Re: [xmca] Re: Mediation AND monism

[Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>]

I think I may have it! Do people realise that Ilyenkov puts 
'consciousness' and 'matter ' in inverted commas because we 
are talking about the *concept of consciousness* and the 
*concept of matter*, not consciousness and matter as such?

Does that help?

Andy

Andy Blunden wrote:
> Forgive me, even I'm getting tired. Let me have another go.
>
> About 400 years ago a project was initiated by Copernicus, Galileo and 
> Descartes. We continue that project. As Mike is fond of saying: "We 
> stand on the shoulders of giants."
>
> The first thing that had to be established by this project was the 
> categorical distinction between thought (a.k.a. Faith, Scripture, 
> Reason, Spirit, Soul, Consciousness) and matter (a.k.a. Nature, God). 
> Each of the writers mentioned did so in their own unique way.
>
> In the 400 years since, despite "branching" into a myriad of different 
> projects, the project (science) continues. The movement is characterized 
> by the question which was the central problem for one generation, giving 
> way to a new question for the next generation. But the former 
> problematic is not abolished and thrown away, but taken up into the new 
> problematic.
>
> People are rightly concerned with solving the problem of how to explain 
> consciousness, how to build a science of consciousness. But this does 
> not and cannot be done by ignoring the gains of the 17th century, 
> namely, that there is a categorical difference between consciousness and 
> something else, which is not consciousness, which lies behind that.
>
> Kant called that other Jenseits or "thing-in-itself" while the subject 
> was a "transcendental subject", both utterly lacking in content (well 
> almost).
>
> Kant was right, but this also did not form a starting point for science. 
> It was his way of laying the question to the side and moving on. That's 
> what Hegel did. But at the expense of taking everything, even Nature, as 
> spirit, i.e., thought forms. Marx chose not to be a philosopher, but the 
> question does not go away.
>
> I learnt my Marxism in the late 60s, I read "Materialism and 
> Empirio-Criticism" in the mid-70s and Ilyenkov in the early 80s, so I 
> admit, I have been taking this for granted. It never occurred to me that 
> people today are happy to equate consciousness and matter, or at least 
> say that the distinction is "relative." A new generation has arrived. I 
> am at a loss how to explain what the problem is with denying the 
> categorical difference between consciousness and matter. I can now see 
> why Lenin felt he had to write a whole book on it 100 years ago!
>
> But this issue was far, far from my mind when I wrote the Paper for 
> Discussion. I wrote this about 2 years ago. It was rejected by the first 
> journal I submitted it to and also by the second. But I appealed to the 
> editor in the second case and eventually with the necessary revisions, 
> it was agreed that the paper should be published. That took 2 years. And 
> in the meantime I have been offered a contract to write it up in 100,000 
> words. But this book is nothing to do with the issues discussed in the 
> recent debate.
>
> Andy
> (in the confidence that you the reader exists outside of my thoughts)
>
>
>
> Andy Blunden wrote:
> > Your first point is true David. I thought about it myself before 
> > writing the offending statement. Really Hegel had the only solution: 
> > "Being is", but even then, he had the whole of the Phenomenology to 
> > mediate the first statement of the Logic. I was just trying to explain.
> >
> > The rest of your post I can't understand David, so I will again simply 
> > sign off with Ilyenkov's words:
> >
> > "'Consciousness' ... is the most general concept which can only be 
> > defined by clearly contrasting it with the most general concept of 
> > 'matter', moreover as something secondary, produced and derived. 
> > Dialectics consists in not being able to define matter as such; it can 
> > only be defined through its opposite, and only if one of the opposites 
> > is fixed as primary, and the other arises from it."
> >
> > Andy
> >
> > David Kellogg wrote:
> > > a) Andy says "consciousness is what is given to us". How is the "us" 
> > > given to us? For consciousness to be given to "us", don't we need an 
> > > "us" first? And isn't this "us" that is given to us actually emergent 
> > > through phylogenetic and then sociogenetic and then finally 
> > > ontogenetic change? (I don't think the word "emergent" is any more 
> > > vacuous than the word "evolved", and in many ways it is actually more 
> > > descriptive, particularly since "evolution" has acquired a meaning 
> > > which is frequently opposed to revolutionary change.)
