Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo (ERRATUM)

From: david.preiss@yale.edu
Date: Tue May 11 2004 - 19:18:11 PDT


Of course my e-mail below has a huge typo! Where it says "SO ABSENT"
it should say "NO ABSENT" or if you wish "SO PRESENT". To make it
brief, what I was just saying is that demonisation has been an active
strategy of islamic fundamentalism which has produced SO bad
consequences for the islamic peoples, as would any form of
fundamentalism do to any society. Indeed, from the point of view of
the subjected, the connection between resistance and fundamentalism is
as dangerous as the one between totalitarism and fundamentalism.

Quoting david.preiss@yale.edu:

>
> Andy,
>
> Demonisation tactics, I may add, which have unfortunately been so
> absent in the minds of the so called "islamist" militants accross the
>
> world and that so much suffering have brought into their own
> peoples.
>
> I was thinking today that the same way that he have been prompt to
> criticize the actions of the military, we should also be prompt to
> applaud the entrance to scene of Monsieur Taguba. If any of you have
>
> any references of Monsieur, I would love to learn more. I guess one
>
> has to be courageous to produce a report as the one he produced in
> the
> current political scenario.
>
> David
>
> Quoting Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>:
>
> > Yes I was amazed and delighted when the Czechs and Slovaks just
> > parted
> > company in good spirit. I think Sweden/Norway is the only earlier
> > precedent
> > for that, but hopefully there will be more!
> >
> > On Monday I watched an extended interview with Jose Ramos Horta,
> one
> > of the
> > leaders of the East Timor resistance movement FRETILIN, whose job
> it
> > was
> > during the Indonesian occupation of their country, to tour the
> world
> > trying
> > to get support for their cause. He pointed out that at no time
> did
> > FRETILIN
> > "demonise" the Indonesians or Americans and Australians, because
> he
> > said,
> > they would eventually have to live with these people, once they
> had
> >
> > attained their victory. It seems to me that the Vietnamese also
> never
> >
> > engaged in the demonisation tactic and their use of bombings of
> > civilian
> > targets was also almost nil. It seems to me that brutality and
> > inhumanity
> > does not always flow from war, just as (as you point out) nations
> do
> > not
> > have to slaughter each other if they want to go their own way.
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > At 07:42 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > >The only ones that I can think of are the UN police actions in
> > Korea, Congo,
> > >Iraq 1, Bosnia and Kossovo, and so on . Most other late 20th
> > century wars
> > >were either counter-insurgency operations or, like Topsy, they
> > just
> > >happened. Messy isn't it.
> > >
> > >The Brits have had only one real success in anti-insurgent
> action,
> > Malaya,
> > >the Americans have gotten their way in Chile (or so they thought
> > until they
> > >learned how incompetent and expensive military dictatorships
> usually
> > are),
> > >the Israelis have only managed a doubtful stalemate, the
> Russians
> > have been
> > >fighting the Chechens on and off ever since the mid 19th
> century,
> > and the
> > >Vietnamese more or less succeeded in repressing the Pot Pol
> > abomination.
> > >You're right there, pure repression does not have a particularly
> > good record
> > >as an effective way of dealing with popular uprisings. You'd
> have
> > thought
> > >that someone would have come up with a better solution by now.
> The
> > Czechs
> > >might have started something new when they quickly agreed to
> > Slovakia's
> > >demands for the status of an independent state. Smart people
> those
> > Czechs.
> > >Regards
> > >Victor
> > >
> > >----- Original Message -----
> > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 1:15 PM
> > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > >
> > >
> > > > Apologies for jumping into this thread somewhat precipitously
> > Victor and
> > > > perhaps being a bit disruptive. I would like to ask you to
> help
> > clarify a
> > > > few things about war.
> > > >
> > > > I was born in October 1945. Has there been a declaration of
> war
> > any time
> > >in
> > > > my lifetime? I can't think of any.
