Yes I was amazed and delighted when the Czechs and Slovaks just parted
company in good spirit. I think Sweden/Norway is the only earlier precedent
for that, but hopefully there will be more!
On Monday I watched an extended interview with Jose Ramos Horta, one of the
leaders of the East Timor resistance movement FRETILIN, whose job it was
during the Indonesian occupation of their country, to tour the world trying
to get support for their cause. He pointed out that at no time did FRETILIN
"demonise" the Indonesians or Americans and Australians, because he said,
they would eventually have to live with these people, once they had
attained their victory. It seems to me that the Vietnamese also never
engaged in the demonisation tactic and their use of bombings of civilian
targets was also almost nil. It seems to me that brutality and inhumanity
does not always flow from war, just as (as you point out) nations do not
have to slaughter each other if they want to go their own way.
Andy
At 07:42 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
>The only ones that I can think of are the UN police actions in Korea, Congo,
>Iraq 1, Bosnia and Kossovo, and so on . Most other late 20th century wars
>were either counter-insurgency operations or, like Topsy, they just
>happened. Messy isn't it.
>
>The Brits have had only one real success in anti-insurgent action, Malaya,
>the Americans have gotten their way in Chile (or so they thought until they
>learned how incompetent and expensive military dictatorships usually are),
>the Israelis have only managed a doubtful stalemate, the Russians have been
>fighting the Chechens on and off ever since the mid 19th century, and the
>Vietnamese more or less succeeded in repressing the Pot Pol abomination.
>You're right there, pure repression does not have a particularly good record
>as an effective way of dealing with popular uprisings. You'd have thought
>that someone would have come up with a better solution by now. The Czechs
>might have started something new when they quickly agreed to Slovakia's
>demands for the status of an independent state. Smart people those Czechs.
>Regards
>Victor
>
>----- Original Message -----
>From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
>To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 1:15 PM
>Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
>
>
> > Apologies for jumping into this thread somewhat precipitously Victor and
> > perhaps being a bit disruptive. I would like to ask you to help clarify a
> > few things about war.
> >
> > I was born in October 1945. Has there been a declaration of war any time
>in
> > my lifetime? I can't think of any.
> >
> > Nevertheless, people rightly still distinguish between war and not-war,
> > despite attempt of the prosecutors to cast their actions as "police
> > actions" or "intervention" or "support to the government" or whatever.
> >
> > It is a strange thing, isn't it, that war gives licence to do things that
> > are otherwise illegal. So for example, the US administration felt no
> > compunction about dropping bombs on a city during the "war," but beating
> > and humiliating people after the enemy's army has been destroyed and the
>US
> > is the administrator of the country are rightly not considered admissible.
> >
> > The British and the Israelis are very experienced at administering subject
> > populations. The US has bombed countries, they've blockaded countries,
> > they've subverted them and financed torture regimes, they've subjugated
> > most of the world economically, but have they ever successfully subjugated
> > a population by military means?
> >
> > I know I've gone way off the subject, Victor, sorry for that. I understand
> > you were discussing the psychological facts of life of people involved in
>a
> > war. My guess on that is that anyone who has been naive enough to
> > *volunteer* for one of those jobs (softening up prisoners in Iraq, etc.)
>is
> > going to behave like that. Anyone with the strength of character not to
> > degenerate in that way would never have joined up.
> >
> > And as for the opposition from Iraq. What did anyone expect? Did anyone
> > really believe that the US army was going to fly into the heart of Arab
> > territory and set up anything better than something resembling Guantanamo
>Bay?
> >
> > sorry for the interruption
> > Andy
> >
> > At 12:43 PM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > >Andy,
> > >The focus of the discussion was - at least up to now - on the practice of
> > >war. I think that rational analysis has a lot to say on this subject and
> > >said so. You're raising a different, though no less important issue, the
> > >wider economic and political questions involved in the decision to go to
> > >war. Simple good-old repression, gunboat diplomacy and what have you
>are
> > >practices of war; ask any Vietnamese vetran (as well as a good many
>American
> > >and Russian vetrans for that matter), most Iraqi citizens, and... (I
>don't
> > >think its necessary to list others, there are plenty). War is as
>Clauswitz
> > >wrote is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil
>our
> > >will." I can't think of a better definition than that for repression! War
> > >can be undeclared, it can involve ngo's, and can even be declared against
>an
> > >unarmed population.