> > >  
> > > b) In my profession, a lot of abstract stuff comes to us in exactly 
> > > the "reified" form that Andy talks about in his paper for discussion 
> > > where he says that the worker experiences labor as making a "living" 
> > > and the capitalist as "making profit" but objectively it is reified 
> > > as yarn. For example, I have on my desk a text which purports to 
> > > teach English words like "can" and "your" through the use of 
> > > pictures! I just sat through a two hour lunch with other members of 
> > > the department where we discussed the furniture of the new "English 
> > > Zone" in the department and the bookcases and the website and so on 
> > > but never once touched on what is now known rather ridiculously as 
> > > "content" (it appears that for the "Conversation Clinic" there will 
> > > be no content at all, only furniture). Isn't this reification as much 
> > > a proof of monism as the historical, evolutionary nature of 
> > > consciousness?  David Kellogg
> > > Seoul National University of Education
> > >
> > > --- On Tue, 9/29/09, Bruce Robinson <bruce@brucerob.eu> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > From: Bruce Robinson <bruce@brucerob.eu>
> > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Mediation AND monism
> > > To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" 
> > > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > Date: Tuesday, September 29, 2009, 3:24 PM
> > >
> > >
> > > > Tell me: If I say, "I don't know anything really for sure about the 
> > > > world, maybe you're right about phlogiston and maybe the world is 
> > > > governed by the will of Allah, but what I do know for sure is that 
> > > > there is something there outside of my consciousness," would you 
> > > > disagree? Would you say "Well, that's a matter of opinion" or 
> > > > "That's something which needs to be tested by the methods of 
> > > > science"? or is it just simply true beyond any dispute or scientific 
> > > > theory? That's what is meant by being a categorical truth.
> > > >
> > > > Andy
> > >
> > > Would anyone but a philosopher say that? For most 'ordinary people' 
> > > it would be a matter of common sense borne out of their experience. 
> > > Does one have to start from the individual seeking to establish a 
> > > firm footing in the world - an abstraction supreme like the utility 
> > > maximiser of neo-classical economics?
> > >
> > > I'm not sure anything is beyond dispute - you may conclude that the 
> > > disputer is irrational but I'm sure there is nothing universally 
> > > accepted except, if I remember rightly, in Jane Austen and the 
> > > American Declaration of Independence.
> > >
> > > Bruce
> > >
> > > > Bruce Robinson wrote:
> > > > > Oh. Andy, you agree with me. Now I'm totally confused. ;) Have I 
> > > > > completely missed the point of what you're saying?
> > > > >
> > > > > Bruce
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 1:20 PM
> > > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Mediation AND monism
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > > All agreed, Bruce.
> > > > > > andy
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote:
> > > > > > > > Mediation and Monism: you suggest not either but both. Yes.
> > > > > > > > How could one disagree. Really, as soon as dualism is rejected, 
> > > > > > > > one has a kind of monism. But unless one finds a way to *deal 
> > > > > > > > with the distinction* which generated the original dualism, not 
> > > > > > > > just deny it, then dualism pops up again at a deeper level. 
> > > > > > > > That's why I insist.
> > > > > > > I accept that - there is something that needs to be explained. 
> > > > > > > But I suppose that underlying what I wrote is that the 
> > > > > > > distinction cannot be resolved by shuffling the philosophical 
> > > > > > > categories or looking for the correct definition of consciousness 
> > > > > > > but rather that the question can only be resolved by a scientific 
> > > > > > > explanation of consciousness as a - dare I use the word? - 
> > > > > > > material phenomenon. While I do not hold that the development of 
> > > > > > > science will abolish philosophy, I think this is one area where 
> > > > > > > philosophy has tried to speculatively fill in for gaps in our 
> > > > > > > scientific knowledge. That's why I'm not happy with your view 
> > > > > > > that: "My position is that consciousness is a *category* not a 
> > > > > > > thing."
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > (To avoid one possible misunderstanding: I am not saying 
> > > > > > > scientific knowledge is independent of methodological, 
> > > > > > > philosophical or social pre-conceptions.)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Emergence: Emergence has an intuitive attraction, as a counter 
> > > > > > > > to the idea of causation, but I have discovered that in dialogue 
> > > > > > > > with neuro-types "emergence" acts a little like God: it is the 
> > > > > > > > idea you stuff into that gap you can't explain. "Oh! I don't 
> > > > > > > > know how Cs arises from a material system; it is emergence. I 
> > > > > > > > don't have to explain it."
> > > > > > > Yes, maybe emergence is a fashionable explanation precisely 
> > > > > > > because it avoids other obvious pitfalls of dualism and 
> > > > > > > reductionist materialism. I am not sufficiently up to speed on 
> > > > > > > the current state of neuro-science but there certainly are 
> > > > > > > attempts to provide a more specific explanation of consciousness 
> > > > > > > as emergent from 'brain matter', Gerald Edelman's for example.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Bruce
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Meaning of "Matter" and "material": more than 2 meanings. 
> > > > > > > > Several. Add "something else that I don't know about, outside my 
> > > > > > > > consciousness". Add the Nature (outside of any labour process) 
> > > > > > > > as opposed to "material life" in the sense of industry and 
> > > > > > > > commerce. I sure many many definitions of matter have been used 
> > > > > > > > in this discussion. The one I have tried to convey has mostly 
> > > > > > > > still not been accepted.
