I think that's too big a question for me, Katarina. What is your specific
issue in relation to the psychology of disability?
Andy
At 10:50 PM 1/12/2006 +0100, you wrote:
>Hi Andy, Sasha and everybody else interested in these issues,
>
>Could you kindly explain the significance of this developmental
>Spinoza-Descartes-Hegel-Marx-Ilyenkov point of view in relation to
>Vygotsky’s early works and clinical research in the field of special
>psychology & education? What ideas were important for Vygotsky`s
>theoretical foundation for the psychology of disability?
>
>Yours,
>Katarina
>
>
>On Thu, November 30, 2006 08:57, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > Firstly, Sasha I recommended Lektorsky's book purely and simply because it
> > is a book-length treatment of this very complex subject from within our
> > shared tradition. I recognise the kinship of my ideas with both Lektorsky
> > and AN Leontyev but nothing in what I have said was intended as a
> > representation of the ideas of these two writers. It is all my own view. I
> > have no bone to pick with Lektorsky, Leontyev or anyone else in this broad
> > tradition of enquiry.
> >
> > Secondly, we are surely talking at cross purposes. Yes, a "subject" is *by
> > definition* self-conscious and yes I do exclude plant life from
> > participation in the subject-object relation in the role of subject. I am
> > aware of the relation between any organism and "its" object and how this
> > state of being can be seen as part of the biological evolution towards
> > human life. But I am not giving lessons in Darwinism. I will leave
> > speculations about the dialectics of nature for the biologists. (BTW, I
> > have no time for the application of the notion of "emergence" outside of
> > the narrow domain for which it is applicable. I don't know why you mention
> > this.)
> >
> > Thirdly, not even a human individual is a subject actually, let alone a
> > sea
> > cucumber. It is also wrong to describe the working class as a subject,
> > though for different reasons. If you want to label every form of life as a
> > subject because it is active, then that's fine. The word 'active', in
> > English at least, can be used that way, and may be useful for the study of
> > biology. But such a notion contributes absolutely nothing to resolving the
> > problem of the place of the individual in modern capitalist society, the
> > design of experiments into learning, understanding the persuasiveness of
> > neo-conservative scaremongering, the reasons for low levels of literacy
> > among immigrant populations, etc., etc., etc..
> >
> > My interest in a notion of subjectivity is for the purpose and only for
> > the
> > purpose of resolving these kinds of questions.
> >
> > The problem of freedom is in fact posed at two distinct levels: (1) at the
> > level of free-will vs Laplacian determinism. This was the problem which
> > bothered Spinoza and still bothers people like John R Searle, for example,
> > who are interested in finding the key to consciousness in neurons and
> > electrons; and (2) the problem of humanism vs structuralism, or
> > culturalism
> > vs constructivism, liberalism vs communitarianism, etc., the problems
> > raised by Anna Stetsenko and Stephen Billett about agency and
> > individuality, all those questions about whether human beings really can
> > determine their own lives, or on the contrary they are prisoners (not of
> > biological or molecular forces, but) of social structures and historical
> > forces.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> >
> > At 03:30 AM 30/11/2006 +0300, you wrote:
> >>Hi, Andy
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>I’m afraid but I think that just in this issue we have better to base our
> >>analysis on Marx and Il’enkov themselves than on Lektorsky. If you are
> >>retelling him correctly he doesn’t gives us an insight into the problem
> >> of
> >>Subject and Object (Predmet) relation but simply shares the old mistake
> >> with
> >>A.N.Leont’ev.
> >>
> >>If subject is “some self-conscious system of activity” it means that both
> >>animals and plants can’t be estimated as subjects, surely, if we don’t
> >>ascribe them some form of self-consciousness :-). So it means that all
> >>living creatures (except the self-conscious humans) are mere objects
> >> (here
> >>it doesn’t mean “predmet” but something passive). This is nothing but
> >>ancient Cartesian formula.
> >>
> >>Let’s go ahead. You write: “subject arises out of some definite,
> >> objective
> >>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious”. I will agree with
> >> this
> >>statement if you (or Lektorsky) will explain us what makes your
> >> “definite,
> >>objective system of activity” turn into self-conscious being? The
> >>possibility of such a magical transmutation of something mechanical,
> >> passive
> >>(“objective”) into self-conscious is looking like the popular among some
> >>psychologists idea of emerging. According to this point of view we
> >> explain
> >>something if we say that it suddenly emerges, or in old Soviet
> >> ideological
> >>style if something appears as a result of transition of quantity into
> >>quality. You probably know that Vygotsky scoffed at the very idea of
> >>emergentism in his “Emotions teaching”.
> >>
> >>The main (Cartesian) mistake of CHAT classics was in their theoretically
> >>fruitful attempts to jump from mechanic S==>R level to the level of
> >>consciousness leaving out three necessary stages. It is clear that such
> >>transition is possible only in fair tales where the fairy godmother gives
> >> a
> >>soul to the ugly nutcracker.
