Hi, Andy.
Surely speculating on the problem of "object oriented activity" we have to
recognize that this activity is not something mechanical, but has and
realize its goal (object). But the main point for Leont'ev as well for Marx
and Il'enkov is that the very possibility to have goals have to be precede
by the act of interaction with real material object. The very term "object
oriented activity" sounds in Russian as "predmetnaya deyatel'nost'" in which
the term "predmet" is just an opposition to "subject". It hasn't meaning
"goal" at all. But focusing on this problem you nick it.
Just in this point Leont'ev meets a principal theoretical difficulty. Thus
he starts from presupposition that subject and object exist as such before
their meeting, so he echoed after Ivan Pavlov and literally repeats its
lamentation: "The first meeting of subject and object is an extraordinary
act". Indeed it is, if we are starting from magically emerged from nowhere
opposition of subject and object.
The thing is that the right to make this distinction can be given to us only
by real (not magical or only imaginary) spontaneous act of mutual
positioning of active subject and passive object in special organic type of
interaction. The previous two natural stages or types of interaction -
mechanical and chemical - are basically symmetrical. Only life with its
organic type of active interaction gives us basically asymmetric opposition
of subject and object. I don't suffer from megalomania to pretend to be the
first who mentioned it, because the text with clear explanation of this idea
was the first Marxist text the most of us have ever read. It was the first
these on Feuerbach. Surely you know it even by heart, but nevertheless I
repeat it.
"The main defect of all hitherto-existing materialism - that of Feuerbach
included - is that the Object [der Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are
conceived only in the form of the object [Objekts], or of contemplation
[Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity, practice [Praxis], not
subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to
materialism, was developed by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of
course, idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such".
Surely it is not so easy to understand Marx' thought because it contains his
basic philosophical idea, the essence of his materialistic as well as
dialectic philosophy in very thick concentrate. That's why I (after
Il'enkov) insist that the old bourgeois tails that Marxist philosophy 1.
Doesn't exist as something different from Hegelian idealistic one and 2.
That it deals only with social groups without personality and subjectness
and has nothing to say about the human as real subject, subjectivity and
personality is totally false. It is just a bourgeois slander trying to hide
from working people the obvious fact that it is the very bourgeoisie who
steals from the working people its chance to be a creative and universally
developed personality in exchange for the miserable chance to become a
partly developed appendage of dead mechanical and impersonal Moloch of
capitalist system of production, to become a "professional cretin".
The core idea of Marxism is the restoration of human personality and
subjectness at the expense of capital who usurped those human abilities
along with their material property.
So I think that Marx do has to say "something" substantial about the
subject.
Both Vygotsky and Leont'ev began their theoretic reflection from this
starting point, and both of them failed to realize it in their theories.
Vygotsky who knowingly tried to realize the Marxist method made a
regrettable step back from dialectic and materialism applying the semiotic
to solve the psychophysical problem, as if a wooden Stimulus-Reactive
marionette can magically invent a magic sign to acquire a freedom from the
Puppeteer. Leont'ev make a huge step forward from his teacher putting his
eye on sensual "external" activity as a basis of human psyche and
consciousness, but the very activity he realized as a mediating chain
between Stimulus and Reaction and didn't guess that Stimulus-Reactive
"subject" which magically meets with it's "object" is just a new redaction
of old Cartesian magic tale about dead mechanism which needs in old
religious God or if nothing else a Magician to be supplied with the Soul.
Only Il'enkov basing on Spinosa's ideas and Marx's materialistic dialectic
put forward the consistent resolution of psychophysical problem so the first
two chapters of his Dialectical logic
http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/index.htm marked the
revolution in theoretic psychology which moved it finally from magic to real
science.
Receiving such a great theoretic heritage we have to master, to save and to
develop it. Otherwise our descendants will have right to despise us for our
blindness and irresponsibility.
