Thanks Denise. This looks like a great paper. Michael ________________________________ From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham Sent: Tue 8/10/2010 6:50 AM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'; ablunden@mira.net Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Hi Michael, I have attached an article where abduction as in Peirce has been explored Denise From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Michael Glassman Sent: 09 August 2010 21:44 To: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts Hi Denise, Andy and others, Thanks for all of this. I have been doing a good deal of thinking in this area so this is really interesting to me. I've made a first pass through the work and thought I would offer some of my thinking and wonder if anybody else might have some thought. Actually the person I have been working with this on is something of a deductive thinker and that sort of keeps me in line. I wonder if Valsiner was a little bit too hard on deductive thinking and a little bit too easy on inductive thinking (and I wonder about giving primacy to any form of logic because they all play their role). I see Peirce's great contribution (at least one of them) is that there are not only logics but that logics are based on relationships. Deductive logic is certainly dangerous (just as I think giving primacy to any logic is) because it is too easy to believe that premises are static and determinate. If you rely completely on deductive logic there is really the possibility of using it to go to an extreme and creating students who not only give primacy to deductive logic but have difficulty of thinking any other way. At the same time Dewey for instance does posit warranted assertability. There are times when we can certainly make the argument that it is possible to start from a basic set of premises (If you treat an object in A manner you will have B conclusion). What is always important to remember is that the premises are malleable and that if you don't get the conclusion you expected that you can't really blame the experiment or experimenter but must accept that the premises were in some way lacking. So it is important to remember that there is always a dynamic relationship between Premise A and conclusion B - and that this relationship is always in the context of a larger system which is constantly changing circumstances. Induction I think can also be dangerous though and is not necessarily the "good guy" in this trilogy. David Human was I think the first to point this out - one that you are always only making your assumptions on a limited class (so system relationships really enter in here as weill) and also that you tend to draw conclusions too quickly and too easily. It is interesting because this it seems to me is the mistake that so many economists make. They put together pieces of informatiion and then reach conclusions about what this information means and then are able to incorporate new information when it emerges. But I think where I most differ is abduction. I don't really think so much that it is a combination of deduction and induction, and intermingling and/or overlapping of the two. That is sort of where I started as well, but as we have come to really explore this logic I think it is representative of a unique way of generating hypotheses, but one that is really difficult to grasp because it is the most open of the three logics as well as the most systems oriented. I sort of see abduction as competing possibilities and the ability to use the possibility to generate a new hypothesis. This usually occurs when information is readily available, any for of warranted assertability is low, the problem is unique or novel in some way, and there are strong relationships between different nodes within the system. Relationships need to be strong and well defined for two reasons. The first is that the different nodes need to work together without one racing to acheive a hegemony of ideas based on power relationships. The second is that abduction represents the biggest risk - there is far less certainty in outcomes than there would be in deduction or even induction. You do not know where you are going to end up when going through a process of abduction. The reward is a higher value in the hypothesis generated. Okay, well that's my thinking. Michael ________________________________ From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Mon 8/9/2010 10:03 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts And here's the second half hopefully ... Denise Newnham wrote: > Hello everyone, I copied Valsiner (2007) which has his final ideas on > abduction and specifically thinking as a cultural process > > Please tell me if you cannot open these pages I have a limited technology > > Denise > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On > Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: 07 August 2010 19:21 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts > > Thanks Denise. > This time of year (in northern hemisphere) everyone is moving around in > every which direction. And when lots of people get into the discussion. > multi-voicedness goes ballistic!! > > Will read Valsiner on abduction with interest. Mulling over the abduction/ > imagination connection which intuitively works, although I had not connect > the two ideas before (the influence, too, of prior discussions about LSV and > imagination). > > Sure a lot of threads entangled here. very interesting. > mike > > On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 6:46 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch> wrote: > >> Dear Michael, >> >> >> >> I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly stipulated >> in >> the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and text >> >> >> >> Denise >> >> Dear Denise, >> >> >> >> Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce cand >> abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism). >> >> But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what later >> (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS AND >> SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the > highest >> level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity of >> meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited. >> >> Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into field-type >> sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation) >> >> >> >> Jaan >> >> >> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Michael Glassman >> Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts >> >> >> >> Hi Denise, >> >> >> >> I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why >> pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction. I am >> currently >> under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis > generation >> - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems. > So >> I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's >> definition, might play in all this. >> >> >> >> Michael >> >> >> >> _____ >> >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham >> Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM >> To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' >> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts >> >> Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book 'The >> guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of >> development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon, & > R. >> Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical >> models >> of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley. >> >> I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the closest >> example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts in >> human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of >> mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones), yet >> by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis is >> actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that pseudo-concepts >> (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities) are >> the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The claim >> would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler, >> described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction >> (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense (along >> the lines of Pierce). >> >> I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that there >> was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not > heard >> or read this debate. >> >> Denise >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On >> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22 >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts >> >> Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner, >> 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it >> incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as >> Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the >> development hierarchy. >> >> Andy >> >> Denise Newnham wrote: >>> Dear Larry and others, >>> >>> I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if so >> let >>> me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think of >>> Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states that >>> pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the >>> developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to >> changes >>> or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p. >>> 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of >>> intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth >>> dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by >>> Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web. >>> >>> Denise >>> >>> 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the >>> developmental question of how socially situated microgenetic > experiences >>> get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize >>> experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" >> and >>> "higher" >>> functions]?' >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] >> On >>> Behalf Of Larry Purss >>> Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04 >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on >>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology >>> >>> Hi Leif and Katerina >>> >>> Leif, >>> I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment" and >> I >>> agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of "engagement" >>> that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with >>> others. I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick. >> It >>> is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on >>> Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also focused >> on >>> "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts. >>> >>> Katerina, >>> I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I >>> accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as >>> interpretive and "perspectival". As I read Glick's interpretation of >>> Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on > Mike >> & >>> Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development, and >>> also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of >>> social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions]. These >>> reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the > developmental >>> question of how socially situated microgenetic experiences get >>> "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize >> experience >>> across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and "higher" >>> functions]? >>> >>> Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental >>> Psychology" points out that Werner thought developmental processes got >>> organized "at one of three different levels: the sensorimotor, the >>> perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562) Metaphor organizes experience at >> the >>> 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of >> "mind" >>> [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.] >>> However, this still leaves us with questioning the RELATIONAL process > of >>> linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at the >>> sensorimotor and perceptual levels. >>> Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and >>> others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for >>> organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more >>> reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear > teleological >>> dynamic. The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and >>> perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social >>> situations of development are symbolic [and metaphorical]? As Glick >> points >>> out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a >>> differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) However >>> these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize >> experience. >>> The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process >> where >> a >>> specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development. An >>> alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading >>> activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For >>> example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one >>> specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but >>> ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the >> societal >>> microgenetic situation of development]. Whether the previous "leading >>> activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of >>> development [age determined] but rather on the particular social >> situation >>> of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate >> with >>> particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development. >>> Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is >>> socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedes >> into >>> the background] If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured schools >> and >>> affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED, >> identity >>> and concept development would be altered. >>> My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the >> possibility >>> of creating institutional structures which promote the >> "interchangeability >>> of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces >>> which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the > creation >> of >>> the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of >> positions >>> is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity" >>> where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing >> OTHERS >>> RESPONDING to their recognition. This affiliative activity is formative >> of >>> particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept >>> development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The >> reason >> I >>> appreciate neo-Meadian accounts of development are >>> there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social >>> positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor, >>> perceptual, and symbolic experiences]. I also believe this "ideal" of >>> actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical as >> the >>> participants openly share perspectives. This also creates social >>> spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is nurtured >> and >>> "grown" [cultured] >>> >>> Larry >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi >> <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote: >>>> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor", >> which >>>> is been considered as a constructivist argument? >>>> Katerina Plakitsi >>>> Assistant Professor of Science Education >>>> Department of Early Childhood Education >>>> School of Education >>>> University of Ioannina >>>> 45110 >>>> Greece >>>> tel.: +302651005771 office >>>> fax: +302651005842 >>>> tel.: +6972898463 mobile >>>> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr >>>> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits >>>> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns >>>> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/> >>>> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html >>>> >>>> -------------------------------------------------- >>>> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu> >>>> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on >>>> >>>> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology >>>> >>>> Hi