Hi Andy, Sasha and everybody else interested in these issues,
Could you kindly explain the significance of this developmental
Spinoza-Descartes-Hegel-Marx-Ilyenkov point of view in relation to
Vygotsky’s early works and clinical research in the field of special
psychology & education? What ideas were important for Vygotsky`s
theoretical foundation for the psychology of disability?
Yours,
Katarina
On Thu, November 30, 2006 08:57, Andy Blunden wrote:
> Firstly, Sasha I recommended Lektorsky's book purely and simply because it
> is a book-length treatment of this very complex subject from within our
> shared tradition. I recognise the kinship of my ideas with both Lektorsky
> and AN Leontyev but nothing in what I have said was intended as a
> representation of the ideas of these two writers. It is all my own view. I
> have no bone to pick with Lektorsky, Leontyev or anyone else in this broad
> tradition of enquiry.
>
> Secondly, we are surely talking at cross purposes. Yes, a "subject" is *by
> definition* self-conscious and yes I do exclude plant life from
> participation in the subject-object relation in the role of subject. I am
> aware of the relation between any organism and "its" object and how this
> state of being can be seen as part of the biological evolution towards
> human life. But I am not giving lessons in Darwinism. I will leave
> speculations about the dialectics of nature for the biologists. (BTW, I
> have no time for the application of the notion of "emergence" outside of
> the narrow domain for which it is applicable. I don't know why you mention
> this.)
>
> Thirdly, not even a human individual is a subject actually, let alone a
> sea
> cucumber. It is also wrong to describe the working class as a subject,
> though for different reasons. If you want to label every form of life as a
> subject because it is active, then that's fine. The word 'active', in
> English at least, can be used that way, and may be useful for the study of
> biology. But such a notion contributes absolutely nothing to resolving the
> problem of the place of the individual in modern capitalist society, the
> design of experiments into learning, understanding the persuasiveness of
> neo-conservative scaremongering, the reasons for low levels of literacy
> among immigrant populations, etc., etc., etc..
>
> My interest in a notion of subjectivity is for the purpose and only for
> the
> purpose of resolving these kinds of questions.
>
> The problem of freedom is in fact posed at two distinct levels: (1) at the
> level of free-will vs Laplacian determinism. This was the problem which
> bothered Spinoza and still bothers people like John R Searle, for example,
> who are interested in finding the key to consciousness in neurons and
> electrons; and (2) the problem of humanism vs structuralism, or
> culturalism
> vs constructivism, liberalism vs communitarianism, etc., the problems
> raised by Anna Stetsenko and Stephen Billett about agency and
> individuality, all those questions about whether human beings really can
> determine their own lives, or on the contrary they are prisoners (not of
> biological or molecular forces, but) of social structures and historical
> forces.
>
> Andy
>
>
> At 03:30 AM 30/11/2006 +0300, you wrote:
>>Hi, Andy
>>
>>
>>
>>I’m afraid but I think that just in this issue we have better to base our
>>analysis on Marx and Il’enkov themselves than on Lektorsky. If you are
>>retelling him correctly he doesn’t gives us an insight into the problem
>> of
>>Subject and Object (Predmet) relation but simply shares the old mistake
>> with
>>A.N.Leont’ev.
>>
>>If subject is “some self-conscious system of activity” it means that both
>>animals and plants can’t be estimated as subjects, surely, if we don’t
>>ascribe them some form of self-consciousness :-). So it means that all
>>living creatures (except the self-conscious humans) are mere objects
>> (here
>>it doesn’t mean “predmet” but something passive). This is nothing but
>>ancient Cartesian formula.
>>
>>Let’s go ahead. You write: “subject arises out of some definite,
>> objective
>>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious”. I will agree with
>> this
>>statement if you (or Lektorsky) will explain us what makes your
>> “definite,
>>objective system of activity” turn into self-conscious being? The
>>possibility of such a magical transmutation of something mechanical,
>> passive
>>(“objective”) into self-conscious is looking like the popular among some
>>psychologists idea of emerging. According to this point of view we
>> explain
>>something if we say that it suddenly emerges, or in old Soviet
>> ideological
>>style if something appears as a result of transition of quantity into
>>quality. You probably know that Vygotsky scoffed at the very idea of
>>emergentism in his “Emotions teaching”.
>>
>>The main (Cartesian) mistake of CHAT classics was in their theoretically
>>fruitful attempts to jump from mechanic S==>R level to the level of
>>consciousness leaving out three necessary stages. It is clear that such
>>transition is possible only in fair tales where the fairy godmother gives
>> a
>>soul to the ugly nutcracker.
