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Re: [xmca] Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
Helena
Andy points out in his book (An interdisciplinary theory of activity) that
people may work for arts sake, but they may have a utilitarian motive for
their work, for example working for the money. I think you may be in
agreement with this.
Carol
On 28 March 2013 00:20, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com> wrote:
> Martin --
>
> Apologies for lurking, following by cryptic/petulant message.
>
> The point being that the same action can, depending on what activity
> system you're looking at it from, mean two very different things. And they
> can be in conflict, ranging from a cool, subdued conflict, to a very hot
> one. Specifically (since my interest lies in how people negotiated decent
> conditions of work), someone can be doing a job for the purpose of earning
> a living, and care not one whit about what the industry is (could be
> weaving cloth, making bombs, dumping garbage pails in a restaurant,
> grading papers). Or the person can be doing a job for the purpose of doing
> the job. Most studies of the workplace assume that people at work are
> working for the purpose that the firm/company/enterprise/industry is set
> up for. When they overlook the possibility that two very different,
> sometimes conflicting activities are taking place (an activity system
> defined by motive/purpose), then they can't discern how people are
> feeling, how they're learning to do the job, how they're managing their
> effort, etc etc.
>
> Thanks for asking.
>
> Helena
>
> On 3/27/13 1:42 PM, "Martin Packer" <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
>
> >Hi Helena,
> >
> >Which point are you referring to? There have been so many!
> >
> >Martin
> >
> >On Mar 27, 2013, at 1:13 PM, Helena Worthen <helenaworthen@gmail.com>
> >wrote:
> >
> >> Hello -- Exactly my point in my MCA article on using AT to study work.
> >>
> >> Helena Worthen
> >> Hworthen@illinois.edu
> >>
> >> On 3/22/13 8:40 AM, "Holodynski, Manfred"
> >> <manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de> wrote:
> >>
> >>> Dear colleagues,
> >>>
> >>> thank you very much for all your valued comments on my article. There
> >>>are
> >>> a lot of aspects already discussed and I have some difficulties to
> >>>follow
> >>> all lines of argumentation. Therefore, I would like to answer to the
> >>> following:
> >>>
> >>> 1. Emotions as psychological function within the macrostructure of
> >>> activity.
> >>>
> >>> As Andy claims it I get my Activity Theory from AN Leont'ev and I
> >>>focused
> >>> especially on his concept of macrostructure of activity and its levels
> >>>of
> >>> activity that is related to motives, actions that are related to goals
> >>> and operations that are related to the conditions under which an action
> >>> is given. And Andy gets precisely to the heart of it when he stated
> >>>that
> >>> my article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how the
> >>> macrostructure of an activity is related to the motives and goals of an
> >>> individual. One activity can be realized by different actions, and one
> >>> action can realize different activities.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> May I quote Andy's words:
> >>>
> >>> " Because motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to
> >>>be
> >>> inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
> >>>success,
> >>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
> >>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion is
> >>> tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
> >>> activity. One and the same action could be part of different ""actions
> >>> activities (!) (MH)"". It is the emotions which signal (internally and
> >>> externally) the success, etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering
> >>> an activity, and it is this which makes manifest and actual that
> >>> connection between action and activity, for both the
> >>>observer/participant
> >>> and the individual subject.
> >>>
> >>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind", or
> >>> intelligent infants, etc."
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> a) Take the example of the opening of the window. That's the behavior.
> >>> What's the goal?
> >>>
> >>> b) Imagine the person is a leader and opens the window in order to
> >>>greet
> >>> his followers and to hold a speech. That's the goal. What is the
> >>>activity?
> >>>
> >>> c) If one look at the circumstances one can derive that the speech is a
> >>> part of a political activity in order to celebrate the election
> >>>victory.
> >>> So, if the leader also feels pride and enthusiasm about the victory
> >>>there
> >>> is coincidence between the publically assigned meaning and the
> >>>personally
> >>> felt sense of the situation. However, it may also be possible that he
> >>> doesn't feel pride but a great burden and he personally feels to be
> >>> overloaded with the duties and future expectations. Then the societal
> >>> meaning assigned by the followers to this situation and the personal
> >>> sense assigned by the leader himself are not congruent. The leader
> >>>framed
> >>> this situation under an achievement perspective whether he is able to
> >>> fulfill the leadership.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> But, note when we talk about actions and activity, then we speak about
> >>>an
> >>> advanced level of activity e.g. in children or adults, but not in
> >>>infants
> >>> who start to have intentions but still not a mental image of a future
> >>> state of affairs.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> 2. Differentiation between the basic level in infants and advanced
> >>>level
> >>> in older children:
> >>>
> >>> - A young infant has not already established a goal-driven level of
> >>> actions. In the first weeks one can observe the acquisition of first
> >>> operations and of first expectations what should happen. But these
> >>> expectations are not yet represented as a mental image about the
> >>>desired
> >>> future states. This is the product of the acquisition of a sign system
> >>> which enables the person to evoke and imagine a future state in the
> >>>here
> >>> and now and to start to strive for it. And for this starting point, not
> >>> only to imagine different future states, but also to select one of them
> >>> and to start to strive for it, emotional processes come into play that
> >>> color one of the imagined future state e.g. in a state worth striving
> >>>for
> >>> and that mobilize the executive power to start striving for it.
> >>>
> >>> However, the ability to form such notions of goals and to transform
> >>>them
> >>> into actions is not something that occurs automatically. It emerges in
> >>>a
> >>> long-drawn ontogenetic learning process in which the attainment of
> >>>goals
> >>> through actions is tried, tested, and increasingly optimized. Older
> >>> children are
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> So, for an understanding of my emotion concept the macrostructure of an
> >>> activity is very decisive because I embedded emotions as a specific
> >>> psychological function within the macrostructure of an activity.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Best
> >>>
> >>> Manfred
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Prof. Dr. Manfred Holodynski
> >>>
> >>> Institut für Psychologie in Bildung und Erziehung
> >>>
> >>> Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
> >>>
> >>> Fliednerstr. 21
> >>>
> >>> D-48149 Münster
> >>>
> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34311
> >>>
> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34310 (Sekretariat)
> >>>
> >>> +49-(0)-251-83-34314 (Fax)
> >>>
> >>>
> http://wwwpsy.uni-muenster.de/Psychologie.inst5/AEHolodynski/index.html
> >>>
> >>> manfred.holodynski@uni-muenster.de
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> -----Ursprüngliche Nachricht-----
> >>> Von: Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
> >>> Gesendet: Freitag, 22. März 2013 04:13
> >>> An: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> >>> Cc: Holodynski, Manfred
> >>> Betreff: Re: Polls are closed: Manfred Holodynsk's article is choice
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Mike, Manfred gets his Activity Theory from AN Leontyev, rather than
> >>> Engestrom's "systems of activity."
> >>>
> >>> So actions and activities are defined by their goals and motives. So
> >>> Manfred's article needs to be read with attention to motivation and how
> >>> the structure of an activity is related to motives and goals. Because
> >>> motives are not given to immediate perception; they have to be
> >>> inferred/learnt. Emotional expression and experience signal the
> >>>success,
> >>> failure, frustration, expectation, etc. of goals and motives for both
> >>> participant/observers and the individual subject themself, emotion is
> >>> tied up with motives and goals and therefore with the structure of an
> >>> activity. One and the same action could be part of different actions.
> >>>It
> >>> is the emotions which signal (internally and externally) the success,
> >>> etc., etc., that is, in an action's furthering an activity, and it is
> >>> this which makes manifest and actual that connection between action and
> >>> activity, for both the observer/participant and the individual subject.
> >>>
> >>> So there is no metaphysics here. No hypothetical "states of mind", or
> >>> intelligent infants, etc.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> It's all in there.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Andy
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> mike cole wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> Hi Andy - and here I was wondering why operation/action/activity were
> >>>
> >>>> not prominent in Manfred's article. Where does he lay out the views in
> >>>
> >>>> this note? Am I reading too superficially as usual? Seems important
> >>>
> >>>> for me to get clear about!
> >>>
> >>>> Mike
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>> On Thursday, March 21, 2013, Andy Blunden wrote:
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>> Think of your illustration,Martin, about whether, in opening the
> >>>
> >>>> window, you were acting as a technician or moral leader. I.e., the
> >>>
> >>>> meaning of the action lies in the activity of which it is a part,
> >>>
> >>>> which is not immediately given. Manfred does not refer this to
> >>>
> >>>> "intention" or "belief". Manfred is quite specific that the
> >>>
> >>>> signalising and self-perception of an action in relation to an
> >>>
> >>>> activity - i.e., an action's being of this and not that activity -
> >>>
> >>>> is a function played by emotion. Concepts like internal state and
> >>>
> >>>> intention are derivative from operation/action/activity, not
> >>>
> >>>> fundamental.
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>> Andy
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> __________________________________________
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> >>
> >>
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--
Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin)
Developmental psycholinguist: EMBED
Academic, Researcher, Writer and Editor
Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa
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