Re: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts

[mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>]

Thanks Denise.
This time of year (in northern hemisphere) everyone is moving around in
every which direction. And when lots of people get into the discussion.
multi-voicedness goes ballistic!!

Will read Valsiner on abduction with interest. Mulling over the abduction/
imagination connection which intuitively works, although I had not connect
the two ideas before (the influence, too, of prior discussions about LSV and
imagination).

Sure a lot of threads entangled here. very interesting.
mike

On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 6:46 AM, Denise Newnham <dsnewnham@bluewin.ch> wrote:

> Dear Michael,
>
>
>
> I wrote to Jaan about your question as no where was it clearly stipulated
> in
> the earlier works and he has just replied so I forward his words and text
>
>
>
> Denise
>
> Dear Denise,
>
>
>
> Good question! In 1998 I was somewhat naively optimistic about Peirce cand
> abduction (see Pizarroso & V 2009 on overcoming that optimism).
>
> But the 1998 quote from my book is indeed an embryonic form of what later
> (2001 in Potsdam, and more thoroughly in my 2007 book CULTURE IN MINDS AND
> SOCIETIES became clear-- words as POINT-LIKE CONCEPTS cannot be the highest
> level of semiotic mediation as they would close up further creativity of
> meaning-making. So Vygotsky was basically limited.
>
> Instead, the pseudo-concept translates in my terminology into field-type
> sign (Level 4 in my system of semiotic mediation)
>
>
>
> Jaan
>
>
>
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Michael Glassman
> Sent: 05 August 2010 15:22
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
>
>
>
> Hi Denise,
>
>
>
> I was wondering, does Valsiner have an argument as to how and why
> pseudo-concepts actally aids in Peirces ilogic of abduction.  I am
> currently
> under the impresson that abduction is primarily about hypothesis generation
> - the ability to develop new hypotheses in response to unique problems.  So
> I'm wondering what role pseudo-concepts, if we are going by Vygotsky's
> definition, might play in all this.
>
>
>
> Michael
>
>
>
>  _____
>
>  From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu on behalf of Denise Newnham
> Sent: Thu 8/5/2010 5:26 AM
> To: ablunden@mira.net; 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'
> Subject: RE: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
>
> Hello Andy, the reference as you saw to pseudoconcepts is in his book 'The
> guided mind' 1998 and the other is : The development of the concept of
> development: Historical and epistemological perspectives. In W. Damon, & R.
> Lerner(Eds), Handbook of child psychology. 5th Ed. VOl.1. Theoretical
> models
> of human development (pp. 189-232). New York: Wiley.
>
> I quote (1998): 'Vygotsky and his colleagues (Luria would be the closest
> example) attributed and overly idealized role to the role of concepts in
> human reasoning. The role fitted with his emphasis on the hierarchy of
> mental functions (i.e. higher mental functions regulating lower ones), yet
> by this exaggerated emphasis the focus on the process of semiogenesis is
> actually diminished. In contrast, it could be claimed that pseudo-concepts
> (i.e. specific unified conglomerates of concept and complex qualities) are
> the core (and highest form) of human psychological functioning. The claim
> would fit with the unity of representational fields (of Karl Buhler,
> described and extended earlier) and with the central focus of abduction
> (rather than induction or deduction) in the process of making sense (along
> the lines of Pierce).
>
> I read you paper 'when is a concept really a concept' and heard that there
> was a debate on XMCA but as I was not connected at that time have not heard
> or read this debate.
>
> Denise
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
> Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> Sent: 05 August 2010 10:22
> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> Subject: [xmca] Valsiner and pseudoconcepts
>
> Can you give us the full reference for "see Valsiner,
> 1997d", Denise, and maybe even the context? I just find it
> incredible that someone could know as much about Vygotsky as
> Valsiner does and place pseduoconcepts at the top of the
> development hierarchy.