Martin >>>>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs "non-mind reading" models of young >>>>> infants >>>>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is >> a >>>>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT >>>>> conversations >>>>> on this listserve. >>>>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal >>>>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy >> for >>>>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely >> on >>>>> this particular topic. >>>>> >>>>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for > further >>>>> articles which engage with the pros and cons of the various models in >> a >>>>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the >> Review >>>>> of >>>>> Philosophy and Psychology? >>>>> >>>>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for >>>>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and >> microgenesis. >>>>> However, I'm also interested in how the various models of "infants >>>>> engaging >>>>> with others" become transformed in the transition to >>>>> TRANS-situational understandings [the development of "higher" mental >>>>> functions.] >>>>> >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Begin forwarded message: >>>>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk> >>>>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00 >>>>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading, >>>>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology >>>>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Guest Editors: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> CALL FOR PAPERS >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities >>>>>>> for >>>>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of >>> such >>>>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading": the >>>>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds >>>>>> (i.e., >>>>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of > such >>>>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question > the >>>>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for >>>>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of >>>>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be >>>>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly >>>>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to >> any >>>>>> sort >>>>>> of mindreading. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate >>>>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a >> variety >>>>>> of >>>>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm and >>>>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more >>>>>> active >>>>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' goals, >>>>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most >>>>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age >>> are >>>>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before >> they >>>>>> are >>>>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4 >> years >>>>>> of >>>>>> age. >>>>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims > to >>>>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading >> approaches >>>>>> to >>>>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their >>>>>> theoretical >>>>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how >>> they >>>>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from >>>>>> human >>>>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed > include >>>>>> but >>>>>> are not limited to: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic >>>>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must > be >>>>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all? >>>>>>> - Normally developing children become able to attribute false >>>>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that >> they >>>>>> must >>>>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent? >>>>>>> - What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly >>>>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early >>> social >>>>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the > other? >>>>>>> - What exact roles are mental representations thought to play >> in >>>>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be >>>>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between >>>>>> representational >>>>>> and non-representational approaches? >>>>>>> - How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit >>>>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Invited contributors >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Important dates >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Submission deadline: 1 December 2010 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Target publication date: July 2011 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> How to submit >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Prospective authors should register at: >>>>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select >>>>>> "Social >>>>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to submit >> a >>>>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words. >>> Submissions >>>>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's >> website: >>>>>> http://www.springer.com/13164 Any questions? Please email the guest >>>>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu, >> v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk >>>>>>> >>>>>>> About the journal >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN: >>>>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer >>> and >>>>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive >> science. >>>>>> The >>>>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of >>>>>> mutual >>>>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster >>>>>> interdisciplinary >>>>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the > mind, >>>>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences. >>>>>>> The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical >>> research >>>>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. > It >>>>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading >>>>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Editorial board >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors: >> Roberto >>>>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU. >>>>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn; >>> Ned >>>>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard >> Breheny, >>>>>> UCL; >>>>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU; >> Vittorio >>>>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire; >> Ray >>>>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego >>>>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley; >> Christopher >>>>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli, >>>>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; > Brian >>>>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan; >> Barry >>>>>> C. >>>>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia; >>>>>> Timothy >>>>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate >>>>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow >>>>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development >>>>>>> Henry Wellcome Building >>>>>>> Birkbeck, University of London >>>>>>> Malet Street >>>>>>> London, WC1E 7HX. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> xmca mailing list >>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> xmca mailing list >>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> xmca mailing list >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> xmca mailing list >>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >>> >>> >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/ <http://home.mira.net/~andy/> > >> Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> >> _______________________________________________ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> xmca mailing list >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca >> >> > _______________________________________________ > xmca mailing list > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca > > > 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