Andy,
First, my questions were referring to the significance of “modernist” and
Darwinist/biological approaches to psychology, i.e. CHAT psychology and
the holistic part of the “psychology of disability” (Vygotsky’s concept of
dysontogenesis).
I fail to see the actuality and relevance of these issues to psychology
and education in what might be described as a postmodern cultural
situation (at least in the West). So why is this so important? Why should
we spend time, energy and intellectual faculties on these issues?
Second, Vygotsky as a clinical psychologist is predominantly
anti-modernist and anti-behaviorist, possibly even anti-evolutionist. We
can trace his ontological view on disability back to the period 1924-1934.
Vygotsky (“Fundamentals of Defectology”, 1993:30) was opposed to modernist
positivist methodology using predominantly quantitative diagnostics as an
“arithmetical conception of a handicapped condition”. In his work
Defektologia, Vygotsky was clearly opposed to a biological view on
disability as a static condition. Vygotsky’s view on the nature of
disability as a dialectical process - “social aberration” (1993:66) -
highlighted in his concept of “complex structures of disability”, in the
understanding of “abnormal ontogenesis” and the concept of disabled
persons as “ingrown/rooted into culture” is essentially social
constructionist, possibly even “pre-postmodernist”(Neuman & Holzman
1997:25). The question is: in what way was vygotskian social
constructionist (not constructivist) psychology, especially in regard to
disability, influenced by Spinoza-Descartes (modernistic epistemologists)?
P.S. May I remind you that I have previously tried to highlight similar
perspectives:
> I have some difficulties seeing LSV as a Marxist, more than a
> social-constructionist, inspired by the French sociological school, German
> idealism etc (which was not unusual in the Russian “underground”
> intellectual culture at the beginning of the 20th century in the fields of
> literature, arts etc). Vygotsky’s work (from his “Psychology of Art”,
> 1915, to the very last writings of 1934 in the field of psychopathology
> and defectology) is constructionist (Gergen 1995; 2001) as well as
> non-constructivist (see Karpov, 2005). From my point of view, Vygotsky’s
> social constructionist views do not represent the same view on the social
> construction of mind as in the social constructionist theory by Bergman &
> Luckman (1966), which explain human socialisation from an evolutionist
> perspective. I would rather say that Vygotsky’s social constructionism is
> an historical (not evolutionist) situated approach to the understanding of
> human cultural development.
http://www.lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2006_10.dir/0279.html
Yours,
Katarina
On Fri, December 1, 2006 23:58, Andy Blunden wrote:
> I think that's too big a question for me, Katarina. What is your specific
> issue in relation to the psychology of disability?
> Andy
> At 10:50 PM 1/12/2006 +0100, you wrote:
>
>>Hi Andy, Sasha and everybody else interested in these issues,
>>
>>Could you kindly explain the significance of this developmental
>>Spinoza-Descartes-Hegel-Marx-Ilyenkov point of view in relation to
>>Vygotsky’s early works and clinical research in the field of special
>>psychology & education? What ideas were important for Vygotsky`s
>>theoretical foundation for the psychology of disability?
>>
>>Yours,
>>Katarina
>>
>>
>>On Thu, November 30, 2006 08:57, Andy Blunden wrote:
>> > Firstly, Sasha I recommended Lektorsky's book purely and simply
>> because it
>> > is a book-length treatment of this very complex subject from within
>> our
>> > shared tradition. I recognise the kinship of my ideas with both
>> Lektorsky
>> > and AN Leontyev but nothing in what I have said was intended as a
>> > representation of the ideas of these two writers. It is all my own
>> view. I
>> > have no bone to pick with Lektorsky, Leontyev or anyone else in this
>> broad
>> > tradition of enquiry.
>> >
>> > Secondly, we are surely talking at cross purposes. Yes, a "subject" is
>> *by
>> > definition* self-conscious and yes I do exclude plant life from
>> > participation in the subject-object relation in the role of subject. I
>> am
>> > aware of the relation between any organism and "its" object and how
>> this
>> > state of being can be seen as part of the biological evolution towards
>> > human life. But I am not giving lessons in Darwinism. I will leave
>> > speculations about the dialectics of nature for the biologists. (BTW,
>> I
>> > have no time for the application of the notion of "emergence" outside
>> of
>> > the narrow domain for which it is applicable. I don't know why you
>> mention
>> > this.)
>> >
>> > Thirdly, not even a human individual is a subject actually, let alone
>> a
>> > sea
>> > cucumber. It is also wrong to describe the working class as a subject,
>> > though for different reasons. If you want to label every form of life
>> as a
>> > subject because it is active, then that's fine. The word 'active', in
>> > English at least, can be used that way, and may be useful for the
>> study of
>> > biology. But such a notion contributes absolutely nothing to resolving
>> the
>> > problem of the place of the individual in modern capitalist society,
>> the
>> > design of experiments into learning, understanding the persuasiveness
>> of
>> > neo-conservative scaremongering, the reasons for low levels of
>> literacy
>> > among immigrant populations, etc., etc., etc..
>> >
>> > My interest in a notion of subjectivity is for the purpose and only
>> for
>> > the
>> > purpose of resolving these kinds of questions.
>> >
>> > The problem of freedom is in fact posed at two distinct levels: (1) at
>> the
>> > level of free-will vs Laplacian determinism. This was the problem
>> which
>> > bothered Spinoza and still bothers people like John R Searle, for
>> example,
>> > who are interested in finding the key to consciousness in neurons and
>> > electrons; and (2) the problem of humanism vs structuralism, or
>> > culturalism
>> > vs constructivism, liberalism vs communitarianism, etc., the problems
>> > raised by Anna Stetsenko and Stephen Billett about agency and
>> > individuality, all those questions about whether human beings really
>> can
>> > determine their own lives, or on the contrary they are prisoners (not
>> of
>> > biological or molecular forces, but) of social structures and
>> historical
>> > forces.
>> >
>> > Andy
>> >
>> >
>> > At 03:30 AM 30/11/2006 +0300, you wrote:
>> >>Hi, Andy
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>I’m afraid but I think that just in this issue we have better to base
>> our
>> >>analysis on Marx and Il’enkov themselves than on Lektorsky. If you are
>> >>retelling him correctly he doesn’t gives us an insight into the
>> problem
>> >> of
>> >>Subject and Object (Predmet) relation but simply shares the old
>> mistake
>> >> with
>> >>A.N.Leont’ev.
>> >>
>> >>If subject is “some self-conscious system of activity” it means that
>> both
>> >>animals and plants can’t be estimated as subjects, surely, if we don’t
>> >>ascribe them some form of self-consciousness :-). So it means that all
>> >>living creatures (except the self-conscious humans) are mere objects
>> >> (here
>> >>it doesn’t mean “predmet” but something passive). This is nothing but
>> >>ancient Cartesian formula.
>> >>
>> >>Let’s go ahead. You write: “subject arises out of some definite,
>> >> objective
>> >>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious”. I will agree with
>> >> this
>> >>statement if you (or Lektorsky) will explain us what makes your
>> >> “definite,
>> >>objective system of activity” turn into self-conscious being? The
>> >>possibility of such a magical transmutation of something mechanical,
>> >> passive
>> >>(“objective”) into self-conscious is looking like the popular among
>> some
>> >>psychologists idea of emerging. According to this point of view we
>> >> explain
>> >>something if we say that it suddenly emerges, or in old Soviet
>> >> ideological
>> >>style if something appears as a result of transition of quantity into
>> >>quality. You probably know that Vygotsky scoffed at the very idea of
>> >>emergentism in his “Emotions teaching”.
>> >>
>> >>The main (Cartesian) mistake of CHAT classics was in their
>> theoretically
>> >>fruitful attempts to jump from mechanic S==>R level to the level of
>> >>consciousness leaving out three necessary stages. It is clear that
>> such
>> >>transition is possible only in fair tales where the fairy godmother
>> gives
>> >> a
>> >>soul to the ugly nutcracker.
>> >>
>> >>In reality to pass from mechanical to the consciousness level we have
>> to
>> >>ascend to the levels of chemism and organism and only here on the
>> stage
>> >> of
>> >>organic life we will meet the real subject-object (predmetnoe)
>> relation.
>> >> The
>> >>birth of subjectness takes place here on the level of abstract life.
>> But
>> >> on
>> >>the first stage (including unicellulars and plants) we have only
>> >>subjectness, not subjectivness. We have no reasons to search here
>> >>self-consciousness because on this level we haven’t even psyche.
>> >>
>> >>Only on the next level when a living subject starts to relate to
>> itself
>> >> or
>> >>the predmet activity of living subject is realizing by means of self
>> >>directed, reflecsive activity we are coming to the level of psyche
>> (zoo
>> >>psyche) or self-sensation (still now not self-consciousness).
>> >>
>> >>Thus we can go to the next level the level of consciousness and self
>> >>consciousness only standing on the level of zoo psyche.
>> >>
>> >>Only basing on such intermediate evolutionary levels separating the
>> >>mechanical (Cartesian) S==>R robot and still Cartesian bodiless soul
>> with
>> >>free will we can acquire the rational, not magical understanding of
>> free
>> >>bodily human being. On the contrary, if we will insist on our
>> Cartesian
>> >>attempts we will at best have a chance to repeat after LSV the
>> >> questionable
>> >>metaphor of triangle and sign mediation or after ANL the idea of
>> activity
>> >>mediating the relation of stimulus and reaction.
>> >>
>> >>We entirely agree with Vygotsky’s declaration that “the problem of
>> >> freedom
>> >>is a central problem of psychology” (it was recently published in
>> Russian
>> >>among other materials for Vygotsky’s archive). We insist that both
>> >> Vygotsky
>> >>and Leont’ev belonged to one and the same theoretic school (you know
>> some
>> >> of
>> >>our colleges are denying this fact) because both they were trying to
>> >> solve
>> >>the one and the same problem the problem of freedom. How a human can
>> be
>> >>free from the mechanical S==>R causation of its body?
>> >>
>> >>So if we want not only repeat both true and erroneous words of
>> Vygotsky
>> >> and
>> >>Leont’ev being said long ago, but to do our part for development of
>> CHAT
>> >> we
>> >>have to go further than they in solving the same problem which was in
>> the
>> >>focus of their theoretic interest, the problem of freedom. And we can
>> do
>> >> it
>> >>only abandoning the false Cartesian position identifying animals with
>> >>mechanical (exclusive of subjectness) S==>R causality, doesn’t
>> >> understanding
>> >>them as a subjects, (not to say about subjectivness) but as a soulless
>> >>mechanical toys. We are stressing that transition from Cartesian
>> tubes,
>> >>threads and valves to the modern conception of living body as a
>> >>biomechanical S==>R robot left us entirely inside Cartesian mechanism
>> as
>> >> a
>> >>specific logic.
>> >>
>> >>I realize that all this is hardly acceptable for those investigators
>> who
>> >> are
>> >>trying to develop the semiotic approach appreciating LSV’s idea of
>> sign
>> >>mediation as his central and the most fruitful idea. It can't be
>> helped.
>> >>
>> >>We have to choose the way: are we going to share Vygotsky’s way based
>> on
>> >>ideas of sign mediation, or we are going to share Vygotsky’s way based
>> on
>> >>ideas of Spinoza. Vygotsky had too little time to realize that two
>> these
>> >>ways led him to the opposite sides, split the very logic of his
>> >>investigation. I am sure, and I share this position with Il’enkov who
>> >>fundamentally argued the absolute incompatibility, of semiotic and
>> >> activity
>> >>approaches, that the semiotic way leads us to the dead end, while
>> >> activity
>> >>approach gives us a chance to build a new dialectical psychology.
>> >>
>> >>And we have to realize finally that Vygotsky was not a God, so if we
>> are
>> >>investigators, not believers we have to cease the protracted
>> >> interpretation
>> >>of his “sacred” texts and start, or better to say continue after him
>> >>investigation of problems he formulated for himself and for all of us.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>Sasha
>> >>
>> >>-----Original Message-----
>> >>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> On
>> >>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> >>Sent: Wednesday, November 29, 2006 12:22 AM
>> >>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> >>Subject: RE: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>Big question Michael.
>> >>
>> >>See http://www.marxists.org/archive/lektorsky/subject-object/index.htm
>> >> for
>> >>
>> >>a book-length answer from Lektorsky.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>Subject and object are always two distinct entities, but the subject
>> >> (some
>> >>
>> >>self-conscious system of activity) arises out of some definite,
>> objective
>> >>
>> >>system of activity when it becomes self-conscious, and the activity
>> then
>> >>
>> >>constitutes (in AN Leontyev's words) the "intertraffic" between
>> subject
>> >> and
>> >>
>> >>object. The activity of the subject then is to objectify itself in the
>> >>
>> >>object, giving its activities material forms deposited in the
>> objective
>> >>
>> >>world around it, vested with meanings by which the subject
>> >>
>> >>"institutionalises" itself.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>So in the beginning there is no distinction, because the relevant
>> system
>> >> of
>> >>
>> >>activity has not yet become self-conscious, and in the end there is no
>> >>
>> >>distinction because the subject has "naturalised" its activity and
>> become
>> >>
>> >>indistinguishable from the object. These are of course both
>> tendencies,
>> >> and
>> >>
>> >>not absolute truths, and the whole life of a subject exists between
>> these
>> >>
>> >>two poles.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>Andy
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>At 02:03 PM 28/11/2006 -0500, you wrote:
>> >>
>> >> >Andy and Paul,
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >What is the argument that a dialectical approach, even dialectical
>> >>
>> >> >materialism, dissolves the difference between subject and object? I
>> >> guess
>> >>
>> >> >we are all influenced by what we have been reading lately, but it
>> seems
>> >>
>> >> >that it is difficult for a dialectic based perspective to escape the
>> >>
>> >> >idealism trap.
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >Thanks,
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >Michael
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >-----Original Message-----
>> >>
>> >> >From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>> [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>> >> On
>> >>
>> >> >Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>> >>
>> >> >Sent: Tuesday, November 28, 2006 5:09 AM
>> >>
>> >> >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>> >>
>> >> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Empirical Evidence for ZPD (was= Does
>> >> VygotskyAccept
>> >>
>> >> >the "Assistance Assumption"?)
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >Paul, surely you overstate the matter.
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >ZPD is, like all scientific concepts, a theory-laden object. To say
>> >> that it
>> >>
>> >> >exists says that certain more or less well-defined procedures
>> >> understood
>> >>
>> >> >within the Vygotskyan theory, will produce this or that verifiable
>> >> result.
>> >>
>> >> >Otherwise what is the useof the concept and the theory of which it
>> is a
>> >>
>> >> >part? While there are lots of concepts within the Vygotskyan theory
>> >> which
>> >>
>> >> >are new and unique, or have a Marxist genealogy, there are also
>> plenty
>> >>
>> >> >which are shared with all pedagogical theories and common sense. In
>> >> fact,
>> >>
>> >> >all scientific theories must incorporate "common sense" concepts
>> into
>> >> their
>> >>
>> >> >framework in order to be truly scientific. "Empiricism" denies that
>> >>
>> >> >scientific objects are "theory laden" and that there is anything
>> >>
>> >> >problematic in the idea of a purely factual test for the existence
>> of
>> >> some
>> >>
>> >> >object. But to deny Empiricism is not to deny the validity and
>> >> necessity of
>> >>
>> >> >empirical evidence.
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >And surely it is wrong to say that in Marxism or Vygotsky "the
>> subject
>> >>
>> >> >object distinction is dissolved". The absolute independence and
>> >>
>> >> >separateness of subject and object is certainly denied by Marx and
>> >>
>> >> >Vygotsky, but neither claim that "subject" and "object" are invalid
>> >>
>> >> >concepts, or concepts between which no distinction can be made. For
>> >>
>> >> >example, Marx does not claim that an object (e.g. ZPD) exists
>> insofar
>> >> as a
>> >>
>> >> >subject (Vygotskyan psychology) incorporates the concept in its
>> >> activity,
>> >>
>> >> >so that empirical refutation of the concept is ruled out in
>> principle.
>> >> No
>> >>
>> >> >subject exists in absolute separateness from every other subject,
>> all
>> >>
>> >> >subjects exist in a material and therefore infinitely
>> interconnected,
>> >>
>> >> >world. So the identity of subject and object can only be relative,
>> not
>> >>
>> >> >absolute.
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >Andy
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >At 12:26 AM 28/11/2006 -0800, you wrote:
>> >>
>> >> > > Isn´'t the idea of "empirical" evidence for the ZPD something
>> of
>> >> an
>> >>
>> >> > > oxymoron in itself? Didn{t Vygotsky develop his thinking within
>> the
>> >>
>> >> > > framework of dialetical materialism, something that many north
>> >> americans
>> >>
>> >> > > and others seem all too ready to forget? Isn't the concept of a
>> ZPD
>> >> a
>> >>
>> >> > > dialectical model in itself, which is to say, a model in which
>> the
>> >>
>> >> > > subject object distinction is dissolved, a dissolution which
>> defies
>> >> the
>> >>
>> >> > > concept of empirical?
>> >>
>> >> > > Paul Dillon
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380
>> 9435,
>> >> AIM
>> >>
>> >> >identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>> >>
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> >_______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >> >xmca mailing list
>> >>
>> >> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >>
>> >> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>
>> >> >_______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >> >xmca mailing list
>> >>
>> >> >xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >>
>> >> >http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>> >> AIM
>> >>
>> >>identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>_______________________________________________
>> >>
>> >>xmca mailing list
>> >>
>> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >>
>> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >>
>> >>_______________________________________________
>> >>xmca mailing list
>> >>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> >>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >
>> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>> AIM
>> > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> > xmca mailing list
>> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>> >
>>
>>
>>--
>>Katarina A. Rodina
>>MSc in Speech-Language Therapy,
>>PhD-Research Fellow,
>>Department of Special Needs Education
>>University of Oslo
>>P.O.Box 1140 Blindern
>>NO-0318 OSLO,Norway
>>Phone: +47 22 85 81 38
>>Fax: +47 22 85 80 21
>>E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.no
>>
>>Head of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation,
>>Herzen State Pedagogical University
>>St.Petersburg, Russia
>>E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru
>>tlf: +47 41 108 408
>>http://www.herzen.spb.ru
>>
>>
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>xmca mailing list
>>xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, AIM
> identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>
> _______________________________________________
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
-- Katarina A. Rodina MSc in Speech-Language Therapy, PhD-Research Fellow, Department of Special Needs Education University of Oslo P.O.Box 1140 Blindern NO-0318 OSLO,Norway Phone: +47 22 85 81 38 Fax: +47 22 85 80 21 E-mail: katarina.rodina@isp.uio.noHead of Russo-Norwegian Academic Cooperation, Herzen State Pedagogical University St.Petersburg, Russia E-mail: ro-dina@mail.ru tlf: +47 41 108 408 http://www.herzen.spb.ru
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