Andy, I can entirely corroborate your statement in this post. Especially
this:
>almost all the difficulties you and I have had communicating in >this
discussion, I think, derive from differences in word meaning. >I am a bit
stubborn that way, I admit. I refuse to give up the >meaning of words when
those meanings are so profound and contain so >much of science from the past
which is lost in everyday language. >Apologies. All I can do is enjoin you
to acquaint yourself with the >Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky meaning of these words as
I try to follow what >they mean in the Kant-common sense-modern philosophy
usage. My >observation is that within CHAT these words are used with
>inconsistent meanings by different people.
I am stubborn too, discussing such "word usage". The thing is that behind
the different manner of word usage hides entirely different
cultural-theoretic traditions. The main divide or watershed lies between the
tradition of classical rationalism and dialectic of (Descart, Spinoza,
Hegel, Marx and Il'encov) from one side and the opposite tradition of
classical empiricism of John Locke continued in different type of positivism
and so called common sense reflected in banal everyday word usage. The
opposition of those traditions is reflected even in national languages. Thus
German and Russian languages are more suitable for the first tradition while
the historical development of English speakers made the very English
language more suitable for the other one.
There is an illustration in point the distinction between German Der Begriff
and Die Vorstellung (or equivalent Russian categories: pon'atie and
predstavlenie.) This distinction is masked in English behind the same words.
Thus the common Russian-English dictionary translates pon'atie (Der Begriff)
as "idea, notion, conception". The same set of words it gives as translation
of predstavlenie (Die Vorstellung) "idea, notion, conception".
Meanwhile the modern trend leads to unification of cultures, so as the
deplorable result of globalization we have now the loss of rationalistic or
better to say dialectical tradition and the total expansion of empiricist
tradition at least in Russia. (Luckily all this is only a trend, so the old
dialectical tradition is still alive in Russia among a group of Il'enkov's
followers.)
I deliberately take those looking purely logical categories of "pon'atie and
predstavlenie" and abstain from discussion of looking more psychologically
categories of subject and object to escape the difficulties of
interpretation of different traditional usage of this categories inside
different branches of Vygoskian school or so called CHAT tradition. (For the
record - nevertheless the mishmash with this "pure logical" categories
fundamentally mislead Vygotsky in his "Thinking and Speech". I mean that
native Russian and even being Vygotsky itself can't give a guarantee of
dialectical thinking. The dialectical way of thinking is not a synonym of
some formal thinking style, which can be present or can be absent but
synonym of objective truth, it is inevitab attribute of true thought. So the
real appropriation and assimilation of dialectical method can be realized
only by joint efforts of many investigators all over the world belong to
many generations.)
So the very attempt of international participants of XMCA to understand and
moreover to arm with this uncustomary logic deserves admiration. And maximum
friendly help from those who for one reason or another had a chance to be
familiar with this tradition. Frankly speaking the basic cultural-theoretic
propedeutics (like Peter Moxhay and Steve Gabosh organized two years before)
have to precede discussions of some isolated problems. Surely if we really
want to assimilate difficult dialectical approach, instead of assimilating
only its emasculated terminology.
Sasha Surmava
P.S. Andy, as for your suspect of the basic meaning of the term
"object-oriented activity" in Leont'ev's theory I am afraid I can't agree
with you entirely. I think that this dialectical pair of categories can be
understood only as an indivisible pair, as identity in opposition. And I do
hope that the perspective of clarification of the meaning of "subject" is
much more optimistic, I mean it can be clarified much earlier than some of
us will die J. Especially since the most difficult part of this work was
successfully performed by Marx and Il'enkov.
-----Original Message-----
From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu] On
Behalf Of Andy Blunden
Sent: Saturday, October 06, 2007 3:45 AM
To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
Eric, the problem is that the relevant words - ideal, object, subject,
discourse, activity, action, act, operation, thought, matter, mind - all
have radically different meanings according to whether they are taken as
part of Leontyev's Activity Theory, Marxism more generally, Kantian
philosophy, Hegelian philosophy or everyday common sense.
I included a link
http://marx.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm in earlier mail,
solely to clarify what "ideal" meant to me and in the CHAT tradition. The
way Ilyenkov explains the meaning of "ideal" he does indeed see it as
evolving out of human objectives and needs, but it does not mean the same
as "ideal" as in the sentence: "It would be ideal if there were no mice
here." "Ideal" refers to the universal aspect of an activity which is
reified or objectified, that is to say, imputed to the properties of
material objects or actually embodied in matter by changing the form of
matter through some kind of labour, so that the material object can be
interpreted and used to coordinate collaborative human activity. Every
concept or thought is an ideal, because that is exactly how we think and
use concepts.
In an earlier mail I included a link to
http://marx.org/archive/lenin/works/1908/mec/five2.htm so that if anyone
wanted they could check up on what is meant by "material" in the tradition
of thinking to which CHAT belongs.