Cheers,
Sasha
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Saturday, October 06, 2007 8:15 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: RE: [xmca] Wells article
Thanks for that Sasha.
http://www.marxists.org/subject/psychology/works/lektorsky/essay_77.htm is
an essay by Lektrosky on his favourite topic, "Subject and Object". What
are the Russian words he is using? Object in this sense is what I mainly
mean by "object" but often I get the sense that "object-oriented activity"
is understood as synonymous with "purposeful activity". Is this the same
word in Russian?
And finally I don't agree that the problem of clarifying the meaning of
"subject" is an already-accomplished task. Marx himself had hardly anything
to say on this topic. In any case I simply cannot accept this as a closed
question, any more than defining dialectics as a "synonym of objective
truth" helps anything.
:)
Andy
At 08:00 AM 6/10/2007 +0400, you wrote:
>Andy, I can entirely corroborate your statement in this post. Especially
>this:
>
> >almost all the difficulties you and I have had communicating in >this
>discussion, I think, derive from differences in word meaning. >I am a bit
>stubborn that way, I admit. I refuse to give up the >meaning of words when
>those meanings are so profound and contain so >much of science from the
past
>which is lost in everyday language. >Apologies. All I can do is enjoin you
>to acquaint yourself with the >Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky meaning of these words
as
>I try to follow what >they mean in the Kant-common sense-modern philosophy
>usage. My >observation is that within CHAT these words are used with
> >inconsistent meanings by different people.
>
>I am stubborn too, discussing such "word usage". The thing is that behind
>the different manner of word usage hides entirely different
>cultural-theoretic traditions. The main divide or watershed lies between
the
>tradition of classical rationalism and dialectic of (Descart, Spinoza,
>Hegel, Marx and Il'encov) from one side and the opposite tradition of
>classical empiricism of John Locke continued in different type of
positivism
>and so called common sense reflected in banal everyday word usage. The
>opposition of those traditions is reflected even in national languages.
Thus
>German and Russian languages are more suitable for the first tradition
while
>the historical development of English speakers made the very English
>language more suitable for the other one.
>
>There is an illustration in point the distinction between German Der
Begriff
>and Die Vorstellung (or equivalent Russian categories: pon'atie and
>predstavlenie.) This distinction is masked in English behind the same
words.
>Thus the common Russian-English dictionary translates pon'atie (Der
Begriff)
>as "idea, notion, conception". The same set of words it gives as
translation
>of predstavlenie (Die Vorstellung) "idea, notion, conception".
>
>Meanwhile the modern trend leads to unification of cultures, so as the
>deplorable result of globalization we have now the loss of rationalistic or
>better to say dialectical tradition and the total expansion of empiricist
>tradition at least in Russia. (Luckily all this is only a trend, so the old
>dialectical tradition is still alive in Russia among a group of Il'enkov's
>followers.)
>
>I deliberately take those looking purely logical categories of "pon'atie
and
>predstavlenie" and abstain from discussion of looking more psychologically
>categories of subject and object to escape the difficulties of
>interpretation of different traditional usage of this categories inside
>different branches of Vygoskian school or so called CHAT tradition. (For
the
>record - nevertheless the mishmash with this "pure logical" categories
>fundamentally mislead Vygotsky in his "Thinking and Speech". I mean that
>native Russian and even being Vygotsky itself can't give a guarantee of
>dialectical thinking. The dialectical way of thinking is not a synonym of
>some formal thinking style, which can be present or can be absent but
>synonym of objective truth, it is inevitab attribute of true thought. So
the
>real appropriation and assimilation of dialectical method can be realized
>only by joint efforts of many investigators all over the world belong to
>many generations.)
>
>So the very attempt of international participants of XMCA to understand and
>moreover to arm with this uncustomary logic deserves admiration. And
maximum
>friendly help from those who for one reason or another had a chance to be
>familiar with this tradition. Frankly speaking the basic cultural-theoretic
>propedeutics (like Peter Moxhay and Steve Gabosh organized two years
before)
>have to precede discussions of some isolated problems. Surely if we really
>want to assimilate difficult dialectical approach, instead of assimilating
>only its emasculated terminology.
