Martin --
Apologies for lurking, following by cryptic/petulant message.
The point being that the same action can, depending on what activity
system you're looking at it from, mean two very different things. And
they
can be in conflict, ranging from a cool, subdued conflict, to a very hot
one. Specifically (since my interest lies in how people negotiated
decent
conditions of work), someone can be doing a job for the purpose of
earning
a living, and care not one whit about what the industry is (could be
weaving cloth, making bombs, dumping garbage pails in a restaurant,
grading papers). Or the person can be doing a job for the purpose of
doing
the job. Most studies of the workplace assume that people at work are
working for the purpose that the firm/company/enterprise/industry is set
up for. When they overlook the possibility that two very different,
sometimes conflicting activities are taking place (an activity system
defined by motive/purpose), then they can't discern how people are
feeling, how they're learning to do the job, how they're managing their
effort, etc etc.
Thanks for asking.
Helena
On 3/27/13 1:42 PM, "Martin Packer" <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
Hi Helena,
Which point are you referring to? There have been so many!
Martin
On Mar 27, 2013, at 1:13 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
wrote:
Hello -- Exactly my point in my MCA article on using AT to study
work.
Helena Worthen
Hworthen@illinois.edu
On 3/22/13 8:40 AM, "Holodynski, Manfred"
<manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de> wrote:
Dear colleagues,
thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article.
There
are
a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties to
follow
all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to answer to the
following:
1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of
activity.
As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I
focused
especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and its
levels
of
activity that is related to motives, actions that are related to
goals
and operations that are related to the conditions under which an
action
is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he stated
that
my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how the
macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals
of an
individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and
one
action can realize different activities.
May I quote Andy's words:
" Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they have
to
be
inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
success,
failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
both
participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
is
tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of
an
activity. One and the same action could be part of different
""actions
activities (!) (MH)"". It is the emotions which signal (internally
and
externally) the success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's
furthering
an activity, and it is this which makes manifest and actual that
connection between action and activity, for both the
observer/participant
and the individual subject.
So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind",
or
intelligent infants, etc."
a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the
behavior.
What's the goal?
b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to
greet
his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is the
activity?
c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the speech
is a
part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election
victory.
So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory
there
is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the
personally
felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that
he
doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be
overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
societal
meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the personal
sense assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader
framed
this situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able
to
fulfill the leadership.
But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak
about
an
advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in
infants
who start to have intentions but still not a mental image of a
future
state of affairs.
2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced
level
in older children:
- A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level of
actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of first
operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the
desired
future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign
system
which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state in the
here
and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point,
not
only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of
them
and to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play
that
color one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth
striving
for
and that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to transform
them
into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It emerges
in
a
long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment of
goals
through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older
children are
So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure
of an
activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific
psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
Best
Manfred
Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
Fliednerstr. 21
D-48149 Münster
+49-(0)-251-83-34311
+49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
+49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
-----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather than
Engestrom's "systems of activity."
So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives. So
Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
how
the structure of an activity is related to motives and goals.
Because
motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
success,
failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
both
participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
is
tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of
an
activity. One and the same action could be part of different
actions.
It
is the emotions which signal (internally and externally) the
success,
etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it
is
this which makes manifest and actual that connection between action
and
activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual
subject.
So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind",
or
intelligent infants, etc.
It's all in there.
Andy
mike cole wrote:
Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity
were
not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the
views in
this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems important
for me to get clear about!
Mike
On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the
window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e.,
the
meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a
part,
which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
"intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that
activity -
is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state
and
intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
fundamental.
Andy
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