Re: [xmca] Re: Mediation AND monism

[Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net>]

Forgive me, even I'm getting tired. Let me have another go.

About 400 years ago a project was initiated by Copernicus, 
Galileo and Descartes. We continue that project. As Mike is 
fond of saying: "We stand on the shoulders of giants."

The first thing that had to be established by this project 
was the categorical distinction between thought (a.k.a. 
Faith, Scripture, Reason, Spirit, Soul, Consciousness) and 
matter (a.k.a. Nature, God). Each of the writers mentioned 
did so in their own unique way.

In the 400 years since, despite "branching" into a myriad of 
different projects, the project (science) continues. The 
movement is characterized by the question which was the 
central problem for one generation, giving way to a new 
question for the next generation. But the former problematic 
is not abolished and thrown away, but taken up into the new 
problematic.

People are rightly concerned with solving the problem of how 
to explain consciousness, how to build a science of 
consciousness. But this does not and cannot be done by 
ignoring the gains of the 17th century, namely, that there 
is a categorical difference between consciousness and 
something else, which is not consciousness, which lies 
behind that.

Kant called that other Jenseits or "thing-in-itself" while 
the subject was a "transcendental subject", both utterly 
lacking in content (well almost).

Kant was right, but this also did not form a starting point 
for science. It was his way of laying the question to the 
side and moving on. That's what Hegel did. But at the 
expense of taking everything, even Nature, as spirit, i.e., 
thought forms. Marx chose not to be a philosopher, but the 
question does not go away.

I learnt my Marxism in the late 60s, I read "Materialism and 
Empirio-Criticism" in the mid-70s and Ilyenkov in the early 
80s, so I admit, I have been taking this for granted. It 
never occurred to me that people today are happy to equate 
consciousness and matter, or at least say that the 
distinction is "relative." A new generation has arrived. I 
am at a loss how to explain what the problem is with denying 
the categorical difference between consciousness and matter. 
I can now see why Lenin felt he had to write a whole book on 
it 100 years ago!

But this issue was far, far from my mind when I wrote the 
Paper for Discussion. I wrote this about 2 years ago. It was 
rejected by the first journal I submitted it to and also by 
the second. But I appealed to the editor in the second case 
and eventually with the necessary revisions, it was agreed 
that the paper should be published. That took 2 years. And 
in the meantime I have been offered a contract to write it 
up in 100,000 words. But this book is nothing to do with the 
issues discussed in the recent debate.

Andy
(in the confidence that you the reader exists outside of my 
thoughts)