>
>Sasha Surmava
>
>
>
>P.S. Andy, as for your suspect of the basic meaning of the term
>"object-oriented activity" in Leont'ev's theory I am afraid I can't agree
>with you entirely. I think that this dialectical pair of categories can be
>understood only as an indivisible pair, as identity in opposition. And I do
>hope that the perspective of clarification of the meaning of "subject" is
>much more optimistic, I mean it can be clarified much earlier than some of
>us will die J. Especially since the most difficult part of this work was
>successfully performed by Marx and Il'enkov.
>
>
>
>-----Original Message-----
>From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
>Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>Sent: Saturday, October 06, 2007 3:45 AM
>To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>
>
>
>Eric, the problem is that the relevant words - ideal, object, subject,
>
>discourse, activity, action, act, operation, thought, matter, mind - all
>
>have radically different meanings according to whether they are taken as
>
>part of Leontyev's Activity Theory, Marxism more generally, Kantian
>
>philosophy, Hegelian philosophy or everyday common sense.
>
>
>
>I included a link
>
>http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm in earlier mail,
>
>solely to clarify what "ideal" meant to me and in the CHAT tradition. The
>
>way Ilyenkov explains the meaning of "ideal" he does indeed see it as
>
>evolving out of human objectives and needs, but it does not mean the same
>
>as "ideal" as in the sentence: "It would be ideal if there were no mice
>
>here." "Ideal" refers to the universal aspect of an activity which is
>
>reified or objectified, that is to say, imputed to the properties of
>
>material objects or actually embodied in matter by changing the form of
>
>matter through some kind of labour, so that the material object can be
>
>interpreted and used to coordinate collaborative human activity. Every
>
>concept or thought is an ideal, because that is exactly how we think and
>
>use concepts.
>
>
>
>In an earlier mail I included a link to
>
>http://marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm so that if anyone
>
>wanted they could check up on what is meant by "material" in the tradition
>
>of thinking to which CHAT belongs.
>
>
>
>"Subject" and "object" are also very contested words. "Object" does not
>
>mean for us what it means in a sentence like: "The object was to get rid of
>
>the mice" and "Subject" does not mean what it means in the sentence: "The
>
>subject of our conversation was the best method for eradication of mice."
>
>"Object" in the sense of what is intended to be achieved is similar to
>
>"object" here, and perhaps someone else will help me here, but I suspect
>
>that when Leontyev and his followers talk about "object-oriented activity"
>
>they do indeed mean "object" in this sense, as opposed to the meaning of
>
>"object" when contrasted with "subject". The two meanings are closely
>
>related but not identical.
>
>
>
>The meaning of "subject" is extremely tricky and I will make it my
>
>contribution hopefully before I die to clarify this one. Despite the fact
>
>that CHAT arose from the tradition of thought: Hegel - Marx - Vygotsky,
>
>using the Hegelian meaning of the word "subject", in common with all
>
>contemporary philosophy, advocates of CHAT almost invariably use the word
>
>"subject" in its Kantian sense, tied to methodological individualism. This
>
>meaning is so ubiquitous and also it remains the only means of capturing
>
>the ethical meaning, that it is almost impossible to avoid using "subject"
>
>in the sense of a morally responsible individual person. But that is not
>
>what it meant to Hegel and Marx. I don't have the knowledge to track how it
>
>was used by the Russians, though I'd love to be told.
>
>
>
>So Eric, almost all the difficulties you and I have had communicating in
>
>this discussion, I think, derive from differences in word meaning. I am a
>
>bit stubborn that way, I admit. I refuse to give up the meaning of words
>
>when those meanings are so profound and contain so much of science from the
>
>past which is lost in everyday language. Apologies. All I can do is enjoin
>
>you to acquaint yourself with the Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky meaning of these
>
>words as I try to follow what they mean in the Kant-common sense-modern
>
>philosophy usage. My observation is that within CHAT these words are used
>
>with inconsistent meanings by different people.
