I have always wondered about the gulf between Lakoff's work and the
bibliography in which CHAT and CHAT related writing is embedded. I've yet
to see Lakoff considered at all in relationship to the discussions
engendered here. I haven't seen that latest piece but am familiar with
Lakoff's theories of embodied self and it relation to categorization and
language from "Metaphors We Live By" and "Women, Fire, and Dangerous
Things."
Paul H. Dillon
-----Original Message-----
From: Victoria Yew <v.yew who-is-at edfac.usyd.edu.au>
To: xmca who-is-at weber.ucsd.edu <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
Date: Wednesday, October 27, 1999 6:27 PM
Subject: Re: A question of selves
>Paul & Judy
>
>Have you read Lakoff & Johnson's (1999) latest exposition on the theory of
>self in "Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to
>western thought".
>
>V
>
>At 04:15 PM 27/10/99 -0700, you wrote:
>>In a post some time back Judy wrote, "Can you say more about your concern
>>about 'all those selves' that i had mentioned?" referring to my mention of
>>the following statement from an earlier post:
>>
>>" I've been
>>paying attention to similar questions in different literatures, which seem
>>motivated in part by a concern for complexity and for parsing out
different
>>strata or time depths in sociocultural phenomena - like the distinction
>>between the situated social self and the "cultural" or enduring self; or
the
>>autobiographical self, the discoursal self, the writing self...."
>>
>>I have been meaning to respond and take BB's multilogue decay rates to be
>>descriptive not prescriptive so here is my concern.
>>
>>Actually I only have two questions. 1. Are these different selves
>>constituted with respect to bound or unbound, contextualized or
>>decontextualized audiences (no jokes please, I'm using set theoretic
>>terminology). 2. Is the narrative self different in some qualitative way
>>from any of the other "selves" or is it part of each? According to Bruner
>>(in Cult Psych, p128) narrative is "linking of events over time" and hence
>>inherent in all thought and thus, I presume, in all selves.
>>
>>These two questions suggest a third concerning communication between the
>>different selves. Are there different narrative selves for each of the
>>possible narratives (i.e., writing, discoursal, etc.) who need have no
>>knowledge of each other--Jekyll and Hyde extreme? It seems that at least
>>some "higher order narratives" would to be necessary to allow successful
>>social functioning unless one takes an extreme social objectivist position
.
>>But then what is that self that knows itself in all of these particular
>>selves? Spooky shades of Hegel in the season of the witch.
>>
>>Paul H. Dillon
>>
>>
>>
>>
>Victoria Yew
>Doctoral Candidate
>School of Educational Psychology, Literacies & Learning
>Faculty of Education (A35)
>University of Sydney
>NSW 2006
>AUSTRALIA
>Telephone : (02) 9351 6326/ International +61 2 9351 6326
>Fax : (02) 9351 2606 / International +61 2 9351 2606
>E-mail : v.yew who-is-at edfac.usyd.edu.au
>