I wonder what justification is provided for including credit information in the security clearances. Are poor people who continually find themselves behind on paying bills, especially after being hit with major medical expenses and similar unexpected costs to be excluded from such routine activities as crunching numbers? What about all the people who got sucked into variable rate mortgages and have now defaulted? This is really sinister. The protestant ethic transformed into law.
And what's more cynical than a government that has claimed the right to spy on anyone it chooses, without any kind of oversight and in violation of the Bill of Rights, claiming that it cares about protecting personal information?
This seems to be no more nor less than a movement to total(itarian) government control over research. I'll bet lots of climate-related, alternate fuels, and other progressive "hard science" research will feel the brunt of these regulations, not to mention social research into poverty, alternate education, power and any other topic that questions what is going down.
One would think that the AERA could take a much stronger political stand about this than that of simply monitoring the situation and informing its members.
Paul Dillon
Mike Cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
Just one tip of the iceberg.
mike
On 4/6/07, Cathrene Connery wrote:
>
> I wonder if the same scrutiny is required for the government contractors
> currently "supplementing' the troops in Afganistan and Iraq. Doubtful!
>
>
> M. Cathrene Connery, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor of Bilingual & TESL Education
> Co-coordinator, Bilingual / TESL Program
> Central Washington University
>
> >>> David Preiss 4/6/2007 4:33 PM >>>
>
> Oh my god!
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> > From: "AERA Executive Director, Felice J. Levine" > > response@eloop.goldlasso.com>
> > Date: April 6, 2007 4:06:53 PM GMT-04:00
> > To: davidpreiss@uc.cl
> > Subject: The Three C's - Security Clearances, Research Contracts,
> > and AERA Concerns
> > Reply-To: "AERA Executive Director, Felice J. Levine" > > response@eloop.goldlasso.com>
> >
> >
> >
> > April 6, 2007
> >
> > Dear AERA Members:
> >
> > As final bags and boxes are being closed for the 2007 AERA Annual
> > Meeting, I want to update you on an important matter for education
> > researchers working under federal contracts. Over the course of
> > this past year, the U.S. Department of Education has taken new
> > steps to implement security clearance procedures for contractor
> > employees. Several AERA members informed the Association and
> > expressed serious concern that the process is intrusive and
> > unwarranted for non-classified research. Articles on the topic have
>
> > appeared recently in The New York Times
> > ( http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/washington/
> >
> 11privacy.htmlex=1328850000&en=57277d56f1770fb6&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt
> > &emc=rss) and Education Week (http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
> > 2007/02/21/24checks.h26.html).
> >
> > Over many months, AERA has been investigating this situation and
> > pressing for greater understanding. Since September, we have been
> > engaged in discussions with numerous federal officials at the
> > Department of Education and other federal agencies as well as
> > working with other research organizations (in particular with the
> > American Association for the Advancement of Science) and
> > individuals in the scientific community to scrutinize this issue
> > and learn as much as we can. President Eva Baker described some of
> > these activities in the January/February 2007 issue of Educational
> > Researcher (http://er.aera.net/).
> >
> > The actual clearance procedures required of contractual personnel
> > vary by the risk level assigned to a position, but minimally
> > require employees on contracts who are designated low risk to
> > submit fingerprints. Low risk positions include those on a
> > contractor*s research team who conduct statistical analyses, but
> > have no access to personally-identifiable information. Contractor
> > employees in moderate-risk positions must provide a release for
> > credit information and may also be asked to sign a release allowing
>
> > investigators to ask specific questions of an individual*s health
>
> > care provider regarding prior mental health consultations.
> > Researchers who collect or have access to personally-identifiable
> > information or sensitive, but unclassified information are
> > considered moderate risk under current Department of Education
> > Directive OM:5-101, Contractor Employee Personnel Security
> Screenings.
> >
> > Our goal has been to understand the authority underlying the
> > changes, determine whether the situation is unique to the
> > Department of Education, and to effectuate change where needed. Our
>
> > efforts in the fall, for example, led the Department of Education
> > to indicate that the directive would be revised and its
> > implementation examined. Most recently, the Department of Education
>
> > also confirmed that the medical/mental health release was not
> > required for moderate-risk positions (at least as an initial step).
>
> > At our urging, agency officials agreed to add an instruction to
> > this effect so that contracting officers and contractors would be
> > aware of this at the onset.
> >
> > An overarching concern is about the appropriate scope of security
> > clearance procedures. The security measures being implemented by
> > the Department of Education may reach beyond what was originally
> > intended under Presidential Directive HSPD-12, the key authority
> > often cited by federal officials as extending security clearance
> > procedures to contractors. Both the Directive and the Office of
> > Management and Budget guidance for implementing the Directive focus
>
> > on contractors who access federal facilities and critical
> > information systems, not researchers who are engaged in primary
> > data collection or use of these data in the field. We are seeking
> > an interpretation from senior federal officials regarding the
> > intended reach of the Presidential Directive and anticipate
> > receiving clarification quite soon.
> >
> > Our fact gathering thus far indicates that security clearance
> > procedures vary by agency. The National Science Foundation, for
> > example, does not typically require security clearance screenings
> > for contractors who collect data or prepare analytical products for
>
> > the agency. At the National Institute of Justice, only those
> > contractors who need access to federal buildings or information
> > systems must generally undergo security clearances. Currently, the
> > U.S. Department of Education*relying on Directive
> OM:5-101*requires
> > a security screening process for all contractors employed for 30
> > days or more. Although, as noted above, this Directive is currently
>
> > in the final stages of revision, Department officials have
> > indicated that the changes are directed to clarifying the intent of
>
> > the policy as it is currently being practiced*that is, that it
> > covers all contracts.
> >
> > We remain concerned about the collection of credit information and
> > fingerprints for researchers who work in the field and have no
> > access to federal facilities or information systems. While we
> > recognize and appreciate the renewed efforts of federal officials
> > to provide the best protections possible for personally
> > identifiable information collected by researchers*and indeed, we as
>
> > an Association are continuously engaged in exercises and
> > initiatives to improve privacy and confidentiality protections*the
>
> > measures must be balanced and appropriate to the circumstances.
> >
> > In a post 9-11 world, there could be a reasoned need for those
> > performing work for the federal government in federal facilities or
>
> > on federal data bases to undergo security clearances at a level
> > appropriate to the types of access. The issue of the
> > appropriateness of security clearance procedures that are broader
> > in scope ultimately hinges on whether there is a compelling basis
> > to do so. The federal government has an interest in supporting
> > research and attracting researchers*whether working under grants or
>
> > contracts*of the highest quality and creativity. We take the view
>
> > that any constraints need to be the minimum necessary to achieve
> > legitimate goals. Thus, we await clarification of the scope of the
> > security clearance requirements and the rationale underlying them.
> > Our next steps depend on what we learn.
> >
> > For now, I want to keep you, our members, informed and to let you
> > know that this topic*as a matter of sound research policy*is very
>
> > much on the active agenda of staff and of strong interest to AERA
> > Council and the AERA Government Relations (GR) Committee. Both
> > Council and the GR Committee have this topic on their business
> > agendas at the Annual Meeting. Meanwhile, please e-mail me if you
> > have knowledge or experiences that we should be aware of as we
> > continue to address the issue of security clearances for
> > contractual research employees.
> >
> > I look forward to seeing many of you in Chicago.
> >
> > Warm regards,
> >
> > Felice
> >
> > Felice J. Levine, PhD
> > Executive Director
> > flevine@aera.net
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > We take your privacy very seriously.
> > This e-mail was sent to: davidpreiss@uc.cl from:
> >
> > American Educational Research Association
> > 1230 17th Street, NW
> > Washington, DC 20036-3078
> > If you do not wish to receive e-mail from American Educational
> > Research Association, or would like to modify your preferences,
> > please click:
> > http://eloop.goldlasso.com/optout/index.php?u=2625037&s=6394
> > Powered by:
>
> David Preiss, Ph.D.
> Subdirector de Extensión y Comunicaciones
> Escuela de Psicología
> Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
> Av Vicuña Mackenna 4860
> Macul, Santiago
> Chile
>
> Fono: 3544605
> Fax: 3544844
> e-mail: davidpreiss@uc.cl
> web personal: http://web.mac.com/ddpreiss/
> web institucional: http://www.uc.cl/psicologia
>
>
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Received on Sat Apr 7 10:21 PDT 2007
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