> > > >
> > > > Nevertheless, people rightly still distinguish between war
> and
> > not-war,
> > > > despite attempt of the prosecutors to cast their actions as
> > "police
> > > > actions" or "intervention" or "support to the government" or
> > whatever.
> > > >
> > > > It is a strange thing, isn't it, that war gives licence to do
> > things that
> > > > are otherwise illegal. So for example, the US administration
> felt
> > no
> > > > compunction about dropping bombs on a city during the "war,"
> but
> > beating
> > > > and humiliating people after the enemy's army has been
> destroyed
> > and the
> > >US
> > > > is the administrator of the country are rightly not
> considered
> > admissible.
> > > >
> > > > The British and the Israelis are very experienced at
> > administering subject
> > > > populations. The US has bombed countries, they've blockaded
> > countries,
> > > > they've subverted them and financed torture regimes, they've
> > subjugated
> > > > most of the world economically, but have they ever
> successfully
> > subjugated
> > > > a population by military means?
> > > >
> > > > I know I've gone way off the subject, Victor, sorry for that.
> I
> > understand
> > > > you were discussing the psychological facts of life of people
> > involved in
> > >a
> > > > war. My guess on that is that anyone who has been naive
> enough
> > to
> > > > *volunteer* for one of those jobs (softening up prisoners in
> > Iraq, etc.)
> > >is
> > > > going to behave like that. Anyone with the strength of
> character
> > not to
> > > > degenerate in that way would never have joined up.
> > > >
> > > > And as for the opposition from Iraq. What did anyone expect?
> Did
> > anyone
> > > > really believe that the US army was going to fly into the
> heart
> > of Arab
> > > > territory and set up anything better than something
> resembling
> > Guantanamo
> > >Bay?
> > > >
> > > > sorry for the interruption
> > > > Andy
> > > >
> > > > At 12:43 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > >Andy,
> > > > >The focus of the discussion was - at least up to now - on
> the
> > practice of
> > > > >war. I think that rational analysis has a lot to say on
> this
> > subject and
> > > > >said so. You're raising a different, though no less
> important
> > issue, the
> > > > >wider economic and political questions involved in the
> decision
> > to go to
> > > > >war. Simple good-old repression, gunboat diplomacy and
> what
> > have you
> > >are
> > > > >practices of war; ask any Vietnamese vetran (as well as a
> good
> > many
> > >American
> > > > >and Russian vetrans for that matter), most Iraqi citizens,
> > and... (I
> > >don't
> > > > >think its necessary to list others, there are plenty). War
> is
> > as
> > >Clauswitz
> > > > >wrote is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent
> to
> > fulfil
> > >our
> > > > >will." I can't think of a better definition than that for
> > repression! War
> > > > >can be undeclared, it can involve ngo's, and can even be
> > declared against
> > >an
> > > > >unarmed population.
> > > > >
> > > > >The fact that war is repression is like the fact that it is
> > violent, not
> > > > >really very useful for serious analysis. Machiavelli, V.
> > Clauswitz, Marx
> > > > >and Engels, as well as other more recent writers like
> Hobsbawm,
> > Stadt and
> > > > >Schelling have raised important and relevant questions about
> > war; its
> > > > >relation to economics and civil society, its role in
> > cultural-historical
> > > > >development, and so on. Considering the threat of war to
> human
> > survival
> > >and
> > > > >the natural difficulties of regarding it rationally, it is a
> > major
> > > > >challenge, if not the major challenge to cultural-historical
> > analysis.
> > > > >Highest regards,
> > > > >Victor
> > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 11:01 AM
> > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > Sorry Victor. I think that was one of those reflex
> messages
> > when I
> > >should
> > > > > > hesitate before pressing "Send."