> > >
> > >The fact that war is repression is like the fact that it is violent, not
> > >really very useful for serious analysis. Machiavelli, V. Clauswitz, Marx
> > >and Engels, as well as other more recent writers like Hobsbawm, Stadt and
> > >Schelling have raised important and relevant questions about war; its
> > >relation to economics and civil society, its role in cultural-historical
> > >development, and so on. Considering the threat of war to human survival
>and
> > >the natural difficulties of regarding it rationally, it is a major
> > >challenge, if not the major challenge to cultural-historical analysis.
> > >Highest regards,
> > >Victor
> > >----- Original Message -----
> > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 11:01 AM
> > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > >
> > >
> > > > Sorry Victor. I think that was one of those reflex messages when I
>should
> > > > hesitate before pressing "Send."
> > > > I guess part of my reaction was because of radio talk here to the
>effect
> > > > that "war is like this," i.e., it's justifiable. But of course what
>may be
> > > > at a pinch justifiable in overcoming an opposing army can in no sense
>at
> > > > all be justified when occupying a country and suppressing the
>resistance
> > >of
> > > > its populace. The war was justified before the event because although
>they
> > > > were going to kill civilians with their "precision bombing" it was all
> > > > worth it to get rid of the Saddam Hussein regime. I guess a lot of
> > > > Americans and even some Iraqis were willing to go along with that
> > > > utilitarian argument. This is what they get. And it isn't war, because
> > > > there's no-one to declare war against. This is just simple, good old
> > > > fashioned repression.
> > > > Andy
> > > > At 10:41 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > >Andy,
> > > > >Since when is war a matter of official prononciamentos? The US
>fought a
> > >10
> > > > >year undeclared war in Vietnam (one important reason why I don't live
> > >there)
> > > > >killed some 2 million Vietnamese and about 58,000 Americans,
>effectively
> > > > >destroyed the physical and economic infrastructure of Vietnam and
>lost
> > >the
> > > > >war against international Communism to boot. The WAR in Iraq
>promises us
> > > > >another replay of Vietnam. It will probably go on interminably for
>years,
> > > > >kill lots of Americans and many many more Iraqis, destroy whatever
> > >remnants
> > > > >of economic and civil organization are left in Iraq, and the US will
>end
> > >up
> > > > >losing the war for Liberal Democracy to boot. Is it relevant? I say
>it's
> > > > >relevant as h--l!
> > > > >Highest regards,
> > > > >Victor
> > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > >From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > >Sent: Tuesday, May 11, 2004 7:36 AM
> > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > But excuse me, the war was over months ago.
> > > > > > What is going on now is the imposition of democracy in Iraq by
>the
> > > > > > occupying power.
> > > > > > Andy
> > > > > >
> > > > > > At 07:34 AM 11/05/2004 +0200, you wrote:
> > > > > > >Peter and David,
> > > > > > >1. I sense here a certain degree of imbalance, easy judgements
>too
> > > > >quickly
> > > > > > >arrived at, and a measure of distance from the conditions
>experienced
> > >by
> > > > > > >soldiers and police officers, and civilians in war-time
>conditions.
> > >The
> > > > > > >Milgram experiments, Zimbardo's experiments at Stanford, and
>other
> > >like
> > > > > > >exercises for evoking interpersonal cruelty and terror have only
>the
> > > > >barest
> > > > > > >relevance to the practice of cruelty and of terror in war-time.
>The
> > > > > > >discovery that humans are capable of collective violence, even
> > >extreme
> > > > > > >collective violence, is of little interest when applied to the
>study
> > >and
> > > > > > >evaluation of war and military policy. WE ALREADY KNOW THAT!