>
> Andy
>
> Denise Newnham wrote:
> > Dear Larry and others,
> >
> > I am new to this game so perhaps am doing something out of turn so if so
> let
> > me know. Larry I read your reply and this extract below made me think of
> > Valsiner's work on semiotic mediators and concepts where he states that
> > pseudoconcepts (1998, p.278-279) should be placed at the top to the
> > developmental hierarchy as the hierarchy should be seen as 'open to
> changes
> > or formation of intrasensitive order- [see Valsiner, 1997d]' (2001, p.
> > 85).This brings ot my mind Markova's discussion on the spontaneous of
> > intuitive in knowledge formation (2003) and I think that Cole's fifth
> > dimension attests to this argument. There is an interesting paper by
> > Galligan (2008) "using Valsiner" on the web.
> >
> > Denise
> >
> > 'These reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the
> > developmental question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences
> > get "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> > experience across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower"
> and
> > "higher"
> > functions]?'
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> On
> > Behalf Of Larry Purss
> > Sent: 04 August 2010 19:04
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
> > Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >
> > Hi Leif and Katerina
> >
> > Leif,
> > I have recently read Daniel Stern's latest book "The Present Moment" and
> I
> > agree that he has a fascinating perspective on the topic of "engagement"
> > that emphasizes a "non-mind reading interpretation" of engaging with
> > others.  I will look up his earlier work discussing Vygotsky and Glick.
> It
> > is also interesting that you mention Joseph Glick. Glick's articles on
> > Werner are also fascinating as they suggest that Werner was also focused
> on
> > "microgenesis" as central to developmental accounts.
> >
> > Katerina,
> > I'm not sure exactly what you mean by "accept metaphor" but generally I
> > accept metaphor as a central way of understanding "human science" as
> > interpretive and "perspectival".  As I read  Glick's interpretation of
> > Werner's microgenetic developmental theory, I was also REFLECTING on Mike
> &
> > Natalia's focus on the microgenetic social situation of development, and
> > also my attempt to link these perspectives with neo-Meadian notions of
> > social ACTS [interchangeability of actual social positions].  These
> > reflections of linking up multiple perspectives lead to the developmental
> > question of how  socially situated microgenetic experiences get
> > "generalized" into "higher" levels of organization that organize
> experience
> > across situations [and organize the relation of the "lower" and "higher"
> > functions]?
> >
> > Glick's article "Werner's Relevance for Contemporary Developmental
> > Psychology"  points out that Werner thought developmental processes got
> > organized "at one of  three different levels: the sensorimotor, the
> > perceptual, or the symbolic." (p.562)  Metaphor organizes experience at
> the
> > 3rd symbolic level and at this level we can have metaphoric models of
> "mind"
> > [for example: conversation, text, computers, dance, orchestra, etc.]
> > However, this still leaves us with questioning  the RELATIONAL process of
> > linking language and metaphor to the other levels of organization at the
> > sensorimotor and perceptual levels.
> > Stern, Reddy, Werner, Glick, Gillespie & Martin, Mike and Natalia, and
> > others are exploring the possible dynamic fluidity of the capacity for
> > organizing and structuring the 3 levels of experience that may be more
> > reciprocal [and possibly simultaneous assemby] than a linear teleological
> > dynamic.  The question becomes, how central are the sensorimotor and
> > perceptual ways of "constructing" or "forming" experience once social
> > situations of development are  symbolic [and metaphorical]?  As Glick
> points
> > out, Werner believed these language and symbolic functions "undergo a
> > differentiation process from deeper sensorimotor roots." (p.562) However
> > these deeper roots are NOT TRANSCENDED but continue to organize
> experience.