Andy Blunden wrote:
> Your first point is true David. I thought about it myself before writing 
> the offending statement. Really Hegel had the only solution: "Being is", 
> but even then, he had the whole of the Phenomenology to mediate the 
> first statement of the Logic. I was just trying to explain.
>
> The rest of your post I can't understand David, so I will again simply 
> sign off with Ilyenkov's words:
>
> "'Consciousness' ... is the most general concept which can only be 
> defined by clearly contrasting it with the most general concept of 
> 'matter', moreover as something secondary, produced and derived. 
> Dialectics consists in not being able to define matter as such; it can 
> only be defined through its opposite, and only if one of the opposites 
> is fixed as primary, and the other arises from it."
>
> Andy
>
> David Kellogg wrote:
> > a) Andy says "consciousness is what is given to us". How is the "us" 
> > given to us? For consciousness to be given to "us", don't we need an 
> > "us" first? And isn't this "us" that is given to us actually emergent 
> > through phylogenetic and then sociogenetic and then finally 
> > ontogenetic change? (I don't think the word "emergent" is any more 
> > vacuous than the word "evolved", and in many ways it is actually more 
> > descriptive, particularly since "evolution" has acquired a meaning 
> > which is frequently opposed to revolutionary change.)
> >  
> > b) In my profession, a lot of abstract stuff comes to us in exactly 
> > the "reified" form that Andy talks about in his paper for discussion 
> > where he says that the worker experiences labor as making a "living" 
> > and the capitalist as "making profit" but objectively it is reified as 
> > yarn. For example, I have on my desk a text which purports to teach 
> > English words like "can" and "your" through the use of pictures! I 
> > just sat through a two hour lunch with other members of the department 
> > where we discussed the furniture of the new "English Zone" in the 
> > department and the bookcases and the website and so on but never once 
> > touched on what is now known rather ridiculously as "content" (it 
> > appears that for the "Conversation Clinic" there will be no content at 
> > all, only furniture). Isn't this reification as much a proof of monism 
> > as the historical, evolutionary nature of consciousness?  
> > David Kellogg
> > Seoul National University of Education
> >
> > --- On Tue, 9/29/09, Bruce Robinson <bruce@brucerob.eu> wrote:
> >
> >
> > From: Bruce Robinson <bruce@brucerob.eu>
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Mediation AND monism
> > To: ablunden@mira.net, "eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity" 
> > <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > Date: Tuesday, September 29, 2009, 3:24 PM
> >
> >
> > > Tell me: If I say, "I don't know anything really for sure about the 
> > > world, maybe you're right about phlogiston and maybe the world is 
> > > governed by the will of Allah, but what I do know for sure is that 
> > > there is something there outside of my consciousness," would you 
> > > disagree? Would you say "Well, that's a matter of opinion" or "That's 
> > > something which needs to be tested by the methods of science"? or is 
> > > it just simply true beyond any dispute or scientific theory? That's 
> > > what is meant by being a categorical truth.
> > >
> > > Andy
> >
> > Would anyone but a philosopher say that? For most 'ordinary people' it 
> > would be a matter of common sense borne out of their experience. Does 
> > one have to start from the individual seeking to establish a firm 
> > footing in the world - an abstraction supreme like the utility 
> > maximiser of neo-classical economics?
> >
> > I'm not sure anything is beyond dispute - you may conclude that the 
> > disputer is irrational but I'm sure there is nothing universally 
> > accepted except, if I remember rightly, in Jane Austen and the 
> > American Declaration of Independence.
> >
> > Bruce
> >
> > > Bruce Robinson wrote:
> > > > Oh. Andy, you agree with me. Now I'm totally confused. ;) Have I 
> > > > completely missed the point of what you're saying?
> > > >
> > > > Bruce
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Andy Blunden" <ablunden@mira.net>
> > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > Sent: Monday, September 28, 2009 1:20 PM
> > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: Mediation AND monism
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > All agreed, Bruce.
> > > > > andy
> > > > >
> > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote:
> > > > > > > Mediation and Monism: you suggest not either but both. Yes.
> > > > > > > How could one disagree. Really, as soon as dualism is rejected, 
> > > > > > > one has a kind of monism. But unless one finds a way to *deal 
> > > > > > > with the distinction* which generated the original dualism, not 
> > > > > > > just deny it, then dualism pops up again at a deeper level. 
> > > > > > > That's why I insist.
> > > > > > I accept that - there is something that needs to be explained. But 
> > > > > > I suppose that underlying what I wrote is that the distinction 
> > > > > > cannot be resolved by shuffling the philosophical categories or 
> > > > > > looking for the correct definition of consciousness but rather 
> > > > > > that the question can only be resolved by a scientific explanation 
> > > > > > of consciousness as a - dare I use the word? - material 
> > > > > > phenomenon. While I do not hold that the development of science 
> > > > > > will abolish philosophy, I think this is one area where philosophy 
> > > > > > has tried to speculatively fill in for gaps in our scientific 
> > > > > > knowledge. That's why I'm not happy with your view that: "My 
> > > > > > position is that consciousness is a *category* not a thing."
> > > > > >
> > > > > > (To avoid one possible misunderstanding: I am not saying 
> > > > > > scientific knowledge is independent of methodological, 
> > > > > > philosophical or social pre-conceptions.)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Emergence: Emergence has an intuitive attraction, as a counter to 
> > > > > > > the idea of causation, but I have discovered that in dialogue 
> > > > > > > with neuro-types "emergence" acts a little like God: it is the 
> > > > > > > idea you stuff into that gap you can't explain. "Oh! I don't know 
> > > > > > > how Cs arises from a material system; it is emergence. I don't 
> > > > > > > have to explain it."
> > > > > > Yes, maybe emergence is a fashionable explanation precisely 