>
>
>
>Andy
>
>
>
>At 10:54 AM 5/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
>
>
>
> >Paul:
>
> >
>
> >I truely believe that the result may be far from the ideal. However, if
>
> >there is a discourse taking place between people who are engaged in a
goal
>
> >directed activity, then within the paramaters of this discoursing the
>
> >"ideal" is the "object"??? I must admit I am engaging in this discussion
>
> >more for a sense of trying to hear what my thoughts are as I write them
>
> >down. Here is an example:
>
> >
>
> >Perhaps I have mice in my basement. I go to the feed mill and talk to an
>
> >expert on mice eradication. The ideal would be to rid my basement of
mice.
>
> >The discourse between I and the expert revolves around ridding my
basement
>
> >of mice. This may not result from the efforts I engage upon my return
home
>
> >but nevertheless, when I am talking to the expert we are engaged in a
>
> >discourse of "rid the mice"; not, "get rid of SOME of the mice."
>
> >
>
> > Andy, I do not think the expert sees me as a subject to be manipulated
>but
>
> >rather views "rid the mice" as the subject. The ideal provides a
catalyst
>
> >for how to discourse with me, the customer.
>
> >
>
> >Is any of this making sense?
>
> >
>
> >eric
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > Paul
>
> > Dillon
>
> >
>
> > <phd_crit_think@ To: "eXtended Mind,
>
> > Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
>
> > yahoo.com> cc:
>
> >
>
> > Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells
>
> > article
>
> > xmca-bounces@web
>
> >
>
> > er.ucsd.edu
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> > 10/03/2007
>
> > 01:41
>
> >
>
> > PM
>
> >
>
> > Please
>
> > respond
>
> >
>
> > to
>
> > "eXtended
>
> >
>
> > Mind,
>
> > Culture,
>
> >
>
> > Activity"
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Eric,
>
> >
>
> > Before entering into the argument strictly speaking, I would like you
to
>
> >look at some evidence (see attachment).
>
> >
>
> > I don't agree that the "ideal" exists in the discussion unless that
>
> >discussion has an identifiable
>
> >[object/frame-of-reference/verifiabilty-space/etc?] that exists
>
> >independently of the ideal that exists in the discussion and against
which
>
> >any given instantiation of the ideal as developed in the discussion can
be
>
> >compared. Say the shape of a knife. Form as ideal - cleaver or scalpel?
>
> >
>
> > Also, internalized discussions in which imagined communities
>participate,
>
> >"Walter Mitty" comes to mind, must clearly enter in the discussion space
in
>
> >which shadows of ideals sport and play.
>
> >
>
> > I think the evidence I' ve attached provides an arguable demonstration
>of
>
> >how the ideal in discussion can lead one far from the ideal that might
>
> >exist independently of that discussion.
>
> >
>
> > Paul
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>
> >
>
> >Paul:
>
> >
>
> >That is indeed a good question pertaining to the "ideal". If the ideal
>
> >nose is invisioned then what is the product end result of the operation?
>
> >There is the activity of the "noe job" and then there is the operation of
>
> >changing the nose. The ideal is the discussion of what the new nose
>
> >should look like and then there is the material end of a new nose. Just
>
> >positing in fun : )
>
> >
>
> >eric
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>
> >cc:
>
> >bcc:
>
> >Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>
> >Paul Dillon
>
> >
>
> >Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>
> >10/02/2007 03:25 PM MST
>
> >Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" size=-1>
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >before or after the nose job?
>
> >
>
> >ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>
> >Paul;
>
> >
>
> >And here I had always invisioned you as Robert Zimmerman : )
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Paul Dillon
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >yahoo.com> cc:
>
> >Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>
> >xmca-bounces@web
>
> >er.ucsd.edu
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >10/02/2007 02:29
>
> >PM
>
> >Please respond
>
> >to "eXtended
>
> >Mind, Culture,
>
> >Activity"
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Sure and I'm Alexander the Grape.
>
> >
>
> >
>
> >Kevin Rocap wrote:
>
> >That was....
