[xmca] Learning through peripheral participation in XMCA

["David H Kirshner" <dkirsh@lsu.edu>]

Thanks, Carol.
What a great topic for discussion: Learning through peripheral
participation in XMCA. 
My sense, over time, is that the language and ideation of
CHAT/sociocultural theory become more familiar and more comfortable over
time--despite the limited number of threads I actually follow, and the
limited opportunity I have to do side reading in this area. But I have
to confess that it was co-authoring a piece with David Kellogg that
really contributed most directly to my understanding. Meanwhile, the
value of being awash in the language and structure of XMCA debate is
largely an unknown quantity for me.
David



-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald
Sent: Sunday, May 15, 2011 10:39 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of
CHAT

Larry
Mike told me not to be intimidated by some of you big guns on XMCA, but
I
have to be frank that I have great deal of difficulty reading your work.
Usually it's too long for me to follow, or maybe too arcane, but right
here
in 16 lines of text you used "scare quotes" 13 times. (They come out as
asterisks) Is there not perhaps some way you can be more inclusive in
your
style?  I supervised a splendid PhD which used AR, and know the
literature
reasonably well, but don't feel I fit in with these kinds of postings.
Colleagially yours
Carol

On 15 May 2011 15:04, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi Michael
>
> Your thoughts on the different roots of US Action Research and
Friere's PAR
> is an excellent example of Anna, Gadamer and Aristotle's central point
that
> *episteme* that is not INFORMED by phronesis [as *a* or maybe *the*
central
> question of inquiry]  can lead the epistemologically FORMED *system*
to
> PRODUCE radically different transformations.
>
> I want to add that this orientation with its particular bias or
prejudice
> [as a *right* relation]  can be seen as a DISPOSITION that can be
> *acquired*
> within communities of inquiry where this FORM of awareness can attempt
to
> *reflect* [phronesis] on the historical and developmental roots of our
> *habits* of somewhat predictable behaviour.  It was Bellah who wrote
about
> changing the *habits of our hearts* through changing *common sense*
within
> communities.   My reflections and exploring Stetsenko's writings can
be
> viewed as an attempt to participate in developing *better* habits of
the
> heart.  The term disposition and the term *stance* used in Anna's
> dialectical framework point to a particular TYPE of *agentic* capacity
> which
> develops case by case within *right relations*.
>
> Larry
>
> Larry
>
> On Sun, May 15, 2011 at 4:17 AM, Michael Glassman
<MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu
> >wrote:
>
> > Hi Larry and Christine and others,
> >
> > Larry what you write about Anna Stetsenko's approach is particularly
> > interesting to me right now.  The other day I was talking with a
student
> who
> > wanted to use Participatory Action Research in her dissertation.  We
> talked
> > a bit about Lewin and Argylis but she argued she wanted to use
Friere's
> PAR.
> >  She claimed that while the two types of AR wind up with a number of
> > similarities (the biggest difference being US AR wants to change
> > organizaitons through relationships, while South American AR of whom
> Friere
> > was an important founding voice, wants to empower individuals by
allowing
> > them to recognize the effects of corrupt relationships through
> > knowlege/information) they both came from two very different
origins.  It
> is
> > true I think that you can't really find any deposit of Lewin in
Friere's
> > writing.  The student made the argument that Friere's PAR comes
almost
> > completely from his use of Marx.  It is ironic because the PAR in
the
> United
> > States was developed primarily by business consultants who would
probably
> > become upset at the mention of Marx.  Having two groups doing almost
the
> > same thing, with exactly the same name, but a few very, very
critical
> > difference certainly makes things confusing.
> >
> > But reading what you say about Anna Stetsenko is gave me greater
insight
> > into what this student was trying to say.  There does seem to be a
strong
> > Marxist aspect to what Friere was trying to say (or in the case of
Friere
> is
> > is more what he was trying to do).  It seems like Friere's PAR (and
> Martin I
> > think already made this point) might be much closer to Vygotsky in
> origins
> > and spirit than the AR and Action Science that emerged out of
Lewin's
> work
> > and the whole business consultation movement.  Were there any Friere
> based
> > articles in the special issue discussing AR and Vygotsky.
> >
> > But as far as general laws, I don't think Lewin was speaking
> > paradigmatically, at least as Kuhn describes it.  He was I think
instead
> > talking about habits systems develop that become part of cultural
> > intelligence without the participants even realizing it.  It is the
> > underlying systems relationships that would lead to real change (and
I
> would
> > suppose one of the impetuses behind Argylis' double loop learning).
> >
> > I'm thinking about Christine's question about environmental
education.
>  The
> > melt down at Fukushia Dai-ichi is an extraordinary ecological
disaster.
>  I
> > read where a Japanese woman wrote to a friend and asked, "After what
> > happened to us how can you in the U.S. not be having a very serious
> > conversation about nuclear power in your country." - the U.S.  I am
sure
> > some people on this list live near a nuclear power plant, some near
a
> fault.
> >  And yet after a short burst of enery all conversation about nuclear
> power
> > has pretty much been blacked out.  Just as conversation of global
warming
> > has become blacked out after a short conversation related to Al
Gore's
> work.
> >  Why can't we talk about these things, what are the relationships
that
> make
> > it unallowable and for even people in danger to acquiesce to the
silence?
> > This I think is what PAR gets to.
> >
> > Michael
> >
> > ________________________________
> >
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss
> > Sent: Sun 5/15/2011 1:13 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of
CHAT
> >
> >
> >
> > This months discussion is about method/methodology as contrasted in
> Action