> > > > > > I guess part of my reaction was because of radio talk here
> to
> > the
> > >effect
> > > > > > that "war is like this," i.e., it's justifiable. But of
> > course what
> > >may be
> > > > > > at a pinch justifiable in overcoming an opposing army can
> in
> > no sense
> > >at
> > > > > > all be justified when occupying a country and suppressing
> > the
> > >resistance
> > > > >of
> > > > > > its populace. The war was justified before the event
> because
> > although
> > >they
> > > > > > were going to kill civilians with their "precision
> bombing"
> > it was all
> > > > > > worth it to get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime. I guess
> a
> > lot of
> > > > > > Americans and even some Iraqis were willing to go along
> with
> > that
> > > > > > utilitarian argument. This is what they get. And it isn't
> > war, because
> > > > > > there's no-one to declare war against. This is just
> simple,
> > good old
> > > > > > fashioned repression.
> > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > At 10:41 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > > >Andy,
> > > > > > >Since when is war a matter of official prononciamentos?
> The
> > US
> > >fought a
> > > > >10
> > > > > > >year undeclared war in Vietnam (one important reason why
> I
> > don't live
> > > > >there)
> > > > > > >killed some 2 million Vietnamese and about 58,000
> > Americans,
> > >effectively
> > > > > > >destroyed the physical and economic infrastructure of
> > Vietnam and
> > >lost
> > > > >the
> > > > > > >war against international Communism to boot. The WAR in
> > Iraq
> > >promises us
> > > > > > >another replay of Vietnam. It will probably go on
> > interminably for
> > >years,
> > > > > > >kill lots of Americans and many many more Iraqis,
> destroy
> > whatever
> > > > >remnants
> > > > > > >of economic and civil organization are left in Iraq, and
> the
> > US will
> > >end
> > > > >up
> > > > > > >losing the war for Liberal Democracy to boot. Is it
> > relevant? I say
> > >it's
> > > > > > >relevant as h--l!
> > > > > > >Highest regards,
> > > > > > >Victor
> > > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:36 AM
> > > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
> > > > > > > > What is going on now is the imposition of democracy
> in
> > Iraq by
> > >the
> > > > > > > > occupying power.
> > > > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > >Peter and David,
> > > > > > > > >1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy
> > judgements
> > >too
> > > > > > >quickly
> > > > > > > > >arrived at, and a measure of distance from the
> > conditions
> > >experienced
> > > > >by
> > > > > > > > >soldiers and police officers, and civilians in
> > war-time
> > >conditions.
> > > > >The
> > > > > > > > >Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at
> Stanford,
> > and
> > >other
> > > > >like
> > > > > > > > >exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and
> terror
> > have only
> > >the
> > > > > > >barest
> > > > > > > > >relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror
> in
> > war-time.
> > >The
> > > > > > > > >discovery that humans are capable of collective
> > violence, even
> > > > >extreme
> > > > > > > > >collective violence, is of little interest when
> applied
> > to the
> > >study
> > > > >and
> > > > > > > > >evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY
> KNOW
> > THAT!
> > >Regard
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > >elementary concept of war as presented by that most
> > excellent
> > > > >objective
> > > > > > > > >idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> > > > > > > > >
> "War
> > ... is
> > >an
> > > > >act of
> > > > > > > > >violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil
> our
> > will."
> > > > > > > > >This concept is elementary, and universal; it does
> not
> > refer to
> > > > >Americans
> > > > > > >at
> > > > > > > > >war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc.
> etc.
> > but to
> > >all
> > > > > > > > >practicioners of war and to all practice of war.
> Thus,
> > in the
> > >context
> > > > >of
> > > > > > >war
> > > > > > > > >we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this
> or
> > that
> > >policy of
> > > > > > > > >violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our
> > opponent to
> > > > >fulfill
> > > > > > >our
> > > > > > > > >will," not the practice of violence itself.
> Critical
> > evaluation
> > >of
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > >practice at war is most useful when addressed to the
> > military
> > > > >mission.
