Andy,
About Vietnamese demonization:
The objectivity (in the scientific rather than moral sense) of Vietnamese
discourse on American participation in the War was one of the aspects of
their campaign for independence that convinced me that they would ultimately
win over whatever the US threw at them. Relative to the so-called
professionalism of the American military and their academic advisors, their
cool appraisal of the limitations of US strategy and, more importantly, of
the attitude of American Civil and military authorities to war in general
and to the VN war in particular made the DOD experts and advisors sound like
children.
In the mid '60s I attended a lecture on Vietnamese social psychology by an
American Anthropologist working either for the DOD or the CIA. It was pure
nonsense; something about how the people of VN were incapable of knowing the
difference between Truth (what really happened) and their ideology. Even we
undergraduates could see from the data he cited that the real issue was
clever manipulation of agitprop and the irrelevanceof his theorizing about
what is true and untrue. Of course we had been running public
demonstrations too so, and it's likely that we were better acquainted with
the dynamics of mass actions than he was. From information coming from
Iraq, it appears that this profound ignorance of the social psychology of
war still characterizes the American defence community. The Americans'
inordinate absorption in the machinery of war, the instruments of repression
if you will, at the expense of attention to the relations of war is clearly
evident in their policy or rather lack of it in their treatment of Iraqi
prisoners throughout the theatre. The VN and the Chinese would have
naturally taken the advantage of such a large captive audience as an
opportunity for changing hearts and minds rather than for gaining a few
driblets of doubtful and most likely, obsolete intelligence. While the
political bureau of the People's Army of NV and the Viet Cong was regarded
as having no less importance than the strictly military agencies, the DOD
and even the CIA, which should know better, regard the political effort as a
bit of frosting or cosmetics to prettify the "real" macinery of war. Perhaps
the technicians and their advisors at the DOD aren't really very convinced
about the democratic values they publically advocate.
Highest regards,
Victor
----- Original Message -----
From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2004 3:33 AM
Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> Yes I was amazed and delighted when the Czechs and Slovaks just parted
> company in good spirit. I think Sweden/Norway is the only earlier
precedent
> for that, but hopefully there will be more!
>
> On Monday I watched an extended interview with Jose Ramos Horta, one of
the
> leaders of the East Timor resistance movement FRETILIN, whose job it was
> during the Indonesian occupation of their country, to tour the world
trying
> to get support for their cause. He pointed out that at no time did
FRETILIN
> "demonise" the Indonesians or Americans and Australians, because he said,
> they would eventually have to live with these people, once they had
> attained their victory. It seems to me that the Vietnamese also never
> engaged in the demonisation tactic and their use of bombings of civilian
> targets was also almost nil. It seems to me that brutality and inhumanity
> does not always flow from war, just as (as you point out) nations do not
> have to slaughter each other if they want to go their own way.
>
> Andy
>
> At 07:42 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> >The only ones that I can think of are the UN police actions in Korea,
Congo,
> >Iraq 1, Bosnia and Kossovo, and so on . Most other late 20th century
wars
> >were either counter-insurgency operations or, like Topsy, they just
> >happened. Messy isn't it.
> >
> >The Brits have had only one real success in anti-insurgent action,
Malaya,
> >the Americans have gotten their way in Chile (or so they thought until
they
> >learned how incompetent and expensive military dictatorships usually
are),
> >the Israelis have only managed a doubtful stalemate, the Russians have
been
> >fighting the Chechens on and off ever since the mid 19th century, and the
> >Vietnamese more or less succeeded in repressing the Pot Pol abomination.
> >You're right there, pure repression does not have a particularly good
record
> >as an effective way of dealing with popular uprisings. You'd have
thought
> >that someone would have come up with a better solution by now. The
Czechs
> >might have started something new when they quickly agreed to Slovakia's
> >demands for the status of an independent state. Smart people those
Czechs.
> >Regards
> >Victor
> >
> >----- Original Message -----
> >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 1:15 PM
> >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> >
> >
> > > Apologies for jumping into this thread somewhat precipitously Victor
and
> > > perhaps being a bit disruptive. I would like to ask you to help
clarify a
> > > few things about war.