> > The notion of "leading activity" implies an INVARIANT linear process
> where
> a
> > specific leading activity DOMINATES each stage of development.  An
> > alternative perspective emphasizes the fluidity of these "leading
> > activities" as continuing to remain central for development. For
> > example functions such as "affiliation" are not only dominant in one
> > specific stage of developmentand then recede into the background, but
> > ACTUALLY continue to ACTIVELY organize experience [depending on the
> societal
> > microgenetic situation of development].  Whether the previous "leading
> > activity" recedes or remains active is dependent, not on the stage of
> > development [age determined] but rather on the particular social
> situation
> > of development. Mike's point that particular school contexts correlate
> with
> > particular ages of students allows 2 alternative models of development.
> > Stage theory that is age "determined" or layered development that is
> > socially situated [schools CONSTRAIN affiliative activity which recedes
> into
> > the background]  If the 2nd alternative guided how we structured schools
> and
> > affiliation and interchangeability of social positions was VALUED,
> identity
> > and concept development would be altered.
> > My personal fascination, working in schools, is the idea of the
> possibility
> > of creating institutional structures which promote the
> "interchangeability
> > of social positions in social acts" and how to facilitate social spaces
> > which nurture this interchangeability. An example of this is the creation
> of
> > the 5th dimension METAPHORICAL SPACES where interchangeability of
> positions
> > is fluid and dynamic and leads to the development of "agentic capacity"
> > where ALL participants experience being recognized and experiencing
> OTHERS
> > RESPONDING to their recognition.  This affiliative activity is formative
> of
> > particular "identity" characteristics [communal self] and also "concept
> > development" formed within microgenetic moments of development. The
> reason
> I
> > appreciate  neo-Meadian accounts of development are
> > there privileging the centrality of ACTUAL INTERCHANGEABILITY of social
> > positions [which simultaneously organize and regulate sensorimotor,
> > perceptual, and symbolic experiences].  I also believe this "ideal" of
> > actual interchangeability is fundamentally affiliative and dialogical as
> the
> > participants openly share perspectives.  This also creates social
> > spaces where cognitive development [and reflective capacity] is nurtured
> and
> > "grown" [cultured]
> >
> > Larry
> >
> > On Wed, Aug 4, 2010 at 7:32 AM, Katerina Plakitsi
> <kplakits@gmail.com>wrote:
> >
> >> Larry, with "trans situated" do you mean that you accept "metaphor",
> which
> >> is been considered as a constructivist argument?
> >> Katerina Plakitsi
> >> Assistant Professor of Science Education
> >> Department of Early Childhood Education
> >> School of Education
> >> University of Ioannina
> >> 45110
> >> Greece
> >> tel.: +302651005771 office
> >> fax: +302651005842
> >> tel.: +6972898463 mobile
> >> e-mail: kplakits@cc.uoi.gr
> >> http://users.uoi.gr/kplakits
> >> http://users.uoi.gr/5conns
> >> http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr <http://erasmus-ip.uoi.gr/>
> >> http://www.edife.gr/school/5oschool.html
> >>
> >> --------------------------------------------------
> >> From: "Larry Purss" <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> >> Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 8:43 PM
> >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> >> Subject: Re: [xmca] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on
> >>
> >> Mindreading, Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>
> >> Hi Martin
> >>> This topic of "mind-reading" vs  "non-mind reading" models of young
> >>> infants
> >>> CAPACITY for attending to and ENGAGING with other "minds" [persons] is
> a
> >>> fascinating topic which has been discussed previously in CHAT
> >>> conversations
> >>> on this listserve.
> >>> I recently read V. Reddy's book which recommends a 2nd person societal
> >>> interactional microgenetic model of non-mind reading. I have sympathy
> for
> >>> this particular perspective. However, I would like to read more widely
> on
> >>> this particular topic.
> >>>
> >>> Do you or others on this listserve have any recommendations for further
> >>> articles which  engage with the pros and cons of the various models in
> a
> >>> spirit similar to the proposed intent of the special issue of the
> Review
> >>> of
> >>> Philosophy and Psychology?
> >>>
> >>> I'm curious about the various theories of young infants capacity for
> >>> engaging with others within sociogenesis, ontogenesis, and
> microgenesis.
> >>> However, I'm also interested in how the various  models of "infants
> >>> engaging
> >>> with others" become transformed in the transition to
> >>> TRANS-situational understandings  [the development of "higher" mental
> >>> functions.]
> >>>
> >>> Larry
> >>>
> >>> On Mon, Aug 2, 2010 at 12:57 PM, Martin Packer <packer@duq.edu> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> Begin forwarded message:
> >>>>> From: Victoria Southgate <v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk>
> >>>>> Date: August 2, 2010 4:22:07 AM GMT-05:00
> >>>>> To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu
> >>>>> Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Call For Papers: Special Issue on Mindreading,
> >>>> Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>>> Social Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Guest Editors:
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Daniel D Hutto, University of Hertfordshire
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Mitchell Herschbach, University of California, San Diego
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Victoria Southgate, University of London
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>           CALL FOR PAPERS
> >>>>>
> >>>>>           Deadline for submissions: 1 December 2010
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Human beings, even very young infants, exhibit remarkable capacities
> >>>>> for
> >>>> attending to, and engaging with, other minds. A prevalent account of
> > such
> >>>> abilities is that they involve "theory of mind" or "mindreading": the
> >>>> ability to represent mental states as mental states of specific kinds
> >>>> (i.e.,
> >>>> to have concepts of "belief," "desire," etc.) and the contents of such
> >>>> mental states. A number of philosophers and psychologists question the
> >>>> standard mindreading and wider representationalist framework for
> >>>> characterizing and explaining our everyday modes and methods of
> >>>> understanding other people. One possibility is that infants may be
> >>>> exhibiting sophisticated yet non-conceptual, and possibly
> >>>> non-representational, mind tracking abilities that do not equate to
> any
> >>>> sort
> >>>> of mindreading.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Proponents on both sides of this debate must adequately accommodate
> >>>> recent work in developmental psychology. Experiments involving a
> variety
> >>>> of
> >>>> nonverbal tasks - e.g., the "violation of expectation" paradigm and
> >>>> anticipatory looking tasks, as well as nonverbal tasks involving more
> >>>> active
> >>>> responses -suggest that young infants can understand others' goals,
> >>>> intentions, desires, knowledge/ignorance, and beliefs. Perhaps most
> >>>> prominent are studies suggesting infants as young as 13 months of age
> > are
> >>>> selectively responsive to the false beliefs of others, well before
> they
> >>>> are
> >>>> able to reliably pass standard verbal false belief tasks around 4
> years
> >>>> of
> >>>> age.
> >>>>> This special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology aims to
> >>>> create a dialogue between the mindreading and non-mindreading
> approaches
> >>>> to
> >>>> basic social cognition. Contributors are asked to clarify their
> >>>> theoretical
> >>>> commitments; explain how their accounts compare with rivals; and how
> > they
> >>>> propose to handle the emerging empirical data, particularly that from
> >>>> human
> >>>> developmental psychology. Themes and questions to be addressed include
> >>>> but
> >>>> are not limited to:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -       Infants as young as 13 months old display a systematic
> >>>> sensitivity to the beliefs of others. Does it follow that they must be
> >>>> operating with a concept of belief, or indeed, any concepts at all?
> >>>>> -       Normally developing children become able to attribute false
> >>>> beliefs to others between the ages of 3 and 5. Does it follow that
> they
> >>>> must
> >>>> be operating with a "theory of mind" or the equivalent?
> >>>>> -       What does mental attribution minimally involve? What exactly
> >>>> distinguishes mindreading from non-mindreading approaches to early
> > social
> >>>> cognition? Are there theoretical reasons to prefer one over the other?
> >>>>> -       What exact roles are mental representations thought to play
> in
> >>>> mindreading approaches? What kind of mental representations might be
> >>>> involved? Can a principled dividing line be drawn between
> >>>> representational
> >>>> and non-representational approaches?
