RE: [xmca] Wells article

Thanks for that Sasha.
http://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/lektorsky/essay_77.htm is
an essay by Lektrosky on his favourite topic, "Subject and Object". What
are the Russian words he is using? Object in this sense is what I mainly
mean by "object" but often I get the sense that "object-oriented activity"
is understood as synonymous with "purposeful activity". Is this the same
word in Russian?

And finally I don't agree that the problem of clarifying the meaning of
"subject" is an already-accomplished task. Marx himself had hardly anything
to say on this topic. In any case I simply cannot accept this as a closed
question, any more than defining dialectics as a "synonym of objective
truth" helps anything.
:)
Andy
At 08:00 AM 6/10/2007 +0400, you wrote:
>Andy, I can entirely corroborate your statement in this post. Especially
>this:
>
> >almost all the difficulties you and I have had communicating in >this
>discussion, I think, derive from differences in word meaning. >I am a bit
>stubborn that way, I admit. I refuse to give up the >meaning of words when
>those meanings are so profound and contain so >much of science from the past
>which is lost in everyday language. >Apologies. All I can do is enjoin you
>to acquaint yourself with the >Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky meaning of these words as
>I try to follow what >they mean in the Kant-common sense-modern philosophy
>usage. My >observation is that within CHAT these words are used with
> >inconsistent meanings by different people.
>
>I am stubborn too, discussing such "word usage". The thing is that behind
>the different manner of word usage hides entirely different
>cultural-theoretic traditions. The main divide or watershed lies between the
>tradition of classical rationalism and dialectic of (Descart, Spinoza,
>Hegel, Marx and Il'encov) from one side and the opposite tradition of
>classical empiricism of John Locke continued in different type of positivism
>and so called common sense reflected in banal everyday word usage. The
>opposition of those traditions is reflected even in national languages. Thus
>German and Russian languages are more suitable for the first tradition while
>the historical development of English speakers made the very English
>language more suitable for the other one.
>
>There is an illustration in point the distinction between German Der Begriff
>and Die Vorstellung (or equivalent Russian categories: pon'atie and
>predstavlenie.) This distinction is masked in English behind the same words.
>Thus the common Russian-English dictionary translates pon'atie (Der Begriff)
>as "idea, notion, conception". The same set of words it gives as translation
>of predstavlenie (Die Vorstellung) "idea, notion, conception".
>
>Meanwhile the modern trend leads to unification of cultures, so as the
>deplorable result of globalization we have now the loss of rationalistic or
>better to say dialectical tradition and the total expansion of empiricist
>tradition at least in Russia. (Luckily all this is only a trend, so the old
>dialectical tradition is still alive in Russia among a group of Il'enkov's
>followers.)
>
>I deliberately take those looking purely logical categories of "pon'atie and
>predstavlenie" and abstain from discussion of looking more psychologically
>categories of subject and object to escape the difficulties of
>interpretation of different traditional usage of this categories inside
>different branches of Vygoskian school or so called CHAT tradition. (For the
>record - nevertheless the mishmash with this "pure logical" categories
>fundamentally mislead Vygotsky in his "Thinking and Speech". I mean that
>native Russian and even being Vygotsky itself can't give a guarantee of
>dialectical thinking. The dialectical way of thinking is not a synonym of
>some formal thinking style, which can be present or can be absent but
>synonym of objective truth, it is inevitab attribute of true thought. So the
>real appropriation and assimilation of dialectical method can be realized
>only by joint efforts of many investigators all over the world belong to
>many generations.)
>
>So the very attempt of international participants of XMCA to understand and
>moreover to arm with this uncustomary logic deserves admiration. And maximum
>friendly help from those who for one reason or another had a chance to be
>familiar with this tradition. Frankly speaking the basic cultural-theoretic
>propedeutics (like Peter Moxhay and Steve Gabosh organized two years before)
>have to precede discussions of some isolated problems. Surely if we really
>want to assimilate difficult dialectical approach, instead of assimilating
>only its emasculated terminology.
>
>Sasha Surmava
>
>
>
>P.S. Andy, as for your suspect of the basic meaning of the term
>"object-oriented activity" in Leont'ev's theory I am afraid I can't agree
>with you entirely. I think that this dialectical pair of categories can be
>understood only as an indivisible pair, as identity in opposition. And I do
>hope that the perspective of clarification of the meaning of "subject" is
>much more optimistic, I mean it can be clarified much earlier than some of
>us will die J. Especially since the most difficult part of this work was
>successfully performed by Marx and Il'enkov.
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>Sent: Saturday, October 06, 2007 3:45 AM
>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>
>
>
>Eric, the problem is that the relevant words - ideal, object, subject,
>
>discourse, activity, action, act, operation, thought, matter, mind - all
>
>have radically different meanings according to whether they are taken as
>
>part of Leontyev's Activity Theory, Marxism more generally, Kantian
>
>philosophy, Hegelian philosophy or everyday common sense.
>
>
>
>I included a link
>
>http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm in earlier mail,
>
>solely to clarify what "ideal" meant to me and in the CHAT tradition. The
>
>way Ilyenkov explains the meaning of "ideal" he does indeed see it as
>
>evolving out of human objectives and needs, but it does not mean the same
>
>as "ideal" as in the sentence: "It would be ideal if there were no mice
>
>here." "Ideal" refers to the universal aspect of an activity which is
>
>reified or objectified, that is to say, imputed to the properties of
>
>material objects or actually embodied in matter by changing the form of
>
>matter through some kind of labour, so that the material object can be
>
>interpreted and used to coordinate collaborative human activity. Every
>
>concept or thought is an ideal, because that is exactly how we think and
>
>use concepts.
>
>
>
>In an earlier mail I included a link to
>
>http://marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm so that if anyone
>
>wanted they could check up on what is meant by "material" in the tradition
>
>of thinking to which CHAT belongs.
>
>
>
>"Subject" and "object" are also very contested words. "Object" does not
>
>mean for us what it means in a sentence like: "The object was to get rid of
>
>the mice" and "Subject" does not mean what it means in the sentence: "The
>
>subject of our conversation was the best method for eradication of mice."
>
>"Object" in the sense of what is intended to be achieved is similar to
>
>"object" here, and perhaps someone else will help me here, but I suspect
>
>that when Leontyev and his followers talk about "object-oriented activity"
>
>they do indeed mean "object" in this sense, as opposed to the meaning of
>
>"object" when contrasted with "subject". The two meanings are closely
>
>related but not identical.
>
>
>
>The meaning of "subject" is extremely tricky and I will make it my
>
>contribution hopefully before I die to clarify this one. Despite the fact
>
>that CHAT arose from the tradition of thought: Hegel - Marx - Vygotsky,
>
>using the Hegelian meaning of the word "subject", in common with all
>
>contemporary philosophy, advocates of CHAT almost invariably use the word
>
>"subject" in its Kantian sense, tied to methodological individualism. This
>
>meaning is so ubiquitous and also it remains the only means of capturing
>
>the ethical meaning, that it is almost impossible to avoid using "subject"
>
>in the sense of a morally responsible individual person. But that is not
>
>what it meant to Hegel and Marx. I don't have the knowledge to track how it
>
>was used by the Russians, though I'd love to be told.
>
>
>
>So Eric, almost all the difficulties you and I have had communicating in
>
>this discussion, I think, derive from differences in word meaning. I am a
>
>bit stubborn that way, I admit. I refuse to give up the meaning of words
>
>when those meanings are so profound and contain so much of science from the
>
>past which is lost in everyday language. Apologies. All I can do is enjoin
>
>you to acquaint yourself with the Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky meaning of these
>
>words as I try to follow what they mean in the Kant-common sense-modern
>
>philosophy usage. My observation is that within CHAT these words are used
>
>with inconsistent meanings by different people.
>
>
>
>Andy
>
>
>
>At 10:54 AM 5/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
>
>
>
> >Paul:
>
> >
>
> >I truely believe that the result may be far from the ideal. However, if
>
> >there is a discourse taking place between people who are engaged in a goal
>
> >directed activity, then within the paramaters of this discoursing the
>
> >"ideal" is the "object"??? I must admit I am engaging in this discussion
>
> >more for a sense of trying to hear what my thoughts are as I write them
>
> >down. Here is an example:
>
> >
>
> >Perhaps I have mice in my basement. I go to the feed mill and talk to an
>
> >expert on mice eradication. The ideal would be to rid my basement of mice.
>
> >The discourse between I and the expert revolves around ridding my basement
>
> >of mice. This may not result from the efforts I engage upon my return home
>
> >but nevertheless, when I am talking to the expert we are engaged in a
>
> >discourse of "rid the mice"; not, "get rid of SOME of the mice."
>
> >
>
> > Andy, I do not think the expert sees me as a subject to be manipulated
>but
>
> >rather views "rid the mice" as the subject. The ideal provides a catalyst
>
> >for how to discourse with me, the customer.
>
> >
>
> >Is any of this making sense?
>
> >
>
> >eric
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Paul
>
> > Dillon
>
> >
>
> > <phd_crit_think@ To: "eXtended Mind,
>
> > Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
> > yahoo.com> cc:
>
> >
>
> > Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells
>
> > article
>
> > xmca-bounces@web
>
> >
>
> > er.ucsd.edu
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > 10/03/2007
>
> > 01:41
>
> >
>
> > PM
>
> >
>
> > Please
>
> > respond
>
> >
>
> > to
>
> > "eXtended
>
> >
>
> > Mind,
>
> > Culture,
>
> >
>
> > Activity"
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Eric,
>
> >
>
> > Before entering into the argument strictly speaking, I would like you to
>
> >look at some evidence (see attachment).
>
> >
>
> > I don't agree that the "ideal" exists in the discussion unless that
>
> >discussion has an identifiable
>
> >[object/frame-of-reference/verifiabilty-space/etc?] that exists
>
> >independently of the ideal that exists in the discussion and against which
>
> >any given instantiation of the ideal as developed in the discussion can be
>
> >compared. Say the shape of a knife. Form as ideal - cleaver or scalpel?
>
> >
>
> > Also, internalized discussions in which imagined communities
>participate,
>
> >"Walter Mitty" comes to mind, must clearly enter in the discussion space in
>
> >which shadows of ideals sport and play.
>
> >
>
> > I think the evidence I' ve attached provides an arguable demonstration
>of
>
> >how the ideal in discussion can lead one far from the ideal that might
>
> >exist independently of that discussion.
>
> >
>
> > Paul
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>
> >
>
> >Paul:
>
> >
>
> >That is indeed a good question pertaining to the "ideal". If the ideal
>
> >nose is invisioned then what is the product end result of the operation?
>
> >There is the activity of the "noe job" and then there is the operation of
>
> >changing the nose. The ideal is the discussion of what the new nose
>
> >should look like and then there is the material end of a new nose. Just
>
> >positing in fun : )
>
> >
>
> >eric
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>
> >cc:
>
> >bcc:
>
> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>
> >Paul Dillon
>
> >
>
> >Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> >10/02/2007 03:25 PM MST
>
> >Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" size=-1>
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >before or after the nose job?
>
> >
>
> >ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>
> >Paul;
>
> >
>
> >And here I had always invisioned you as Robert Zimmerman : )
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Paul Dillon
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >yahoo.com> cc:
>
> >Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>
> >xmca-bounces@web
>
> >er.ucsd.edu
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >10/02/2007 02:29
>
> >PM
>
> >Please respond
>
> >to "eXtended
>
> >Mind, Culture,
>
> >Activity"
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Sure and I'm Alexander the Grape.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Kevin Rocap wrote:
>
> >That was....
>
> >
>
> >A Gordon Knot?
>
> >
>
> >;-)
>
> >
>
> >Paul Dillon wrote:
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > > It just ocurred to me that listserv threads are something akin to Andean
>
> >quipu, threads with knots used to record every kind of information. But . .
>
> >.
