Re: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of CHAT

[Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>]

Michael,

You wrote,

 Whyte makes the argument though in this article that in AR it is best for
those leading the research are separate from the organizational structure
(which I guess Thorsrud and Mayo were not careful about), and act as outside
consultants (I don't think I agree with this)

I would recommend, if you want another perspective on this particular
question, to look up Bent Flysbjerg on Google scholar.  He is exploring
*phronetic social research* within town planning in Denmark. [In 2009 he
moved over to Oxford]  He explicitly takes a position that having
consultants come in on behalf of the organization is a FORM of
techne-knowledge. PRODUCING knowledge with specific PRODUCTS or end results
previously specified.

Larry



un, May 15, 2011 at 6:02 AM, Michael Glassman <MGlassman@ehe.osu.edu> wrote:

> Yrjo, Larry, Christine, everybody,
>
> Primarily I know Whytte, and owe what I think about the evolution of AR in
> the US from this issue of American Behavior Scientist, 32, (1989).
> http://journals.ohiolink.edu.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/ejc/pdf.cgi/Whyte_William_Foote.pdf?issn=00027642&issue=v32i0005&article=502_i(The link it through my library, so unless you have access to a university
> system it might be hard to find)
>
> Whytte takes the beginnings of AR back to Einar Thorsrud (who was actually
> Norwegian and did his original research with Norwegian shipyards) and Elton
> Mayo who did his original research with General Western Electric.  (Before I
> had read this I had no idea the Hawthorne effect came from AR).  Whyte makes
> the argument though in this article that in AR it is best for those leading
> the research are separate from the organizational structure (which I guess
> Thorsrud and Mayo were not careful about), and act as outside consultants (I
> don't think I agree with this), which is why I think of US AR as being based
> in business consultancy.  Every article in the journal issue seemed to
> follow this model.  I think probably I am taking a wide view of business
> consultancy (or perhaps these days we tend to take too narrow a view of
> business consultancy).  But it does seem for Whyte the word emphasized is
> consultancy and not business.
>
> Michael
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Yrjö Engeström
> Sent: Sun 5/15/2011 8:21 AM
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: Re: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of CHAT
>
>
>
> Dear Michael and others, it seems odd that you do not mention the
> Participatory Action Research (PAR) approach founded by the
> sociologist William Foote Whyte (1914-2000). The term Participatory
> Action Research is usually connected to his work and legacy, and it is
> quite different from the Action Science of the psychologically trained
> Chris Argyris. Whyte's work in Mondragon and in many other industrial
> and community contexts is not easily categorized as mere business
> consultancy.
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Yrjö Engeström
>
>
>
> Michael Glassman kirjoitti 15.5.2011 kello 14.17:
>
> > Hi Larry and Christine and others,
> >
> > Larry what you write about Anna Stetsenko's approach is particularly
> > interesting to me right now.  The other day I was talking with a
> > student who wanted to use Participatory Action Research in her
> > dissertation.  We talked a bit about Lewin and Argylis but she
> > argued she wanted to use Friere's PAR.  She claimed that while the
> > two types of AR wind up with a number of similarities (the biggest
> > difference being US AR wants to change organizaitons through
> > relationships, while South American AR of whom Friere was an
> > important founding voice, wants to empower individuals by allowing
> > them to recognize the effects of corrupt relationships through
> > knowlege/information) they both came from two very different
> > origins.  It is true I think that you can't really find any deposit
> > of Lewin in Friere's writing.  The student made the argument that
> > Friere's PAR comes almost completely from his use of Marx.  It is
> > ironic because the PAR in the United States was developed primarily
> > by business consultants who would probably become upset at the
> > mention of Marx.  Having two groups doing almost the same thing,
> > with exactly the same name, but a few very, very critical difference
> > certainly makes things confusing.
> >
> > But reading what you say about Anna Stetsenko is gave me greater
> > insight into what this student was trying to say.  There does seem
> > to be a strong Marxist aspect to what Friere was trying to say (or
> > in the case of Friere is is more what he was trying to do).  It
> > seems like Friere's PAR (and Martin I think already made this point)
> > might be much closer to Vygotsky in origins and spirit than the AR
> > and Action Science that emerged out of Lewin's work and the whole
> > business consultation movement.  Were there any Friere based
> > articles in the special issue discussing AR and Vygotsky.
> >
> > But as far as general laws, I don't think Lewin was speaking
> > paradigmatically, at least as Kuhn describes it.  He was I think
> > instead talking about habits systems develop that become part of
> > cultural intelligence without the participants even realizing it.
> > It is the underlying systems relationships that would lead to real
> > change (and I would suppose one of the impetuses behind Argylis'
> > double loop learning).
> >
> > I'm thinking about Christine's question about environmental
> > education.  The melt down at Fukushia Dai-ichi is an extraordinary
> > ecological disaster.  I read where a Japanese woman wrote to a
> > friend and asked, "After what happened to us how can you in the U.S.
> > not be having a very serious conversation about nuclear power in
> > your country." - the U.S.  I am sure some people on this list live
> > near a nuclear power plant, some near a fault.  And yet after a
> > short burst of enery all conversation about nuclear power has pretty
> > much been blacked out.  Just as conversation of global warming has
> > become blacked out after a short conversation related to Al Gore's
> > work.  Why can't we talk about these things, what are the
> > relationships that make it unallowable and for even people in danger
> > to acquiesce to the silence?   This I think is what PAR gets to.
> >
> > Michael
> >
> > ________________________________
> >
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss
> > Sent: Sun 5/15/2011 1:13 AM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: [xmca] Dialectical Inquiry as the method/methodology of CHAT
> >
> >
> >
> > This months discussion is about method/methodology as contrasted in
> > Action
> > Research and CHAT. I may be wandering off topic but this topic has
> > left me
> > perplexed about the larger context of this question
> >
> > I have re-read a chapter  "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants A
> > Balancing
> > Act of Dialectically Theorizing Conceptual Understanding on the
> > Grounds of
> > Vygotsky's Project" by Anna Stetsenko .  The chapter is in the book
> > "Re/Structuring Science Education: Reuniting Sociological and
> > Psychological
> > Perspectives" edited by W.M.Roth. Anna is offering her
> > interpretation of the
> > dialectical *method* and outlook on reality.
> >
> > To put her reflections in context I want to bring in Jay's thoughts on
> > paradigm assumtions and *general laws*  He wrote,
> >
> > But I am rather conflicted about some of the paradigm assumptions. I
> > don't
> > happen to believe that there are useful general laws about social
> > systems.
> > They are not the kind of objects of study about which such laws are
> > possible, primarily because what usually turns out to matter about
> > them are
> > more their differences rather than their similarities (as opposed to
> > the
> > ways in which natural science's objects are defined, so that
> > similarities
> > matter more than differences). Social systems are in this sense a
> > bit more
> > like literary texts. So there are ways of not having to start from
> > scratch
> > in understanding a new one, but not ways that rely on general laws
> > of their
> > behavior. More like check lists of things to pay attention to, and of
> > possible or frequent kinds of connections seen before. Weak
> > similarities,
> > embedded in strong differences (the uniqueness, individuality, and
> > unpredictability of real complex systems).
> >
> > The methods of controlled research depend on predictability, and on
> > the
> > dominance of similarity over difference. They have their uses in
> > social
> > science and psychology, but they don't get one very far, and in
> > particular
> > they don't enable social engineering. Which may be a good thing! As
> > someone
> > like Latour might note, academic disciplines, and indeed all
> > organized,
> > historically long-lived institutionalized activity systems work at
> > making
> > things seem and sometimes even be more predictable and regular than
> > they
> > would be "in the wild". But when their norms are violated, when
> > objects of
> > study are defined in new ways, when systems under study combine
> > things that
> > do not normally combine, or combine them in new ways (e.g. combining
> > researcher culture and practitioner culture), the predictability and
> > the
> > illusion of control and regularity quickly evaporates.
> >
> > The pursuit of general laws is not a good route to the practical
> > knowledge
> > and wisdom needed to make our way toward a better society. We cannot
> > afford
> > to be misled by superficial generalizations when we are dealing with
> > real,
> > particular comm and their problems. We need particularist research
> > that adds
> > to our capacity to help out in the next particular case.
> >
> > END OF QUOTE
> >
> > Jay is questioning the value of pursuing *general laws" in our
> > search and
> > encourages inquiry into practical knowledge and wisdom [phronesis]
> > as we
> > pursue the value of developing a *better* society.  This perspective
> > values
> > the practical as a *higher* good than searching for general laws.
> >
> > I now want to contrast this standpoint with Anna Stetsenko's
> > perspective
> > towards dialectical methodology.  She states,
> >
> > "Within Marxism, there has been a considerable debate as to WHAT
> > KIND of an
> > approach the dialectical method represents and whether the term
> > dialectics
> > refers to the core outlook on REALITY and its phenomena and
> > processes or,
> > alternatively, ONLY to the ANALYTICAL METHOD itself.?  Anna points
> > out that
> > neither Marx or Vygotsky's positions are clear on this question. (p.
> > 70)
> >
> > Anna suggests that
> >
> > "the true hallmark and condition sin qua non for the dialectical
> > method is
> > the notion that *practice* serves as the ultimate ground for
> > advancing the
> > verifying theories as well as for providing warrants for knowledge
> > claims.
> > Unlike the skepticism of social constructionism and other postmodern
> > approaches that acknowledge no grounds for falsifying theories or
> > adjudicating among various theoretical standpoints and claims, the
> > Marxist
> > method provides warrants for such adjudication.  These warrants have
> > to do
> > not with applying some abstract, fixed principles that lie outside
> > knowledge
> > claims but instead, are derived by discerning the (often implicit
> > but always
> > ineluctably present) ideological and ETHICAL underpinnings and
> > potentialities of a given theory as a form of practice."
> >
> > I introduced Anna's quote as it seems to parallel both Aristole's
> > notion of
> > phronesis and also Gadamer's notion of philosophical hermeneutics
> > [as well
> > as Jay Lemke's position as I understand it]
> >
> > Episteme as a particular *theoretical* form of practice, and also
> > techne as
> > a particular *productive* form of practice, are legitimate ways to
> > engage
> > with the world IF they are INFORMED, not by general laws or
> > *systems* of
> > scientific prediction, but rather by re-cognizing *practical wisdom*
> > [value-knowledge] which serves as the ULTIMATE ground for warranting
> > knowledge claims.
> >
> > The relations between episteme, techne, and phronesis, as various
> > FORMS of
> > knowledge as expressed within the methods of dialectical materialism,
> > philosophical hermeneutics, or Aristotle's  knowledge framework may
> > bias
> > episteme, techne, or practical wisdom [value-knowledge] as more or
> > less
> > central and the other forms as more or less peripheral, [different
> > hierarchical perspectives] but all 3 perspectives emphasize that we
> > must
> > reclaim a central role for practical ethical wisdom in our knowledge
> > frameworks.
> >
> > Larry
> > __________________________________________
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