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These files are maintained strictly for historical reference, research, and recordkeeping purposes, and the content has not been altered or updated since archiving. Content on this site may not meet current digital accessibility standards. If you require an alternative, accessible format of any information found on this site, please contact Bruce Jones, bjones@ucsd.edu to request an accommodation.
On 23 April 2011 06:41, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote: > I'll leave Marx on comm9odity Fetishsm for the moment, Martin, and solely > to make the point that I am not alone on this business of meaning as act. > > For example, V P Zinchenko's "Vygotsky's ideas about units for the analysis > of mind', iubn Culture, Communication and cognition: Vygvotskyan > Perspectives, ed J V Wertsch CUP 1985, pp. 94-118: > > “one can consider tool-mediated action as being very close to > meaning as unit of analysis.” > Quick question, Andy. Are you distinguishing instances and classifications? I can demonstrate a plan by executing it. I can refer to the execution as an example of my plan. But the execution in not a plan. Huw > > and Engestrom's "Learning by Expanding": > > “According to Vygotsky, the instrumentally mediated act ‘is the > simplest segment of behavior that is dealt with by research based on > elementary units’.” > > Andy > > > > > > Martin Packer wrote: > >> I'm still not seeing your argument, Andy. A word is not a natural object, >> of course. No more than is a commodity. I haven't claimed that, nor does >> Vygotsky. I thought you were trying to argue that word-meaning must be an >> act. Are you suggesting that the commodity-form is an act? >> >> Think about it this way. We accept Marx's analysis of the commodity, >> including the fact that it has a form, and an internal contradiction between >> two kinds of value. It has these characteristics, of course, by virtue of >> its constitution in human society, in social practices. But a newborn baby >> recognizes none of these characteristics. Marx doesn't tell us how a child >> comes to grasp them. That remains an untold developmental story. To tell >> that story we don't to rehash what Marx's analysis has already made clear. >> We focus instead on the child. >> >> LSV, similarly, is not directly interested in how human language evolved, >> or how a language is maintained by a community of speakers. In other words, >> he does not analyze how words have come to have inner form, or how that form >> changes historically. He tells us enough to establish the fact that the form >> does exist, and that it does change. He is focused, rather, on the ways in >> which a child comes to be a full participant in the world of human language >> and, in consequence, of human thought. >> Martin >> >> On Apr 22, 2011, at 7:56 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> You demonstrate my point exactly, Martin. >>> The commodity form is a relationship between people mediated by an >>> artifact., not a thing. >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> >> > > __________________________________________ > _____ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > __________________________________________ _____ xmca mailing list xmca@weber.ucsd.edu http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca