I think that "shared" does not necesarily imply accord. If we go back
to Durkeimīs notion of collective consciusness, as retaken latter by
Moscovici in social psychology, there are in our consciousness elements
that have a social origin. The archetipical example of Durkeim was
religion in what he called "primitive societies". Religion there is
shared but is primary to any rational agreement or contract. The idea
that we share something voluntarily, I imagine, may come handy when
dealing with the idea of a social contract or a social pact, as the
thinkers of the enlightnment did. Moving forward to the idea of shared
activity, I guess one can find several examples of shared activities
that are developed without major awareness of their shared nature, as
riding a plane, a bus or a train- Indeed, I guess, our common sensical
approach would be to think of them as random and chaotic arrangements.
But that approach is blind to the hands of culture.
I wonder how contemporary social psychology and particularly the school
of implicit cognitions deals with shared cognition. It seems to me that
they use a more naturalistic approach, but I still have to learn more
about their approach.
Quoting Renee Hayes <rhayes@UDel.Edu>:
> Eugene's response to David really gets at something that I am
> struggling
> with in CHAT:
>
> "I think a sociocultural notion of agency - who-what is responsible
> for an
> activity - has to be inherently distributed across people, tools,
> time, and
> space"
>
> OK. I understand that CHAT notion of distribution across individuals
> should
> be viewed as a reaction to individualistic psychology. And up to
> this point
> I'm there. But how does CHAT address conflicts of interest, and
> contradictory agendas within a single (shared?) activity? It seems
> to me
> that shared implies accord. Which I'm not comfortable with.
>
> For example, in a class where a racist history textbook view is
> contested
> and resisted by minority students,(I'm thinking of Herbert Kohl's
> work in
> this area), how can we say that agency is distributed across these
> students,
> the texts they resist, and the teachers complicit in reproducing
> oppression?
> My first instinct is to think the students and teacher (and
> probably
> textbook writers) have different agency, and maybe even participate
> in
> different activities. But it seems that CHAT suggests that these
> actors
> participate in a shared activity and agency is distributed among
> them...how?
>
>
> By the way, I am not trying to resist CHAT...:-) Just pushing and
> struggling to see if it reaches me.
>
> Renee Hayes
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Eugene Matusov [mailto:ematusov@UDel.Edu]
> Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 12:46 PM
> To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> Subject: RE: goals and agency
>
> Dear David-
>
> Great question! I think a sociocultural notion of agency - who-what
> is
> responsible for an activity - has to be inherently distributed
> across
> people, tools, time, and space (agency chronotope). Agency is an
> aspect of
> people's participation in an activity rather than their possession. I
> think
> it is interesting to study sociocultural and historical forms of
> agency
> including so-called "individualistic agency" wide spread in Western
> modern
> cultures.
>
> It can be also that agency is a form of discourse. To illustrate this
> point
> let me give you a personal example. When my son was around 6, he
> attended a
> Sunday school in a synagogue. At some point of his religious
> learning, he
> started driving us crazy by not talking any responsibility for the
> actions
> that we disapproved. He replied, "Do not make me responsible for
> that, God
> wanted me to do that!" Like in any good Jewish family, we had to find
> a
> counter-argument for this "nonsense" (i.e., his creatively
> constructed
> discourse of agency). We went to consult our rabbi but he was not
> very
> helpful. Finally, I got an idea. When my wife was praising my son
> for
> something "good" he did, I suggested her to stop, "We should praise
> God
> instead, since it was God who made our son do good things." My son
> seemed to
> be shocked. After a few days of consideration (and probably
> assessment of
> the praising-scolding economy :-), he told us, "Mom and dad, please
> scold
> and praise ME because it was me who was doing good and bad things,
> not God."
>
> I'm pretty sure that not only different communities construct the
> notion of
> agency differently through discourses but even within the same
> community
> diverse discourses circulate and often collide with each other. I
> remember a
> very interesting paper that Gary Shank wrote about debates on agency
> of the
> first Shuttle disaster (do you remember it? I placed the paper on
> xmca - I
> hope it is not my senior moment of false memory :-(.
>
> What do you think?
>
> Eugene
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: david.preiss@yale.edu [mailto:david.preiss@yale.edu]
> > Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 12:18 PM
> > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > Subject: Re: goals and agency
> >
> >
> >
> > I wonder how much the notions of "goal" and "agency", given their
> > individualistic bias, are part of what we could call a USA reading
> of
> > CHAT. How much autonomy should we give to the individual and how
> much
> > power should we give to the forces of society/culture when
> sketching
> > the working of the mind?
> >
> > Quoting Renee Hayes <rhayes@UDel.Edu>:
> >
> > > OK, since we are discussing goals, and how and when they are
> defined,
> > > what
> > > do you all see as the relationship between "goal" and "agency"?
> I
> > > mean,
> > > there has been a lot of criticism about the notion of agency (and
> who
> > > has it
> > > in which situations). I am thinking that everybody has goals,
> > > regardless of
> > > there positioning in the activity (so for example teacher and
> > > students in
> > > classroom, despite inequity of power, all have goals, I
> suppose).
