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Re: [xmca] Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
Carol and Helena (and Martin?),
This reminds me of Dewey and his notion of divided vs. undivided interest.
With divided interest, the person stands at a distance from the activity
and the person must continually put "effort" into the task. Undivided
interest is the result of “the annihilation of the distance between the
person and the materials and the results of his action” (Dewey 1913:17).
The result of this annihilation is that “the effort entirely vanishes”
(Dewey 1897:55). As we sometimes say, the person becomes "consumed" by the
activity (cf. Czikzentmihalyi's notion of Flow).
[And as I'm writing this, I'm struck by the parallels to Marx's notion of
alienated labor. Alienated labor ~ divided interest.].
And here is James describing roughly the same phenomena:
"In the mountains, in youth, on some intoxicating autumn morning, after
invigorating slumber, we feel strong enough to jump over the moon, and
casting about us for a barrier, a rock, a tree, or any object on which to
measure our bodily prowess, we perform with perfect spontaneity feats which
at another time might demand an almost impossible exertion of muscle and
will. (James 1880:21)"
[note there are some important questions about identity here that James
doesn't ask such as: why "youth"? (and do women feel this same impulse? Why
or why not?) As well as what is it about the setting (and the cultural
meanings attached to this "intoxicating" setting) that provokes this kind
of response? But it nonetheless seems to nicely describe one possible
moment of undivided interest that seems to reduce the need for effort.].
Anyway, I'm enjoying lurking in the conversation!
-greg
On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 9:59 AM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>wrote:
> Carol --
>
> Certainly. And this difference has implications. For example: Learning.
> When one learns a job that one does for art's sake, one learns it
> differently (or is taught it differently) than when one learns a job for
> the utilitarian motive of receiving money. Or, another example: social
> context. The place where one practices a job that one does for art's sake
> is likely to be unregulated, whereas the place where one practices a job
> that one does to earn money is going to be -- or is supposed to be
> regulated. These regulations govern the relationship between the worker
> and the person/s who employ him/her/. Etc.
>
> Helena
>
> On 3/27/13 9:40 PM, "Carol Macdonald" <carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >Helena
> >
> >Andy points out in his book (An interdisciplinary theory of activity) that
> >people may work for arts sake, but they may have a utilitarian motive for
> >their work, for example working for the money. I think you may be in
> >agreement with this.
> >
> >Carol
> >
> >On 28 March 2013 00:20, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Martin --
> >>
> >> Apologies for lurking, following by cryptic/petulant message.
> >>
> >> The point being that the same action can, depending on what activity
> >> system you're looking at it from, mean two very different things. And
> >>they
> >> can be in conflict, ranging from a cool, subdued conflict, to a very hot
> >> one. Specifically (since my interest lies in how people negotiated
> >>decent
> >> conditions of work), someone can be doing a job for the purpose of
> >>earning
> >> a living, and care not one whit about what the industry is (could be
> >> weaving cloth, making bombs, dumping garbage pails in a restaurant,
> >> grading papers). Or the person can be doing a job for the purpose of
> >>doing
> >> the job. Most studies of the workplace assume that people at work are
> >> working for the purpose that the firm/company/enterprise/industry is set
> >> up for. When they overlook the possibility that two very different,
> >> sometimes conflicting activities are taking place (an activity system
> >> defined by motive/purpose), then they can't discern how people are
> >> feeling, how they're learning to do the job, how they're managing their
> >> effort, etc etc.
> >>
> >> Thanks for asking.
> >>
> >> Helena
> >>
> >> On 3/27/13 1:42 PM, "Martin Packer" <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>
> >> >Hi Helena,
> >> >
> >> >Which point are you referring to? There have been so many!
> >> >
> >> >Martin
> >> >
> >> >On Mar 27, 2013, at 1:13 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> >> >wrote:
> >> >
> >> >> Hello -- Exactly my point in my MCA article on using AT to study
> >>work.
> >> >>
> >> >> Helena Worthen
> >> >> Hworthen@illinois.edu
> >> >>
> >> >> On 3/22/13 8:40 AM, "Holodynski, Manfred"
> >> >> <manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de> wrote:
> >> >>
> >> >>> Dear colleagues,
> >> >>>
> >> >>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article.
> >>There
> >> >>>are
> >> >>> a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties to
> >> >>>follow
> >> >>> all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to answer to the
> >> >>> following:
> >> >>>
> >> >>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of
> >> >>> activity.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I
> >> >>>focused
> >> >>> especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and its
> >>levels
> >> >>>of
> >> >>> activity that is related to motives, actions that are related to
> >>goals
> >> >>> and operations that are related to the conditions under which an
> >>action
> >> >>> is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he stated
> >> >>>that
> >> >>> my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how the
> >> >>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals
> >>of an
> >> >>> individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and
> >>one
> >> >>> action can realize different activities.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> May I quote Andy's words:
> >> >>>
> >> >>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they have
> >>to
> >> >>>be
> >> >>> inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
> >> >>>success,
> >> >>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
> >>both
> >> >>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
> >>is
> >> >>> tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of
> >>an
> >> >>> activity. One and the same action could be part of different
> >>""actions
> >> >>> activities (!) (MH)"". It is the emotions which signal (internally
> >>and
> >> >>> externally) the success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's
> >>furthering
> >> >>> an activity, and it is this which makes manifest and actual that
> >> >>> connection between action and activity, for both the
> >> >>>observer/participant
> >> >>> and the individual subject.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind",
> >>or
> >> >>> intelligent infants, etc."
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the
> >>behavior.
> >> >>> What's the goal?
> >> >>>
> >> >>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to
> >> >>>greet
> >> >>> his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is the
> >> >>>activity?
> >> >>>
> >> >>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the speech
> >>is a
> >> >>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election
> >> >>>victory.
> >> >>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory
> >> >>>there
> >> >>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the
> >> >>>personally
> >> >>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that
> >>he
> >> >>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be
> >> >>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the
> >>societal
> >> >>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the personal
> >> >>> sense assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader
> >> >>>framed
> >> >>> this situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able
> >>to
> >> >>> fulfill the leadership.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak
> >>about
> >> >>>an
> >> >>> advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in
> >> >>>infants
> >> >>> who start to have intentions but still not a mental image of a
> >>future
> >> >>> state of affairs.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced
> >> >>>level
> >> >>> in older children:
> >> >>>
> >> >>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level of
> >> >>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of first
> >> >>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
> >> >>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the
> >> >>>desired
> >> >>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign
> >>system
> >> >>> which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state in the
> >> >>>here
> >> >>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point,
> >>not
> >> >>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of
> >>them
> >> >>> and to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play
> >>that
> >> >>> color one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth
> >>striving
> >> >>>for
> >> >>> and that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to transform
> >> >>>them
> >> >>> into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It emerges
> >>in
> >> >>>a
> >> >>> long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment of
> >> >>>goals
> >> >>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older
> >> >>> children are
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure
> >>of an
> >> >>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific
> >> >>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Best
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Manfred
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Fliednerstr. 21
> >> >>>
> >> >>> D-48149 Münster
> >> >>>
> >> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
> >> >>>
> >> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
> >> >>>
> >> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
> >> >>>
> >> >>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> >> >>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
> >> >>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
> >> >>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >> >>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
> >> >>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather than
> >> >>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
> >> >>>
> >> >>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives. So
> >> >>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and
> >>how
> >> >>> the structure of an activity is related to motives and goals.
> >>Because
> >> >>> motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
> >> >>> inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
> >> >>>success,
> >> >>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for
> >>both
> >> >>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion
> >>is
> >> >>> tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of
> >>an
> >> >>> activity. One and the same action could be part of different
> >>actions.
> >> >>>It
> >> >>> is the emotions which signal (internally and externally) the
> >>success,
> >> >>> etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it
> >>is
> >> >>> this which makes manifest and actual that connection between action
> >>and
> >> >>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual
> >>subject.
> >> >>>
> >> >>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind",
> >>or
> >> >>> intelligent infants, etc.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> It's all in there.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> Andy
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> mike cole wrote:
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity
> >>were
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the
> >>views in
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems important
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> for me to get clear about!
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> Mike
> >> >>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >> >>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e.,
> >>the
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a
> >>part,
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that
> >>activity -
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state
> >>and
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> fundamental.
> >> >>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>> Andy
> >> >>>
> >> >>>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>>
> >> >>> __________________________________________
> >> >>> _____
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> >> >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >> >>
> >> >>
> >> >> __________________________________________
> >> >> _____
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> >> >>
> >> >
> >> >
> >> >__________________________________________
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> >
> >
> >
> >--
> >Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
> >Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
> >Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
> >Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
> >__________________________________________
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>
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--
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Visiting Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
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