Eugene's response to David really gets at something that I am struggling
with in CHAT:
"I think a sociocultural notion of agency - who-what is responsible for an
activity - has to be inherently distributed across people, tools, time, and
space"
OK. I understand that CHAT notion of distribution across individuals should
be viewed as a reaction to individualistic psychology. And up to this point
I'm there. But how does CHAT address conflicts of interest, and
contradictory agendas within a single (shared?) activity? It seems to me
that shared implies accord. Which I'm not comfortable with.
For example, in a class where a racist history textbook view is contested
and resisted by minority students,(I'm thinking of Herbert Kohl's work in
this area), how can we say that agency is distributed across these students,
the texts they resist, and the teachers complicit in reproducing oppression?
My first instinct is to think the students and teacher (and probably
textbook writers) have different agency, and maybe even participate in
different activities. But it seems that CHAT suggests that these actors
participate in a shared activity and agency is distributed among them...how?
By the way, I am not trying to resist CHAT...:-) Just pushing and
struggling to see if it reaches me.
Renee Hayes
-----Original Message-----
From: Eugene Matusov [mailto:ematusov@UDel.Edu]
Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 12:46 PM
To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
Subject: RE: goals and agency
Dear David-
Great question! I think a sociocultural notion of agency - who-what is
responsible for an activity - has to be inherently distributed across
people, tools, time, and space (agency chronotope). Agency is an aspect of
people's participation in an activity rather than their possession. I think
it is interesting to study sociocultural and historical forms of agency
including so-called "individualistic agency" wide spread in Western modern
cultures.
It can be also that agency is a form of discourse. To illustrate this point
let me give you a personal example. When my son was around 6, he attended a
Sunday school in a synagogue. At some point of his religious learning, he
started driving us crazy by not talking any responsibility for the actions
that we disapproved. He replied, "Do not make me responsible for that, God
wanted me to do that!" Like in any good Jewish family, we had to find a
counter-argument for this "nonsense" (i.e., his creatively constructed
discourse of agency). We went to consult our rabbi but he was not very
helpful. Finally, I got an idea. When my wife was praising my son for
something "good" he did, I suggested her to stop, "We should praise God
instead, since it was God who made our son do good things." My son seemed to
be shocked. After a few days of consideration (and probably assessment of
the praising-scolding economy :-), he told us, "Mom and dad, please scold
and praise ME because it was me who was doing good and bad things, not God."
I'm pretty sure that not only different communities construct the notion of
agency differently through discourses but even within the same community
diverse discourses circulate and often collide with each other. I remember a
very interesting paper that Gary Shank wrote about debates on agency of the
first Shuttle disaster (do you remember it? I placed the paper on xmca - I
hope it is not my senior moment of false memory :-(.
What do you think?
Eugene
> -----Original Message-----
> From: david.preiss@yale.edu [mailto:david.preiss@yale.edu]
> Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 12:18 PM
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> Subject: Re: goals and agency
>
>
>
> I wonder how much the notions of "goal" and "agency", given their
> individualistic bias, are part of what we could call a USA reading of
> CHAT. How much autonomy should we give to the individual and how much
> power should we give to the forces of society/culture when sketching
> the working of the mind?
>
> Quoting Renee Hayes <rhayes@UDel.Edu>:
>
> > OK, since we are discussing goals, and how and when they are defined,
> > what
> > do you all see as the relationship between "goal" and "agency"? I
> > mean,
> > there has been a lot of criticism about the notion of agency (and who
> > has it
> > in which situations). I am thinking that everybody has goals,
> > regardless of
> > there positioning in the activity (so for example teacher and
> > students in
> > classroom, despite inequity of power, all have goals, I suppose).
> > And these
> > goals can be misaligned, even mutually excluding. But I think there
> > has
> > been some argument against the possibility of these students (or
> > anybody in
> > relatively powerless position) having agency.
> >
> > So what is the relationship between goals and agency? Can CHAT help
> > us to
> > understand this?