>
> >
>
> >A Gordon Knot?
>
> >
>
> >;-)
>
> >
>
> >Paul Dillon wrote:
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > > It just ocurred to me that listserv threads are something akin to
Andean
>
> >quipu, threads with knots used to record every kind of information. But .
.
>
> >.
>
> > >
>
> > > Maybe Gordon could explain how what he's proposing relates to
Habermas'
>
> >theory of communicative action, a fourth level to the Weberian continuum,
>
> >beyond strategic action, communicative action, with its own ideal state,
>
> >oriented to reaching understanding. As far as I can tell, this wheel
might
>
> >already have been employed in building various kinds of vehicles. So
maybe
>
> >some clarification would be useful.
>
> > >
>
> > > Paul. Dillon
>
> > >
>
> > > "Worthen, Helena Harlow" wrote:
>
> > > Andy --
>
> > >
>
> > > Are you saying you don't see a useful difference between language
being
>
> > > used to coordinate actions directed toward a shared goal, and language
>
> > > being used to create something that is not the shared goal of the
>
> > > participants, but something different? I think this is a useful
>
> > > distinction, because the latter would give us a name for the process
we
>
> > > would expect to see if we could zoom in on and observe in slow motion
>
> > > (maybe in a transcript) the way words get turned, replaced, defined
and
>
> > > re-defined in the process of negotiating an agree-upon text.
>
> > >
>
> > > Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
>
> > > Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations
>
> > > University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
>
> > > 504 E. Armory, Room 227
>
> > > Champaign, IL 61821
>
> > > Phone: 217-244-4095
>
> > > hworthen@uiuc.edu
>
> > >
>
> > > -----Original Message-----
>
> > > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
>
> > > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>
> > > Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 6:15 PM
>
> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>
> > > Subject: RE: [xmca] Wells article
>
> > >
>
> > > Helena,
>
> > > I took it that Gordon ended up saying that Halliday's distinction
cannot
>
> > > be
>
> > > sustained.
>
> > > Here is what he says:
>
> > >
>
> > > "From this work it has becomes apparent that the initial distinction
>
> > > made
>
> > > by Halliday (1978)
>
> > > between ancillary and constitutive discoursing, although useful
>
> > > conceptually, is an oversimplification
>
> > > of actual practice. The first and most obvious complication is that
many
>
> > >
>
> > > interactions
>
> > > involve more than one genre, as when a shopper discusses the weather
or
>
> > > current events in
>
> > > the course of a purchasing action.
>
> > > A second issue is that the distinction between ancillary and
>
> > > constitutive
>
> > > discoursing is
>
> > > not as clear-cut as Halliday suggested. Taking the football example
from
>
> > >
>
> > > earlier, at various
>
> > > points before and during the game, the coach discusses strategy with
the
>
> > >
>
> > > entire team and perhaps
>
> > > also with one or more individuals; he will probably also shout from
the
>
> > > sidelines. Although the
>
> > > latter might fit Halliday's argument that "any instructions or other
>
> > > verbal
>
> > > interaction among
>
> > > the players are part of this social action" (p. 144), it is not so
clear
>
> > >
>
> > > that the strategy talk before
>
> > > the team leaves the dressing room is entirely part of the "social
>
> > > action"
>
> > > of the game itself.
>
> > > However, the most difficult issue is that of determining what goals
are
>
> > > involved in any
>
> > > action in which discoursing plays a part. The problem is that
>
> > > participants
>
> > > rarely announce their
>
> > > goals, expecting others to be able to deduce them from the situation
and
>
> > >
>
> > > from the genre form
>
> > > they adopt."
>
> > >
>
> > > So I didn't follow this issue any further because I wouldn't support
>
> > > this
>
> > > particular dichotomy at any but a superficial level. I think discourse
>
> > > is
>
> > > always, along with other elements of material culture, part of
>
> > > constituting
>
> > > the project. I see conflict as essentially indistinguishable from
>
> > > collaboration and the material/ideal distinction between project also
>
> > > untenable. Anyway, Gordon gave three reasons for not making this
>
> > > distinction and that was good enough for me.