> > >
> > > I was born in October 1945. Has there been a declaration of war any
time
> >in
> > > my lifetime? I can't think of any.
> > >
> > > Nevertheless, people rightly still distinguish between war and
not-war,
> > > despite attempt of the prosecutors to cast their actions as "police
> > > actions" or "intervention" or "support to the government" or whatever.
> > >
> > > It is a strange thing, isn't it, that war gives licence to do things
that
> > > are otherwise illegal. So for example, the US administration felt no
> > > compunction about dropping bombs on a city during the "war," but
beating
> > > and humiliating people after the enemy's army has been destroyed and
the
> >US
> > > is the administrator of the country are rightly not considered
admissible.
> > >
> > > The British and the Israelis are very experienced at administering
subject
> > > populations. The US has bombed countries, they've blockaded countries,
> > > they've subverted them and financed torture regimes, they've
subjugated
> > > most of the world economically, but have they ever successfully
subjugated
> > > a population by military means?
> > >
> > > I know I've gone way off the subject, Victor, sorry for that. I
understand
> > > you were discussing the psychological facts of life of people involved
in
> >a
> > > war. My guess on that is that anyone who has been naive enough to
> > > *volunteer* for one of those jobs (softening up prisoners in Iraq,
etc.)
> >is
> > > going to behave like that. Anyone with the strength of character not
to
> > > degenerate in that way would never have joined up.
> > >
> > > And as for the opposition from Iraq. What did anyone expect? Did
anyone
> > > really believe that the US army was going to fly into the heart of
Arab
> > > territory and set up anything better than something resembling
Guantanamo
> >Bay?
> > >
> > > sorry for the interruption
> > > Andy
> > >
> > > At 12:43 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > >Andy,
> > > >The focus of the discussion was - at least up to now - on the
practice of
> > > >war. I think that rational analysis has a lot to say on this subject
and
> > > >said so. You're raising a different, though no less important issue,
the
> > > >wider economic and political questions involved in the decision to go
to
> > > >war. Simple good-old repression, gunboat diplomacy and what have
you
> >are
> > > >practices of war; ask any Vietnamese vetran (as well as a good many
> >American
> > > >and Russian vetrans for that matter), most Iraqi citizens, and... (I
> >don't
> > > >think its necessary to list others, there are plenty). War is as
> >Clauswitz
> > > >wrote is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to
fulfil
> >our
> > > >will." I can't think of a better definition than that for repression!
War
> > > >can be undeclared, it can involve ngo's, and can even be declared
against
> >an
> > > >unarmed population.
> > > >
> > > >The fact that war is repression is like the fact that it is violent,
not
> > > >really very useful for serious analysis. Machiavelli, V. Clauswitz,
Marx
> > > >and Engels, as well as other more recent writers like Hobsbawm, Stadt
and
> > > >Schelling have raised important and relevant questions about war; its
> > > >relation to economics and civil society, its role in
cultural-historical
> > > >development, and so on. Considering the threat of war to human
survival
> >and
> > > >the natural difficulties of regarding it rationally, it is a major
> > > >challenge, if not the major challenge to cultural-historical
analysis.
> > > >Highest regards,
> > > >Victor
> > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 11:01 AM
> > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > Sorry Victor. I think that was one of those reflex messages when I
> >should
> > > > > hesitate before pressing "Send."
> > > > > I guess part of my reaction was because of radio talk here to the
> >effect
> > > > > that "war is like this," i.e., it's justifiable. But of course
what
> >may be
> > > > > at a pinch justifiable in overcoming an opposing army can in no
sense
> >at
> > > > > all be justified when occupying a country and suppressing the
> >resistance
> > > >of
> > > > > its populace. The war was justified before the event because
although
> >they
> > > > > were going to kill civilians with their "precision bombing" it was
all
> > > > > worth it to get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime. I guess a lot of
> > > > > Americans and even some Iraqis were willing to go along with that
> > > > > utilitarian argument. This is what they get. And it isn't war,
because
> > > > > there's no-one to declare war against. This is just simple, good
old
> > > > > fashioned repression.
