[xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of CHAT

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

This months discussion is about method/methodology as contrasted in Action
Research and CHAT. I may be wandering off topic but this topic has left me
perplexed about the larger context of this question

I have re-read a chapter  "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants A Balancing
Act of Dialectically Theorizing Conceptual Understanding on the Grounds of
Vygotsky's Project" by Anna Stetsenko .  The chapter is in the book
"Re/Structuring Science Education: Reuniting Sociological and Psychological
Perspectives" edited by W.M.Roth. Anna is offering her interpretation of the
dialectical *method* and outlook on reality.

To put her reflections in context I want to bring in Jay's thoughts on
paradigm assumtions and *general laws*  He wrote,

But I am rather conflicted about some of the paradigm assumptions. I don't
happen to believe that there are useful general laws about social systems.
They are not the kind of objects of study about which such laws are
possible, primarily because what usually turns out to matter about them are
more their differences rather than their similarities (as opposed to the
ways in which natural science's objects are defined, so that similarities
matter more than differences). Social systems are in this sense a bit more
like literary texts. So there are ways of not having to start from scratch
in understanding a new one, but not ways that rely on general laws of their
behavior. More like check lists of things to pay attention to, and of
possible or frequent kinds of connections seen before. Weak similarities,
embedded in strong differences (the uniqueness, individuality, and
unpredictability of real complex systems).

The methods of controlled research depend on predictability, and on the
dominance of similarity over difference. They have their uses in social
science and psychology, but they don't get one very far, and in particular
they don't enable social engineering. Which may be a good thing! As someone
like Latour might note, academic disciplines, and indeed all organized,
historically long-lived institutionalized activity systems work at making
things seem and sometimes even be more predictable and regular than they
would be "in the wild". But when their norms are violated, when objects of
study are defined in new ways, when systems under study combine things that
do not normally combine, or combine them in new ways (e.g. combining
researcher culture and practitioner culture), the predictability and the
illusion of control and regularity quickly evaporates.

The pursuit of general laws is not a good route to the practical knowledge
and wisdom needed to make our way toward a better society. We cannot afford
to be misled by superficial generalizations when we are dealing with real,
particular comm and their problems. We need particularist research that adds
to our capacity to help out in the next particular case.

END OF QUOTE

Jay is questioning the value of pursuing *general laws" in our search and
encourages inquiry into practical knowledge and wisdom [phronesis] as we
pursue the value of developing a *better* society.  This perspective values
the practical as a *higher* good than searching for general laws.

I now want to contrast this standpoint with Anna Stetsenko's perspective
towards dialectical methodology.  She states,

"Within Marxism, there has been a considerable debate as to WHAT KIND of an
approach the dialectical method represents and whether the term dialectics
refers to the core outlook on REALITY and its phenomena and processes or,
alternatively, ONLY to the ANALYTICAL METHOD itself.?  Anna points out that
neither Marx or Vygotsky's positions are clear on this question. (p.70)

Anna suggests that

"the true hallmark and condition sin qua non for the dialectical method is
the notion that *practice* serves as the ultimate ground for advancing the
verifying theories as well as for providing warrants for knowledge claims.
Unlike the skepticism of social constructionism and other postmodern
approaches that acknowledge no grounds for falsifying theories or
adjudicating among various theoretical standpoints and claims, the Marxist
method provides warrants for such adjudication.  These warrants have to do
not with applying some abstract, fixed principles that lie outside knowledge
claims but instead, are derived by discerning the (often implicit but always
ineluctably present) ideological and ETHICAL underpinnings and
potentialities of a given theory as a form of practice."

I introduced Anna's quote as it seems to parallel both Aristole's notion of
phronesis and also Gadamer's notion of philosophical hermeneutics [as well
as Jay Lemke's position as I understand it]

Episteme as a particular *theoretical* form of practice, and also techne as
a particular *productive* form of practice, are legitimate ways to engage
with the world IF they are INFORMED, not by general laws or *systems* of
scientific prediction, but rather by re-cognizing *practical wisdom*
[value-knowledge] which serves as the ULTIMATE ground for warranting
knowledge claims.

The relations between episteme, techne, and phronesis, as various FORMS of
knowledge as expressed within the methods of dialectical materialism,
philosophical hermeneutics, or Aristotle's  knowledge framework may bias
episteme, techne, or practical wisdom [value-knowledge] as more or less
central and the other forms as more or less peripheral, [different
hierarchical perspectives] but all 3 perspectives emphasize that we must
reclaim a central role for practical ethical wisdom in our knowledge
frameworks.

Larry
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