>>
>>In reality to pass from mechanical to the consciousness level we have to
>>ascend to the levels of chemism and organism and only here on the stage
>> of
>>organic life we will meet the real subject-object (predmetnoe) relation.
>> The
>>birth of subjectness takes place here on the level of abstract life. But
>> on
>>the first stage (including unicellulars and plants) we have only
>>subjectness, not subjectivness. We have no reasons to search here
>>self-consciousness because on this level we haven’t even psyche.
>>
>>Only on the next level when a living subject starts to relate to itself
>> or
>>the predmet activity of living subject is realizing by means of self
>>directed, reflecsive activity we are coming to the level of psyche (zoo
>>psyche) or self-sensation (still now not self-consciousness).
>>
>>Thus we can go to the next level the level of consciousness and self
>>consciousness only standing on the level of zoo psyche.
>>
>>Only basing on such intermediate evolutionary levels separating the
>>mechanical (Cartesian) S==>R robot and still Cartesian bodiless soul with
>>free will we can acquire the rational, not magical understanding of free
>>bodily human being. On the contrary, if we will insist on our Cartesian
>>attempts we will at best have a chance to repeat after LSV the
>> questionable
>>metaphor of triangle and sign mediation or after ANL the idea of activity
>>mediating the relation of stimulus and reaction.
>>
>>We entirely agree with Vygotsky’s declaration that “the problem of
>> freedom
>>is a central problem of psychology” (it was recently published in Russian
>>among other materials for Vygotsky’s archive). We insist that both
>> Vygotsky
>>and Leont’ev belonged to one and the same theoretic school (you know some
>> of
>>our colleges are denying this fact) because both they were trying to
>> solve
>>the one and the same problem the problem of freedom. How a human can be
>>free from the mechanical S==>R causation of its body?
>>
>>So if we want not only repeat both true and erroneous words of Vygotsky
>> and
>>Leont’ev being said long ago, but to do our part for development of CHAT
>> we
>>have to go further than they in solving the same problem which was in the
>>focus of their theoretic interest, the problem of freedom. And we can do
>> it
>>only abandoning the false Cartesian position identifying animals with
>>mechanical (exclusive of subjectness) S==>R causality, doesn’t
>> understanding
>>them as a subjects, (not to say about subjectivness) but as a soulless
>>mechanical toys. We are stressing that transition from Cartesian tubes,
>>threads and valves to the modern conception of living body as a
>>biomechanical S==>R robot left us entirely inside Cartesian mechanism as
>> a
>>specific logic.
>>
>>I realize that all this is hardly acceptable for those investigators who
>> are
>>trying to develop the semiotic approach appreciating LSV’s idea of sign
>>mediation as his central and the most fruitful idea. It can't be helped.
>>
>>We have to choose the way: are we going to share Vygotsky’s way based on
>>ideas of sign mediation, or we are going to share Vygotsky’s way based on
>>ideas of Spinoza. Vygotsky had too little time to realize that two these
>>ways led him to the opposite sides, split the very logic of his
>>investigation. I am sure, and I share this position with Il’enkov who
>>fundamentally argued the absolute incompatibility, of semiotic and
>> activity
>>approaches, that the semiotic way leads us to the dead end, while
>> activity
>>approach gives us a chance to build a new dialectical psychology.
>>
>>And we have to realize finally that Vygotsky was not a God, so if we are
>>investigators, not believers we have to cease the protracted
>> interpretation
>>of his “sacred” texts and start, or better to say continue after him
>>investigation of problems he formulated for himself and for all of us.
>>
>>
>>
>>Sasha
>>
>>-----Original Message-----
>>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 12:22 AM
>>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>Subject: RE: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
>>
>>
>>
>>Big question Michael.
>>
>>See http://www.marxists.org/archive/lektorsky/subject-object/index.htm
>> for
>>
>>a book-length answer from Lektorsky.
>>
>>
>>
>>Subject and object are always two distinct entities, but the subject
>> (some
>>
>>self-conscious system of activity) arises out of some definite, objective
>>
>>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious, and the activity then
>>
>>constitutes (in AN Leontyev's words) the "intertraffic" between subject
>> and
>>
>>object. The activity of the subject then is to objectify itself in the
>>
>>object, giving its activities material forms deposited in the objective
>>
>>world around it, vested with meanings by which the subject
>>
>>"institutionalises" itself.