> > > > > > > > C'est la vie.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote:
> > > > > > > > > See comments below.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > What to do then? The first answer was Monism. e.g. "everything 
> > > > > > > > > > is matter, even consciousness." Or "consciousness is a 
> > > > > > > > > > property of matter" etc. This does not sidestep the problem 
> > > > > > > > > > but denies it. As I repeatedly said to Martin, if everything 
> > > > > > > > > > is matter, everything you say about matter is a motherhood 
> > > > > > > > > > statement. There is a distinction.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > What Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Vygotsky, Leontyev and Peirce all 
> > > > > > > > > > did, each in their own inimitable fashion, was to move away 
> > > > > > > > > > from the binary to a three-part ontology. In general they have 
> > > > > > > > > > "activity" as the mediating element. For Hegel it is 
> > > > > > > > > > "Particular." But the three "moments" can never ever exist 
> > > > > > > > > > separately, they are always moments of one and the same 
> > > > > > > > > > entity. So Cs is always correlated in some way(s) with matter 
> > > > > > > > > > *in and through activity*. There is no Cs without activity.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > So our writers rarely talk about this hateful dichotomy, but 
> > > > > > > > > > that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. It cannot be abolished by 
> > > > > > > > > > a monism which simply denies it. Mediation not Monism.
> > > > > > > > > Why not both? Are they necessarily counterposed? Or aren't they 
> > > > > > > > > both fundamental to a [note the article] dialectical materialism?
> > > > > > > > > Andy, you may not think the monist element useful; others, 
> > > > > > > > > including me, might find it necessary to a fundamentally 
> > > > > > > > > materialist approach - either way the problem with motherhood 
> > > > > > > > > statements isn't that they're not true but that nobody could 
> > > > > > > > > disagree with them. In fact, in the wider world there are 
> > > > > > > > > plenty of people who do but that's not the issue here.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Consciousness is not just correlated with matter through 
> > > > > > > > > activity but also through the particular organisation of matter 
> > > > > > > > > that enables consciousness to emerge. One of the reasons the 
> > > > > > > > > question has been posed in dichotomous terms that aren't useful 
> > > > > > > > > is that up to now (I nearly wrote 'until now' but we're not 
> > > > > > > > > there yet) there has not been an adequate scientific 
> > > > > > > > > explanation of consciousness which has allowed all sorts of 
> > > > > > > > > both reductionist materialism and idealist mysticism (not quite 
> > > > > > > > > the word I'm after - nor am I including Andy in that) to 
> > > > > > > > > flourish. I started but did not finish writing a post as 
> > > > > > > > > follows a couple of days ago:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > <<Isn't the idea of consciousness as an emergent property of 
> > > > > > > > > matter the key to
> > > > > > > > > understanding the relationship between the two? Consciousness 
> > > > > > > > > is then the
> > > > > > > > > result of a particular form of organisation of a particular 
> > > > > > > > > form of matter
> > > > > > > > > (brain cells) and cannot exist without it but has properties 
> > > > > > > > > that mean it is
> > > > > > > > > not simply reducible to a particular configuration of physical 
> > > > > > > > > matter.
> > > > > > > > > Exactly how the 'upward causation' works is not yet known but as I
> > > > > > > > > understand it this view is both compatible with both the 
> > > > > > > > > current state of
> > > > > > > > > the science and with a non-reductionist materialist philosophy .
> > > > > > > > > This is not to say that 'consciousness is given' in the sense 
> > > > > > > > > of being innate
> > > > > > > > > rather that the matter develops both through biological 
> > > > > > > > > processes and in
> > > > > > > > > a form affected by interaction with the environment - for 
> > > > > > > > > humans, specifically social.>>
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > The idea of emergence implies a stratified conception of both 
> > > > > > > > > matter and of human beings and thus is not reductionist. Rather 
> > > > > > > > > the point is that if we are talking about a materialist 
> > > > > > > > > ontology one has to provide an explanation of how higher order 
> > > > > > > > > forms (both historically and in terms of complexity) such as 
> > > > > > > > > consciousness are possible at all on the basis of lower order 
> > > > > > > > > forms. Otherwise they are left hanging. I don't have a problem 
> > > > > > > > > with the idea of a 'substratum' if understood as a level that 
> > > > > > > > > we need to understand the properties of consciousness rather 
> > > > > > > > > than something separate. A multi-level ontology (with more than 
> > > > > > > > > the three levels Andy refers to but including them) necessarily 
> > > > > > > > > implies mediation but also includes the 'monist' moment. Matter 
> > > > > > > > > as abstraction from its forms - is, I think, necessary even if 
> > > > > > > > > one is asking such a 'higher order', 'social' question as the 
> > > > > > > > > nature of the ideal. Perhaps we can all agree that this is 
> > > > > > > > > taken for granted and a
> > >  motherhood statement - if so, good but I think it's still necessary 
> > > to state it.