> > Research and CHAT. I may be wandering off topic but this topic has
left
> me
> > perplexed about the larger context of this question
> >
> > I have re-read a chapter  "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants A
> Balancing
> > Act of Dialectically Theorizing Conceptual Understanding on the
Grounds
> of
> > Vygotsky's Project" by Anna Stetsenko .  The chapter is in the book
> > "Re/Structuring Science Education: Reuniting Sociological and
> Psychological
> > Perspectives" edited by W.M.Roth. Anna is offering her
interpretation of
> > the
> > dialectical *method* and outlook on reality.
> >
> > To put her reflections in context I want to bring in Jay's thoughts
on
> > paradigm assumtions and *general laws*  He wrote,
> >
> > But I am rather conflicted about some of the paradigm assumptions. I
> don't
> > happen to believe that there are useful general laws about social
> systems.
> > They are not the kind of objects of study about which such laws are
> > possible, primarily because what usually turns out to matter about
them
> are
> > more their differences rather than their similarities (as opposed to
the
> > ways in which natural science's objects are defined, so that
similarities
> > matter more than differences). Social systems are in this sense a
bit
> more
> > like literary texts. So there are ways of not having to start from
> scratch
> > in understanding a new one, but not ways that rely on general laws
of
> their
> > behavior. More like check lists of things to pay attention to, and
of
> > possible or frequent kinds of connections seen before. Weak
similarities,
> > embedded in strong differences (the uniqueness, individuality, and
> > unpredictability of real complex systems).
> >
> > The methods of controlled research depend on predictability, and on
the
> > dominance of similarity over difference. They have their uses in
social
> > science and psychology, but they don't get one very far, and in
> particular
> > they don't enable social engineering. Which may be a good thing! As
> someone
> > like Latour might note, academic disciplines, and indeed all
organized,
> > historically long-lived institutionalized activity systems work at
making
> > things seem and sometimes even be more predictable and regular than
they
> > would be "in the wild". But when their norms are violated, when
objects
> of
> > study are defined in new ways, when systems under study combine
things
> that
> > do not normally combine, or combine them in new ways (e.g. combining
> > researcher culture and practitioner culture), the predictability and
the
> > illusion of control and regularity quickly evaporates.
> >
> > The pursuit of general laws is not a good route to the practical
> knowledge
> > and wisdom needed to make our way toward a better society. We cannot
> afford
> > to be misled by superficial generalizations when we are dealing with
> real,
> > particular comm and their problems. We need particularist research
that
> > adds
> > to our capacity to help out in the next particular case.
> >
> > END OF QUOTE
> >
> > Jay is questioning the value of pursuing *general laws" in our
search and
> > encourages inquiry into practical knowledge and wisdom [phronesis]
as we
> > pursue the value of developing a *better* society.  This perspective
> values
> > the practical as a *higher* good than searching for general laws.
> >
> > I now want to contrast this standpoint with Anna Stetsenko's
perspective
> > towards dialectical methodology.  She states,
> >
> > "Within Marxism, there has been a considerable debate as to WHAT
KIND of
> an
> > approach the dialectical method represents and whether the term
> dialectics
> > refers to the core outlook on REALITY and its phenomena and
processes or,
> > alternatively, ONLY to the ANALYTICAL METHOD itself.?  Anna points
out
> that
> > neither Marx or Vygotsky's positions are clear on this question.
(p.70)
> >
> > Anna suggests that
> >
> > "the true hallmark and condition sin qua non for the dialectical
method
> is
> > the notion that *practice* serves as the ultimate ground for
advancing
> the
> > verifying theories as well as for providing warrants for knowledge
> claims.
> > Unlike the skepticism of social constructionism and other postmodern
> > approaches that acknowledge no grounds for falsifying theories or
> > adjudicating among various theoretical standpoints and claims, the
> Marxist
> > method provides warrants for such adjudication.  These warrants have
to
> do
> > not with applying some abstract, fixed principles that lie outside
> > knowledge
> > claims but instead, are derived by discerning the (often implicit
but
> > always
> > ineluctably present) ideological and ETHICAL underpinnings and
> > potentialities of a given theory as a form of practice."
> >
> > I introduced Anna's quote as it seems to parallel both Aristole's
notion
> of
> > phronesis and also Gadamer's notion of philosophical hermeneutics
[as
> well
> > as Jay Lemke's position as I understand it]
> >
> > Episteme as a particular *theoretical* form of practice, and also
techne
> as
> > a particular *productive* form of practice, are legitimate ways to
engage
> > with the world IF they are INFORMED, not by general laws or
*systems* of
> > scientific prediction, but rather by re-cognizing *practical wisdom*
> > [value-knowledge] which serves as the ULTIMATE ground for warranting
> > knowledge claims.
> >
> > The relations between episteme, techne, and phronesis, as various
FORMS
> of
> > knowledge as expressed within the methods of dialectical
materialism,
> > philosophical hermeneutics, or Aristotle's  knowledge framework may
bias
> > episteme, techne, or practical wisdom [value-knowledge] as more or
less
> > central and the other forms as more or less peripheral, [different
> > hierarchical perspectives] but all 3 perspectives emphasize that we
must
> > reclaim a central role for practical ethical wisdom in our knowledge
> > frameworks.
> >
> > Larry
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
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> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
> >
> > __________________________________________
> > _____
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> > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >
> >
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>



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