Re: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of CHAT

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Hi Michael

Your thoughts on the different roots of US Action Research and Friere's PAR
is an excellent example of Anna, Gadamer and Aristotle's central point that
*episteme* that is not INFORMED by phronesis [as *a* or maybe *the* central
question of inquiry]  can lead the epistemologically FORMED *system*  to
PRODUCE radically different transformations.

I want to add that this orientation with its particular bias or prejudice
[as a *right* relation]  can be seen as a DISPOSITION that can be *acquired*
within communities of inquiry where this FORM of awareness can attempt to
*reflect* [phronesis] on the historical and developmental roots of our
*habits* of somewhat predictable behaviour.  It was Bellah who wrote about
changing the *habits of our hearts* through changing *common sense* within
communities.   My reflections and exploring Stetsenko's writings can be
viewed as an attempt to participate in developing *better* habits of the
heart.  The term disposition and the term *stance* used in Anna's
dialectical framework point to a particular TYPE of *agentic* capacity which
develops case by case within *right relations*.

Larry

Larry

On Sun, May 15, 2011 at 4:17 AM, Michael Glassman <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu>wrote:

> Hi Larry and Christine and others,
>
> Larry what you write about Anna Stetsenko's approach is particularly
> interesting to me right now.  The other day I was talking with a student who
> wanted to use Participatory Action Research in her dissertation.  We talked
> a bit about Lewin and Argylis but she argued she wanted to use Friere's PAR.
>  She claimed that while the two types of AR wind up with a number of
> similarities (the biggest difference being US AR wants to change
> organizaitons through relationships, while South American AR of whom Friere
> was an important founding voice, wants to empower individuals by allowing
> them to recognize the effects of corrupt relationships through
> knowlege/information) they both came from two very different origins.  It is
> true I think that you can't really find any deposit of Lewin in Friere's
> writing.  The student made the argument that Friere's PAR comes almost
> completely from his use of Marx.  It is ironic because the PAR in the United
> States was developed primarily by business consultants who would probably
> become upset at the mention of Marx.  Having two groups doing almost the
> same thing, with exactly the same name, but a few very, very critical
> difference certainly makes things confusing.
>
> But reading what you say about Anna Stetsenko is gave me greater insight
> into what this student was trying to say.  There does seem to be a strong
> Marxist aspect to what Friere was trying to say (or in the case of Friere is
> is more what he was trying to do).  It seems like Friere's PAR (and Martin I
> think already made this point) might be much closer to Vygotsky in origins
> and spirit than the AR and Action Science that emerged out of Lewin's work
> and the whole business consultation movement.  Were there any Friere based
> articles in the special issue discussing AR and Vygotsky.
>
> But as far as general laws, I don't think Lewin was speaking
> paradigmatically, at least as Kuhn describes it.  He was I think instead
> talking about habits systems develop that become part of cultural
> intelligence without the participants even realizing it.  It is the
> underlying systems relationships that would lead to real change (and I would
> suppose one of the impetuses behind Argylis' double loop learning).
>
> I'm thinking about Christine's question about environmental education.  The
> melt down at Fukushia Dai-ichi is an extraordinary ecological disaster.  I
> read where a Japanese woman wrote to a friend and asked, "After what
> happened to us how can you in the U.S. not be having a very serious
> conversation about nuclear power in your country." - the U.S.  I am sure
> some people on this list live near a nuclear power plant, some near a fault.
>  And yet after a short burst of enery all conversation about nuclear power
> has pretty much been blacked out.  Just as conversation of global warming
> has become blacked out after a short conversation related to Al Gore's work.
>  Why can't we talk about these things, what are the relationships that make
> it unallowable and for even people in danger to acquiesce to the silence?
> This I think is what PAR gets to.
>
> Michael
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss
> Sent: Sun 5/15/2011 1:13 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of CHAT
>
>
>
> This months discussion is about method/methodology as contrasted in Action
> Research and CHAT. I may be wandering off topic but this topic has left me
> perplexed about the larger context of this question
>
> I have re-read a chapter  "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants A Balancing
> Act of Dialectically Theorizing Conceptual Understanding on the Grounds of
> Vygotsky's Project" by Anna Stetsenko .  The chapter is in the book
> "Re/Structuring Science Education: Reuniting Sociological and Psychological
> Perspectives" edited by W.M.Roth. Anna is offering her interpretation of
> the
> dialectical *method* and outlook on reality.
>
> To put her reflections in context I want to bring in Jay's thoughts on
> paradigm assumtions and *general laws*  He wrote,
>
> But I am rather conflicted about some of the paradigm assumptions. I don't
> happen to believe that there are useful general laws about social systems.
> They are not the kind of objects of study about which such laws are
> possible, primarily because what usually turns out to matter about them are
> more their differences rather than their similarities (as opposed to the
> ways in which natural science's objects are defined, so that similarities
> matter more than differences). Social systems are in this sense a bit more
> like literary texts. So there are ways of not having to start from scratch
> in understanding a new one, but not ways that rely on general laws of their
> behavior. More like check lists of things to pay attention to, and of
> possible or frequent kinds of connections seen before. Weak similarities,
> embedded in strong differences (the uniqueness, individuality, and
> unpredictability of real complex systems).
>
> The methods of controlled research depend on predictability, and on the
> dominance of similarity over difference. They have their uses in social
> science and psychology, but they don't get one very far, and in particular
> they don't enable social engineering. Which may be a good thing! As someone
> like Latour might note, academic disciplines, and indeed all organized,
> historically long-lived institutionalized activity systems work at making
> things seem and sometimes even be more predictable and regular than they
> would be "in the wild". But when their norms are violated, when objects of
> study are defined in new ways, when systems under study combine things that
> do not normally combine, or combine them in new ways (e.g. combining
> researcher culture and practitioner culture), the predictability and the
> illusion of control and regularity quickly evaporates.
>
> The pursuit of general laws is not a good route to the practical knowledge
> and wisdom needed to make our way toward a better society. We cannot afford
> to be misled by superficial generalizations when we are dealing with real,
> particular comm and their problems. We need particularist research that
> adds
> to our capacity to help out in the next particular case.
>
> END OF QUOTE
>
> Jay is questioning the value of pursuing *general laws" in our search and
> encourages inquiry into practical knowledge and wisdom [phronesis] as we
> pursue the value of developing a *better* society.  This perspective values
> the practical as a *higher* good than searching for general laws.
>
> I now want to contrast this standpoint with Anna Stetsenko's perspective
> towards dialectical methodology.  She states,
>
> "Within Marxism, there has been a considerable debate as to WHAT KIND of an
> approach the dialectical method represents and whether the term dialectics
> refers to the core outlook on REALITY and its phenomena and processes or,
> alternatively, ONLY to the ANALYTICAL METHOD itself.?  Anna points out that
> neither Marx or Vygotsky's positions are clear on this question. (p.70)
>
> Anna suggests that
>
> "the true hallmark and condition sin qua non for the dialectical method is
> the notion that *practice* serves as the ultimate ground for advancing the
> verifying theories as well as for providing warrants for knowledge claims.
> Unlike the skepticism of social constructionism and other postmodern
> approaches that acknowledge no grounds for falsifying theories or
> adjudicating among various theoretical standpoints and claims, the Marxist
> method provides warrants for such adjudication.  These warrants have to do
> not with applying some abstract, fixed principles that lie outside
> knowledge
> claims but instead, are derived by discerning the (often implicit but
> always
> ineluctably present) ideological and ETHICAL underpinnings and
> potentialities of a given theory as a form of practice."
>
> I introduced Anna's quote as it seems to parallel both Aristole's notion of
> phronesis and also Gadamer's notion of philosophical hermeneutics [as well
> as Jay Lemke's position as I understand it]
>
> Episteme as a particular *theoretical* form of practice, and also techne as
> a particular *productive* form of practice, are legitimate ways to engage
> with the world IF they are INFORMED, not by general laws or *systems* of
> scientific prediction, but rather by re-cognizing *practical wisdom*
> [value-knowledge] which serves as the ULTIMATE ground for warranting
> knowledge claims.
>
> The relations between episteme, techne, and phronesis, as various FORMS of
> knowledge as expressed within the methods of dialectical materialism,
> philosophical hermeneutics, or Aristotle's  knowledge framework may bias
> episteme, techne, or practical wisdom [value-knowledge] as more or less
> central and the other forms as more or less peripheral, [different
> hierarchical perspectives] but all 3 perspectives emphasize that we must
> reclaim a central role for practical ethical wisdom in our knowledge
> frameworks.
>
> Larry
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
>
> __________________________________________
> _____
> xmca mailing list
> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
>
__________________________________________
_____
xmca mailing list
xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca