Re: [xmca] Fwd: The Three C's - Security Clearances, Research Contracts, and AERA Concerns

Just one tip of the iceberg.
mike

On 4/6/07, Cathrene Connery <ConneryC@cwu.edu> wrote:
>
> I wonder if the same scrutiny is required for the government contractors
> currently "supplementing' the troops in Afganistan and Iraq. Doubtful!
>
>
> M. Cathrene Connery, Ph.D.
> Assistant Professor of Bilingual & TESL Education
> Co-coordinator, Bilingual / TESL Program
> Central Washington University
>
> >>> David Preiss <davidpreiss@uc.cl> 4/6/2007 4:33 PM >>>
>
> Oh my god!
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> > From: "AERA Executive Director, Felice J. Levine" <aera-
> > response@eloop.goldlasso.com>
> > Date: April 6, 2007 4:06:53 PM GMT-04:00
> > To: davidpreiss@uc.cl
> > Subject: The Three C's - Security Clearances, Research Contracts,
> > and AERA Concerns
> > Reply-To: "AERA Executive Director, Felice J. Levine" <aera-
> > response@eloop.goldlasso.com>
> >
> >
> >
> > April 6, 2007
> >
> > Dear AERA Members:
> >
> > As final bags and boxes are being closed for the 2007 AERA Annual
> > Meeting, I want to update you on an important matter for education
> > researchers working under federal contracts. Over the course of
> > this past year, the U.S. Department of Education has taken new
> > steps to implement security clearance procedures for contractor
> > employees. Several AERA members informed the Association and
> > expressed serious concern that the process is intrusive and
> > unwarranted for non-classified research. Articles on the topic have
>
> > appeared recently in The New York Times
> > ( http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/washington/
> >
> 11privacy.htmlex=1328850000&en=57277d56f1770fb6&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt
> > &emc=rss) and Education Week (http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/
> > 2007/02/21/24checks.h26.html).
> >
> > Over many months, AERA has been investigating this situation and
> > pressing for greater understanding. Since September, we have been
> > engaged in discussions with numerous federal officials at the
> > Department of Education and other federal agencies as well as
> > working with other research organizations (in particular with the
> > American Association for the Advancement of Science) and
> > individuals in the scientific community to scrutinize this issue
> > and learn as much as we can. President Eva Baker described some of
> > these activities in the January/February 2007 issue of Educational
> > Researcher (http://er.aera.net/).
> >
> > The actual clearance procedures required of contractual personnel
> > vary by the risk level assigned to a position, but minimally
> > require employees on contracts who are designated low risk to
> > submit fingerprints. Low risk positions include those on a
> > contractor*s research team who conduct statistical analyses, but
> > have no access to personally-identifiable information. Contractor
> > employees in moderate-risk positions must provide a release for
> > credit information and may also be asked to sign a release allowing
>
> > investigators to ask specific questions of an individual*s health
>
> > care provider regarding prior mental health consultations.
> > Researchers who collect or have access to personally-identifiable
> > information or sensitive, but unclassified information are
> > considered moderate risk under current Department of Education
> > Directive OM:5-101, Contractor Employee Personnel Security
> Screenings.
> >
> > Our goal has been to understand the authority underlying the
> > changes, determine whether the situation is unique to the
> > Department of Education, and to effectuate change where needed. Our
>
> > efforts in the fall, for example, led the Department of Education
> > to indicate that the directive would be revised and its
> > implementation examined. Most recently, the Department of Education
>
> > also confirmed that the medical/mental health release was not
> > required for moderate-risk positions (at least as an initial step).
>
> > At our urging, agency officials agreed to add an instruction to
> > this effect so that contracting officers and contractors would be
> > aware of this at the onset.
> >
> > An overarching concern is about the appropriate scope of security
> > clearance procedures. The security measures being implemented by
> > the Department of Education may reach beyond what was originally
> > intended under Presidential Directive HSPD-12, the key authority
> > often cited by federal officials as extending security clearance
> > procedures to contractors. Both the Directive and the Office of
> > Management and Budget guidance for implementing the Directive focus
>
> > on contractors who access federal facilities and critical
> > information systems, not researchers who are engaged in primary
> > data collection or use of these data in the field. We are seeking
> > an interpretation from senior federal officials regarding the
> > intended reach of the Presidential Directive and anticipate
> > receiving clarification quite soon.
> >
> > Our fact gathering thus far indicates that security clearance
> > procedures vary by agency. The National Science Foundation, for
> > example, does not typically require security clearance screenings
> > for contractors who collect data or prepare analytical products for
>
> > the agency. At the National Institute of Justice, only those
> > contractors who need access to federal buildings or information
> > systems must generally undergo security clearances. Currently, the
> > U.S. Department of Education*relying on Directive
> OM:5-101*requires
> > a security screening process for all contractors employed for 30
> > days or more. Although, as noted above, this Directive is currently
>
> > in the final stages of revision, Department officials have
> > indicated that the changes are directed to clarifying the intent of
>
> > the policy as it is currently being practiced*that is, that it
> > covers all contracts.
> >
> > We remain concerned about the collection of credit information and
> > fingerprints for researchers who work in the field and have no
> > access to federal facilities or information systems. While we
> > recognize and appreciate the renewed efforts of federal officials
> > to provide the best protections possible for personally
> > identifiable information collected by researchers*and indeed, we as
>
> > an Association are continuously engaged in exercises and
> > initiatives to improve privacy and confidentiality protections*the
>
> > measures must be balanced and appropriate to the circumstances.
> >
> > In a post 9-11 world, there could be a reasoned need for those
> > performing work for the federal government in federal facilities or
>
> > on federal data bases to undergo security clearances at a level
> > appropriate to the types of access. The issue of the
> > appropriateness of security clearance procedures that are broader
> > in scope ultimately hinges on whether there is a compelling basis
> > to do so. The federal government has an interest in supporting
> > research and attracting researchers*whether working under grants or
>
> > contracts*of the highest quality and creativity. We take the view
>
> > that any constraints need to be the minimum necessary to achieve
> > legitimate goals. Thus, we await clarification of the scope of the
> > security clearance requirements and the rationale underlying them.
> > Our next steps depend on what we learn.
> >
> > For now, I want to keep you, our members, informed and to let you
> > know that this topic*as a matter of sound research policy*is very
>
> > much on the active agenda of staff and of strong interest to AERA
> > Council and the AERA Government Relations (GR) Committee. Both
> > Council and the GR Committee have this topic on their business
> > agendas at the Annual Meeting. Meanwhile, please e-mail me if you
> > have knowledge or experiences that we should be aware of as we
> > continue to address the issue of security clearances for
> > contractual research employees.
> >
> > I look forward to seeing many of you in Chicago.
> >
> > Warm regards,
> >
> > Felice
> >
> > Felice J. Levine, PhD
> > Executive Director
> > flevine@aera.net
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > We take your privacy very seriously.
> > This e-mail was sent to: davidpreiss@uc.cl from:
> >
> > American Educational Research Association
> > 1230 17th Street, NW
> > Washington, DC 20036-3078
> > If you do not wish to receive e-mail from American Educational
> > Research Association, or would like to modify your preferences,
> > please click:
> > http://eloop.goldlasso.com/optout/index.php?u=2625037&s=6394
> > Powered by:
>
> David Preiss, Ph.D.
> Subdirector de Extensión y Comunicaciones
> Escuela de Psicología
> Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
> Av Vicuña Mackenna 4860
> Macul, Santiago
> Chile
>
> Fono: 3544605
> Fax: 3544844
> e-mail: davidpreiss@uc.cl
> web personal: http://web.mac.com/ddpreiss/
> web institucional: http://www.uc.cl/psicologia
>
>
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Received on Fri Apr 6 22:55 PDT 2007