> > > > > Andy
> > > > > At 10:41 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > >Andy,
> > > > > >Since when is war a matter of official prononciamentos? The US
> >fought a
> > > >10
> > > > > >year undeclared war in Vietnam (one important reason why I don't
live
> > > >there)
> > > > > >killed some 2 million Vietnamese and about 58,000 Americans,
> >effectively
> > > > > >destroyed the physical and economic infrastructure of Vietnam and
> >lost
> > > >the
> > > > > >war against international Communism to boot. The WAR in Iraq
> >promises us
> > > > > >another replay of Vietnam. It will probably go on interminably
for
> >years,
> > > > > >kill lots of Americans and many many more Iraqis, destroy
whatever
> > > >remnants
> > > > > >of economic and civil organization are left in Iraq, and the US
will
> >end
> > > >up
> > > > > >losing the war for Liberal Democracy to boot. Is it relevant? I
say
> >it's
> > > > > >relevant as h--l!
> > > > > >Highest regards,
> > > > > >Victor
> > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:36 AM
> > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
> > > > > > > What is going on now is the imposition of democracy in Iraq
by
> >the
> > > > > > > occupying power.
> > > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >Peter and David,
> > > > > > > >1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy
judgements
> >too
> > > > > >quickly
> > > > > > > >arrived at, and a measure of distance from the conditions
> >experienced
> > > >by
> > > > > > > >soldiers and police officers, and civilians in war-time
> >conditions.
> > > >The
> > > > > > > >Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at Stanford, and
> >other
> > > >like
> > > > > > > >exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and terror have
only
> >the
> > > > > >barest
> > > > > > > >relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror in
war-time.
> >The
> > > > > > > >discovery that humans are capable of collective violence,
even
> > > >extreme
> > > > > > > >collective violence, is of little interest when applied to
the
> >study
> > > >and
> > > > > > > >evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY KNOW THAT!
> >Regard
> > > >the
> > > > > > > >elementary concept of war as presented by that most excellent
> > > >objective
> > > > > > > >idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> > > > > > > > "War ...
is
> >an
> > > >act of
> > > > > > > >violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."
> > > > > > > >This concept is elementary, and universal; it does not refer
to
> > > >Americans
> > > > > >at
> > > > > > > >war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc. etc. but
to
> >all
> > > > > > > >practicioners of war and to all practice of war. Thus, in the
> >context
> > > >of
> > > > > >war
> > > > > > > >we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this or that
> >policy of
> > > > > > > >violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our opponent
to
> > > >fulfill
> > > > > >our
> > > > > > > >will," not the practice of violence itself. Critical
evaluation
> >of
> > > >the
> > > > > > > >practice at war is most useful when addressed to the military
> > > >mission.