> > > > > > > > >Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at
> all
> > levels:
> > >be it
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > >decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so
> without
> > full UN
> > > > > > > > >participation, the decision to renovate the Al
> Ghraib
> > prison, the
> > > > > > >decision
> > > > > > > > >to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla
> > activity - now
> > >all
> > > > > > > > >extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately
> > called
> > >terror,
> > > > >how
> > > > > > > > >silly! - than can be secured and investigated with
> due
> > speed and
> > > > > > > > >effectiveness, and so on and on
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the
> Al
> > Ghraib
> > >prison
> > > > > > >within
> > > > > > > > >the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course,
> > criticize the
> > > > >mission
> > > > > > >as
> > > > > > > > >a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of
> one,
> > possibly
> > >two,
> > > > > > > > >powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose
> in
> > a war in
> > > > >Iraq
> > > > > > > > >augmented by a collection of their client states.
> > While there
> > >is a
> > > > >good
> > > > > > > > >deal to be said about the explicit and hidden
> objectives
> > of the
> > > > >mission
> > > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > >Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion.
> > Evaluation of
> > >the
> > > > > > > > >treatment of a rebellious civilian population,
> prisoners
> > of war
> > >and
> > > > > > > > >prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make
> this
> > short:
> > >the
> > > > > > > > >under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques"
> by
> > personell
> > >with
> > > > > > >only a
> > > > > > > > >smattering acquaintance with the psychology and
> > psychobiology of
> > > > > > >coercion,
> > > > > > > > >with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural
> and
> > social
> > > > >contexts
> > > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > >their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is
> a
> > discussion
> > >of
> > > > > > > > >war-time practice), total ignorance of useful
> military
> > practice
> > >has
> > > > > > >produced
> > > > > > > > >conditions that expose the coalition armies to the
> most
> > difficult
> > > > >kind of
> > > > > > > > >oppositional modes; that of angry contempt.
> > Demonization of the
> > > > >enemy,
> > > > > > > > >indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to
> the
> > mission at
> > > > >hand,
> > > > > > >and
> > > > > > > > >the emergence of what I called in an earlier message
> > the
> > >formation of
> > > > > > >unit
> > > > > > > > >practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all
> sure
> > signs of
> > > > >emergent
> > > > > > > > >irrelevance of practice for the effective
> realization
> > of
> > >military
> > > > > > > > >objectives and the general collapse of morale.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize
> that
> > their
> > > > >opponents
> > > > > > >are
> > > > > > > > >as human as they are has already gone a long way in
> > becoming a
> > > > >military
> > > > > > > > >liability and is in severe danger of permanent,
> > irrevocable and
> > >final
> > > > > > > > >closure. Demonization is, in a military context,
> > simply the
> > > > >replacement
> > > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > >that most basic principle of the art of war; "know
> thine
> > opponent
> > >at
> > > > > > >least
> > > > > > > > >as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but
> > false image
> > >of
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > >opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. .
> > When
> > > > >administration
> > > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of
> > Iraqi
> > >dissidents,
> > > > >and
> > > > > > > > >liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very
> uprising
> > they
> > > > >ostensibly
> > > > > > >hope
> > > > > > > > >to repress. Relevant too is the example from the
> > Rwandan
> > >genocide.
> > > > >The
> > > > > > > > >reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as
> > "cockroaches" may
> > >have
> > > > >given
> > > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > >Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed
> > Tutsi's, but
> > >it
> > > > > > >resulted
> > > > > > > > >in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi
> > "cockroaches"
> > >managed
> > > > >to
> > > > > > > > >expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into
> permanent
> > exile in
> > > > >refugee
> > > > > > > > >camps outside Rwanda.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the
> > practice of
> > >war,
> > > > >but
> > > > > > >it
> > > > > > > > >alone never guarantees the political aims of war.
> Of
> > the most
> > >often
> > > > > > >cited
> > > > > > > > >examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis
> > Khan, the
> > >Romans
> > > > >and,
> > > > > > >of
> > > > > > > > >course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to
> > stabilize
> > > > >somewhat
> > > > > > >their
> > > > > > > > >victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious
> > >incorporation of
> > > > > > > > >conquered states into the very fabric of their
> empire.