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > > Andy
>
> > > At 02:41 PM 1/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
>
> > >
>
> > >
>
> > >> Hello, xmca:
>
> > >>
>
> > >> I'll take a shot at the Wells article, as usual, from the point of
view
>
> > >> of a labor educator.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> As I read it, he's distinguishing between the use of language as
>
> > >> "ancillary" to an activity and the use of language that actually
>
> > >> constitutes what participants are doing. When people use language to
>
> > >> coordinate activity, that's "ancillary." When the thing that has to
>
> > >>
>
> > > "get
>
> > >
>
> > >> done" is itself made out of language (he gives the example of a
meeting
>
> > >> with an agenda and agreed-upon decisions to be made - p. 167) then
>
> > >> that's "constitutive discoursing," the co-construction of "possible
>
> > >> worlds" (he references Bruner). However, he's saying, this
distinction
>
> > >> has already been made (by Halliday). Wells then says that the
>
> > >> distinction between the two is not always clear, because people may
be
>
> > >> co-constructing with different goals in mind. He lists some examples
of
>
> > >> different goals in the middle of page 173.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> At this point, I am thinking that Wells is right but I'd like him to
>
> > >> give an example where people are co-constructing something but have
>
> > >>
>
> > > more
>
> > >
>
> > >> strikingly different goals in mind -- goals more different than the
>
> > >> goals of a trio of researchers observing their own discoursing or
even
>
> > >> than the goals of a teacher and three students in a busy classroom.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Of course I was reading this article keeping in mind the
>
> > >>
>
> > > co-constructive
>
> > >
>
> > >> constitutive discoursing that takes place when workers and employers
>
> > >> bargain a contract. The contract is an example of a "possible world."
>
> > >>
>
> > > It
>
> > >
>
> > >> is built up bit by bit over the years, written down and enforced
>
> > >>
>
> > > through
>
> > >
>
> > >> yards and yards, miles and miles of talk. In fact, both the contract
>
> > >>
>
> > > and
>
> > >
>
> > >> the process by which it is negotiated are negotiated. But most
helpful
>
> > >> of all to me, as I try to understand what is actually happening when
>
> > >> people negotiate their conditions of work, was Wells' point that(p
174)
>
> > >> the "the participants are not interchangeable." Constitutive
>
> > >> discoursing (the co-creation of something through language) is
>
> > >> characterized by participants in an itneraction who are not
>
> > >> interchangeable. It is the different perspectives of the parties to
the
>
> > >> negotiation that make the co-construction of something possible.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> I'm not convinced that the word "discoursing" is going to get into
>
> > >> popular use. It may be that Wells doesn't expect it to go much
further
>
> > >> himself; in fact, he could be putting forth this term ironically,
since
>
> > >> by the end of the article he appears to have pulled the plug on the
>
> > >> notion that discoursing is an activity in its own right.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Is there a significant stream of argument that says that the use of
>
> > >> language for no other purpose (no co-construction, no constitution)
is
>
> > >> in itself an activity? Wouldn't that be like carrying a tape recorder
>
> > >> down a busy street or drifting from channel to channel on the TV? But
>
> > >> then we'd be in the realms of art.
>
> > >>
>
> > >> I saw Chris Marker's movie, Les Chats Perches (?) last night. Now
>
> > >> there's a record of co-construction of an emergent text and possible
>
> > >> world.
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> Helena Worthen
>
> > >> Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
>
> > >> Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations
>
> > >> University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
>
> > >> 504 E. Armory, Room 227
>
> > >> Champaign, IL 61821
>
> > >> Phone: 217-244-4095
>
> > >> hworthen@uiuc.edu
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >>
>
> > >> _______________________________________________
>
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>
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>
> > >>
>
> > >
>
> > > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
>
> > > AIM
>
> > > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
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Received on Fri Oct 5 23:38 PDT 2007
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