>>
>>
>>
>>So in the beginning there is no distinction, because the relevant system
>> of
>>
>>activity has not yet become self-conscious, and in the end there is no
>>
>>distinction because the subject has "naturalised" its activity and become
>>
>>indistinguishable from the object. These are of course both tendencies,
>> and
>>
>>not absolute truths, and the whole life of a subject exists between these
>>
>>two poles.
>>
>>
>>
>>Andy
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>At 02:03 PM 28/11/2006 -0500, you wrote:
>>
>> >Andy and Paul,
>>
>> >
>>
>> >What is the argument that a dialectical approach, even dialectical
>>
>> >materialism, dissolves the difference between subject and object? I
>> guess
>>
>> >we are all influenced by what we have been reading lately, but it seems
>>
>> >that it is difficult for a dialectic based perspective to escape the
>>
>> >idealism trap.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >Thanks,
>>
>> >
>>
>> >Michael
>>
>> >
>>
>> >-----Original Message-----
>>
>> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> On
>>
>> >Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>
>> >Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 5:09 AM
>>
>> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>
>> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD (was= Does
>> VygotskyAccept
>>
>> >the "Assistance Assumption"?)
>>
>> >
>>
>> >Paul, surely you overstate the matter.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >ZPD is, like all scientific concepts, a theory-laden object. To say
>> that it
>>
>> >exists says that certain more or less well-defined procedures
>> understood
>>
>> >within the Vygotskyan theory, will produce this or that verifiable
>> result.
>>
>> >Otherwise what is the useof the concept and the theory of which it is a
>>
>> >part? While there are lots of concepts within the Vygotskyan theory
>> which
>>
>> >are new and unique, or have a Marxist genealogy, there are also plenty
>>
>> >which are shared with all pedagogical theories and common sense. In
>> fact,
>>
>> >all scientific theories must incorporate "common sense" concepts into
>> their
>>
>> >framework in order to be truly scientific. "Empiricism" denies that
>>
>> >scientific objects are "theory laden" and that there is anything
>>
>> >problematic in the idea of a purely factual test for the existence of
>> some
>>
>> >object. But to deny Empiricism is not to deny the validity and
>> necessity of
>>
>> >empirical evidence.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >And surely it is wrong to say that in Marxism or Vygotsky "the subject
>>
>> >object distinction is dissolved". The absolute independence and
>>
>> >separateness of subject and object is certainly denied by Marx and
>>
>> >Vygotsky, but neither claim that "subject" and "object" are invalid
>>
>> >concepts, or concepts between which no distinction can be made. For
>>
>> >example, Marx does not claim that an object (e.g. ZPD) exists insofar
>> as a
>>
>> >subject (Vygotskyan psychology) incorporates the concept in its
>> activity,
>>
>> >so that empirical refutation of the concept is ruled out in principle.
>> No
>>
>> >subject exists in absolute separateness from every other subject, all
>>
>> >subjects exist in a material and therefore infinitely interconnected,
>>
>> >world. So the identity of subject and object can only be relative, not
>>
>> >absolute.
>>
>> >
>>
>> >Andy
>>
>> >
>>
>> >At 12:26 AM 28/11/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>>
>> > > Isn´'t the idea of "empirical" evidence for the ZPD something of
>> an
>>
>> > > oxymoron in itself? Didn{t Vygotsky develop his thinking within the
>>
>> > > framework of dialetical materialism, something that many north
>> americans
>>
>> > > and others seem all too ready to forget? Isn't the concept of a ZPD
>> a
>>
>> > > dialectical model in itself, which is to say, a model in which the
>>
>> > > subject object distinction is dissolved, a dissolution which defies
>> the
>>
>> > > concept of empirical?
>>
>> > > Paul Dillon
>>
>> >
>>
>> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>> AIM
>>
>> >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>
>> >
>>
>> >_______________________________________________
>>
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>>
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>>
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>>
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>>
>> >xmca mailing list
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>>
>>
>>
>> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>> AIM
>>
>>identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>>
>>
>>
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>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>
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-- Katarina A. Rodina MSc in Speech-Language Therapy, PhD-Research Fellow, Department of Special Needs Education University of Oslo P.O.Box 1140 Blindern NO-0318 OSLO,Norway Phone: +47 22 85 81 38 Fax: +47 22 85 80 21 E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.noHead of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation, Herzen State Pedagogical University St.Petersburg, Russia E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru tlf: +47 41 108 408 http://www.herzen.spb.ru
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