>Regard
> > >the
> > > > > > >elementary concept of war as presented by that most excellent
> > >objective
> > > > > > >idealist, v. Clauswitz:
> > > > > > > "War ... is
>an
> > >act of
> > > > > > >violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will."
> > > > > > >This concept is elementary, and universal; it does not refer to
> > >Americans
> > > > >at
> > > > > > >war, Iraquis at war, Muslim Jihadists at war, etc. etc. but to
>all
> > > > > > >practicioners of war and to all practice of war. Thus, in the
>context
> > >of
> > > > >war
> > > > > > >we can reasonably discuss the effectiveness of this or that
>policy of
> > > > > > >violence, i.e. whether it is likely "to compel our opponent to
> > >fulfill
> > > > >our
> > > > > > >will," not the practice of violence itself. Critical evaluation
>of
> > >the
> > > > > > >practice at war is most useful when addressed to the military
> > >mission.
> > > > > > >Evaluation of the mission can and should be done at all levels:
>be it
> > >the
> > > > > > >decision to invade Iraq, the decision to to so without full UN
> > > > > > >participation, the decision to renovate the Al Ghraib prison, the
> > > > >decision
> > > > > > >to arrest and detain far more suspects of guerilla activity - now
>all
> > > > > > >extra-military collect violence is indiscriminately called
>terror,
> > >how
> > > > > > >silly! - than can be secured and investigated with due speed and
> > > > > > >effectiveness, and so on and on
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >2. So, how can we relate to the conditions at the Al Ghraib
>prison
> > > > >within
> > > > > > >the context of the war in Iraq? We can, of course, criticize the
> > >mission
> > > > >as
> > > > > > >a whole; the invasion into Iraq by a coalition of one, possibly
>two,
> > > > > > >powerful states, with much to gain and little to lose in a war in
> > >Iraq
> > > > > > >augmented by a collection of their client states. While there
>is a
> > >good
> > > > > > >deal to be said about the explicit and hidden objectives of the
> > >mission
> > > > >in
> > > > > > >Iraq, it is not the focus of current discussion. Evaluation of
>the
> > > > > > >treatment of a rebellious civilian population, prisoners of war
>and
> > > > > > >prisoners in general is the issue here. I'll make this short:
>the
> > > > > > >under-supervised exercise of "softening techniques" by personell
>with
> > > > >only a
> > > > > > >smattering acquaintance with the psychology and psychobiology of
> > > > >coercion,
> > > > > > >with even less knowledge of the historical, cultural and social
> > >contexts
> > > > >of
> > > > > > >their prisoners, and, worst of all (remember this is a discussion
>of
> > > > > > >war-time practice), total ignorance of useful military practice
>has
> > > > >produced
> > > > > > >conditions that expose the coalition armies to the most difficult
> > >kind of
> > > > > > >oppositional modes; that of angry contempt. Demonization of the
> > >enemy,
> > > > > > >indisciplined expression of violence unrelated to the mission at
> > >hand,
> > > > >and
> > > > > > >the emergence of what I called in an earlier message the
>formation of
> > > > >unit
> > > > > > >practices irrelevant to the unit's mission are all sure signs of
> > >emergent
> > > > > > >irrelevance of practice for the effective realization of
>military
> > > > > > >objectives and the general collapse of morale.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >3. A military unit whose members fail to recognize that their
> > >opponents
> > > > >are
> > > > > > >as human as they are has already gone a long way in becoming a
> > >military
> > > > > > >liability and is in severe danger of permanent, irrevocable and
>final
> > > > > > >closure. Demonization is, in a military context, simply the
> > >replacement
> > > > >of
> > > > > > >that most basic principle of the art of war; "know thine opponent
>at
> > > > >least
> > > > > > >as well as you know thyself," with a comforting but false image
>of
> > >the
> > > > > > >opponent as subhuman, unworthy, and contemptible. . When
> > >administration
> > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi
>dissidents,
> > >and
> > > > > > >liken Iraqis to vermin they encourage the very uprising they
> > >ostensibly
> > > > >hope
> > > > > > >to repress. Relevant too is the example from the Rwandan
>genocide.
