On 23 April 2011 13:00, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>> wrote:
Instances and types are both involved here, Huw.
In fact, any concept has individual, universal and particular moments.
Ok. And are are you happy that a type can be materially implemented,
such as the notion of room temperature implemented in a thermostat,
and that this type is not an action, but that it regulates an action?
Huw
Andy
Huw Lloyd wrote:
On 23 April 2011 06:41, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net> <mailto:ablunden@mira.net
<mailto:ablunden@mira.net>>> wrote:
I'll leave Marx on commodity Fetishsm for the moment,
Martin, and
solely to make the point that I am not alone on this
business of
meaning as act.
For example, V P Zinchenko's "Vygotsky's ideas about units
for the
analysis of mind', in Culture, Communication and cognition:
Vygvotskyan Perspectives, ed J V Wertsch CUP 1985, pp. 94-118:
“one can consider tool-mediated action as being very close to
meaning as unit of analysis.”
Quick question, Andy. Are you distinguishing instances and
classifications?
I can demonstrate a plan by executing it. I can refer to the
execution as an example of my plan. But the execution in not
a plan.
Huw
and Engestrom's "Learning by Expanding":
“According to Vygotsky, the instrumentally mediated act
‘is the
simplest segment of behavior that is dealt with by
research based on
elementary units’.”
Andy
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