> > >Certainly,
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > >indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to
> > military goals
> > >is as
> > > > > > > > >ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and
> > even
> > > > > > >counter-productive
> > > > > > > > >to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance.
> > Indisciplined
> > > > >violence
> > > > > > >on
> > > > > > > > >the part of a military organization signals its
> > opponents that
> > >there
> > > > >is
> > > > > > > > >really no basis for reasonable relations (these can
> > exist in war
> > >as
> > > > >in
> > > > > > >any
> > > > > > > > >other circumstance) and that even compliance is not
> a
> > real
> > >option.
> > > > >In
> > > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > >absence of any possibility to communicate with the
> > enemy, the
> > >only
> > > > > > > > >possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter
> end),
> > something
> > >that
> > > > >no
> > > > > > > > >reasonable policy of war can accept.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >5. As written above we've already discussed the
> > problems of the
> > > > > > >emergence
> > > > > > > > >of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's
> mission.
> > In those
> > > > > > > > >presentations we also indicated that the
> authoritarian
> > military
> > > > >hierarchy
> > > > > > > > >has evolved from the integral difficulties of
> critical
> > > > >self-evaluation
> > > > > > >for
> > > > > > > > >the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree
> > entirely
> > >with
> > > > > > >Stephen
> > > > > > > > >Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of
> > responsible and
> > > > >intelligent
> > > > > > > > >military leadership is integral to an effective
> > military
> > > > >organization.
> > > > > > >It
> > > > > > > > >is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed
> > questions
> > > > >concerning
> > > > > > >the
> > > > > > > > >nature and conditions of leadership in democratic,
> mass
> > society.
> > > > > > >National
> > > > > > > > >leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists
> are
> > subject
> > >to
> > > > > > >political
> > > > > > > > >pressures of both special interests and of public
> > opinion that is
> > > > >neither
> > > > > > > > >subject to the discipline of rational practice of
> war
> > nor even
> > > > >familiar
> > > > > > >with
> > > > > > > > >war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal
> > of
> > >expressions
> > > > >such
> > > > > > >as
> > > > > > > > >"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police
> > Pigs" to a
> > > > >frightened
> > > > > > > > >and impressionable population that votes, often
> without
> > a clear
> > >idea
> > > > >of
> > > > > > >what
> > > > > > > > >they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize
> public
> > support
> > >for
> > > > > > >extreme
> > > > > > > > >politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's
> Tonkin
> > Bay
> > >incident,
> > > > >the
> > > > > > >WMD
> > > > > > > > >foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n
> word
> > + piles"
> > >of
> > > > >naked
> > > > > > > > >Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the
> coalition
> > forces
> > >in
> > > > >Iraq.
> > > > > > >The
> > > > > > > > >emergence of national states, mass democracy, and
> the
> > >possibilities
> > > > >for
> > > > > > > > >concentrating tremendous resources for the
> prosecution
> > of war and
> > > > > > >oppression
> > > > > > > > >has made the last century the bloodiest in human
> > history, and it
> > > > >appears
> > > > > > > > >that we haven't really even begun to address the
> problem
> > in this
> > > > >century
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > > > > >From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
> > > > > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > > > >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
> > > > > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of
> > hard core
> > > > >criminals
> > > > > > >and
> > > > > > > > > > hard core guards.
> > > > > > > > > > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Peter,
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >What Oz is?