> > >The
> > > > > > >reference by Hutu extremists to Tutsi's as "cockroaches" may
>have
> > >given
> > > > >the
> > > > > > >Hutu the confidence to murder some 800,000 unarmed Tutsi's, but
>it
> > > > >resulted
> > > > > > >in a bloody civil war in which the armed Tutsi "cockroaches"
>managed
> > >to
> > > > > > >expell a respectable portion of the Hutu into permanent exile in
> > >refugee
> > > > > > >camps outside Rwanda.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >4. Extreme violence can be effective policy in the practice of
>war,
> > >but
> > > > >it
> > > > > > >alone never guarantees the political aims of war. Of the most
>often
> > > > >cited
> > > > > > >examples of the cruelest of conquest states; Gengis Khan, the
>Romans
> > >and,
> > > > >of
> > > > > > >course, the Axis powers, only the Romans managed to stabilize
> > >somewhat
> > > > >their
> > > > > > >victories, and this they did mainly by conscientious
>incorporation of
> > > > > > >conquered states into the very fabric of their empire.
>Certainly,
> > >the
> > > > > > >indisciplined practice of violence irrelevant to military goals
>is as
> > > > > > >ineffective as are policies of extreme violence and even
> > > > >counter-productive
> > > > > > >to the aim of forcing the opponent's compliance. Indisciplined
> > >violence
> > > > >on
> > > > > > >the part of a military organization signals its opponents that
>there
> > >is
> > > > > > >really no basis for reasonable relations (these can exist in war
>as
> > >in
> > > > >any
> > > > > > >other circumstance) and that even compliance is not a real
>option.
> > >In
> > > > >the
> > > > > > >absence of any possibility to communicate with the enemy, the
>only
> > > > > > >possibility is war ā outrance (war to the bitter end), something
>that
> > >no
> > > > > > >reasonable policy of war can accept.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >5. As written above we've already discussed the problems of the
> > > > >emergence
> > > > > > >of internal practices irrelevant to the unit's mission. In those
> > > > > > >presentations we also indicated that the authoritarian military
> > >hierarchy
> > > > > > >has evolved from the integral difficulties of critical
> > >self-evaluation
> > > > >for
> > > > > > >the isolated military unit under pressure. We agree entirely
>with
> > > > >Stephen
> > > > > > >Reicher and Alex Haslam that the existance of responsible and
> > >intelligent
> > > > > > >military leadership is integral to an effective military
> > >organization.
> > > > >It
> > > > > > >is, again, Clauswitz who raises some pretty pointed questions
> > >concerning
> > > > >the
> > > > > > >nature and conditions of leadership in democratic, mass society.
> > > > >National
> > > > > > >leadership and it's subsidiary military specialists are subject
>to
> > > > >political
> > > > > > >pressures of both special interests and of public opinion that is
> > >neither
> > > > > > >subject to the discipline of rational practice of war nor even
> > >familiar
> > > > >with
> > > > > > >war-time conditions. Think of the tremendous appeal of
>expressions
> > >such
> > > > >as
> > > > > > >"The Axis of Evil," "the Yellow Horde," and "Police Pigs" to a
> > >frightened
> > > > > > >and impressionable population that votes, often without a clear
>idea
> > >of
> > > > >what
> > > > > > >they're voting for. How easy it is to mobilize public support
>for
> > > > >extreme
> > > > > > >politics by contrived lies such as MacNamara's Tonkin Bay
>incident,
> > >the
> > > > >WMD
> > > > > > >foolishness, and the suggestion that making "the n word + piles"
>of
> > >naked
> > > > > > >Iraqi prisoners is high military policy of the coalition forces
>in
> > >Iraq.