> >>>>> -       How precisely should we understand the explicit/implicit
> >>>> distinction as invoked by certain theorists?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Invited contributors
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -       José Luis Bermúdez, Texas A&M University
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -       Pierre Jacob, Institut Jean Nicod
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -       Andrew Meltzoff, University of Washington
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Important dates
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -       Submission deadline: 1 December 2010
> >>>>>
> >>>>> -       Target publication date: July 2011
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> How to submit
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Prospective authors should register at:
> >>>> https://www.editorialmanager.com/ropp to obtain a login and select
> >>>> "Social
> >>>> Cognition: Mindreading and Alternatives" as an article type to submit
> a
> >>>> manuscript. Manuscripts should be no longer than 8,000 words.
> > Submissions
> >>>> should follow the author guidelines available on the journal's
> website:
> >>>> http://www.springer.com/13164  Any questions? Please email the guest
> >>>> editors: d.d.hutto@herts.ac.uk, mherschb@ucsd.edu,
> v.southgate@bbk.ac.uk
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> About the journal
> >>>>>
> >>>>> The Review of Philosophy and Psychology (ISSN: 1878-5158; eISSN:
> >>>> 1878-5166) is a peer-reviewed journal published quarterly by Springer
> > and
> >>>> focusing on philosophical and foundational issues in cognitive
> science.
> >>>> The
> >>>> aim of the journal is to provide a forum for discussion on topics of
> >>>> mutual
> >>>> interest to philosophers and psychologists and to foster
> >>>> interdisciplinary
> >>>> research at the crossroads of philosophy and the sciences of the mind,
> >>>> including the neural, behavioural and social sciences.
> >>>>>  The journal publishes theoretical works grounded in empirical
> > research
> >>>> as well as empirical articles on issues of philosophical relevance. It
> >>>> includes thematic issues featuring invited contributions from leading
> >>>> authors together with articles answering a call for paper.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Editorial board
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Editor-in-Chief: Dario Taraborelli, Surrey. Executive Editors:
> Roberto
> >>>> Casati, CNRS; Paul Egré, CNRS, Christophe Heintz, CEU.
> >>>>> Scientific advisors: Clark Barrett, UCLA; Cristina Bicchieri, Penn;
> > Ned
> >>>> Block, NYU; Paul Bloom, Yale; John Campbell, Berkeley; Richard
> Breheny,
> >>>> UCL;
> >>>> Susan Carey, Harvard; David Chalmers, ANU; Martin Davies, ANU;
> Vittorio
> >>>> Girotto, IUAV; Alvin Goldman, Rutgers; Daniel Hutto, Hertfordshire;
> Ray
> >>>> Jackendoff, Tufts; Marc Jeannerod, CNRS; Alan Leslie, Rutgers; Diego
> >>>> Marconi, Turin; Kevin Mulligan, Geneva; Alva Noë, Berkeley;
> Christopher
> >>>> Peacocke, Columbia; John Perry, Stanford; Daniel Povinelli,
> >>>> Louisiana-Lafayette; Jesse Prinz, CUNY; Zenon Pylyshyn, Rutgers; Brian
> >>>> Scholl, Yale; Natalie Sebanz, Nijmegen; Corrado Sinigaglia, Milan;
> Barry
> >>>> C.
> >>>> Smith, Birkbeck; Elizabeth Spelke, Harvard; Achille Varzi, Columbia;
> >>>> Timothy
> >>>> Williamson, Oxford; Deirdre Wilson, UCL
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Dr. Victoria Southgate
> >>>>> Wellcome Trust Research Career Development Fellow
> >>>>> Centre for Brain and Cognitive Development
> >>>>> Henry Wellcome Building
> >>>>> Birkbeck, University of London
> >>>>> Malet Street
> >>>>> London, WC1E 7HX.
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>> _______________________________________________
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>
> --
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> *Andy Blunden*
> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>
> Videos: http://vimeo.com/user3478333/videos
> Book: http://www.brill.nl/scss
>
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