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few
> > times I saw
> > >NYPD
> > > > > > >blue,
> > > > > > > > > > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of
> > legitimizing the
> > >use
> > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of
> > course, in a
> > > > >"softened"
> > > > > > > > > > >way, but the underlying message was quite
> violent
> > and, of
> > > > >course,the
> > > > > > > > > > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with
> the
> > good
> > >cops. As
> > > > > > >9/11
> > > > > > > > > > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American
> > movies, the
> > >Iraq
> > > > > > >Torture
> > > > > > > > > > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty
> of
> > cases where
> > > > > > >physical
> > > > > > > > > > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in
> a
> > threshold
> > >that
> > > > >an
> > > > > > > > > > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >David
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > > > > > > > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Psychologists
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The
> > Experiment for
> > >the
> > > > >BBC
> > > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > > 2002
> > > > > > > > > > > > >So groups of people in positions of
> > unaccountable power
> > > > >naturally
> > > > > > > > > > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according
> to
> > research
> > > > >conducted
> > > > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > > > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison
> showing
> > Americans
> > > > >abusing
> > > > > > > > > > > > Iraqi
> > > > > > > > > > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to
> > distance
> > >ourselves
> > > > >from
> > > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who
> commit
> > such acts
> > >are
> > > > >not
> > > > > > > > > > > > like
> > > > > > > > > > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted
> or
> > disturbed
> > >in
> > > > >some
> > > > > > > > > > > > way?
> > > > > > > > > > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would
> never
> > condone
> > >or
> > > > > > > > > > > > contribute
> > > > > > > > > > > > >to such events.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological
> > research
> > >indicates
> > > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of
> > major
> > >studies
> > > > >have
> > > > > > > > > > > > shown
> > > > > > > > > > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided
> > into groups
> > >and
> > > > > > >placed
> > > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > > >competition against each other, can become
> > abusive and
> > > > >violent.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed
> experimenters
> > to give
> > > > >electric
> > > > > > > > > > > > >shocks to another
> > > > > > > > > > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison
> > experiment,
> > > > >conducted
> > > > > > > > > > > > by
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly
> showed
> > that
> > >young
> > > > > > > > > > > > students
> > > > > > > > > > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard
> quickly
> > became
> > > > > > >sadistically
> > > > > > > > > > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role
> > of
> > >prisoners.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the
> > disturbing
> > > > >implication of
> > > > > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of
> a
> > small
> > >minority
> > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the
> > capacity to
> > >behave
> > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > > evil
> > > > > > > > > > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by
> Hannah
> > Arendt
> > >whose
> > > > > > > > > > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf
> > Eichmann, led
> > >her
> > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > > remark
> > > > > > > > > > > > >that what was most frightening was just how
> mild
> > and
> > >ordinary
> > > > >he
> > > > > > > > > > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being
> > threatened with
> > >dogs
> > > > >(AP
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might
> go
> > further
> > >and
> > > > > > > > > > > > conclude
> > > > > > > > > > > > >that the torturers were victims of
> > circumstances, that
> > >they
> > > > >lost
> > > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > > >moral compass in the group and did things
> they
> > would
> > >normally
> > > > > > > > > > > > abhor.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as
> evidence,
> > this is
> > > > >precisely
> > > > > > > > > > > > what
> > > > > > > > > > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad
> > psychology and
> > >it is
> > > > >bad
> > > > > > > > > > > > >ethics.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we
> can
> > explain
> > >human
> > > > > > > > > > > > behaviour
> > > > > > > > > > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider
> culture
> > in which
> > >it
> > > > >is
> > > > > > > > > > > > located.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves
> everyone
> > from any
> > > > > > > > > > > > responsibility
> > > > > > > > > > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as
> > constituents
> > >of
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > wider
> > > > > > > > > > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports
> > have
> > >indicated
> > > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > >guards were following orders from
> intelligence
> > officers
> > >and
> > > > > > > > > > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the
> > prisoners for
> > > > > > > > > > > > interrogation.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in
> > which these
> > > > >soldiers
> > > > > > > > > > > > were
> > > > > > > > > > > > >immersed was one in which they were
> encouraged
> > to see and
> > > > >treat
> > > > > > > > > > > > Iraqis
> > > > > > > > > > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost
> certainly
> > had a very
> > > > > > > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > > > > > > >culture and this provides a second
> explanation
> > of why
> > >some
> > > > >people
> > > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did
> > not.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors
> were
> > at play
> > >is
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > fact
> > > > > > > > > > > > >that the pictures were taken at all.