> > > > >The
> > > > > > >emergence of national states, mass democracy, and the
>possibilities
> > >for
> > > > > > >concentrating tremendous resources for the prosecution of war and
> > > > >oppression
> > > > > > >has made the last century the bloodiest in human history, and it
> > >appears
> > > > > > >that we haven't really even begun to address the problem in this
> > >century
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >----- Original Message -----
> > > > > > >From: "Peter Smagorinsky" <smago@coe.uga.edu>
> > > > > > >To: <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > >Sent: Monday, May 10, 2004 9:22 PM
> > > > > > >Subject: Re: Iraq: Responses to Zimbardo
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Oz is an HBO program set in a prison with lots of hard core
> > >criminals
> > > > >and
> > > > > > > > hard core guards.
> > > > > > > > At 01:02 PM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Peter,
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >What Oz is?
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Re the torture imagery in American life, the few times I saw
>NYPD
> > > > >blue,
> > > > > > > > >it seemed to me that it was in the verge of legitimizing the
>use
> > >of
> > > > > > > > >torture as a way to collect criminal info. Of course, in a
> > >"softened"
> > > > > > > > >way, but the underlying message was quite violent and, of
> > >course,the
> > > > > > > > >naive viewer couldnīt help but identifying with the good
>cops. As
> > > > >9/11
> > > > > > > > >directed viewers to see with New eyes American movies, the
>Iraq
> > > > >Torture
> > > > > > > > >case should do the same thing. There is plenty of cases where
> > > > >physical
> > > > > > > > >abuse is done by the "good" guys, but always in a threshold
>that
> > >an
> > > > > > > > >average viewer can tolerate (and enjoy...)
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >David
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >Quoting Peter Smagorinsky <smago@coe.uga.edu>:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > 3ce7295.jpg
> > > > > > > > > > At 10:52 AM 5/10/2004 -0400, you wrote:
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Why everyone's not a torturer
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >By Stephen Reicher and Alex Haslam
> > > > > > > > > > >Psychologists
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Guards and prisoners, taking part in The Experiment for
>the
> > >BBC
> > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > 2002
> > > > > > > > > > >So groups of people in positions of unaccountable power
> > >naturally
> > > > > > > > > > >resort to violence, do they? Not according to research
> > >conducted
> > > > >in
> > > > > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > > > >BBC experiment.
> > > > > > > > > > >The photographs from Abu Ghraib prison showing Americans
> > >abusing
> > > > > > > > > > Iraqi
> > > > > > > > > > >prisoners make us recoil and lead us to distance
>ourselves
> > >from
> > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > >horror and brutality. Surely those who commit such acts
>are
> > >not
> > > > > > > > > > like
> > > > > > > > > > >us? Surely the perpetrators must be twisted or disturbed
>in
> > >some
> > > > > > > > > > way?
> > > > > > > > > > >They must be monsters. We ourselves would never condone
>or
> > > > > > > > > > contribute
> > > > > > > > > > >to such events.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Sadly, 50 years of social psychological research
>indicates
> > >that
> > > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > > >comforting thoughts are deluded. A series of major
>studies
> > >have
> > > > > > > > > > shown
> > > > > > > > > > >that even well-adjusted people, when divided into groups
>and
> > > > >placed
> > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > >competition against each other, can become abusive and
> > >violent.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > OTHER RESEARCH
> > > > > > > > > > >Stanley Milgram at Yale instructed experimenters to give
> > >electric
> > > > > > > > > > >shocks to another
> > > > > > > > > > >They did so, despite person's cries of pain
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >In depth: After Saddam
> > > > > > > > > > >Most notoriously, the 1971 Stanford prison experiment,
> > >conducted
> > > > > > > > > > by
> > > > > > > > > > >Philip Zimbardo and colleagues, seemingly showed that
>young
> > > > > > > > > > students
> > > > > > > > > > >who were assigned to the role of guard quickly became
> > > > >sadistically
> > > > > > > > > > >abusive to the students assigned to the role of
>prisoners.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Combined with lessons from history, the disturbing
> > >implication of
> > > > > > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > > >research is that evil is not the preserve of a small
>minority
> > >of
> > > > > > > > > > >exceptional individuals. We all have the capacity to
>behave
> > >in
> > > > > > > > > > evil
> > > > > > > > > > >ways. This idea was famously developed by Hannah Arendt
>whose
> > > > > > > > > > >observations of the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, led
>her
> > >to
> > > > > > > > > > remark
> > > > > > > > > > >that what was most frightening was just how mild and
>ordinary
> > >he
> > > > > > > > > > >looked. His evil was disarmingly banal.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >The latest pictures show detainees being threatened with
>dogs
> > >(AP
> > > > > > > > > > >Photo/Courtesy of The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > >In order to explain events in Iraq, one might go further
>and
> > > > > > > > > > conclude
> > > > > > > > > > >that the torturers were victims of circumstances, that
>they
> > >lost
> > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > >moral compass in the group and did things they would
>normally
> > > > > > > > > > abhor.
> > > > > > > > > > >Indeed, using Zimbardo's findings as evidence, this is
> > >precisely
> > > > > > > > > > what
> > > > > > > > > > >some people do conclude. But this is bad psychology and
>it is
> > >bad
> > > > > > > > > > >ethics.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >It is bad psychology because it suggests we can explain
>human
> > > > > > > > > > behaviour
> > > > > > > > > > >without needing to scrutinize the wider culture in which
>it
> > >is
> > > > > > > > > > located.
> > > > > > > > > > >It is bad ethics because it absolves everyone from any
> > > > > > > > > > responsibility
> > > > > > > > > > >for events - the perpetrators, ourselves as constituents
>of
> > >the
> > > > > > > > > > wider
> > > > > > > > > > >society, and the leaders of that society.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >In the situation of Abu Ghraib, some reports have
>indicated
> > >that
> > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > >guards were following orders from intelligence officers
>and
> > > > > > > > > > >interrogators in order to soften up the prisoners for
> > > > > > > > > > interrogation.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >If that is true, then clearly the culture in which these
> > >soldiers
> > > > > > > > > > were
> > > > > > > > > > >immersed was one in which they were encouraged to see and
> > >treat
> > > > > > > > > > Iraqis
> > > > > > > > > > >as subhuman. Other army units almost certainly had a very
> > > > > > > > > > different
> > > > > > > > > > >culture and this provides a second explanation of why
>some
> > >people
> > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > >some units may have tortured, but others did not.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Grotesque fun
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Perhaps the best evidence that such factors were at play
>is
> > >the
> > > > > > > > > > fact
> > > > > > > > > > >that the pictures were taken at all. Reminiscent of the
> > >postcards
> > > > > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > > >lynch mobs circulated to advertise their activities, the
> > >torture
> > > > > > > > > > was
> > > > > > > > > > >done proudly and with a grotesque sense of fun.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >'Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had
> > >done'
> > > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > >Those in the photos wanted others to know what they had
>done,
> > > > > > > > > > >presumably believing that the audience would approve.
>This
> > >sense
> > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > >approval is very important, since there is ample evidence
> > >that
> > > > > > > > > > people
> > > > > > > > > > >are more likely to act on any inclinations to behave in
> > >obnoxious
> > > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > > >when they sense - correctly or incorrectly - that they
>have
> > > > > > > > > > broader
> > > > > > > > > > >support.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >So where did the soldiers in Iraq get that sense from?
