I'm wondering how much the notion of "reduction to the biological" means
"reduction to the science of biology" with all of its mechanistic
implications. As I read Lakoff he is discussing the experiential body, the
body that feels exhilaration when racing down a ski slope and is overwhelmed
with disgust and loathing when confronted with situations that offend the
sensibilities, to mention some extremes. Certainly there are biological
processes associated with these experiences and perhaps theseexperiences
presuppose a certain kind of biological basis. The latter of course being a
major theme of popular confrontation with the cybernetic universe from
"Terminator" to "The Matrix".
The achievement of the athlete is clearly a biological phenomena but the
question of reducing it to a description biological is generally recognized
to be to be incomplete (even if possible). The body is the part of the
world in which a self knows itself and everything else. The recognition
that selves are cultural-historical products doesn't eliminate the fact that
we know ourselves as embodied in this sense. Surely biology the science has
something to say about this state of affairs just as we accept that physics
can tell us about the properties of matter thereby allowing us to control
the flow of electrons on micronic scales thereby allowing this message to
come to you.
I read Lakoff's notion of the embodied self as pointing to an understanding
of how our existence as biological organisms provides materials for the
creation of the metaphors that, to apply a CHAT interpretation, we use as
artefacts.
Paul H. Dillon