> > > And these
> > > goals can be misaligned, even mutually excluding. But I think
> there
> > > has
> > > been some argument against the possibility of these students
> (or
> > > anybody in
> > > relatively powerless position) having agency.
> > >
> > > So what is the relationship between goals and agency? Can CHAT
> help
> > > us to
> > > understand this?
> > >
> > > Renee Hayes
> > > University of Delaware
> > >
> > >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Eugene Matusov [mailto:ematusov@UDel.Edu]
> > > Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 10:24 AM
> > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > Subject: RE: RE: cr&c
> > >
> > > In addition to what Sarah wrote, Leont'ev (1981) found an
> > > interesting
> > > Hegel's insight about the development of goal, "As Hegel
> correctly
> > > noted, an
> > > individual 'cannot define the goal of his action until he has
> > > acted....'"
> > > (p. 62)
> > >
> > > Eugene
> > >
> > >
> > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > From: Sarah Woodward Beck [mailto:sarah.beck@nyu.edu]
> > > > Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 9:44 AM
> > > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > Subject: Re: RE: cr&c
> > > >
> > > > David,
> > > > When I wrote that shared goals imply consciousness, I was
> thinking
> > > of
> > > goals as described
> > > > by Wertsch (1979, 1981) in an activity system. Goals are what
> > > give
> > > direction to an activity,
> > > > and according to Wertsch, Marx argued that the ability to set
> > > conscious
> > > goals is part of what
> > > > makes us human. So I was extrapolating from the level of
> activity
> > > to the
> > > level of culture in
> > > > my assumptions about the characteristics of a goal.
> > > > But perhaps the definition of "goal" needs to be expanded at
> the
> > > level of
> > > culture. What do
> > > > you see as some examples of "unconscious" goals in an
> ideological,
> > > complex
> > > society?
> > > > --Sarah
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > From: david.preiss@yale.edu
> > > > Date: Monday, March 22, 2004 1:06 am
> > > > Subject: Re: RE: cr&c
> > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Hi Sarah,
> > > > >
> > > > > Why do shared goals imply consciousness? I think some
> shared
> > > goals
> > > > > can
> > > > > be quite unconscious, specially in complex (ideological)
> > > societies.
> > > > >
> > > > > David
> > > > >
> > > > > Quoting Sarah Woodward Beck <sarah.beck@nyu.edu>:
> > > > >
> > > > > > I agree with Judy - I would remove trust and shared
> goals.
> > > Trust,
> > > > > > because it has strong moral connotations that don't seem
> to
> > > > > belong in
> > > > > > a basic definition of culture, and Shared Goals because
> this
> > > implies
> > > > > > a consciousness (of goals) that participants in a culture
> may
> > > not
> > > > > > possess. We are often not conscious of our participation
> in
> > > a
> > > > > > culture as culture.
> > > > > > --Sarah Beck
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > ----- Original Message -----
> > > > > > From: Judy Diamondstone <jdiamondstone@clarku.edu>
> > > > > > Date: Saturday, March 20, 2004 1:57 pm
> > > > > > Subject: RE: cr&c
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Establshing shared goals/visions?
> > > > > > > > trust?
> > > > > > > > division of labor?
> > > > > > > > complementarity?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Which of these things would remove from your own
> > > conception
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > culture?
> > > > > > > SHAREDness of goals
> > > > > > > Trust.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > What do you think?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Judy
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > -----Original Message-----
> > > > > > > > From: Mike Cole [mcole@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > > > > > > > Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 1:38 PM
> > > > > > > > To: xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > > > > > > > Subject: re: cr&c
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I can see that those working to create activities
> where
> > > > > > > > reflective practice
> > > > > > > > is valued and implemented have good reason not to want
> to
> > > > > > substitute
> > > > > > > > culture into Bill's paragraph. I am, of course,
> speaking
> > > of
> > > > > > > culture as
> > > > > > > > (better, from) a particular perspective and it is
> > > polysemic.
> > > > > > > Reflective> practice is also polysemic. Even the word
> > > > > polysemic is
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > polysemic.>
> > > > > > > > However, which of the following things is not
> > > characteristic of
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > culture> as understood in chat discourse:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I am also uncomfortable about the substtution as I
> think
> > > > > > > collaborative> reflection is a highly specific practice
> and
> > > there
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > are some important
> > > > > > > > principles that givern it including the establishment
> of
> > > a
> > > > > > shared
> > > > > > > > vision or
> > > > > > > > goal, the establishment of trust, division of labor,
> > > > > > > complementarity, etc.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Establshing shared goals/visions?
> > > > > > > > trust?
> > > > > > > > division of labor?
> > > > > > > > complementarity?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Which of these things would remove from your own
> > > conception
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > culture?> mike
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > >
>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Nov 09 2004 - 11:42:23 PST