>This
> > >takes
> > > > >us
> > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > >a critical influence on group behaviour: leadership. In
>the
> > > > > > > > > > studies,
> > > > > > > > > > >leadership - the way in which experimenters either
>overtly or
> > > > > > > > > > tacitly
> > > > > > > > > > >endorsed particular forms of action - was crucial to the
>way
> > > > > > > > > > >participants behaved.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Many guards in our experiment did not wish to act - or
>be
> > >seen
> > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > >act - as bullies or oppressors
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Thus one reason why the guards in our own research for
>the
> > >BBC
> > > > >did
> > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > >behave as brutally as those in the Stanford study, was
>that
> > >we
> > > > >did
> > > > > > > > > > not
> > > > > > > > > > >instruct them to behave in this way.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Zimbardo, in contrast, told his participants: "You can
>create
> > >in
> > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > >prisoners feelings of boredom, a sense of fear to some
> > >degree,
> > > > >you
> > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > >create a notion of arbitrariness that their life is
>totally
> > > > > > > > > > controlled
> > > > > > > > > > >by us, by the system, you, me - and they'll have no
> > >privacy....
> > > > >In
> > > > > > > > > > >general what all this leads to is a sense of
>powerlessness".
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Officers' messages
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >In light of this point it is interesting to ask what
>messages
> > > > >were
> > > > > > > > > > >being provided by fellow and, more critically, senior
> > >officers in
> > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > >units where torture took place? Did those who didn't
>approve
> > >fail
> > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > >speak out for fear of being seen as weak or disloyal? Did
> > >senior
> > > > > > > > > > >officers who knew what was going on turn a blind eye or
>else
> > > > > > > > > > simply
> > > > > > > > > > >file away reports of misbehaviour?
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >All these things happened after the My Lai massacre, and
>in
> > >many
> > > > > > > > > > ways
> > > > > > > > > > >the responses to an atrocity tell us most about how it
>can
> > >happen
> > > > > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > >the first place. They tell us how murderers and torturers
>can
> > > > >begin
> > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > >believe that they will not be held to account for what
>they
> > >do,
> > > > >or
> > > > > > > > > > even
> > > > > > > > > > >that their actions are something praiseworthy. The more
>they
> > > > > > > > > > perceive
> > > > > > > > > > >that torture has the thumbs up, the more they will give
>it a
> > > > >thumbs
> > > > > > > > > > up
> > > > > > > > > > >themselves.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >So how do we prevent these kinds of episodes? One answer
>is
> > >to
> > > > > > > > > > ensure
> > > > > > > > > > >that people are always made aware of their other moral
> > > > >commitments
> > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > >their accountability to others. Whatever the pressures
>within
> > > > > > > > > > their
> > > > > > > > > > >military group, their ties to others must never be
>broken.
> > >Total
> > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > >secret institutions, where people are isolated from
>contact
> > >with
> > > > > > > > > > all
> > > > > > > > > > >others are breeding grounds for atrocity. Similarly,
>there
> > >are
> > > > > > > > > > great
> > > > > > > > > > >dangers in contracting out security functions to private
> > > > > > > > > > contractors
> > > > > > > > > > >which lack fully developed structures of public
> > >accountability.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Power vacuum
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Another answer is to look at the culture of our
>institutions
> > >and
> > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > >role of leaders in framing that culture. Bad leadership
>can
> > > > >permit
> > > > > > > > > > >torture in two ways. Sometimes leaders can actively
>promote
> > > > > > > > > > oppressive
> > > > > > > > > > >values. This is akin to what happened in Zimbardo's study
>and
> > >may
> > > > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > > >the case in certain military intelligence units. But
> > >sometimes
> > > > > > > > > > leaders
> > > > > > > > > > >can simply fail to promote anything and hence create a
>vacuum
> > >of
> > > > > > > > > > power.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >'Inmates' in The Experiment in their cells
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Is it in anyone to abuse a captive?
> > > > > > > > > > >Our own findings indicated that where such a vacuum
>exists,
> > > > >people
> > > > > > > > > > are
> > > > > > > > > > >more likely to accept any clear line of action which is
> > > > >vigorously
> > > > > > > > > > >proposed. Often, then, tyranny follows from powerlessness
> > >rather
> > > > > > > > > > than
> > > > > > > > > > >power. In either case, the failure of leaders to champion
> > >clear
> > > > > > > > > > humane
> > > > > > > > > > >and democratic values is part of the problem.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >But it is not enough to consider leadership in the
>military.
> > >One
> > > > > > > > > > must
> > > > > > > > > > >look more widely at the messages and the values provided
>in
> > >the
> > > > > > > > > > >community at large. That means that we must address the
> > >anti-Arab
> > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > >anti-Muslim sentiment in our society. A culture where we
>have
> > >got
> > > > > > > > > > used
> > > > > > > > > > >to pictures of Iraqi prisoners semi-naked, chained and
> > >humiliated
> > > > > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > > > >create a climate in which torturers see themselves as
>heroes
> > > > > > > > > > rather
> > > > > > > > > > >than villains.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Again, for such a culture to thrive it is not necessary
>for
> > > > >everyone
> > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > >embrace such sentiments, it is sufficient simply for
>those
> > >who
> > > > > > > > > > would
> > > > > > > > > > >oppose them to feel muted and out-of-step with societal
> > >norms.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Leaders' language
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >And we must also look at political leadership. When
> > > > >administration
> > > > > > > > > > >officials talk about cleaning out "rats' nests" of Iraqi
> > > > >dissidents,
> > > > > > > > > > it
> > > > > > > > > > >likens Iraqis to vermin. Note, for example, that just
>before
> > >the
> > > > > > > > > > >Rwandan genocide, Hutu extremists started referring to
> > >Tutsi's
> > > > > > > > > > >as "cockroaches".
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >The US is trying to limit the damage after an abuse
>scandal
> > > > > > > > > > >(AP/Courtesy The New Yorker)
> > > > > > > > > > >Such use of language again creates a climate in which
> > > > >perpetrators
> > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > >atrocity can maintain the illusion that they are nobly
>doing
> > >what
> > > > > > > > > > >others know must be done. The torturers in Iraq may or
>may
> > >not
> > > > > > > > > > have
> > > > > > > > > > >been following direct orders from their leaders, but they
> > >were
> > > > > > > > > > almost
> > > > > > > > > > >certainly allowed to feel that they were behaving as good
> > > > > > > > > > followers.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >So if we want to understand why torture occurs, it is
> > >important
> > > > >to
> > > > > > > > > > >consider the psychology of individuals, of groups, and of
> > > > >society.
> > > > > > > > > > >Groups do indeed affect the behaviour of individuals and
>can
> > >lead
> > > > > > > > > > them
> > > > > > > > > > >to do things they never anticipated. But how any given
>group
> > > > > > > > > > affects
> > > > > > > > > > >our behaviour depends upon the norms and values of that
> > >specific
> > > > > > > > > > group.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Evil can become banal, but so can humanism. The choice is
>not
> > > > >denied
> > > > > > > > > > to
> > > > > > > > > > >us by human nature but rests in our own hands. Hence, we
>need
> > >a
> > > > > > > > > > >psychological analysis that addresses the values and
>beliefs
> > >that
> > > > > > > > > > we,
> > > > > > > > > > >our institutions, and our leaders promote. These create
>the
> > > > > > > > > > conditions
> > > > > > > > > > >in which would-be torturers feel either emboldened or
>unable
> > >to
> > > > > > > > > > act.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >We need an analysis that makes us accept rather than
>avoid
> > >our
> > > > > > > > > > >responsibilities. Above all, we need a psychology which
>does
> > >not
> > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >distance us from torture but which requires us to look
> > >closely at
> > > > > > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > > > >ways in which we and those who lead us are implicated in
>a
> > > > >society
> > > > > > > > > > >which makes barbarity possible.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >Alex Haslam is a professor of psychology at University of
> > >Exeter
> > > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > > >editor of the European Journal of Social Psychology.
>Stephen
> > > > >Reicher
> > > > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > > >a professor of psychology at University of St Andrews,
>past
> > > > >editor
> > > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > >the British Journal of Social Psychology and a fellow of
>the
> > > > >Royal
> > > > > > > > > > >Society of Edinburgh.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > >
> >
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 12:05:48 PST