> Reminiscent
> > of the
> > > > >postcards
> > > > > > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their
> > activities, the
> > > > >torture
> > > > > > > > > > > > was
> > > > > > > > > > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of
> > fun.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know
> what
> > they had
> > > > >done'
> > > > > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know
> what
> > they had
> > >done,
> > > > > > > > > > > > >presumably believing that the audience would
> > approve.
> > >This
> > > > >sense
> > > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > > >approval is very important, since there is
> ample
> > evidence
> > > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > > people
> > > > > > > > > > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations
> to
> > behave in
> > > > >obnoxious
> > > > > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly -
> > that they
> > >have
> > > > > > > > > > > > broader
> > > > > > > > > > > > >support.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that
> sense
> > from?
> > >This
> > > > >takes
> > > > > > >us
> > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour:
> > leadership. In
> > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > studies,
> > > > > > > > > > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters
> > either
> > >overtly or
> > > > > > > > > > > > tacitly
> > > > > > > > > > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was
> > crucial to the
> > >way
> > > > > > > > > > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish
> to
> > act - or
> > >be
> > > > >seen
> > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own
> > research for
> > >the
> > > > >BBC
> > > > > > >did
> > > > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford
> > study, was
> > >that
> > > > >we
> > > > > > >did
> > > > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his
> participants:
> > "You can
> > >create
> > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of
> fear
> > to some
> > > > >degree,
> > > > > > >you
> > > > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their
> life
> > is
> > >totally
> > > > > > > > > > > > controlled
> > > > > > > > > > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll
> have
> > no
> > > > >privacy....
> > > > > > >In
> > > > > > > > > > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of
> > >powerlessness".
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to
> ask
> > what
> > >messages
> > > > > > >were
> > > > > > > > > > > > >being provided by fellow and, more
> critically,
> > senior
> > > > >officers in
> > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > >units where torture took place? Did those
> who
> > didn't
> > >approve
> > > > >fail
> > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or
> > disloyal? Did
> > > > >senior
> > > > > > > > > > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a
> blind
> > eye or
> > >else
> > > > > > > > > > > > simply
> > > > > > > > > > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai
> > massacre, and
> > >in
> > > > >many
> > > > > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most
> about
> > how it
> > >can
> > > > >happen
> > > > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers
> and
> > torturers
> > >can
> > > > > > >begin
> > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > >believe that they will not be held to
> account
> > for what
> > >they
> > > > >do,
> > > > > > >or
> > > > > > > > > > > > even
> > > > > > > > > > > > >that their actions are something
> praiseworthy.
> > The more
> > >they
> > > > > > > > > > > > perceive
> > > > > > > > > > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more
> they
> > will give
> > >it a
> > > > > > >thumbs
> > > > > > > > > > > > up
> > > > > > > > > > > > >themselves.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of
> episodes?
> > One answer
> > >is
> > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > > ensure
> > > > > > > > > > > > >that people are always made aware of their
> other
> > moral
> > > > > > >commitments
> > > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the
> > pressures
> > >within
> > > > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > > > >military group, their ties to others must
> never
> > be
> > >broken.
> > > > >Total
> > > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > > >secret institutions, where people are
> isolated
> > from
> > >contact
> > > > >with
> > > > > > > > > > > > all
> > > > > > > > > > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity.
> > Similarly,
> > >there
> > > > >are
> > > > > > > > > > > > great
> > > > > > > > > > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions
> to
> > private
> > > > > > > > > > > > contractors
> > > > > > > > > > > > >which lack fully developed structures of
> > public
> > > > >accountability.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of
> > our
> > >institutions
> > > > >and
> > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad
> > leadership
> > >can
> > > > > > >permit
> > > > > > > > > > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can
> > actively
> > >promote
> > > > > > > > > > > > oppressive
> > > > > > > > > > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in
> > Zimbardo's study
> > >and
> > > > >may
> > > > > > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > > > > >the case in certain military intelligence
> units.