> >>
> >>In reality to pass from mechanical to the consciousness level we have to
> >>ascend to the levels of chemism and organism and only here on the stage
> >> of
> >>organic life we will meet the real subject-object (predmetnoe) relation.
> >> The
> >>birth of subjectness takes place here on the level of abstract life. But
> >> on
> >>the first stage (including unicellulars and plants) we have only
> >>subjectness, not subjectivness. We have no reasons to search here
> >>self-consciousness because on this level we haven’t even psyche.
> >>
> >>Only on the next level when a living subject starts to relate to itself
> >> or
> >>the predmet activity of living subject is realizing by means of self
> >>directed, reflecsive activity we are coming to the level of psyche (zoo
> >>psyche) or self-sensation (still now not self-consciousness).
> >>
> >>Thus we can go to the next level the level of consciousness and self
> >>consciousness only standing on the level of zoo psyche.
> >>
> >>Only basing on such intermediate evolutionary levels separating the
> >>mechanical (Cartesian) S==>R robot and still Cartesian bodiless soul with
> >>free will we can acquire the rational, not magical understanding of free
> >>bodily human being. On the contrary, if we will insist on our Cartesian
> >>attempts we will at best have a chance to repeat after LSV the
> >> questionable
> >>metaphor of triangle and sign mediation or after ANL the idea of activity
> >>mediating the relation of stimulus and reaction.
> >>
> >>We entirely agree with Vygotsky’s declaration that “the problem of
> >> freedom
> >>is a central problem of psychology” (it was recently published in Russian
> >>among other materials for Vygotsky’s archive). We insist that both
> >> Vygotsky
> >>and Leont’ev belonged to one and the same theoretic school (you know some
> >> of
> >>our colleges are denying this fact) because both they were trying to
> >> solve
> >>the one and the same problem the problem of freedom. How a human can be
> >>free from the mechanical S==>R causation of its body?
> >>
> >>So if we want not only repeat both true and erroneous words of Vygotsky
> >> and
> >>Leont’ev being said long ago, but to do our part for development of CHAT
> >> we
> >>have to go further than they in solving the same problem which was in the
> >>focus of their theoretic interest, the problem of freedom. And we can do
> >> it
> >>only abandoning the false Cartesian position identifying animals with
> >>mechanical (exclusive of subjectness) S==>R causality, doesn’t
> >> understanding
> >>them as a subjects, (not to say about subjectivness) but as a soulless
> >>mechanical toys. We are stressing that transition from Cartesian tubes,
> >>threads and valves to the modern conception of living body as a
> >>biomechanical S==>R robot left us entirely inside Cartesian mechanism as
> >> a
> >>specific logic.
> >>
> >>I realize that all this is hardly acceptable for those investigators who
> >> are
> >>trying to develop the semiotic approach appreciating LSV’s idea of sign
> >>mediation as his central and the most fruitful idea. It can't be helped.
> >>
> >>We have to choose the way: are we going to share Vygotsky’s way based on
> >>ideas of sign mediation, or we are going to share Vygotsky’s way based on
> >>ideas of Spinoza. Vygotsky had too little time to realize that two these
> >>ways led him to the opposite sides, split the very logic of his
> >>investigation. I am sure, and I share this position with Il’enkov who
> >>fundamentally argued the absolute incompatibility, of semiotic and
> >> activity
> >>approaches, that the semiotic way leads us to the dead end, while
> >> activity
> >>approach gives us a chance to build a new dialectical psychology.
> >>
> >>And we have to realize finally that Vygotsky was not a God, so if we are
> >>investigators, not believers we have to cease the protracted
> >> interpretation
> >>of his “sacred” texts and start, or better to say continue after him
> >>investigation of problems he formulated for himself and for all of us.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>Sasha
> >>
> >>-----Original Message-----
> >>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> >>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >>Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 12:22 AM
> >>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>Subject: RE: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>Big question Michael.
> >>
> >>See http://www.marxists.org/archive/lektorsky/subject-object/index.htm
> >> for
> >>
> >>a book-length answer from Lektorsky.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>Subject and object are always two distinct entities, but the subject
> >> (some
> >>
> >>self-conscious system of activity) arises out of some definite, objective
> >>
> >>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious, and the activity then
> >>
> >>constitutes (in AN Leontyev's words) the "intertraffic" between subject
> >> and
> >>
> >>object. The activity of the subject then is to objectify itself in the
> >>
> >>object, giving its activities material forms deposited in the objective
> >>
> >>world around it, vested with meanings by which the subject
> >>
> >>"institutionalises" itself.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>So in the beginning there is no distinction, because the relevant system
> >> of
> >>
> >>activity has not yet become self-conscious, and in the end there is no
> >>
> >>distinction because the subject has "naturalised" its activity and become
> >>
> >>indistinguishable from the object. These are of course both tendencies,
> >> and
> >>
> >>not absolute truths, and the whole life of a subject exists between these
> >>
> >>two poles.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>Andy
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>At 02:03 PM 28/11/2006 -0500, you wrote:
> >>
> >> >Andy and Paul,
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >What is the argument that a dialectical approach, even dialectical
> >>
> >> >materialism, dissolves the difference between subject and object? I
> >> guess
> >>
> >> >we are all influenced by what we have been reading lately, but it seems
> >>
> >> >that it is difficult for a dialectic based perspective to escape the
> >>
> >> >idealism trap.