> > > > > > > >Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at all
levels:
> >be it
> > > >the
> > > > > > > >decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so without full
UN
> > > > > > > >participation, the decision to renovate the Al Ghraib prison,
the
> > > > > >decision
> > > > > > > >to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla activity -
now
> >all
> > > > > > > >extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately called
> >terror,
> > > >how
> > > > > > > >silly! - than can be secured and investigated with due speed
and
> > > > > > > >effectiveness, and so on and on
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the Al Ghraib
> >prison
> > > > > >within
> > > > > > > >the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course, criticize
the
> > > >mission
> > > > > >as
> > > > > > > >a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of one,
possibly
> >two,
> > > > > > > >powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose in a
war in
> > > >Iraq
> > > > > > > >augmented by a collection of their client states. While
there
> >is a
> > > >good
> > > > > > > >deal to be said about the explicit and hidden objectives of
the
> > > >mission
> > > > > >in
> > > > > > > >Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion. Evaluation
of
> >the
> > > > > > > >treatment of a rebellious civilian population, prisoners of
war
> >and
> > > > > > > >prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make this
short:
> >the
> > > > > > > >under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques" by
personell
> >with
> > > > > >only a
> > > > > > > >smattering acquaintance with the psychology and psychobiology
of
> > > > > >coercion,
> > > > > > > >with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural and
social
> > > >contexts
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > >their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is a
discussion
> >of
> > > > > > > >war-time practice), total ignorance of useful military
practice
> >has
> > > > > >produced
> > > > > > > >conditions that expose the coalition armies to the most
difficult
> > > >kind of
> > > > > > > >oppositional modes; that of angry contempt. Demonization of
the
> > > >enemy,
> > > > > > > >indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to the mission
at
> > > >hand,
> > > > > >and
> > > > > > > >the emergence of what I called in an earlier message the
> >formation of
> > > > > >unit
> > > > > > > >practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all sure signs
of
> > > >emergent
> > > > > > > >irrelevance of practice for the effective realization of
> >military
> > > > > > > >objectives and the general collapse of morale.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize that their
> > > >opponents
> > > > > >are
> > > > > > > >as human as they are has already gone a long way in becoming
a
> > > >military
> > > > > > > >liability and is in severe danger of permanent, irrevocable
and
> >final
> > > > > > > >closure. Demonization is, in a military context, simply the
> > > >replacement
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > >that most basic principle of the art of war; "know thine
opponent
> >at
> > > > > >least
> > > > > > > >as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but false
image
> >of
> > > >the
> > > > > > > >opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. . When
> > > >administration
> > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi
> >dissidents,
> > > >and
> > > > > > > >liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very uprising they
> > > >ostensibly
> > > > > >hope
> > > > > > > >to repress. Relevant too is the example from the Rwandan
> >genocide.
> > > >The
> > > > > > > >reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as "cockroaches" may
> >have
> > > >given
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > >Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed Tutsi's,
but
> >it
> > > > > >resulted
> > > > > > > >in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi "cockroaches"
> >managed
> > > >to
> > > > > > > >expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into permanent exile
in
> > > >refugee
> > > > > > > >camps outside Rwanda.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the practice
of
> >war,
> > > >but
> > > > > >it
> > > > > > > >alone never guarantees the political aims of war. Of the
most
> >often
> > > > > >cited
> > > > > > > >examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis Khan, the
> >Romans
> > > >and,
> > > > > >of
> > > > > > > >course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to stabilize
> > > >somewhat
> > > > > >their
> > > > > > > >victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious
> >incorporation of
> > > > > > > >conquered states into the very fabric of their empire.
> >Certainly,
> > > >the
> > > > > > > >indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to military
goals
> >is as
> > > > > > > >ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and even
> > > > > >counter-productive
> > > > > > > >to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance.
Indisciplined
> > > >violence
> > > > > >on
> > > > > > > >the part of a military organization signals its opponents
that
> >there
> > > >is
> > > > > > > >really no basis for reasonable relations (these can exist in
war
> >as
> > > >in
> > > > > >any
> > > > > > > >other circumstance) and that even compliance is not a real
> >option.
> > > >In
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > >absence of any possibility to communicate with the enemy, the
> >only
> > > > > > > >possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter end),
something
> >that
> > > >no
> > > > > > > >reasonable policy of war can accept.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >5. As written above we've already discussed the problems of
the
> > > > > >emergence
> > > > > > > >of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's mission. In
those
> > > > > > > >presentations we also indicated that the authoritarian
military
> > > >hierarchy
> > > > > > > >has evolved from the integral difficulties of critical
> > > >self-evaluation
> > > > > >for
> > > > > > > >the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree entirely
> >with
> > > > > >Stephen
> > > > > > > >Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of responsible and
> > > >intelligent
> > > > > > > >military leadership is integral to an effective military
> > > >organization.
> > > > > >It
> > > > > > > >is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed questions
> > > >concerning
> > > > > >the
> > > > > > > >nature and conditions of leadership in democratic, mass
society.