> > > > > > > > > Finally a few points I intended to make earlier:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > (1) I think people have been using the term material in two 
> > > > > > > > > different senses - one = reducible to matter; two = having a 
> > > > > > > > > material force or impact on the world - which maybe has 
> > > > > > > > > confused things;
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > (2) To say consciousness is 'all we have' to know the workl 
> > > > > > > > > with is irrelevant to conceptualising the relationship between 
> > > > > > > > > matter and consciousness. It is an epistemological statement 
> > > > > > > > > rather than an ontological one. If we were to discuss whether 
> > > > > > > > > or how a true ontology was possible or sustainable given 
> > > > > > > > > consciousness is 'all we have', that would be a different 
> > > > > > > > > discussion to which there are both philosophical and above all 
> > > > > > > > > practical (cf Theses on Feuerbach) answers.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Bruce R
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Does that resolve the issues?
> > > > > > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Vera Steiner wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > Hi,
> > > > > > > > > > > I always wondered why "inside" in its strictest 
> > > > > > > > > > > interpretation, that of the brain/mind that is not accessible 
> > > > > > > > > > > to unmediated eye sight should be such a pervasive metaphor. 
> > > > > > > > > > > Now, the "inner"  is becoming more accessible with CAT scans, 
> > > > > > > > > > > X-ray, imaging, etc, should it still be called "inside?" 
> > > > > > > > > > > Theories are not immune to technological change, and this 
> > > > > > > > > > > which is so loaded an issue, we are stuck in an old 
> > > > > > > > > > > dichotomy. Why is stone the best example for matter? Why not 
> > > > > > > > > > > blood that also changes with environmental, physiological and 
> > > > > > > > > > > pathological variables?  It changes as does the brain/mind 
> > > > > > > > > > > through action, through aging, through education, through the 
> > > > > > > > > > > increasing, sophisticated understanding of meanings. All of 
> > > > > > > > > > > these changes take place with people, or by and through their 
> > > > > > > > > > > uses of signs and symbols, which are the consequences of 
> > > > > > > > > > > their prior, collective actions? Is material only that which 
> > > > > > > > > > > we can touch, but not what we create, including our minds 
> > > > > > > > > > > which we create
> > >  in.interaction with others?
> > > > > > > > > > > The categorical distinction  between Cs and matter baffles 
> > > > > > > > > > > me,  The discussion is still governed, I believe on both 
> > > > > > > > > > > sides, by the old difference between in here, that voice in 
> > > > > > > > > > > my head, or those images, which are no longer inaccessible, 
> > > > > > > > > > > no longer "inner" in the old sense of the word when 
> > > > > > > > > > > approached with  material tools and the grass outside. But, 
> > > > > > > > > > > it seems  we cannot help but be snared by its pervasive, 
> > > > > > > > > > > metaphoric power..
> > > > > > > > > > > Vera
> > > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Martin Packer" 
> > > > > > > > > > > <packer@duq.edu>
> > > > > > > > > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > > > > > > Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 6:40 AM
> > > > > > > > > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness"only a part of the material 
> > > > > > > > > > > quality of the man-sign"
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Andy,
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > You're misrepresenting what I wrote, and why I wrote it. I 
> > > > > > > > > > > > am indeed arguing that all representational systems are 
> > > > > > > > > > > > material. Yet I find myself dealing constantly with 
> > > > > > > > > > > > colleagues who believe that psychology must study 
> > > > > > > > > > > > non-material representational systems. That to understand 
> > > > > > > > > > > > children's development, for example, requires studying their 
> > > > > > > > > > > > 'internal,' 'mental' representations. I was citing Donald's 
> > > > > > > > > > > > work as an example that does a good job of explaining human 
> > > > > > > > > > > > cognitive development (historical rather than ontogenetic, 
> > > > > > > > > > > > but that's not an important difference in this context) with 
> > > > > > > > > > > > reference only to representational systems that are 
> > > > > > > > > > > > material. Plus brain functioning, construed in non- 
> > > > > > > > > > > > representational ways. No tautology here, and no problem.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Martin
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > On Sep 26, 2009, at 7:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > being all "material"; I pointed out that Martin had already 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > said that *everything*, even consciousness, was material so 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > the statement that these representational systems were 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > material was a "motherhood statement", i.e., a tautology.
> > > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > > So I responded "show me a representational system which is 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > *not* material" which is a problem for Martin because he 
> > > > > > > > > > > > > says that everything is material.
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> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > > > > > > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
> > > > > > > > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> > > > > > > > > >
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> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > > > > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
> > > > > > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> > > > > > > >
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> > > > > >
> > > > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
> > > > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> > > > > >
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> > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
> > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
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--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
Ilyenkov $20 ea

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