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Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo Finnish Insufficiences
- To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
- Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo Finnish Insufficiences
- From: Victor Friedlander <victor@kfar-hanassi.org.il>
- Date: Sun, 25 Dec 2011 17:40:22 +0200
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On 25 December 2011 10:10, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> I don't know Markell, but I read Williams as what I call billiard table
> recognition. As you correctly say, individuals in the modern state get
> recognition first of all through Right, and then on top of all that
> through participation in a whole variety of mediating projects.
> Mediation is the alpha and omega of Hegel and I don't see a single
> glimmer of understanding of this in the writers I mentioned. Why? They
> express the spirit of their age, in which individuals bang around like
> billiard balls on a level playing field. They want to do away with
> religion, but all they have to replace it with is individualism.
>
> There is a lot of be said for Mead and his rendering of the master-slave
> narrative, but I think he remained unclear, and his subjects seem to be
> able to generate the means of mediation from within themselves. OK up to
> a point, but as Hegel says ...
>
> Also, what is overlooked is that the subjects of Hegel's narratives are
> not first of all individuals, but are social subjects, and only
> derivatively from that, persons.
>
>
>
> Andy
>
> Greg Thompson wrote:
>
>> Yes, Andy, your quote from Hegel makes clear that Hegel is tracing out
>> subjective spirit as it emerges through recognition in phylogenetic
>> history. But this is not to say that the process of recognition is all
>> said and done once human social life has developed past this state.
>> What does follow from this historical transformation, imho, is that
>> recognition will take on a new quality with the emergence of civil
>> society and the State - recognition becomes mediated in a whole new
>> way; recognition becomes mediated through culture. This is not your
>> father's recognition. It is not about struggle and battle, but it is
>> about gaining rich individuality through the complex macrosocial array
>> of identities that are on offer in society (and which are realized
>> with respect to the complex metapragmatics of exhibiting and,
>> critically, being recognized as having had exhibited, the signs and
>> symbols of having had been such and such type of person in a given
>> moment). To put it in a slightly different idiom, identity is like a
>> right - it exists consequentially only through the recognition of
>> others (writ large, i.e. recognition via thirdness (Peirce) or, if you
>> prefer, a generalized other (Mead), in short, through recognition
>> through culture). And just as property creates possibilities for
>> agentive action, e.g. raising cattle or raising capital, so too do
>> various identities create possibilities for agentive action (something
>> that the con-man is well aware of, but which most of the rest of us
>> seem too stuck in our "own" skin to realize).
>>
>> I also happen to think that this importance of culture to mediation
>> comes through in both Markell's and Williams' readings of Hegel,
>> although I think it is more clearly articulated in the former than in
>> the latter (though I do have some issues with both). And I will need
>> to go back through my notes and through your writings on Williams,
>> Andy, to see where I think that you've got Williams wrong (but I'm not
>> about to make a similar claim about your reading of Hegel - you're way
>> out of my league in that regard!).
>>
>> But that will have to wait as there are more pressing matters right
>> now (presents to wrap and cookies to eat and notes to leave!).
>>
>> And a very merry Christmas to you Andy.
>> And to all a good night.
>> -greg
>>
>> p.s., to mike I'm not sure at all how to connect this to Leontiev.
>> Have much work to do in that connection... Motivation maybe?
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 6:24 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> To let Hegel speak for himself. In The Subjective Spirit, after the
>>> "master-servant" narrative, he says:
>>>
>>> "To prevent any possible misunderstandings with regard to the
>>> standpoint just outlined, we must here remark that the fight for
>>> recognition pushed to the extreme here indicated can only occur in
>>> the natural state, where men exist only as single, separate
>>> individuals; but it is absent in civil society and the State because
>>> here the recognition for which the combatants fight already exists.
>>> For although the State may originate in violence, it does not rest
>>> on it" (1830/1971 §432n).
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> Andy Blunden wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> I have written/spoken eslewhere and at length on R R Williams (as well
>>>> as
>>>> Robert Brandom, Axel Honneth and others) and I regard their postmodern
>>>> interpretation of recognition-without-culture. I regard it as the main
>>>> barrier to an understanding of CHAT or Hegel of our times.
>>>>
>>>> Functionalism is interesting in the way you mentioned, in that it
>>>> prefigured more contemporary currents which also do away with any
>>>> centre of
>>>> power but cast power as flowing through "capillaries" - a more radical
>>>> conception of power-wthout-a-centre actually.
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for providing a link back to the Leontiev/functionalism
>>>>> discussion, Andy.
>>>>>
>>>>> The links appear to go right through your home hegelian territory and
>>>>> link us up
>>>>> to current discussions of "recognition." They also link up with ideas
>>>>> linked to
>>>>> Zygmund Bauman's "Liquid Modernity." And to the many other people whose
>>>>> work
>>>>> I know too little of.
>>>>>
>>>>> With respect to functionalism, casting national aspersions aside :-))
>>>>> , it never occurred to me during my years getting trained to be a
>>>>> learning
>>>>> theorist in the
>>>>> Skinnerian tradition, to consider the question of "where does the
>>>>> function come from" or "who is exerting power here?" We starved the
>>>>> rats
>>>>> and they ran or died. Or coerced sophomores using grades as "part of
>>>>> their
>>>>> education."
>>>>>
>>>>> Then I went to Moscow. Where the caste of characters under discussion
>>>>> were my hosts. Like I said. I am a slow learner on all these
>>>>> complicated
>>>>> matters. At the rate I am going I am never going to figure it all out!
>>>>>
>>>>> :-)
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 9:05 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
>>>>> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> In my view, Mike, there were some basic questions asked and
>>>>> answered by A N Leontyev in launching the enquiry we know as
>>>>> "Activity Theory" are uneliminable, that is, he took a step which
>>>>> has to be valued and continued. But it was a step at an extremely
>>>>> fundamental level. It absolutely left open Stalinist-functionalist
>>>>> directions and well as emancipatory directions. Personally, I
>>>>> think the impact of the "planned economy" and the "leadership"
>>>>> which understood "the laws of history" and the state which
>>>>> represented a "higher stage of society" and so on, left a mark on
>>>>> the whole current. But its basics, its fundamentals remain intact.
>>>>> It only remains to agree on what those were.
>>>>>
>>>>> By-the-by, the home of "functionalism" is the USA.
>>>>>
>>>>> By-the-by again, in the early 80s I was a member of a Trotskyist
>>>>> party which put Ilyenkov on a pedastal, and published new
>>>>> translations of his work in English, which also came very close to
>>>>> endorsing Lamarkism. It debated it, but the Party perished before
>>>>> the debate was resolved.
>>>>>
>>>>> Andy
>>>>>
>>>>> mike cole wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> I am being very slow here. How does this discussion resolve
>>>>> or help me to
>>>>> think more clearly about the issues in the subject line? the
>>>>> issues over
>>>>> different interpretations of Leontiev, their relation to
>>>>> functionalism,
>>>>> stalinism, fascism, etc?
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 3:34 PM, Greg Thompson
>>>>> <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
>>>>> >>wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Larry,
>>>>> IMHO, you're hitting the heart of the matter with
>>>>> recognition and
>>>>> agency - self-assertion vs. self-emptying seems a nice way
>>>>> to think
>>>>> about the central problematic (and I agree with your
>>>>> preference for
>>>>> the latter). If you are interested in developing a more more
>>>>> self-emptying Kyoto-like notion of recognition, I've got a
>>>>> couple of
>>>>> suggestions (and I'm sure I've made these suggestions in a
>>>>> different
>>>>> context before, so apologies for redundancy).
>>>>>
>>>>> First, I'd strongly encourage a read of Robert Williams'
>>>>> Ethics of
>>>>> Recognition. In Williams' read of Hegel, you find an
>>>>> articulation of
>>>>> recognition that is much more like the Kyoto understanding of
>>>>> recognition and which is against the crass version you get
>>>>> from the
>>>>> existentialists where recognition always about a fight or
>>>>> struggle for
>>>>> recognition. As evidence of the cultural tendency toward
>>>>> self-assertion, it is very telling that one small
>>>>> paragraph in Hegel's
>>>>> oeuvre would get picked up as the thing that most people
>>>>> for most of
>>>>> the 20th century would equate with Hegel's notion of
>>>>> "recognition."
>>>>> But that approach is shortsighted and Williams really
>>>>> nails this
>>>>> point. (although I am persuaded by Willaims'
>>>>> interpretation, I don't
>>>>> have any skin in the game of whether or not this is a more
>>>>> or less
>>>>> "authentic" interpretation of Hegel - I just happen to
>>>>> believe that
>>>>> the position Williams articulates is far more productive
>>>>> than the
>>>>> struggle-for-recognition model that has been on offer from
>>>>> the
>>>>> existentialists).
>>>>>
>>>>> Second, to provide some further support for this claim,
>>>>> I'd also
>>>>> suggest checking out Johann Georg Hamann, who is said to
>>>>> have been a
>>>>> significant influence on Hegel (but don't read Isaiah
>>>>> Berlin's stuff
>>>>> on Hamann, he misses the point). Hamann didn't really
>>>>> publish much. He
>>>>> was most noted for his letters to his friend, Immanuel
>>>>> Kant and in
>>>>> which he repeatedly tells Kant that he's got it all wrong
>>>>> (and does it
>>>>> in a style that makes the point through medium as well as,
>>>>> if not more
>>>>> than, message - a point which itself speaks to one of his
>>>>> central
>>>>> points about the importance of poetics). In these letters,
>>>>> Hamann has
>>>>> a wonderful sense of the intractability of human life, and
>>>>> the
>>>>> fundamental wrong-headedness of the desire for sovereign
>>>>> agency. I'd
>>>>> be happy to share more if there is any interest.
>>>>>
>>>>> Oh, and I forgot there is a third author of interest in
>>>>> this regard,
>>>>> Patchen Markell's Bound by Recognition gives a compelling
>>>>> portrait of
>>>>> what he calls "the impropriety of action" - the sense in
>>>>> which our
>>>>> actions are not our property alone. Markell's book argues
>>>>> that tragedy
>>>>> (and its twin, comedy) derives from this very human
>>>>> problem. Also
>>>>> great stuff.
>>>>>
>>>>> All three of these readings I suggest as a way of pointing
>>>>> out that
>>>>> within Western traditions there is a trope that is closer to
>>>>> self-emptying than self-asserting. Unfortunately it
>>>>> doesn't articulate
>>>>> as well with Enlightenment perspectives because it is
>>>>> often, as with
>>>>> Hamann, articulated through Christianity. This presents
>>>>> something of a
>>>>> marketing problem since the Enlightenment put Christianity
>>>>> as a thing
>>>>> of the past and as the kind of believing that small minded
>>>>> people do
>>>>> (the kind that tote guns and don't believe in evolution),
>>>>> and thus a
>>>>> not very appealing thing for most Westerner's "natural" (i.e.
>>>>> "cultural") inclination to self-assertion. So I think that
>>>>> as a matter
>>>>> of packaging, Buddhism, with its stripped down religious
>>>>> ideology,
>>>>> probably has more appeal to most post-Enlightenment
>>>>> Western thinkers.
>>>>>
>>>>> And I wanted to add that I feel like your posts are
>>>>> speaking directly
>>>>> to me and maybe we can carry on this conversation in more
>>>>> detail
>>>>> somewhere down the road (in a different thread, I
>>>>> suspect). So many
>>>>> thanks for your words (even if they weren't "intended" for
>>>>> me - a
>>>>> fortuitous impropriety to be sure!).
>>>>>
>>>>> Anyway, hope all is well,
>>>>> greg
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 1:02 PM, Larry Purss
>>>>> <lpscholar2@gmail.com <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>> I'm enjoying this line [circle? spiral?] of
>>>>> inquiry.
>>>>>
>>>>> David, you wrote
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The mind is a highly parsimonious thing; it is very
>>>>> tiring to believe one
>>>>> thing and say another. Vygotsky's genetic law predicts
>>>>> that eventually it
>>>>> is the former that shall cede to the latter.
>>>>>
>>>>> I want to go out on a speculative limb that tries to
>>>>> weave together some
>>>>> of
>>>>> Wittgenstein's notions that are also
>>>>> expressed in John
>>>>> Shotter's
>>>>> exploration of conversation.
>>>>>
>>>>> The question of the relation and distinction between
>>>>> "taking a position"
>>>>> and "developing dispositions" In David's quote above
>>>>> "believing" one
>>>>> thing
>>>>> [a position] and "saying" [practicing
>>>>> another] will
>>>>> over time eventually
>>>>> lead to the practice winning out over the belief.
>>>>>
>>>>> Their are a group of scholars in Japan referred to as
>>>>> "the kyoto school"
>>>>> who are engaged in the project of having an indepth
>>>>> conversation between
>>>>> Buddhism and German Continental philosophy.
>>>>>
>>>>> A central difference the authors of the Kyoto school
>>>>> are articulating is
>>>>> different notions [and values] of "intersubjectivity"
>>>>> as epressed in the
>>>>> contrasting concepts
>>>>> "self-assertion" and "self-emptying".
>>>>>
>>>>> They suggest many Western notions of intersubjectivity
>>>>> and recognition
>>>>> are
>>>>> in pursuit of recognizing our assertoric
>>>>> stance or
>>>>> position towards
>>>>> words,
>>>>> self, other, & world. This assertive
>>>>> position can be
>>>>> expressed in
>>>>> emancipatory notions of "finding one's VOICE" and
>>>>> overcoming being
>>>>> "silenced". Anger and conflict leading to overcoming
>>>>> resistance from
>>>>> within classes, races, genders. Through recognition
>>>>> [being seen and
>>>>> listened to develops the capacity to move from a
>>>>> silenced "voice" to an
>>>>> assertive "voice"] one stands up and speaks back to
>>>>> the dominating
>>>>> constraints and the shame and humiliation that
>>>>> silences voices.
>>>>>
>>>>> As Shotter [in Christine's quotes above shows] the
>>>>> assertoric position of
>>>>> challenging dominant structures and power can be seen
>>>>> as expressing a
>>>>> particular "attitude" or "style" or "posture".
>>>>>
>>>>> This style or attitude valorizes "the assertoric
>>>>> stance" in the world"
>>>>> which develops into an enduring "disposition" if we
>>>>> keep "saying" this
>>>>> form
>>>>> of recognition and emancipation.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, the Kyoto School, in deep conversation with
>>>>> this assertoric
>>>>> "position" and "disposition" suggests or gestures
>>>>> toward an "alternative"
>>>>> [not truer, more real, but an alternative]
>>>>> They suggest Buddhist practice and "saying" can guide
>>>>> or mediate another
>>>>> in*formation of "self" that they express in the
>>>>> concept of "self-emptying
>>>>> This is NOT a passive or resigned form of agency but
>>>>> rather an active
>>>>> intentional positioning of self that attempts to
>>>>> foreground the
>>>>> "fallibility" and "uncertainty" of ALL positioning and
>>>>> assertoric
>>>>> stances.
>>>>> This is a deeply intersubjective practice
>>>>> of
>>>>> valuing
>>>>> "emergence" and
>>>>> "openning spaces" in which to INVITE the other to
>>>>> exist by the practice
>>>>> of
>>>>> mving our self from center stage. Finding
>>>>> one's
>>>>> "voice" from this
>>>>> position
>>>>> of ACTIVE INTENTIONAL self-emptying [and
>>>>> creating the
>>>>> openning space for
>>>>> the other's "voice" to emerge] is a very different
>>>>> "attitude" or "stance"
>>>>> or "posture" to take leading to a very different
>>>>> "disposition" from
>>>>> within
>>>>> a very different form of "saying" and
>>>>> "practice".
>>>>>
>>>>> I "read" scholars such as Wittgenstein, Shotter,
>>>>> Gadamer, Buber, Levinas,
>>>>> as exploring this alternative in*formation of "self"
>>>>> that is less
>>>>> assertoric in finding one's "voice" and moving towards
>>>>> a posture of
>>>>> self-emptying that embraces FALLIBILITY, UNCERTAINTY,
>>>>> AMBIVALENCE, NOT
>>>>> KNOWING, at the heart of this particular way of
>>>>> becoming human.
>>>>> I do believe this is an historically guided
>>>>> perspective that embraces
>>>>> multiple perspectives and multiple practices.
>>>>> Intersubjectivity and dialogical hermeneutical
>>>>> perspectives and the
>>>>> multiple formations this conversation can take
>>>>> [expressing alternative
>>>>> moral committments] is the concept at the center of
>>>>> this possible
>>>>> inquiry.
>>>>> I'm not sure how "possible" it is for
>>>>> persons in North
>>>>> America to
>>>>> consider
>>>>> such alternative moral compasses as
>>>>> explored
>>>>> by the
>>>>> Kyoto School. [it may
>>>>> be beyond our horizon of understanding to envision as
>>>>> a possibility].
>>>>> It is also difficult to grasp Wittgenstein's attempt
>>>>> to "see through"
>>>>> theoretical positions as a practice and disposition.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Self-asserion is often viewed as the only path to
>>>>> intentional stances and
>>>>> postures in finding one's voice to participate in
>>>>> GENERATIVE
>>>>> conversations. Is there merit in engaging with
>>>>> another tradition
>>>>> exploring
>>>>> agentic ACTORS actively practising
>>>>> "self-emptying"
>>>>> motivated by the deep
>>>>> disposition and committment to generative dialogical
>>>>> ways of practice.??
>>>>> As I said in my opening remarks, this is going "out on
>>>>> a limb". Is
>>>>> conflict
>>>>> and anger the ONLY motivators that can be
>>>>> harnessed to
>>>>> transform the
>>>>> world??
>>>>> I'm also aware that my position as a "white male" with
>>>>> a secure job may
>>>>> be
>>>>> calling me to take a naive "utopian"
>>>>> perspective.
>>>>> At the minimum I want to suggest that it is these types
>>>>> of
>>>>> "conversations"
>>>>> across "traditions" such as the Kyoto
>>>>> School
>>>>> scholars
>>>>> are engaged in
>>>>> which
>>>>> invite us into a world conversation which
>>>>> puts into
>>>>> play the monolithic
>>>>> bias towards the assertoric stance in the world.
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm preparing for "challenges" to this alternative
>>>>> "attitude" but am
>>>>> putting it out there in a spirit of the holiday season
>>>>> to think outside
>>>>> our
>>>>> Western notions of "self-assertion" and
>>>>> finding one's
>>>>> voice.
>>>>>
>>>>> Larry
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Fri, Dec 23, 2011 at 12:04 AM, David Kellogg <
>>>>> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>>>>> <mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.**com<vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>
>>>>> >>wrote:
>>>>> Ivan:
>>>>>
>>>>> At the beginning of the Philosophical
>>>>> Investigations, Wittgenstein
>>>>> quotes
>>>>> Augustine, who describes the
>>>>> indescribable
>>>>> experience of learning a
>>>>> first
>>>>> language in Latin, and remarks that his
>>>>> model of
>>>>> language (a big bag of
>>>>> names) is OK, but only for a very restricted
>>>>> application; there are many
>>>>> things we call language for which it is not
>>>>> appropriate. And thence to
>>>>> his
>>>>> famous discussion of complexes, in the
>>>>> form of
>>>>> games and language games.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think what I said was that Wittgenstein's
>>>>> account of language is
>>>>> pragmatic in a linguistic sense. Pragmatics is
>>>>> about the use of
>>>>> language,
>>>>> as opposed to its usage (which is more
>>>>> or less
>>>>> what Augustine is
>>>>> describing, language as a dictionary written in
>>>>> some form of mentalese,
>>>>> where every language is necessarily a foreign
>>>>> language).
>>>>>
>>>>> And I think what Wittgenstein says about language
>>>>> applies to every
>>>>> account
>>>>> of language, even his own; it is
>>>>> appropriate, but
>>>>> ony for a very
>>>>> restricted
>>>>> application. In that way it is like a
>>>>> metaphor (as
>>>>> we see in the
>>>>> language
>>>>> games section, and the tool box
>>>>> section,
>>>>> it really
>>>>> IS a metaphor). So I
>>>>> think we need to ask the question where it stops
>>>>> being appropriate.
>>>>>
>>>>> As Andy points out, it doesn't describe conceptual
>>>>> thinking very well.
>>>>> But
>>>>> that is not because the pragmatic
>>>>> account of
>>>>> language is a subset of
>>>>> some
>>>>> larger conceptual account; I think that
>>>>> the
>>>>> relationship is quite the
>>>>> other
>>>>> way around: scientific concepts are a
>>>>> rarefied,
>>>>> specialized subset of
>>>>> semantic meaning, and of course semantic meaning
>>>>> took many centuries of
>>>>> billions of daily interactions to be precipitated
>>>>> from everyday
>>>>> pragmatics.
>>>>> Now it seems to me that on this scale
>>>>> of
>>>>> things,
>>>>> the cultural individual
>>>>> really is quite unchanging and hidebound, rather
>>>>> like a bottle. We
>>>>> rejoice
>>>>> that Western women do not bind their
>>>>> feet--and
>>>>> instead mutilate their
>>>>> chests with silicon implants. We rejoice in not
>>>>> stoning women for
>>>>> adultery
>>>>> and congratulate ourselves on no longer
>>>>> insisting
>>>>> on the male ownership
>>>>> of
>>>>> sexuality that this entails, but we so
>>>>> stigmatize
>>>>> child sexual abuse
>>>>> that
>>>>> children's lives, and not simply their
>>>>> putative
>>>>> purity, are now at risk
>>>>> from pedophiles, and nobody reflects that what is
>>>>> really threatened
>>>>> here is
>>>>> the parental ownership of sexual access
>>>>> to their
>>>>> children.
>>>>>
>>>>> This morning's New York Times, just for example,
>>>>> has a thoroughly silly
>>>>> article on North Korea by one Nicolas Kristof. We
>>>>> are told that
>>>>> apartments in Pyeongyang are all equipped with
>>>>> telescreens that
>>>>> make propaganda announcements of, e.g., the
>>>>> leaders' golf scores. We
>>>>> have a
>>>>> similar telescreen in our apartment in
>>>>> Seoul,
>>>>> which announces municipal
>>>>> elections and tells where to find the local leader
>>>>> of the anti-communist
>>>>> militia. The difference is that when we do it is
>>>>> feels normal.
>>>>>
>>>>> Kristof certainly does not feel hidebound; he is
>>>>> quite comfortable in
>>>>> his
>>>>> own skin. Nevertheless, he tells a
>>>>> wildly
>>>>> brainwashed account of the
>>>>> way in
>>>>> which North Korea developed nuclear
>>>>> weapons. He
>>>>> correctly remembers
>>>>> that in
>>>>> 1994 an agreement was negotiated to
>>>>> build nuclear
>>>>> power plants in North
>>>>> Korea (he carefully omits to say that these would
>>>>> be non-weaponizable
>>>>> and built by South Korean companies). Now,
>>>>> according to Kristof, the
>>>>> Clinton administration only did this because they
>>>>> fooishly assumed that
>>>>> the
>>>>> regime would collapse before the
>>>>> reactors were
>>>>> actually built! Wisely,
>>>>> the
>>>>> Bush administration caught the North
>>>>> Koreans
>>>>> "cheating", and tore up the
>>>>> agreement.
>>>>>
>>>>> What really happened, as anybody with a memory
>>>>> longer than the Bush
>>>>> adminstration will tell you, was that the North
>>>>> Koreans asked for, and
>>>>> got,
>>>>> a codicil that would supply them with
>>>>> fuel oil for
>>>>> energy as a stopgap
>>>>> measure (if you look at the widely circulated
>>>>> satellite picture of North
>>>>> Korea at night you will see why they insisted on
>>>>> this). The Clinton
>>>>> Administration always boasted that the fuel oil
>>>>> they supplied was
>>>>> unusably
>>>>> poor, but that was not enough for the
>>>>> Bush
>>>>> adminstration. They simply
>>>>> reneged on the agreement. But the North did not
>>>>> renege: they had
>>>>> promised
>>>>> they would develop nuclear weapons if
>>>>> the deal
>>>>> fell through, and that is
>>>>> what they did.
>>>>>
>>>>> Why does Kristof tell this transparent lie?
>>>>> Doesn't it go against the
>>>>> usual NYT ethos of telling the truth about
>>>>> checkable and trivial
>>>>> matters so
>>>>> as to be able to deceive with the
>>>>> necessary
>>>>> authority when it comes to
>>>>> the
>>>>> essentials? I think, alas, Mr. Kristof
>>>>> simply
>>>>> cannot control himself any
>>>>> more (see his WILDLY improbable tale about a
>>>>> husband executing his own
>>>>> wife
>>>>> for writing a highly implausible letter
>>>>> to Kim
>>>>> Jeong-il himself). The
>>>>> leather mask has become a face.
>>>>>
>>>>> And I think that is probably what happened to poor
>>>>> Leontiev as well. The
>>>>> mind is a highly parsimonious thing; it is very
>>>>> tiring to believe one
>>>>> thing
>>>>> and say another. Vygotsky's genetic law
>>>>> predicts
>>>>> that eventually it is
>>>>> the
>>>>> former that shall cede to the latter.
>>>>>
>>>>> It is that sense in which what Mike says is true:
>>>>> Vygotsky's psychology,
>>>>> as a scientific system, describes the development
>>>>> of institutionalized
>>>>> lying just as accurately as it describes the
>>>>> development of higher
>>>>> concepts. What I wanted to say was that his
>>>>> earlier sense that ideas are
>>>>> always embodied, and some bodies are gifted with
>>>>> an extraordinary
>>>>> foresight, is also true. I think Vygotsky knew
>>>>> that he would die, but he
>>>>> also knew that his ideas, so long as they were
>>>>> true ones, would live.
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --- On Wed, 12/21/11, Ivan Rosero
>>>>> <irosero@ucsd.edu <mailto:irosero@ucsd.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Ivan Rosero <irosero@ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:irosero@ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev:
>>>>> functionalism and Anglo
>>>>> Finnish
>>>>> Insufficiences
>>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>
>>>>> Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 6:50 PM
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> David, if you agree with the summary Larry has
>>>>> presented, I remain
>>>>> confused
>>>>> by your analogy. I read Larry's
>>>>> presentation of
>>>>> Kitching/Pleasant as
>>>>> saying that action cobbles together further sense
>>>>> within already-given
>>>>> sense that is simultaneously ideal-material, and
>>>>> therefore subject to
>>>>> culturally and historically specific constraints
>>>>> and possibilities. But
>>>>> surely, this includes the bottle and the person
>>>>> too, both as moving
>>>>> entities (the bottle, unless highly heated, a much
>>>>> more slowly moving
>>>>> entity). I am not invested in any particular
>>>>> reading of Leontiev, but
>>>>> your
>>>>> analogy as presented suggests a kind of
>>>>> essential
>>>>> fixity to the person
>>>>> which I want to believe you don't really mean.
>>>>>
>>>>> To be fair, your emphasis is on the wine in the
>>>>> bottle. But, in this
>>>>> case,
>>>>> a slowly moving bottle is rather less
>>>>> interesting
>>>>> than a human being,
>>>>> with
>>>>> a rather less historically complex
>>>>> relationship to
>>>>> the liquid it gives
>>>>> shape to.
>>>>>
>>>>> Does what Andy refer to help here? What kind of
>>>>> concept-complex (is it
>>>>> enough to call it Stalinism?) helps to explain the
>>>>> Leontiev at issue
>>>>> here?
>>>>> Or, if the critique was there from
>>>>> early
>>>>> on, what
>>>>> kind of
>>>>> concept-complex
>>>>> would help to explain his writings'
>>>>> wide
>>>>> acceptance?
>>>>>
>>>>> Or, do we forgo all this and just grab Leontiev,
>>>>> as you say, "on a good
>>>>> day"?
>>>>>
>>>>> Ivan
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 3:55 PM, David Kellogg <
>>>>> vaughndogblack@yahoo.com
>>>>> <mailto:vaughndogblack@yahoo.**com <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Mike wrote that as he grows older, he
>>>>> becomes less attached to his
>>>>> position (expressed in his editorial
>>>>> commentary to Luria's
>>>>> autobiography,
>>>>> "The Making of Mind") that ideas
>>>>> really are
>>>>> highly embodied things.
>>>>> Mike
>>>>> says that as he grows older, he
>>>>> becomes more
>>>>> and more attached to
>>>>> Luria's
>>>>> position that only ideas matter.
>>>>>
>>>>> But as I grow older, I become more and more
>>>>> attached to Mike's
>>>>> original
>>>>> position that individuals really
>>>>> matter. Wine
>>>>> has no shape of its
>>>>> own; it
>>>>> really depends on what bottle we
>>>>> put
>>>>> it in,
>>>>> and the form of ideas
>>>>> depends
>>>>> very much on the character of the
>>>>> individuals
>>>>> wo carry them.
>>>>>
>>>>> On paper, the theoretical positions of
>>>>> Vygotsky and Leontiev are not
>>>>> that
>>>>> far apart. So when Mike asks what
>>>>> presents
>>>>> Vygotsky's ideas from being
>>>>> pressed into service by the Stalinist state, I
>>>>> think the answer has
>>>>> to be
>>>>> referred to the individual who
>>>>> carried this
>>>>> idea after all.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think it is not accidental that one was
>>>>> amenable and the other was
>>>>> not,
>>>>> that one's ideas were deformed and
>>>>> degenerated, and the others still
>>>>> amaze
>>>>> by their freshness and
>>>>> color. Nor is it
>>>>> accidental that one lived and
>>>>> one
>>>>> died.
>>>>>
>>>>> But of course death is simply the moment when
>>>>> our thinking and spoken
>>>>> speech must come to an end, and our written
>>>>> speech, like a hermit
>>>>> crab,
>>>>> must find a new home in the minds
>>>>> and mouths
>>>>> of others. And by that
>>>>> measure, it was Vygotsky who lived on, yea,
>>>>> even in the mind and the
>>>>> mouth
>>>>> of Leontiev. Well,
>>>>> Leontiev on a good day!
>>>>>
>>>>> David Kellogg
>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>>>>>
>>>>> PS; I think I am (once again) with Larry. I
>>>>> think that if we read
>>>>> (late)
>>>>> Wittgenstein as a linguistic (not a
>>>>> philosophical) pragmatist, that
>>>>> is,
>>>>> as
>>>>> someone who believes
>>>>> that meaning in language
>>>>> comes from sense in
>>>>> activity,
>>>>> Wittgenstein is
>>>>> perfectly consistent with what
>>>>> Marx writes in the
>>>>> German
>>>>> Ideology (that language is
>>>>> practical
>>>>> consciousness, real for myself
>>>>> because
>>>>> real for others).
>>>>> Wittgenstein is
>>>>> Vygotsky-compatible in other ways,
>>>>> too,
>>>>> e.g. his argument about
>>>>> preconceptual
>>>>> "families" and his argument
>>>>> about
>>>>> the
>>>>> tool like nature of
>>>>> signs.
>>>>>
>>>>> dk
>>>>>
>>>>> --- On Wed, 12/21/11, mike cole
>>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>>
>>>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev:
>>>>> functionalism and Anglo
>>>>> Finnish
>>>>> Insufficiences
>>>>> To: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
>>>>> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>>>>> <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>>, "Morten
>>>>> Nissen" <Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.dk
>>>>> <mailto:Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.**dk<Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.dk>
>>>>> >>
>>>>> Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 2:12 PM
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Very helpful, Larry. Thanks.
>>>>>
>>>>> As I read the Leontiev materials what was at
>>>>> issue in 1949 is whether
>>>>> there
>>>>> is any "third space" of
>>>>> the self in the "unity
>>>>> of consciousness and
>>>>> activity." I take Stalinism
>>>>> in these materials to refer to the way that
>>>>> idealism is joined with
>>>>> belief
>>>>> in some sort of
>>>>> "autonomous" realm of thought.
>>>>> Zinchenko's work on
>>>>> micromovements of the eye and perceptual
>>>>> action seem to me now
>>>>> significant
>>>>> in exactly this
>>>>> respect:
>>>>> they point to a rapid
>>>>> simulation process
>>>>> which
>>>>> is
>>>>> not mechanically
>>>>> connected to externalized
>>>>> action (as one example). If
>>>>> you
>>>>> know the future of
>>>>> history and what is good
>>>>> for everyone, all such
>>>>> processes risk deviation from "the true path."
>>>>> The motives of the
>>>>> "healthy"
>>>>> individual are supposed
>>>>> to coincide with those
>>>>> of the "collective" (as
>>>>> represented by the general secretary of the
>>>>> central committee of the
>>>>> communist party). Functionalism as command and
>>>>> control statism.
>>>>>
>>>>> If we accept THIS version of CHAT, seems to me
>>>>> that Phillip is
>>>>> corrrect -
>>>>> Use the ideas for something called
>>>>> communism,
>>>>> fascism, ANY form of
>>>>> collective social project.
>>>>>
>>>>> David says this is Leontiev's (AT) problem,
>>>>> not Vygotsky's (CH)
>>>>> problem.
>>>>> Larry points
>>>>> to Wittgensteinian marxism that appears to
>>>>> provide a way to select
>>>>> wheat
>>>>> from chaff (or discover a different
>>>>> level of
>>>>> chaff!).
>>>>>
>>>>> My guess is that German, Russian, and other
>>>>> thinkers have already
>>>>> carried
>>>>> this conversation pretty far....
>>>>> Morten's
>>>>> citation of German work
>>>>> points
>>>>> to
>>>>> this conclusion.
>>>>>
>>>>> But how are we poor non_Russian, non_German
>>>>> reading unfortunates
>>>>> wandering
>>>>> in the woods to find
>>>>> our
>>>>> way?
>>>>>
>>>>> mike
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 12:08 PM, Larry Purss
>>>>> <lpscholar2@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:lpscholar2@gmail.com>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Andy,
>>>>> Christine, Mike
>>>>> I have been hibernating on Mayne Island, a
>>>>> small Island between
>>>>> Vancouver
>>>>> and Vancouver and
>>>>> Vancouver Island.
>>>>> [school break for the holidays]
>>>>> No
>>>>> internet except at the small
>>>>> library]
>>>>>
>>>>> I was interested in this comment from
>>>>> Morten Nissen on Andy's book
>>>>>
>>>>> Blunden, as it were, attacks it from the
>>>>> “opposite” side: the
>>>>>
>>>>> functionalism
>>>>> of Leontiev’s
>>>>> way of relating subject with
>>>>> society. This has to do
>>>>> with
>>>>> how
>>>>> objects and
>>>>> motives appear to coincide in
>>>>> Leontiev’s idealized
>>>>> image of
>>>>> the
>>>>> true society,
>>>>> that is, the society of
>>>>> original communism and that of
>>>>> the
>>>>> Soviet Union.
>>>>> Andy, it is this notion of "coinciding"
>>>>> that I have difficulty with
>>>>> when
>>>>> reading about
>>>>> Activity Theory.
>>>>>
>>>>> Leontiev's statements such as "Education
>>>>> is the decisive force which
>>>>> forms
>>>>> man
>>>>> intellectually. This intellectual
>>>>> development MUST CORRESPOND TO
>>>>> THE
>>>>> AIMS AND THE NEEDS
>>>>> OF THE ENTIRE SOCIETY.
>>>>> It must fully agree with
>>>>> REAL
>>>>> human needs"
>>>>>
>>>>> I'm been browsing through an edited book
>>>>> by Gavin Kitching and
>>>>> Nigel
>>>>> Pleasant titled "Marx and
>>>>> Wittgenstein:
>>>>> Knowledge, Morality,
>>>>> Politics."
>>>>> These authors take an
>>>>> interesting
>>>>> perspective on materialism &
>>>>> idealism
>>>>> that gives idealism its place
>>>>> in
>>>>> our human
>>>>> being [in contrast to
>>>>> how I
>>>>> read
>>>>> Leontiev}
>>>>> These authors are exploring a
>>>>> Wittgensteinian Marxism that examines
>>>>> Marx's
>>>>> notion that
>>>>> "The tradition of all the dead
>>>>> generations weighs like a
>>>>> nightmare on the brain of the living" A
>>>>> Wittgensteinian Marxist
>>>>> reading
>>>>> [from the authors perspective]
>>>>> would make
>>>>> 3 points.
>>>>>
>>>>> 1] Tradition and circumstances cannot be
>>>>> understood in ABSTRACTION
>>>>> FROM
>>>>> the traditions and
>>>>> understandings that
>>>>> people have of these
>>>>>
>>>>> circumstances.
>>>>> 2] WHATEVER
>>>>> such varied understandings
>>>>> may consist (class, culture,
>>>>> gender etc) nonetheless some KINDS of
>>>>> actions by historical subjects
>>>>> [agents, actors] will prove impossible IF
>>>>> these actions are entered
>>>>> into
>>>>> in
>>>>> disregard to
>>>>> the traditions and
>>>>> circumstances directly GIVEN,
>>>>> ENCOUNTERED
>>>>> and transmitted
>>>>> from
>>>>> the past
>>>>> 3] A principle WAY in which the TRADITIONS
>>>>> OF THE DEAD GENERATIONS
>>>>> weighs
>>>>> like a nightmare on
>>>>> the brain of the
>>>>> living is that ANTECEDENT
>>>>> historical
>>>>> circumstances often
>>>>> make it IMPOSSIBLE TO
>>>>> THINK AND FEEL (and
>>>>> therefore
>>>>> act)in certain ways.
>>>>> Historically created
>>>>> material culture restricts
>>>>> and
>>>>> enables the making
>>>>> of PARTICULAR KINDS of
>>>>> history. People do not
>>>>> try to
>>>>> do
>>>>> things and
>>>>> then for "material reasons"
>>>>> find they cannot do things. (
>>>>> cannot
>>>>> make history
>>>>> as THEY PLEASE ) Such
>>>>> traditions and circumstances
>>>>> DEEPLY
>>>>> FORM
>>>>> what it is
>>>>> that present generations can
>>>>> DESIRE TO DO. and CONCEIVE
>>>>> OF.
>>>>> (as
>>>>> well as what
>>>>> actions they can conceive of
>>>>> as being
>>>>> possible/impossible,
>>>>> feasible/unfeasible)
>>>>>
>>>>> It is human action in and on the world
>>>>> that inextricably LINKS
>>>>> THOUGHT
>>>>> (and language) TO MATERIAL
>>>>> REALITY.
>>>>> Historical traditions and
>>>>>
>>>>> circumstances
>>>>> are the
>>>>> outcomes of previous generations
>>>>> actions [intended &
>>>>> unintended]
>>>>> which place
>>>>> constraints on present
>>>>> generations. Constraints on what
>>>>> they
>>>>> can think, feel,
>>>>> desire (and how they act)
>>>>> By keeping these 3 points in mind the
>>>>> authors suggest we can avoid
>>>>> falling
>>>>> into the DEEP
>>>>> CONFUSIONS which have always
>>>>> attended the
>>>>> material/ideal
>>>>> distinction.
>>>>> The most DIRECT and comprehensible way to
>>>>> SEE THROUGH this
>>>>> material/ideal
>>>>> distinction is to
>>>>> see that all action is
>>>>> simultaneously mental &
>>>>> physical,
>>>>> material &
>>>>> ideal. Neither material or
>>>>> ideal is an "epiphenomena" of
>>>>> the
>>>>> other.
>>>>>
>>>>> In my reading of Leontiev in the chapter
>>>>> from the book posted I
>>>>> don't
>>>>> see
>>>>> the nuances
>>>>> recognizing the depths of the
>>>>> "ideal" within Marx's
>>>>> theory.
>>>>> This edited book, by putting
>>>>> Marx into
>>>>> explicit conversation is
>>>>> elaborating a Wittgensteinian Marxism or a
>>>>> Marxist Wittgenstein.
>>>>>
>>>>> Larry
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 7:39 PM, mike cole
>>>>> <lchcmike@gmail.com
>>>>> <mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com>>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>> Below are two quotations
>>>>> from Morten
>>>>> Nissen's review of Andy
>>>>> Blunden's
>>>>> book
>>>>> on activity theory. Full review in
>>>>> current issue of MCA.
>>>>>
>>>>> After presenting the quotation, a
>>>>> comment.
>>>>> mike
>>>>> -------------------
>>>>>
>>>>> Morten Nissen on Leontiev,
>>>>> functionalism, and Stalinism
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ….behind this terminological trouble
>>>>> lies a deep theoretical
>>>>> problem
>>>>> in
>>>>> Leontiev’s
>>>>> social theory. This problem
>>>>> was identified in the German
>>>>> and
>>>>> Scandinavian
>>>>> reception (Axel & Nissen,
>>>>> 1993; Holzkamp, 1979;
>>>>>
>>>>> Osterkamp,
>>>>> 1976) but
>>>>> almost
>>>>> completely ignored in
>>>>> the Anglo-Finnish (with
>>>>>
>>>>> Miettinen,
>>>>> 2005, and
>>>>> Kaptelinin, 2005, as the
>>>>> noble exceptions to the
>>>>> rule)—and
>>>>> Blunden, as it were,
>>>>> attacks
>>>>> it from
>>>>> the “opposite” side: the
>>>>> functionalism
>>>>> of Leontiev’s way of relating subject
>>>>> with society. This has to do
>>>>> with
>>>>> how
>>>>> objects and motives appear to coincide
>>>>> in Leontiev’s idealized
>>>>> image
>>>>> of
>>>>> the
>>>>> true society, that is, the society of
>>>>> original communism and that
>>>>> of
>>>>> the
>>>>> Soviet Union.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >From the perspective of this
>>>>> functionalist utopia, a psychology
>>>>> could
>>>>> become relevant only in the
>>>>> face of
>>>>> the undeveloped and the
>>>>> deviant:
>>>>> as
>>>>> in
>>>>> fact,
>>>>> according to Leontiev (1978),
>>>>> children and disturbed provide
>>>>> the
>>>>> tasks of psychology in the
>>>>> institutions of the Soviet Union. To
>>>>> paraphrase:
>>>>> The child who puts down her book still
>>>>> has not grasped the harmony
>>>>> of
>>>>> society’s needs with the
>>>>> desire to
>>>>> learn that she *must*
>>>>>
>>>>> develop—she has not yet developed
>>>>> those “higher cultural needs.”
>>>>>
>>>>> Bourgeois
>>>>> society
>>>>> is
>>>>> another matter, where sense
>>>>> and meaning are divided in
>>>>> principle, but this matter—that of
>>>>> ideology and social
>>>>>
>>>>> critique—Leontiev
>>>>> sets aside and
>>>>> forgets. An elaborate
>>>>> critique of Leontiev’s
>>>>>
>>>>> functionalism
>>>>> was given
>>>>> already in 1980 (Haug,
>>>>> Nemitz,& Waldhubel, 1980), and the
>>>>> background was explained by Osterkamp
>>>>> (1976) in her groundbreaking
>>>>> work
>>>>> on
>>>>> the
>>>>> theory
>>>>> of motivation.
>>>>>
>>>>> ------------------------------**--
>>>>>
>>>>> Comment.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> When I first read these passages as
>>>>> part of the attempted "swap of
>>>>>
>>>>> ideas"
>>>>> that
>>>>> Morten and I tried to organize
>>>>> around
>>>>>
>>>>> our reviews of Andy's book in Outlines
>>>>> and MCA, I commented how
>>>>> sad it
>>>>> was
>>>>> that the
>>>>> elaborate critique that goes
>>>>> back to
>>>>>
>>>>> 1980 is not in English and fully
>>>>> engaged by both European and
>>>>> "Ango-Finns"
>>>>> (although how poor Viktor got into
>>>>> that category
>>>>>
>>>>> I do not know!).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Seems like real interchange around
>>>>> these issues is long overdue.
>>>>> But
>>>>> given
>>>>> the
>>>>> progress of the last couple of
>>>>> years, I'll not be
>>>>>
>>>>> holding my breath!
>>>>>
>>>>> --------------------------
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> But thinking about the issues as well
>>>>> as my limited language (and
>>>>> other)
>>>>> capacities
>>>>> allow.
>>>>>
>>>>> mike
>>>>> ______________________________**
>>>>> ____________
>>>>> _____
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>> <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**
>>>>> listinfo/xmca <http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ______________________________**
>>>>> ____________
>>>>> _____
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>> _____
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>> _____
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>> _____
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>> _____
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
>>>>> Sanford I. Berman Post-Doctoral Scholar
>>>>> Department of Communication
>>>>> University of California, San Diego
>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>> _____
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>> ______________________________**____________
>>>>> _____
>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>>>> ------------
>>>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>>>> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>>>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <
>>>>> http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/**>
>>>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>>> <http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> --
>>> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
>>> ------------
>>> *Andy Blunden*
>>> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
>>> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
>>> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>>>
>>> ______________________________**____________
>>> _____
>>> xmca mailing list
>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> ------------------------------**------------------------------**
> ------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Joint Editor MCA: http://www.tandfonline.com/**toc/hmca20/18/1<http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/hmca20/18/1>
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/default.**aspx?partid=227&pid=34857<http://www.brill.nl/default.aspx?partid=227&pid=34857>
>
>
> ______________________________**____________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/**listinfo/xmca<http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca>
>
> This mail was received via Mail-SeCure System.
>
> <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/#bkV14E118>
>
Despite my general approach that Historical Dialectics (Marxian
Social-Cultural theory) and Pragmatism mutually repair the lacuna in their
respective representations of human social and cultural practice, and a
very critical response to Leninism, Lenin's critique of American
Pragmatism, rough as it is, is right on target.
[15] <http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/#bkV14E118> *
> Pragmatism—*a subjective-idealist trend of bourgeois (mainly American)
> philosophy in the imperialist era. It arose in the seven ties. of the last
> century in the U.S.A. as a reflection of specific features of the
> development of American capitalism, replacing the hitherto prevailing
> religious philosophy. The main propositions of pragmatism were formulated
> by Charles Peirce. As an independent philosophical tendency it took shape
> at the turn of the century in the works of William James and Ferdinand
> Schiller and was further developed in the instrumentalism of John Dewey.
>
> The pragmatists consider that the central problem of philosophy is the
> attainment of true knowledge. However, they completely distort the very
> concept of truth; already Peirce looked on cognition as a purely
> psychological, subjective process of achieving religious belief. James
> substituted the concept of “usefulness”, of success or advantage, for the
> concept of truth, i.e., for the objectively true reflection of reality.
> From his point of view, all concepts, including religious ones, are true
> insofar as they are useful. Dewey went, even farther by declaring all
> scientific theories, all moral principles and social institutions, to be
> merely “instruments” for the attainment of the personal aims of the
> individual. As the criterion of the “truth” (usefulness) of knowledge,
> the pragmatists take experience, understood not as human social practice
> but as the constant stream of individual experiences, of the subjective
> phenomena of consciousness; they regard this experience as the solo
> reality, declaring the concepts of matter and mind “obsolete”. Like the
> Machists, the pragmatists claim to have created a “third line” in
> philosophy; they try to place themselves above materialism and idealism,
> while in fact advocating one of the varieties of idealism. In contrast to
> materialist monism, the pragmatists put forward the standpoint of
> “pluralism”, according to which there is no internal connection, no
> conformity to law, in the universe; it is like a mosaic which each person
> builds in his own way, out of his own individual experiences. Hence,
> starting out from the needs of the given moment, pragmatism considers it
> possible to give different, even contradictory, explanations of one and the
> same phenomenon. Consistency is declared to be unnecessary; if it is to a
> man’s advantage, he can be a determinist or an indeterminist, he can assert
> or deny the existence of God, and so on.
>
> By basing themselves on the subjective-idealist tradition of English
> philosophy from Berkeley and Hume to John Stuart Mill, by exploiting
> particular aspects of the theories of Kant, Mach and Avenarius, Nietzsche
> and Henri Bergson, the American pragmatists created one of the most
> reactionary philosophical trends of modern times, a convenient form for
> theoretically defending the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie. It is
> for this reason that pragmatism spread so widely in the U.S.A., becoming
> almost the official American philosophy. There have been advocates of
> pragmatism at various times in Italy, Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and
> other countries. Lenin, V.I. (1908) MATERIALISM and EMPIRIO-CRITICISM: Critical
> Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy, Chapter 4. Parties in Philosophy
> and Philosophical Blockheads
>
--
Victor Friedlander
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