> > > > > >National
> > > > > > > >leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists are
subject
> >to
> > > > > >political
> > > > > > > >pressures of both special interests and of public opinion
that is
> > > >neither
> > > > > > > >subject to the discipline of rational practice of war nor
even
> > > >familiar
> > > > > >with
> > > > > > > >war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal of
> >expressions
> > > >such
> > > > > >as
> > > > > > > >"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police Pigs" to
a
> > > >frightened
> > > > > > > >and impressionable population that votes, often without a
clear
> >idea
> > > >of
> > > > > >what
> > > > > > > >they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize public
support
> >for
> > > > > >extreme
> > > > > > > >politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's Tonkin Bay
> >incident,
> > > >the
> > > > > >WMD
> > > > > > > >foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n word +
piles"
> >of
> > > >naked
> > > > > > > >Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the coalition
forces
> >in
> > > >Iraq.
> > > > > >The
> > > > > > > >emergence of national states, mass democracy, and the
> >possibilities
> > > >for
> > > > > > > >concentrating tremendous resources for the prosecution of war
and
> > > > > >oppression
> > > > > > > >has made the last century the bloodiest in human history, and
it
> > > >appears
> > > > > > > >that we haven't really even begun to address the problem in
this
> > > >century
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > > > >From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
> > > > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > > >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
> > > > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of hard
core
> > > >criminals
> > > > > >and
> > > > > > > > > hard core guards.
> > > > > > > > > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Peter,
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >What Oz is?
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few times I
saw
> >NYPD
> > > > > >blue,
> > > > > > > > > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of legitimizing
the
> >use
> > > >of
> > > > > > > > > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of course, in
a
> > > >"softened"
> > > > > > > > > >way, but the underlying message was quite violent and, of
> > > >course,the
> > > > > > > > > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with the good
> >cops. As
> > > > > >9/11
> > > > > > > > > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American movies,
the
> >Iraq
> > > > > >Torture
> > > > > > > > > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty of cases
where
> > > > > >physical
> > > > > > > > > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in a
threshold
> >that
> > > >an
> > > > > > > > > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >David
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > > > > > > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > > > > > > > > >Psychologists
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The Experiment
for
> >the
> > > >BBC
> > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > 2002
> > > > > > > > > > > >So groups of people in positions of unaccountable
power
> > > >naturally
> > > > > > > > > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according to
research
> > > >conducted
> > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > > > > > > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison showing
Americans
> > > >abusing
> > > > > > > > > > > Iraqi
> > > > > > > > > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to distance
> >ourselves
> > > >from
> > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who commit such
acts
> >are
> > > >not
> > > > > > > > > > > like
> > > > > > > > > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted or
disturbed
> >in
> > > >some
> > > > > > > > > > > way?
> > > > > > > > > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would never
condone
> >or
> > > > > > > > > > > contribute
> > > > > > > > > > > >to such events.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological research
> >indicates
> > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of major
> >studies
> > > >have
> > > > > > > > > > > shown
> > > > > > > > > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided into
groups
> >and
> > > > > >placed
> > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > >competition against each other, can become abusive
and
> > > >violent.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > > > > > > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed experimenters to
give
> > > >electric
> > > > > > > > > > > >shocks to another
> > > > > > > > > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > > > > > > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison
experiment,
> > > >conducted
> > > > > > > > > > > by
> > > > > > > > > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly showed that
> >young
> > > > > > > > > > > students
> > > > > > > > > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard quickly became
> > > > > >sadistically
> > > > > > > > > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role of
> >prisoners.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the disturbing
> > > >implication of
> > > > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of a small
> >minority
> > > >of
> > > > > > > > > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the capacity to
> >behave
> > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > evil
> > > > > > > > > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by Hannah
Arendt
> >whose
> > > > > > > > > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann,
led
> >her
> > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > remark
> > > > > > > > > > > >that what was most frightening was just how mild and
> >ordinary
> > > >he
> > > > > > > > > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being threatened
with
> >dogs
> > > >(AP
> > > > > > > > > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might go
further
> >and
> > > > > > > > > > > conclude
> > > > > > > > > > > >that the torturers were victims of circumstances,
that
> >they
> > > >lost
> > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > >moral compass in the group and did things they would
> >normally
> > > > > > > > > > > abhor.
> > > > > > > > > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as evidence, this
is
> > > >precisely
> > > > > > > > > > > what
> > > > > > > > > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad psychology
and
> >it is
> > > >bad
> > > > > > > > > > > >ethics.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we can
explain
> >human
> > > > > > > > > > > behaviour
> > > > > > > > > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider culture in
which
> >it
> > > >is
> > > > > > > > > > > located.
> > > > > > > > > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves everyone from
any
> > > > > > > > > > > responsibility
> > > > > > > > > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as
constituents
> >of
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > wider
> > > > > > > > > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports have
> >indicated
> > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > >guards were following orders from intelligence
officers
> >and
> > > > > > > > > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the prisoners for
> > > > > > > > > > > interrogation.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in which
these
> > > >soldiers
> > > > > > > > > > > were
> > > > > > > > > > > >immersed was one in which they were encouraged to see
and
> > > >treat
> > > > > > > > > > > Iraqis
> > > > > > > > > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost certainly had a
very
> > > > > > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > > > > > >culture and this provides a second explanation of why
> >some
> > > >people
> > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did not.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors were at
play
> >is
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > fact
> > > > > > > > > > > >that the pictures were taken at all. Reminiscent of
the
> > > >postcards
> > > > > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their activities,
the
> > > >torture
> > > > > > > > > > > was
> > > > > > > > > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of fun.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know what they
had
> > > >done'
> > > > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know what they
had
> >done,
> > > > > > > > > > > >presumably believing that the audience would approve.
> >This
> > > >sense
> > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > >approval is very important, since there is ample
evidence
> > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > people
> > > > > > > > > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations to behave
in
> > > >obnoxious
> > > > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly - that
they
> >have
> > > > > > > > > > > broader
> > > > > > > > > > > >support.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that sense
from?
> >This
> > > >takes
> > > > > >us
> > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour: leadership.
In
> >the
> > > > > > > > > > > studies,
> > > > > > > > > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters either
> >overtly or
> > > > > > > > > > > tacitly
> > > > > > > > > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was crucial to
the
> >way
> > > > > > > > > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish to
act - or
> >be
> > > >seen
> > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own research
for
> >the
> > > >BBC
> > > > > >did
> > > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford study,
was
> >that
> > > >we
> > > > > >did
> > > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his participants: "You
can
> >create
> > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to
some
> > > >degree,
> > > > > >you
> > > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is
> >totally
> > > > > > > > > > > controlled
> > > > > > > > > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll have no
> > > >privacy....
> > > > > >In
> > > > > > > > > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of
> >powerlessness".
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to ask what
> >messages
> > > > > >were
> > > > > > > > > > > >being provided by fellow and, more critically, senior
> > > >officers in
> > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > >units where torture took place? Did those who didn't
> >approve
> > > >fail
> > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or disloyal?
Did
> > > >senior
> > > > > > > > > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a blind eye
or
> >else
> > > > > > > > > > > simply
> > > > > > > > > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai massacre,
and
> >in
> > > >many
> > > > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most about how
it
> >can
> > > >happen
> > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers and
torturers
> >can
> > > > > >begin
> > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > >believe that they will not be held to account for
what
> >they
> > > >do,
> > > > > >or
> > > > > > > > > > > even
> > > > > > > > > > > >that their actions are something praiseworthy. The
more
> >they
> > > > > > > > > > > perceive
> > > > > > > > > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more they will
give
> >it a
> > > > > >thumbs
> > > > > > > > > > > up
> > > > > > > > > > > >themselves.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of episodes? One
answer
> >is
> > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > ensure
> > > > > > > > > > > >that people are always made aware of their other
moral
> > > > > >commitments
> > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the
pressures
> >within
> > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > >military group, their ties to others must never be
> >broken.