> > > > > > because it avoids other obvious pitfalls of dualism and 
> > > > > > reductionist materialism. I am not sufficiently up to speed on the 
> > > > > > current state of neuro-science but there certainly are attempts to 
> > > > > > provide a more specific explanation of consciousness as emergent 
> > > > > > from 'brain matter', Gerald Edelman's for example.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Bruce
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Meaning of "Matter" and "material": more than 2 meanings. 
> > > > > > > Several. Add "something else that I don't know about, outside my 
> > > > > > > consciousness". Add the Nature (outside of any labour process) as 
> > > > > > > opposed to "material life" in the sense of industry and commerce. 
> > > > > > > I sure many many definitions of matter have been used in this 
> > > > > > > discussion. The one I have tried to convey has mostly still not 
> > > > > > > been accepted.
> > > > > > > C'est la vie.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Bruce Robinson wrote:
> > > > > > > > See comments below.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > What to do then? The first answer was Monism. e.g. "everything 
> > > > > > > > > is matter, even consciousness." Or "consciousness is a property 
> > > > > > > > > of matter" etc. This does not sidestep the problem but denies 
> > > > > > > > > it. As I repeatedly said to Martin, if everything is matter, 
> > > > > > > > > everything you say about matter is a motherhood statement. 
> > > > > > > > > There is a distinction.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > What Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Vygotsky, Leontyev and Peirce all 
> > > > > > > > > did, each in their own inimitable fashion, was to move away 
> > > > > > > > > from the binary to a three-part ontology. In general they have 
> > > > > > > > > "activity" as the mediating element. For Hegel it is 
> > > > > > > > > "Particular." But the three "moments" can never ever exist 
> > > > > > > > > separately, they are always moments of one and the same entity. 
> > > > > > > > > So Cs is always correlated in some way(s) with matter *in and 
> > > > > > > > > through activity*. There is no Cs without activity.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > So our writers rarely talk about this hateful dichotomy, but 
> > > > > > > > > that doesn't mean it doesn't exist. It cannot be abolished by a 
> > > > > > > > > monism which simply denies it. Mediation not Monism.
> > > > > > > > Why not both? Are they necessarily counterposed? Or aren't they 
> > > > > > > > both fundamental to a [note the article] dialectical materialism?
> > > > > > > > Andy, you may not think the monist element useful; others, 
> > > > > > > > including me, might find it necessary to a fundamentally 
> > > > > > > > materialist approach - either way the problem with motherhood 
> > > > > > > > statements isn't that they're not true but that nobody could 
> > > > > > > > disagree with them. In fact, in the wider world there are plenty 
> > > > > > > > of people who do but that's not the issue here.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Consciousness is not just correlated with matter through 
> > > > > > > > activity but also through the particular organisation of matter 
> > > > > > > > that enables consciousness to emerge. One of the reasons the 
> > > > > > > > question has been posed in dichotomous terms that aren't useful 
> > > > > > > > is that up to now (I nearly wrote 'until now' but we're not 
> > > > > > > > there yet) there has not been an adequate scientific explanation 
> > > > > > > > of consciousness which has allowed all sorts of both 
> > > > > > > > reductionist materialism and idealist mysticism (not quite the 
> > > > > > > > word I'm after - nor am I including Andy in that) to flourish. I 
> > > > > > > > started but did not finish writing a post as follows a couple of 
> > > > > > > > days ago:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > <<Isn't the idea of consciousness as an emergent property of 
> > > > > > > > matter the key to
> > > > > > > > understanding the relationship between the two? Consciousness is 
> > > > > > > > then the
> > > > > > > > result of a particular form of organisation of a particular form 
> > > > > > > > of matter
> > > > > > > > (brain cells) and cannot exist without it but has properties 
> > > > > > > > that mean it is
> > > > > > > > not simply reducible to a particular configuration of physical 
> > > > > > > > matter.
> > > > > > > > Exactly how the 'upward causation' works is not yet known but as I
> > > > > > > > understand it this view is both compatible with both the current 
> > > > > > > > state of
> > > > > > > > the science and with a non-reductionist materialist philosophy .
> > > > > > > > This is not to say that 'consciousness is given' in the sense of 
> > > > > > > > being innate
> > > > > > > > rather that the matter develops both through biological 
> > > > > > > > processes and in
> > > > > > > > a form affected by interaction with the environment - for 
> > > > > > > > humans, specifically social.>>
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > The idea of emergence implies a stratified conception of both 
> > > > > > > > matter and of human beings and thus is not reductionist. Rather 
> > > > > > > > the point is that if we are talking about a materialist ontology 
> > > > > > > > one has to provide an explanation of how higher order forms 
> > > > > > > > (both historically and in terms of complexity) such as 
> > > > > > > > consciousness are possible at all on the basis of lower order 
> > > > > > > > forms. Otherwise they are left hanging. I don't have a problem 
> > > > > > > > with the idea of a 'substratum' if understood as a level that we 
> > > > > > > > need to understand the properties of consciousness rather than 
> > > > > > > > something separate. A multi-level ontology (with more than the 
> > > > > > > > three levels Andy refers to but including them) necessarily 
> > > > > > > > implies mediation but also includes the 'monist' moment. Matter 
> > > > > > > > as abstraction from its forms - is, I think, necessary even if 
> > > > > > > > one is asking such a 'higher order', 'social' question as the 
> > > > > > > > nature of the ideal. Perhaps we can all agree that this is taken 
> > > > > > > > for granted and a
> >  motherhood statement - if so, good but I think it's still necessary 
> > to state it.