> > But
> > > > >sometimes
> > > > > > > > > > > > leaders
> > > > > > > > > > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and
> hence
> > create a
> > >vacuum
> > > > >of
> > > > > > > > > > > > power.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a
> > vacuum
> > >exists,
> > > > > > >people
> > > > > > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > > > > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of
> action
> > which is
> > > > > > >vigorously
> > > > > > > > > > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from
> > powerlessness
> > > > >rather
> > > > > > > > > > > > than
> > > > > > > > > > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders
> to
> > champion
> > > > >clear
> > > > > > > > > > > > humane
> > > > > > > > > > > > >and democratic values is part of the
> problem.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership
> in
> > the
> > >military.
> > > > >One
> > > > > > > > > > > > must
> > > > > > > > > > > > >look more widely at the messages and the
> values
> > provided
> > >in
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > >community at large. That means that we must
> > address the
> > > > >anti-Arab
> > > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A
> culture
> > where we
> > >have
> > > > >got
> > > > > > > > > > > > used
> > > > > > > > > > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked,
> > chained and
> > > > >humiliated
> > > > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > > > >create a climate in which torturers see
> > themselves as
> > >heroes
> > > > > > > > > > > > rather
> > > > > > > > > > > > >than villains.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is
> not
> > necessary
> > >for
> > > > > > >everyone
> > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient
> simply
> > for
> > >those
> > > > >who
> > > > > > > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > > > > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step
> with
> > societal
> > > > >norms.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >And we must also look at political
> leadership.
> > When
> > > > > > >administration
> > > > > > > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats'
> nests"
> > of Iraqi
> > > > > > >dissidents,
> > > > > > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > > > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example,
> that
> > just
> > >before
> > > > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started
> > referring to
> > > > >Tutsi's
> > > > > > > > > > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after
> an
> > abuse
> > >scandal
> > > > > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate
> in
> > which
> > > > > > >perpetrators
> > > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they
> are
> > nobly
> > >doing
> > > > >what
> > > > > > > > > > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in
> Iraq
> > may or
> > >may
> > > > >not
> > > > > > > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > > > > > > >been following direct orders from their
> leaders,
> > but they
> > > > >were
> > > > > > > > > > > > almost
> > > > > > > > > > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were
> > behaving as good
> > > > > > > > > > > > followers.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >So if we want to understand why torture
> occurs,
> > it is
> > > > >important
> > > > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of
> > groups, and of
> > > > > > >society.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of
> > individuals and
> > >can
> > > > >lead
> > > > > > > > > > > > them
> > > > > > > > > > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how
> any
> > given
> > >group
> > > > > > > > > > > > affects
> > > > > > > > > > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and
> values
> > of that
> > > > >specific
> > > > > > > > > > > > group.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism.
> The
> > choice is
> > >not
> > > > > > >denied
> > > > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own
> hands.
> > Hence, we
> > >need
> > > > >a
> > > > > > > > > > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the
> values
> > and
> > >beliefs
> > > > >that
> > > > > > > > > > > > we,
> > > > > > > > > > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote.
> These
> > create
> > >the
> > > > > > > > > > > > conditions
> > > > > > > > > > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either
> > emboldened or
> > >unable
> > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > > > act.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept
> rather
> > than
> > >avoid
> > > > >our
> > > > > > > > > > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a
> > psychology which
> > >does
> > > > >not
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >distance us from torture but which requires
> us
> > to look
> > > > >closely at
> > > > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are
> > implicated in
> > >a
> > > > > > >society
> > > > > > > > > > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at
> > University of
> > > > >Exeter
> > > > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social
> > Psychology.
> > >Stephen
> > > > > > >Reicher
> > > > > > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > > > > >a professor of psychology at University of
> St
> > Andrews,
> > >past
> > > > > > >editor
> > > > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and
> a
> > fellow of
> > >the
> > > > > > >Royal
> > > > > > > > > > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > >
> >
>
>



This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST