Another odd something for me is their use of Varela, Thompson, and Rosch
(1995). They use a lot of the ideas in there but, again, elide the social
which is intrinsic to VT&R's perspective, so much so that they use
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as an organising theme:=20
"The world is not an object I have in my possession =85 it is the natural
setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions
=85 The world is inseparable from the subject =85 and the subject is
inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself
specifies" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, in Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993, pp.=
3-4).
Following is part of a paper I'm working on that attempts an account of a
more socially oriented approach to embodied cognition. I started it well
before Lakoff & Johnson's book came out and it is in no way a response to=
them
---------------------
Varela (1992) specifies a =91double dialectical=92 epistemology that is
intrinsic to autopoietic, and therefore cognitive, systems: the dialectic
of =91the nature of identity=92, and the dialectical nature of a system=92s
=91relation to a world=92 (pp. 13-14). The =91dialectics of identity=92 esta=
blishes
an autonomous entity that has a =91dynamical=92 network of interactions from
which properties such as metabolic networks and =91linguistic recursivity=92
emerge (p. 14, original emphasis). This network of interactions appears, as
a =91global=92 totality of emerging properties that downwardly conditions th=
e
reconstituting network of interactions, which, in turn, maintains systemic
coherence (p. 14, original emphasis).=20
The second tier of Varela=92s double dialectic is =91a dialectics of knowled=
ge=92
which =91establishes a world of cognitive significance for this identity.
Knowledge emerges from the perspective provided by this identity=92 and
refers to somatically generated meanings engendered by the relationship
between a system its environment (1992, p. 14, original emphasis). This
somatic significance stands in dialectic opposition to the coupling between
the system and its environment, the necessary and permanent embeddedness
and dependency of the system on its environment, =91since only through such
coupling can its world be brought forth=92 (p. 14). In human beings, such
couplings include =91socio-linguistic exchanges for our subjective selves=92
(p. 14). The key point here is that social systems produce their=20
"own domain of problems and actions to be "solved"; this cognitive domain
does not exist "out there" in an environment that acts as a landing pad for
an organism that somehow drops or is parachuted into the world. Instead,
living beings and their worlds of meaning stand in relation to each other
through mutual specification or co-determination. Thus what we describe as
significant environmental regularities are not external features that have
been internalised =85 Environmental regularities are the result of a conjoin=
t
history, a congruence which unfolds from a long history of
co-determination" (p. 14).=20
----------------------
My two-bob's worth.
Phil
=20
Phil Graham
p.graham who-is-at qut.edu.au
http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Palms/8314/index.html