the object that is
transformed by human activity."
>>>>>>>>> Hmmm. When a child picks up a stick and
decides to play horsie the
>>>>>>>> transformation occurs more clearly from the
point of view of the
>>>>>>>> stick (or from
>>>>>>>> the point of view of the horse-play) than from
the point of view of
>>>>>>>> the child.
>>>>>>>> This does look a little sticky.
>>>>>>>>> On p. 50, ANL explicitly goes against
LSV's portrayal of
>>>>>>>> "needs" and "desires" as
"anything that motivates the
>>>>>>>> child to act". He differentiates between
desire as a precondition of
>>>>>>>> activity and "desire as a factor that
guides and regulates the
>>>>>>>> agent's
>>>>>>>> concrete activity in the object
environment". Only the latter is the
>>>>>>>> object of psychology.
>>>>>>>>> OK, now let me turn to the only text I can
find where ANL really goes
>>>>>>>> into play, which is a later chapter of his
book "Problems of the
>>>>>>>> Development of Mind".
>>>>>>>>> On p. 366 he begins with the rather
startling statement that play has
>>>>>>>>> no
>>>>>>>> object (and thus by his previous account does
not constitute an
>>>>>>>> activity). He
>>>>>>>> says:
>>>>>>>>> "Satisfaction of its vital needs is
actually still distinct from the
>>>>>>>> results of its activity: a child's
activity does not determine and
>>>>>>>> essentially cannot determine satisfaction of
its need for food warmth etc.
>>>>>>>> Characteristic of it, therefore is a wide
range of activity that
>>>>>>>> satisfies
>>>>>>>> needs which are unrelated to its objective
>>>>>>>>> Curiously, he then uses "object"
activity to differentiate human
>>>>>>>> from animal play!
>>>>>>>>> "Where does the specific difference
between animals' play activity
>>>>>>>> and play, the rudimentary forms of which we
first observe in
>>>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>>>> children, consist in? It lies in the fact that
it is not instinctive
>>>>>>>> activity
>>>>>>>> but it is precisely human, object activity
which by constituting the
>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>> the child's awareness of the world of
human objects, determines the
>>>>>>>> content
>>>>>>>> of its play."
>>>>>>>>> Now this is starting to look suspiciously
like the thesis I mildly
>>>>>>>> objected to last week, where the adult's
attitudes are simply
>>>>>>>> projected
>>>>>>>> onto the child and then "detected"
using Likert scales. On pp.
>>>>>>>> 367-368, ANL develops his thesis that play is
a substitute for the
>>>>>>>> handling of
>>>>>>>> adult objects. So for example on p. 368 ANL
speaks of "let me" and
>>>>>>>> "don't", the struggle between
the adult who wants to protect the
>>>>>>>> child from himself and the child who wants to
drive a car and row a
>>>>>>>> boat. This
>>>>>>>> leads, on p. 369, to the idea of a leading
activity which is indeed
>>>>>>>> equivalent
>>>>>>>> to a neoformation without the crisis. He then
returns uncomfortably
>>>>>>>> to his
>>>>>>>> nagging suspicion that that play is an
activity without an object,
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> therefore not an activity at all.
>>>>>>>>> On p. 370, he's got this: "As we
have already said, play is
>>>>>>>> characerized by its motive's lying in the
process itself rather than
>>>>>>>> in the
>>>>>>>> result of the action. For a child playing with
wooden bricks, for
>>>>>>>> example, the
>>>>>>>> motive for the play does not lie in building a
 structure, but in the
>>>>>>>> doing,
>>>>>>>> i.e. in the content of the action. That is
true not only of the
>>>>>>>> preschool
>>>>>>>> child's play but also of any real game in
general. 'Not to win but to
>>>>>>>> play' is the general formula of the
motivation of play. In adult's
>>>>>>>> games, therefore in which winning rather than
playing becomes the
>>>>>>>> inner motive,
>>>>>>>> the game as such ceased to be play."
>>>>>>>>> Contrast that with LSV's observation
in Chapter Seven that children
>>>>>>>> do NOT like running around without any rules
or goal, and in games
>>>>>>>> the meaning
>>>>>>>> of the game is entirely to win. Of course, we
might be talking about
>>>>>>>> different
>>>>>>>> children: Leontiev might be talking about pre-
schoolers, and LSV is
>>>>>>>> certainly
>>>>>>>> talking about school-age kids. But the gap is
remarkable; something
>>>>>>>> rather
>>>>>>>> important is getting lept over.
>>>>>>>>> OK—so then ANL says that in play there
is a mismatch between
>>>>>>>>> operation
>>>>>>>> and action, in that the operation is performed
with the meaning of
>>>>>>>> the stick
>>>>>>>> and the action is performed with its sense. He
 says that this split
>>>>>>>> is not
>>>>>>>> given in advance but only arises in play
action and that children do
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> imagine play without actually playing. If
this were true, of course,
>>>>>>>> it would
>>>>>>>> be very hard to see how children are able to
plan play, read about
>>>>>>>> it, or
>>>>>>>> reflect upon it, much less day-dream or
indulge in language play.
>>>>>>>>> No, this isn't going to work. And it
gets worse. Look at this, from
>>>>>>>> p. 381:
>>>>>>>>> "Games 'with rules' i.e. like
hide and seek, table games,
>>>>>>>> etc. differ sharply from such 'role'
games as playing doctor, polar
>>>>>>>> explorer, etc. They do not seem to be related
to one another by any
>>>>>>>> genetic succession and seem to constitute
different lines in the devleopment
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> children's play, but in fact the one form
develops from other (sic)
>>>>>>>> by virtue
>>>>>>>> of a need inherent in the child's play
activity itself (?), whereby
>>>>>>>> games
>>>>>>>> 'with rules' arise at a later
>>>>>>>>> So ANL explicitly denies that whole
discussion (in Vygotsky's
>>>>>>>> Leningrad lecture) about the intrinsic link
between games with roles
>>>>>>>> and games
>>>>>>>> with rules. (There's a pretty good account
of this lecture, which I
>>>>>>>> have
>>>>>>>> always seen as the starting point for his
elaboration of the zone of
>>>>>>>> proximal
>>>>>>>> development, in Chapter Seven, but it's
well worth reading the
>>>>>>>> original
>>>>>>>> lecture, which is at
>>>>>>>>> ANL then has to explain why there appears
to be a developmental
>>>>>>>>> sequence
>>>>>>>> linking role based play and rule-based games.
For LSV this is no
>>>>>>>> problem: they
>>>>>>>> ARE genetically linked and in fact the child
creates rule based games
>>>>>>>> iteratively, by varying the roles in
systematic ways. But for ANL,
>>>>>>>> who denies
>>>>>>>> the genetic link, this is rather harder to
>>>>>>>>> "Why do games with rules only arise
at a certain stage of
>>>>>>>>> development,
>>>>>>>> and not simultaneously with the genesis of the
first role games? It
>>>>>>>> depends on
>>>>>>>> the difference in their motivation. Initially
the first play actions
>>>>>>>> arise on
>>>>>>>> the basis of the child's growing need to
master the world of human
>>>>>>>> objects.
>>>>>>>> The motive contained in this action itself is
fixed in a thing,
>>>>>>>> directly in its
>>>>>>>> object content. The action here is the path
for the child that leads
>>>>>>>> it first
>>>>>>>> of all to the discovery of objective reality;
the human still emerges
>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>> child in its objectified form. The role of the
 horseman, the play
>>>>>>>> action of
>>>>>>>> riding, is playing at horses, the action with
a block of wood that
>>>>>>>> the child
>>>>>>>> 'drives' from one chair to another is
playing cars.
>>>>>>>>> And MORE:
>>>>>>>>> "But during the development of these
games the human relation
>>>>>>>> included in their object content itself comes
out ever more clearly
>>>>>>>> in them.
>>>>>>>> The tram driver not only 'acts with a
tram' but is obliged at the
>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>> time to enter into certain relations with
other people— with the
>>>>>>>> conductor,
>>>>>>>> the passengers, and so on. Therefore, at
relatively early stages of
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> development of play activity, a child finds
not only man's relation
>>>>>>>> to it
>>>>>>>> in the object but also people's relations
with one another. Group
>>>>>>>> games
>>>>>>>> become possible not only alongside one
another but also together.
>>>>>>>> Social
>>>>>>>> relations already come out in these games in
overt form, in the form
>>>>>>>> of the
>>>>>>>> players' relations with one another. At
the same time the play 'role'
>>>>>>>> is also altered. Its content now determines
not only the child's
>>>>>>>> actions in regard to the object but also its
actions in regard to the other
>>>>>>>> players in the
>>>>>>>> game. The latter also become content of the
play activity, for which
>>>>>>>> its motive
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>>> fixed. Games are distinguished in which
actions in regard to other
>>>>>>>> people become the main thing."
>>>>>>>>> OK--so the reason why there is no genetic
link is that the child goes
>>>>>>>> from focussing on material objects in role
play to focussing on human
>>>>>>>> relations
>>>>>>>> in rule play? No, that's not right either,
>>>>>>>>> p. 372: "We already know how play
arises in the preschool child. It
>>>>>>>> arises from its need to act in relation not
only to the object world
>>>>>>>> directly
>>>>>>>> accessible to itself but also to the wider
world of adults."
>>>>>>>>> Mike--it looks like we're not the only
ones befuddled by
>>>>>>>> Leontiev's "motive" applied to
children; he appears to have
>>>>>>>> thoroughly befuddled himself. Leontiev's
"motive" applied to
>>>>>>>> children is a little like the clocks that
keep going off in
>>>>>>>> Shakespeare's
>>>>>>>> Julius Caesar, a thousand years before they
were invented.
>>>>>>>>> This is yet another reason for prefering
Andy's term
>>>>>>>> "project" in describing play:
unlike "activity" or
>>>>>>>> "motive", it's a real Gestalt,
in that a "project" can
>>>>>>>> be, for the child, action/meaning, and for
the adult, meaning/action,
>>>>>>>> whence
>>>>>>>> the possiblity of transforming, outside in,
the one into the other!
>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>>>>>> Seoul Natoinal University of Education
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>>> Andy Blunden<>+61 3 9380 9435
Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>>> --
>>>>>>> Andy Blunden<>+61 3 9380 9435
Skype andy.blunden
>>>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> --
>>>>> Andy Blunden
<>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> xmca mailing list
>>> --
>>> Andy Blunden
<>+61 3 9380 9435 Skype andy.blunden
>>> Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> xmca mailing list
>> _______________________________________________
>> xmca mailing list

Andy Blunden +61 3 9380 9435 
Skype andy.blunden
Hegel's Logic with a Foreword by Andy Blunden:
xmca mailing list
xmca mailing list
Received on Thu Dec 18 04:31:22 2008

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