> >
> > Renee Hayes
> > University of Delaware
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Eugene Matusov [mailto:ematusov@UDel.Edu]
> > Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 10:24 AM
> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: RE: RE: cr&c
> >
> > In addition to what Sarah wrote, Leont'ev (1981) found an
> > interesting
> > Hegel's insight about the development of goal, "As Hegel correctly
> > noted, an
> > individual 'cannot define the goal of his action until he has
> > acted....'"
> > (p. 62)
> >
> > Eugene
> >
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Sarah Woodward Beck [mailto:sarah.beck@nyu.edu]
> > > Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 9:44 AM
> > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > Subject: Re: RE: cr&c
> > >
> > > David,
> > > When I wrote that shared goals imply consciousness, I was thinking
> > of
> > goals as described
> > > by Wertsch (1979, 1981) in an activity system. Goals are what
> > give
> > direction to an activity,
> > > and according to Wertsch, Marx argued that the ability to set
> > conscious
> > goals is part of what
> > > makes us human. So I was extrapolating from the level of activity
> > to the
> > level of culture in
> > > my assumptions about the characteristics of a goal.
> > > But perhaps the definition of "goal" needs to be expanded at the
> > level of
> > culture. What do
> > > you see as some examples of "unconscious" goals in an ideological,
> > complex
> > society?
> > > --Sarah
> > >
> > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > From: david.preiss@yale.edu
> > > Date: Monday, March 22, 2004 1:06 am
> > > Subject: Re: RE: cr&c
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Hi Sarah,
> > > >
> > > > Why do shared goals imply consciousness? I think some shared
> > goals
> > > > can
> > > > be quite unconscious, specially in complex (ideological)
> > societies.
> > > >
> > > > David
> > > >
> > > > Quoting Sarah Woodward Beck <sarah.beck@nyu.edu>:
> > > >
> > > > > I agree with Judy - I would remove trust and shared goals.
> > Trust,
> > > > > because it has strong moral connotations that don't seem to
> > > > belong in
> > > > > a basic definition of culture, and Shared Goals because this
> > implies
> > > > > a consciousness (of goals) that participants in a culture may
> > not
> > > > > possess. We are often not conscious of our participation in
> > a
> > > > > culture as culture.
> > > > > --Sarah Beck
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > From: Judy Diamondstone <jdiamondstone@clarku.edu>
> > > > > Date: Saturday, March 20, 2004 1:57 pm
> > > > > Subject: RE: cr&c
> > > > >
> > > > > > > Establshing shared goals/visions?
> > > > > > > trust?
> > > > > > > division of labor?
> > > > > > > complementarity?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Which of these things would remove from your own
> > conception
> > > > of
> > > > > > culture?
> > > > > > SHAREDness of goals
> > > > > > Trust.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > What do you think?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Judy
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > From: Mike Cole [mcole@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > > > > > Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 1:38 PM
> > > > > > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > Subject: re: cr&c
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I can see that those working to create activities where
> > > > > > > reflective practice
> > > > > > > is valued and implemented have good reason not to want to
> > > > > substitute
> > > > > > > culture into Bill's paragraph. I am, of course, speaking
> > of
> > > > > > culture as
> > > > > > > (better, from) a particular perspective and it is
> > polysemic.
> > > > > > Reflective> practice is also polysemic. Even the word
> > > > polysemic is
> > > > >
> > > > > > polysemic.>
> > > > > > > However, which of the following things is not
> > characteristic of
> > > > >
> > > > > > culture> as understood in chat discourse:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I am also uncomfortable about the substtution as I think
> > > > > > collaborative> reflection is a highly specific practice and
> > there
> > > > >
> > > > > > are some important
> > > > > > > principles that givern it including the establishment of
> > a
> > > > > shared
> > > > > > > vision or
> > > > > > > goal, the establishment of trust, division of labor,
> > > > > > complementarity, etc.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Establshing shared goals/visions?
> > > > > > > trust?
> > > > > > > division of labor?
> > > > > > > complementarity?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Which of these things would remove from your own
> > conception
> > > > of
> > > > > > culture?> mike
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> >
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 11:42:23 PST