> > > >Total
> > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > >secret institutions, where people are isolated from
> >contact
> > > >with
> > > > > > > > > > > all
> > > > > > > > > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity. Similarly,
> >there
> > > >are
> > > > > > > > > > > great
> > > > > > > > > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions to
private
> > > > > > > > > > > contractors
> > > > > > > > > > > >which lack fully developed structures of public
> > > >accountability.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of our
> >institutions
> > > >and
> > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad
leadership
> >can
> > > > > >permit
> > > > > > > > > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can actively
> >promote
> > > > > > > > > > > oppressive
> > > > > > > > > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in Zimbardo's
study
> >and
> > > >may
> > > > > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > > > >the case in certain military intelligence units. But
> > > >sometimes
> > > > > > > > > > > leaders
> > > > > > > > > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and hence create
a
> >vacuum
> > > >of
> > > > > > > > > > > power.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > > > > > > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a vacuum
> >exists,
> > > > > >people
> > > > > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > > > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of action which
is
> > > > > >vigorously
> > > > > > > > > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from
powerlessness
> > > >rather
> > > > > > > > > > > than
> > > > > > > > > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders to
champion
> > > >clear
> > > > > > > > > > > humane
> > > > > > > > > > > >and democratic values is part of the problem.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership in the
> >military.
> > > >One
> > > > > > > > > > > must
> > > > > > > > > > > >look more widely at the messages and the values
provided
> >in
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > >community at large. That means that we must address
the
> > > >anti-Arab
> > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A culture where
we
> >have
> > > >got
> > > > > > > > > > > used
> > > > > > > > > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked, chained
and
> > > >humiliated
> > > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > > >create a climate in which torturers see themselves as
> >heroes
> > > > > > > > > > > rather
> > > > > > > > > > > >than villains.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is not
necessary
> >for
> > > > > >everyone
> > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient simply for
> >those
> > > >who
> > > > > > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > > > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step with
societal
> > > >norms.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >And we must also look at political leadership. When
> > > > > >administration
> > > > > > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of
Iraqi
> > > > > >dissidents,
> > > > > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example, that just
> >before
> > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started referring
to
> > > >Tutsi's
> > > > > > > > > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after an abuse
> >scandal
> > > > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate in which
> > > > > >perpetrators
> > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they are
nobly
> >doing
> > > >what
> > > > > > > > > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in Iraq may
or
> >may
> > > >not
> > > > > > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > > > > > >been following direct orders from their leaders, but
they
> > > >were
> > > > > > > > > > > almost
> > > > > > > > > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were behaving as
good
> > > > > > > > > > > followers.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >So if we want to understand why torture occurs, it is
> > > >important
> > > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of groups,
and of
> > > > > >society.
> > > > > > > > > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of individuals
and
> >can
> > > >lead
> > > > > > > > > > > them
> > > > > > > > > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how any
given
> >group
> > > > > > > > > > > affects
> > > > > > > > > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and values of
that
> > > >specific
> > > > > > > > > > > group.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism. The
choice is
> >not
> > > > > >denied
> > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own hands. Hence,
we
> >need
> > > >a
> > > > > > > > > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the values and
> >beliefs
> > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > we,
> > > > > > > > > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote. These
create
> >the
> > > > > > > > > > > conditions
> > > > > > > > > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either emboldened or
> >unable
> > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > act.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept rather than
> >avoid
> > > >our
> > > > > > > > > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a psychology
which
> >does
> > > >not
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >distance us from torture but which requires us to
look
> > > >closely at
> > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are implicated
in
> >a
> > > > > >society
> > > > > > > > > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at
University of
> > > >Exeter
> > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social Psychology.
> >Stephen
> > > > > >Reicher
> > > > > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > > > >a professor of psychology at University of St
Andrews,
> >past
> > > > > >editor
> > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and a fellow
of
> >the
> > > > > >Royal
> > > > > > > > > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST