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Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo Finnish Insufficiences
David, if you agree with the summary Larry has presented, I remain confused
by your analogy. I read Larry's presentation of Kitching/Pleasant as
saying that action cobbles together further sense within already-given
sense that is simultaneously ideal-material, and therefore subject to
culturally and historically specific constraints and possibilities. But
surely, this includes the bottle and the person too, both as moving
entities (the bottle, unless highly heated, a much more slowly moving
entity). I am not invested in any particular reading of Leontiev, but your
analogy as presented suggests a kind of essential fixity to the person
which I want to believe you don't really mean.
To be fair, your emphasis is on the wine in the bottle. But, in this case,
a slowly moving bottle is rather less interesting than a human being, with
a rather less historically complex relationship to the liquid it gives
shape to.
Does what Andy refer to help here? What kind of concept-complex (is it
enough to call it Stalinism?) helps to explain the Leontiev at issue here?
Or, if the critique was there from early on, what kind of concept-complex
would help to explain his writings' wide acceptance?
Or, do we forgo all this and just grab Leontiev, as you say, "on a good
day"?
Ivan
On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 3:55 PM, David Kellogg <vaughndogblack@yahoo.com>wrote:
> Mike wrote that as he grows older, he becomes less attached to his
> position (expressed in his editorial commentary to Luria's autobiography,
> "The Making of Mind") that ideas really are highly embodied things. Mike
> says that as he grows older, he becomes more and more attached to Luria's
> position that only ideas matter.
>
> But as I grow older, I become more and more attached to Mike's original
> position that individuals really matter. Wine has no shape of its own; it
> really depends on what bottle we put it in, and the form of ideas depends
> very much on the character of the individuals wo carry them.
>
> On paper, the theoretical positions of Vygotsky and Leontiev are not that
> far apart. So when Mike asks what presents Vygotsky's ideas from being
> pressed into service by the Stalinist state, I think the answer has to be
> referred to the individual who carried this idea after all.
>
> I think it is not accidental that one was amenable and the other was not,
> that one's ideas were deformed and degenerated, and the others still amaze
> by their freshness and color. Nor is it accidental that one lived and one
> died.
>
> But of course death is simply the moment when our thinking and spoken
> speech must come to an end, and our written speech, like a hermit crab,
> must find a new home in the minds and mouths of others. And by that
> measure, it was Vygotsky who lived on, yea, even in the mind and the mouth
> of Leontiev. Well, Leontiev on a good day!
>
> David Kellogg
> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
>
> PS; I think I am (once again) with Larry. I think that if we read (late)
> Wittgenstein as a linguistic (not a philosophical) pragmatist, that is, as
> someone who believes that meaning in language comes from sense in activity,
> Wittgenstein is perfectly consistent with what Marx writes in the German
> Ideology (that language is practical consciousness, real for myself because
> real for others). Wittgenstein is Vygotsky-compatible in other ways, too,
> e.g. his argument about preconceptual "families" and his argument about the
> tool like nature of signs.
>
> dk
>
> --- On Wed, 12/21/11, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
> From: mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Interpreting Leontiev: functionalism and Anglo Finnish
> Insufficiences
> To: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>, "Morten
> Nissen" <Morten.Nissen@psy.ku.dk>
> Date: Wednesday, December 21, 2011, 2:12 PM
>
>
> Very helpful, Larry. Thanks.
>
> As I read the Leontiev materials what was at issue in 1949 is whether there
> is any "third space" of the self in the "unity of consciousness and
> activity." I take Stalinism
> in these materials to refer to the way that idealism is joined with belief
> in some sort of "autonomous" realm of thought. Zinchenko's work on
> micromovements of the eye and perceptual action seem to me now significant
> in exactly this respect: they point to a rapid simulation process which is
> not mechanically connected to externalized action (as one example). If you
> know the future of history and what is good for everyone, all such
> processes risk deviation from "the true path." The motives of the "healthy"
> individual are supposed to coincide with those of the "collective" (as
> represented by the general secretary of the central committee of the
> communist party). Functionalism as command and control statism.
>
> If we accept THIS version of CHAT, seems to me that Phillip is corrrect -
> Use the ideas for something called communism, fascism, ANY form of
> collective social project.
>
> David says this is Leontiev's (AT) problem, not Vygotsky's (CH) problem.
> Larry points
> to Wittgensteinian marxism that appears to provide a way to select wheat
> from chaff (or discover a different level of chaff!).
>
> My guess is that German, Russian, and other thinkers have already carried
> this conversation pretty far.... Morten's citation of German work points to
> this conclusion.
>
> But how are we poor non_Russian, non_German reading unfortunates wandering
> in the woods to find our way?
>
> mike
>
> On Wed, Dec 21, 2011 at 12:08 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Hi Andy, Christine, Mike
> > I have been hibernating on Mayne Island, a small Island between Vancouver
> > and Vancouver and Vancouver Island. [school break for the holidays] No
> > internet except at the small library]
> >
> > I was interested in this comment from Morten Nissen on Andy's book
> >
> > Blunden, as it were, attacks it from the “opposite” side: the
> functionalism
> > of Leontiev’s way of relating subject with society. This has to do with
> how
> > objects and motives appear to coincide in Leontiev’s idealized image of
> the
> > true society, that is, the society of original communism and that of the
> > Soviet Union.
> > Andy, it is this notion of "coinciding" that I have difficulty with when
> > reading about Activity Theory.
> >
> > Leontiev's statements such as "Education is the decisive force which
> forms
> > man intellectually. This intellectual development MUST CORRESPOND TO THE
> > AIMS AND THE NEEDS OF THE ENTIRE SOCIETY. It must fully agree with REAL
> > human needs"
> >
> > I'm been browsing through an edited book by Gavin Kitching and Nigel
> > Pleasant titled "Marx and Wittgenstein: Knowledge, Morality, Politics."
> >
> > These authors take an interesting perspective on materialism & idealism
> > that gives idealism its place in our human being [in contrast to how I
> read
> > Leontiev}
> > These authors are exploring a Wittgensteinian Marxism that examines
> Marx's
> > notion that "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a
> > nightmare on the brain of the living" A Wittgensteinian Marxist reading
> > [from the authors perspective] would make 3 points.
> >
> > 1] Tradition and circumstances cannot be understood in ABSTRACTION FROM
> > the traditions and understandings that people have of these
> circumstances.
> > 2] WHATEVER such varied understandings may consist (class, culture,
> > gender etc) nonetheless some KINDS of actions by historical subjects
> > [agents, actors] will prove impossible IF these actions are entered into
> in
> > disregard to the traditions and circumstances directly GIVEN, ENCOUNTERED
> > and transmitted from the past
> > 3] A principle WAY in which the TRADITIONS OF THE DEAD GENERATIONS weighs
> > like a nightmare on the brain of the living is that ANTECEDENT historical
> > circumstances often make it IMPOSSIBLE TO THINK AND FEEL (and therefore
> > act)in certain ways. Historically created material culture restricts and
> > enables the making of PARTICULAR KINDS of history. People do not try to
> do
> > things and then for "material reasons" find they cannot do things. (
> cannot
> > make history as THEY PLEASE ) Such traditions and circumstances DEEPLY
> FORM
> > what it is that present generations can DESIRE TO DO. and CONCEIVE OF.
> (as
> > well as what actions they can conceive of as being possible/impossible,
> > feasible/unfeasible)
> >
> > It is human action in and on the world that inextricably LINKS THOUGHT
> > (and language) TO MATERIAL REALITY. Historical traditions and
> circumstances
> > are the outcomes of previous generations actions [intended & unintended]
> > which place constraints on present generations. Constraints on what they
> > can think, feel, desire (and how they act)
> > By keeping these 3 points in mind the authors suggest we can avoid
> falling
> > into the DEEP CONFUSIONS which have always attended the material/ideal
> > distinction.
> > The most DIRECT and comprehensible way to SEE THROUGH this material/ideal
> > distinction is to see that all action is simultaneously mental &
> physical,
> > material & ideal. Neither material or ideal is an "epiphenomena" of the
> > other.
> >
> > In my reading of Leontiev in the chapter from the book posted I don't see
> > the nuances recognizing the depths of the "ideal" within Marx's theory.
> >
> > This edited book, by putting Marx into explicit conversation is
> > elaborating a Wittgensteinian Marxism or a Marxist Wittgenstein.
> >
> > Larry
> >
> > On Mon, Dec 19, 2011 at 7:39 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> >> Below are two quotations from Morten Nissen's review of Andy Blunden's
> >> book
> >> on activity theory. Full review in
> >> current issue of MCA.
> >>
> >> After presenting the quotation, a comment.
> >> mike
> >> -------------------
> >>
> >> Morten Nissen on Leontiev, functionalism, and Stalinism
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> ….behind this terminological trouble lies a deep theoretical problem in
> >> Leontiev’s social theory. This problem was identified in the German and
> >> Scandinavian reception (Axel & Nissen, 1993; Holzkamp, 1979; Osterkamp,
> >> 1976) but almost completely ignored in the Anglo-Finnish (with
> Miettinen,
> >> 2005, and Kaptelinin, 2005, as the noble exceptions to the rule)—and
> >> Blunden, as it were, attacks it from the “opposite” side: the
> >> functionalism
> >> of Leontiev’s way of relating subject with society. This has to do with
> >> how
> >> objects and motives appear to coincide in Leontiev’s idealized image of
> >> the
> >> true society, that is, the society of original communism and that of the
> >> Soviet Union.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> >From the perspective of this functionalist utopia, a psychology could
> >> become relevant only in the face of the undeveloped and the deviant: as
> in
> >> fact, according to Leontiev (1978), children and disturbed provide the
> >> tasks of psychology in the institutions of the Soviet Union. To
> >> paraphrase:
> >> The child who puts down her book still has not grasped the harmony of
> >> society’s needs with the desire to learn that she *must*
> >>
> >> develop—she has not yet developed those “higher cultural needs.”
> Bourgeois
> >> society is another matter, where sense and meaning are divided in
> >> principle, but this matter—that of ideology and social critique—Leontiev
> >> sets aside and forgets. An elaborate critique of Leontiev’s
> functionalism
> >> was given already in 1980 (Haug, Nemitz,& Waldhubel, 1980), and the
> >> background was explained by Osterkamp (1976) in her groundbreaking work
> on
> >> the theory of motivation.
> >>
> >> --------------------------------
> >>
> >> Comment.
> >>
> >>
> >> When I first read these passages as part of the attempted "swap of
> ideas"
> >> that Morten and I tried to organize around
> >>
> >> our reviews of Andy's book in Outlines and MCA, I commented how sad it
> was
> >> that the elaborate critique that goes back to
> >>
> >> 1980 is not in English and fully engaged by both European and
> >> "Ango-Finns"
> >> (although how poor Viktor got into that category
> >>
> >> I do not know!).
> >>
> >>
> >> Seems like real interchange around these issues is long overdue. But
> given
> >> the progress of the last couple of years, I'll not be
> >>
> >> holding my breath!
> >>
> >> --------------------------
> >>
> >>
> >> But thinking about the issues as well as my limited language (and other)
> >> capacities allow.
> >>
> >> mike
> >> __________________________________________
> >> _____
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >
> >
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