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >Thanks,
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >Michael
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >-----Original Message-----
> >>
> >> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> >> On
> >>
> >> >Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> >>
> >> >Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 5:09 AM
> >>
> >> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>
> >> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD (was= Does
> >> VygotskyAccept
> >>
> >> >the "Assistance Assumption"?)
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >Paul, surely you overstate the matter.
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >ZPD is, like all scientific concepts, a theory-laden object. To say
> >> that it
> >>
> >> >exists says that certain more or less well-defined procedures
> >> understood
> >>
> >> >within the Vygotskyan theory, will produce this or that verifiable
> >> result.
> >>
> >> >Otherwise what is the useof the concept and the theory of which it is a
> >>
> >> >part? While there are lots of concepts within the Vygotskyan theory
> >> which
> >>
> >> >are new and unique, or have a Marxist genealogy, there are also plenty
> >>
> >> >which are shared with all pedagogical theories and common sense. In
> >> fact,
> >>
> >> >all scientific theories must incorporate "common sense" concepts into
> >> their
> >>
> >> >framework in order to be truly scientific. "Empiricism" denies that
> >>
> >> >scientific objects are "theory laden" and that there is anything
> >>
> >> >problematic in the idea of a purely factual test for the existence of
> >> some
> >>
> >> >object. But to deny Empiricism is not to deny the validity and
> >> necessity of
> >>
> >> >empirical evidence.
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >And surely it is wrong to say that in Marxism or Vygotsky "the subject
> >>
> >> >object distinction is dissolved". The absolute independence and
> >>
> >> >separateness of subject and object is certainly denied by Marx and
> >>
> >> >Vygotsky, but neither claim that "subject" and "object" are invalid
> >>
> >> >concepts, or concepts between which no distinction can be made. For
> >>
> >> >example, Marx does not claim that an object (e.g. ZPD) exists insofar
> >> as a
> >>
> >> >subject (Vygotskyan psychology) incorporates the concept in its
> >> activity,
> >>
> >> >so that empirical refutation of the concept is ruled out in principle.
> >> No
> >>
> >> >subject exists in absolute separateness from every other subject, all
> >>
> >> >subjects exist in a material and therefore infinitely interconnected,
> >>
> >> >world. So the identity of subject and object can only be relative, not
> >>
> >> >absolute.
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >Andy
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >At 12:26 AM 28/11/2006 -0800, you wrote:
> >>
> >> > > Isn´'t the idea of "empirical" evidence for the ZPD something of
> >> an
> >>
> >> > > oxymoron in itself? Didn{t Vygotsky develop his thinking within the
> >>
> >> > > framework of dialetical materialism, something that many north
> >> americans
> >>
> >> > > and others seem all too ready to forget? Isn't the concept of a ZPD
> >> a
> >>
> >> > > dialectical model in itself, which is to say, a model in which the
> >>
> >> > > subject object distinction is dissolved, a dissolution which defies
> >> the
> >>
> >> > > concept of empirical?
> >>
> >> > > Paul Dillon
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> >> AIM
> >>
> >> >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >>
> >> >
> >>
> >> >_______________________________________________
> >>
> >> >xmca mailing list
> >>
> >> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >> >_______________________________________________
> >>
> >> >xmca mailing list
> >>
> >> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> >> AIM
> >>
> >>identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>_______________________________________________
> >>
> >>xmca mailing list
> >>
> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>
> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >>_______________________________________________
> >>xmca mailing list
> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
> > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > xmca mailing list
> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
>
>
>--
>Katarina A. Rodina
>MSc in Speech-Language Therapy,
>PhD-Research Fellow,
>Department of Special Needs Education
>University of Oslo
>P.O.Box 1140 Blindern
>NO-0318 OSLO,Norway
>Phone: +47 22 85 81 38
>Fax: +47 22 85 80 21
>E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.no
>
>Head of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation,
>Herzen State Pedagogical University
>St.Petersburg, Russia
>E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru
>tlf: +47 41 108 408
>http://www.herzen.spb.ru
>
>
>
>_______________________________________________
>xmca mailing list
>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
_______________________________________________
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Wed Jan 03 2007 - 07:06:17 PST