> > > > > > > > Finally a few points I intended to make earlier:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > (1) I think people have been using the term material in two 
> > > > > > > > different senses - one = reducible to matter; two = having a 
> > > > > > > > material force or impact on the world - which maybe has confused 
> > > > > > > > things;
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > (2) To say consciousness is 'all we have' to know the workl with 
> > > > > > > > is irrelevant to conceptualising the relationship between matter 
> > > > > > > > and consciousness. It is an epistemological statement rather 
> > > > > > > > than an ontological one. If we were to discuss whether or how a 
> > > > > > > > true ontology was possible or sustainable given consciousness is 
> > > > > > > > 'all we have', that would be a different discussion to which 
> > > > > > > > there are both philosophical and above all practical (cf Theses 
> > > > > > > > on Feuerbach) answers.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Bruce R
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Does that resolve the issues?
> > > > > > > > > Andy
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Vera Steiner wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > Hi,
> > > > > > > > > > I always wondered why "inside" in its strictest 
> > > > > > > > > > interpretation, that of the brain/mind that is not accessible 
> > > > > > > > > > to unmediated eye sight should be such a pervasive metaphor. 
> > > > > > > > > > Now, the "inner"  is becoming more accessible with CAT scans, 
> > > > > > > > > > X-ray, imaging, etc, should it still be called "inside?" 
> > > > > > > > > > Theories are not immune to technological change, and this 
> > > > > > > > > > which is so loaded an issue, we are stuck in an old dichotomy. 
> > > > > > > > > > Why is stone the best example for matter? Why not blood that 
> > > > > > > > > > also changes with environmental, physiological and 
> > > > > > > > > > pathological variables?  It changes as does the brain/mind 
> > > > > > > > > > through action, through aging, through education, through the 
> > > > > > > > > > increasing, sophisticated understanding of meanings. All of 
> > > > > > > > > > these changes take place with people, or by and through their 
> > > > > > > > > > uses of signs and symbols, which are the consequences of their 
> > > > > > > > > > prior, collective actions? Is material only that which we can 
> > > > > > > > > > touch, but not what we create, including our minds which we 
> > > > > > > > > > create
> >  in.interaction with others?
> > > > > > > > > > The categorical distinction  between Cs and matter baffles 
> > > > > > > > > > me,  The discussion is still governed, I believe on both 
> > > > > > > > > > sides, by the old difference between in here, that voice in my 
> > > > > > > > > > head, or those images, which are no longer inaccessible, no 
> > > > > > > > > > longer "inner" in the old sense of the word when approached 
> > > > > > > > > > with  material tools and the grass outside. But, it seems  we 
> > > > > > > > > > cannot help but be snared by its pervasive, metaphoric power..
> > > > > > > > > > Vera
> > > > > > > > > > ----- Original Message ----- From: "Martin Packer" 
> > > > > > > > > > <packer@duq.edu>
> > > > > > > > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> > > > > > > > > > Sent: Saturday, September 26, 2009 6:40 AM
> > > > > > > > > > Subject: Re: [xmca] Consciousness"only a part of the material 
> > > > > > > > > > quality of the man-sign"
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Andy,
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > You're misrepresenting what I wrote, and why I wrote it. I am 
> > > > > > > > > > > indeed arguing that all representational systems are 
> > > > > > > > > > > material. Yet I find myself dealing constantly with 
> > > > > > > > > > > colleagues who believe that psychology must study 
> > > > > > > > > > > non-material representational systems. That to understand 
> > > > > > > > > > > children's development, for example, requires studying their 
> > > > > > > > > > > 'internal,' 'mental' representations. I was citing Donald's 
> > > > > > > > > > > work as an example that does a good job of explaining human 
> > > > > > > > > > > cognitive development (historical rather than ontogenetic, 
> > > > > > > > > > > but that's not an important difference in this context) with 
> > > > > > > > > > > reference only to representational systems that are material. 
> > > > > > > > > > > Plus brain functioning, construed in non- representational 
> > > > > > > > > > > ways. No tautology here, and no problem.
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > Martin
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > On Sep 26, 2009, at 7:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote:
> > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > Martin referred to a series of "representational systems" 
> > > > > > > > > > > > being all "material"; I pointed out that Martin had already 
> > > > > > > > > > > > said that *everything*, even consciousness, was material so 
> > > > > > > > > > > > the statement that these representational systems were 
> > > > > > > > > > > > material was a "motherhood statement", i.e., a tautology.
> > > > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > > > So I responded "show me a representational system which is 
> > > > > > > > > > > > *not* material" which is a problem for Martin because he 
> > > > > > > > > > > > says that everything is material.
> > > > > > > > > > > _______________________________________________
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> > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > > > > > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
> > > > > > > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> > > > > > > > >
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> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > > > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
> > > > > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
> > > > > > >
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> > > > >
> > > > > Andy Blunden http://www.erythrospress.com/
> > > > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
> > > > > Ilyenkov $20 ea
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> > > Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, Ilyenkov 
> > > $20 ea
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Classics in Activity Theory: Hegel, Leontyev, Meshcheryakov, 
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