>
> > >
>
> > > Maybe Gordon could explain how what he's proposing relates to Habermas'
>
> >theory of communicative action, a fourth level to the Weberian continuum,
>
> >beyond strategic action, communicative action, with its own ideal state,
>
> >oriented to reaching understanding. As far as I can tell, this wheel might
>
> >already have been employed in building various kinds of vehicles. So maybe
>
> >some clarification would be useful.
>
> > >
>
> > > Paul. Dillon
>
> > >
>
> > > "Worthen, Helena Harlow" wrote:
>
> > > Andy --
>
> > >
>
> > > Are you saying you don't see a useful difference between language being
>
> > > used to coordinate actions directed toward a shared goal, and language
>
> > > being used to create something that is not the shared goal of the
>
> > > participants, but something different? I think this is a useful
>
> > > distinction, because the latter would give us a name for the process we
>
> > > would expect to see if we could zoom in on and observe in slow motion
>
> > > (maybe in a transcript) the way words get turned, replaced, defined and
>
> > > re-defined in the process of negotiating an agree-upon text.
>
> > >
>
> > > Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
>
> > > Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations
>
> > > University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
>
> > > 504 E. Armory, Room 227
>
> > > Champaign, IL 61821
>
> > > Phone: 217-244-4095
>
> > > hworthen@uiuc.edu
>
> > >
>
> > > -----Original Message-----
>
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>
> > > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>
> > > Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 6:15 PM
>
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>
> > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Wells article
>
> > >
>
> > > Helena,
>
> > > I took it that Gordon ended up saying that Halliday's distinction cannot
>
> > > be
>
> > > sustained.
>
> > > Here is what he says:
>
> > >
>
> > > "From this work it has becomes apparent that the initial distinction
>
> > > made
>
> > > by Halliday (1978)
>
> > > between ancillary and constitutive discoursing, although useful
>
> > > conceptually, is an oversimplification
>
> > > of actual practice. The first and most obvious complication is that many
>
> > >
>
> > > interactions
>
> > > involve more than one genre, as when a shopper discusses the weather or
>
> > > current events in
>
> > > the course of a purchasing action.
>
> > > A second issue is that the distinction between ancillary and
>
> > > constitutive
>
> > > discoursing is
>
> > > not as clear-cut as Halliday suggested. Taking the football example from
>
> > >
>
> > > earlier, at various
>
> > > points before and during the game, the coach discusses strategy with the
>
> > >
>
> > > entire team and perhaps
>
> > > also with one or more individuals; he will probably also shout from the
>
> > > sidelines. Although the
>
> > > latter might fit Halliday's argument that "any instructions or other
>
> > > verbal
>
> > > interaction among
>
> > > the players are part of this social action" (p. 144), it is not so clear
>
> > >
>
> > > that the strategy talk before
>
> > > the team leaves the dressing room is entirely part of the "social
>
> > > action"
>
> > > of the game itself.
>
> > > However, the most difficult issue is that of determining what goals are
>
> > > involved in any
>
> > > action in which discoursing plays a part. The problem is that
>
> > > participants
>
> > > rarely announce their
>
> > > goals, expecting others to be able to deduce them from the situation and
>
> > >
>
> > > from the genre form
>
> > > they adopt."
>
> > >
>
> > > So I didn't follow this issue any further because I wouldn't support
>
> > > this
>
> > > particular dichotomy at any but a superficial level. I think discourse
>
> > > is
>
> > > always, along with other elements of material culture, part of
>
> > > constituting
>
> > > the project. I see conflict as essentially indistinguishable from
>
> > > collaboration and the material/ideal distinction between project also
>
> > > untenable. Anyway, Gordon gave three reasons for not making this
>
> > > distinction and that was good enough for me.
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > > Andy
>
> > > At 02:41 PM 1/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > >> Hello, xmca:
>
> > >>
>
> > >> I'll take a shot at the Wells article, as usual, from the point of view
>
> > >> of a labor educator.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> As I read it, he's distinguishing between the use of language as
>
> > >> "ancillary" to an activity and the use of language that actually
>
> > >> constitutes what participants are doing. When people use language to
>
> > >> coordinate activity, that's "ancillary." When the thing that has to
>
> > >>
>
> > > "get
>
> > >
>
> > >> done" is itself made out of language (he gives the example of a meeting
>
> > >> with an agenda and agreed-upon decisions to be made - p. 167) then
>
> > >> that's "constitutive discoursing," the co-construction of "possible
>
> > >> worlds" (he references Bruner). However, he's saying, this distinction
>
> > >> has already been made (by Halliday). Wells then says that the
>
> > >> distinction between the two is not always clear, because people may be
>
> > >> co-constructing with different goals in mind. He lists some examples of
>
> > >> different goals in the middle of page 173.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> At this point, I am thinking that Wells is right but I'd like him to
>
> > >> give an example where people are co-constructing something but have
>
> > >>
>
> > > more
>
> > >
>
> > >> strikingly different goals in mind -- goals more different than the
>
> > >> goals of a trio of researchers observing their own discoursing or even
>
> > >> than the goals of a teacher and three students in a busy classroom.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Of course I was reading this article keeping in mind the
>
> > >>
>
> > > co-constructive
>
> > >
>
> > >> constitutive discoursing that takes place when workers and employers
>
> > >> bargain a contract. The contract is an example of a "possible world."
>
> > >>
>
> > > It
>
> > >
>
> > >> is built up bit by bit over the years, written down and enforced
>
> > >>
>
> > > through
>
> > >
>
> > >> yards and yards, miles and miles of talk. In fact, both the contract
>
> > >>
>
> > > and
>
> > >
>
> > >> the process by which it is negotiated are negotiated. But most helpful
>
> > >> of all to me, as I try to understand what is actually happening when
>
> > >> people negotiate their conditions of work, was Wells' point that(p 174)
>
> > >> the "the participants are not interchangeable." Constitutive
>
> > >> discoursing (the co-creation of something through language) is
>
> > >> characterized by participants in an itneraction who are not
>
> > >> interchangeable. It is the different perspectives of the parties to the
>
> > >> negotiation that make the co-construction of something possible.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> I'm not convinced that the word "discoursing" is going to get into
>
> > >> popular use. It may be that Wells doesn't expect it to go much further
>
> > >> himself; in fact, he could be putting forth this term ironically, since
>
> > >> by the end of the article he appears to have pulled the plug on the
>
> > >> notion that discoursing is an activity in its own right.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Is there a significant stream of argument that says that the use of
>
> > >> language for no other purpose (no co-construction, no constitution) is
>
> > >> in itself an activity? Wouldn't that be like carrying a tape recorder
>
> > >> down a busy street or drifting from channel to channel on the TV? But
>
> > >> then we'd be in the realms of art.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> I saw Chris Marker's movie, Les Chats Perches (?) last night. Now
>
> > >> there's a record of co-construction of an emergent text and possible
>
> > >> world.
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Helena Worthen
>
> > >> Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
>
> > >> Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations
>
> > >> University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
>
> > >> 504 E. Armory, Room 227
>
> > >> Champaign, IL 61821
>
> > >> Phone: 217-244-4095
>
> > >> hworthen@uiuc.edu
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> _______________________________________________
>
> > >> xmca mailing list
>
> > >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> > >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> > >>
>
> > >
>
> > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>
> > > AIM
>
> > > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
>
> > >
>
> > > _______________________________________________
>
> > > xmca mailing list
>
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> > > _______________________________________________
>
> > > xmca mailing list
>
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> > > http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > > ---------------------------------
>
> > > Moody friends. Drama queens. Your life? Nope! - their life, your story.
>
> > > Play Sims Stories at Yahoo! Games.
>
> > > _______________________________________________
>
> > > xmca mailing list
>
> > > xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
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> >Tonight's top picks. What will you watch tonight? Preview the hottest shows
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> >Check out the hottest 2008 models today at Yahoo! Autos.
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> >---------------------------------
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> >Boardwalk for $500? In 2007? Ha!
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> >Play Monopoly Here and Now (it's updated for today's economy) at Yahoo!
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> >Games.(See attached file: mjackson nose.jpg)
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> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>
>mobile 0409 358 651
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  Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
mobile 0409 358 651

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Received on Fri Oct 5 21:17 PDT 2007