"Subject" and "object" are also very contested words. "Object" does not
mean for us what it means in a sentence like: "The object was to get rid of
the mice" and "Subject" does not mean what it means in the sentence: "The
subject of our conversation was the best method for eradication of mice."
"Object" in the sense of what is intended to be achieved is similar to
"object" here, and perhaps someone else will help me here, but I suspect
that when Leontyev and his followers talk about "object-oriented activity"
they do indeed mean "object" in this sense, as opposed to the meaning of
"object" when contrasted with "subject". The two meanings are closely
related but not identical.
The meaning of "subject" is extremely tricky and I will make it my
contribution hopefully before I die to clarify this one. Despite the fact
that CHAT arose from the tradition of thought: Hegel - Marx - Vygotsky,
using the Hegelian meaning of the word "subject", in common with all
contemporary philosophy, advocates of CHAT almost invariably use the word
"subject" in its Kantian sense, tied to methodological individualism. This
meaning is so ubiquitous and also it remains the only means of capturing
the ethical meaning, that it is almost impossible to avoid using "subject"
in the sense of a morally responsible individual person. But that is not
what it meant to Hegel and Marx. I don't have the knowledge to track how it
was used by the Russians, though I'd love to be told.
So Eric, almost all the difficulties you and I have had communicating in
this discussion, I think, derive from differences in word meaning. I am a
bit stubborn that way, I admit. I refuse to give up the meaning of words
when those meanings are so profound and contain so much of science from the
past which is lost in everyday language. Apologies. All I can do is enjoin
you to acquaint yourself with the Hegel-Marx-Vygotsky meaning of these
words as I try to follow what they mean in the Kant-common sense-modern
philosophy usage. My observation is that within CHAT these words are used
with inconsistent meanings by different people.
Andy
At 10:54 AM 5/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
>Paul:
>
>I truely believe that the result may be far from the ideal. However, if
>there is a discourse taking place between people who are engaged in a goal
>directed activity, then within the paramaters of this discoursing the
>"ideal" is the "object"??? I must admit I am engaging in this discussion
>more for a sense of trying to hear what my thoughts are as I write them
>down. Here is an example:
>
>Perhaps I have mice in my basement. I go to the feed mill and talk to an
>expert on mice eradication. The ideal would be to rid my basement of mice.
>The discourse between I and the expert revolves around ridding my basement
>of mice. This may not result from the efforts I engage upon my return home
>but nevertheless, when I am talking to the expert we are engaged in a
>discourse of "rid the mice"; not, "get rid of SOME of the mice."
>
> Andy, I do not think the expert sees me as a subject to be manipulated
but
>rather views "rid the mice" as the subject. The ideal provides a catalyst
>for how to discourse with me, the customer.
>
>Is any of this making sense?
>
>eric
>
>
>
>
> Paul
> Dillon
>
> <phd_crit_think@ To: "eXtended Mind,
> Culture, Activity" <xmca@weber.ucsd.edu>
> yahoo.com> cc:
>
> Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells
> article
> xmca-bounces@web
>
> er.ucsd.edu
>
>
>
>
>
> 10/03/2007
> 01:41
>
> PM
>
> Please
> respond
>
> to
> "eXtended
>
> Mind,
> Culture,
>
> Activity"
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Eric,
>
> Before entering into the argument strictly speaking, I would like you to
>look at some evidence (see attachment).
>
> I don't agree that the "ideal" exists in the discussion unless that
>discussion has an identifiable
>[object/frame-of-reference/verifiabilty-space/etc?] that exists
>independently of the ideal that exists in the discussion and against which
>any given instantiation of the ideal as developed in the discussion can be
>compared. Say the shape of a knife. Form as ideal - cleaver or scalpel?
>
> Also, internalized discussions in which imagined communities
participate,
>"Walter Mitty" comes to mind, must clearly enter in the discussion space in
>which shadows of ideals sport and play.
>
> I think the evidence I' ve attached provides an arguable demonstration
of
>how the ideal in discussion can lead one far from the ideal that might
>exist independently of that discussion.
>
> Paul
>
>
>
>ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>
>Paul:
>
>That is indeed a good question pertaining to the "ideal". If the ideal
>nose is invisioned then what is the product end result of the operation?
>There is the activity of the "noe job" and then there is the operation of
>changing the nose. The ideal is the discussion of what the new nose
>should look like and then there is the material end of a new nose. Just
>positing in fun : )
>
>eric
>
>
>
>To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
>cc:
>bcc:
>Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>Paul Dillon
>
>Sent by: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu
>10/02/2007 03:25 PM MST
>Please respond to "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" size=-1>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>before or after the nose job?
>
>ERIC.RAMBERG@spps.org wrote:
>Paul;
>
>And here I had always invisioned you as Robert Zimmerman : )
>
>
>
>Paul Dillon
>
>
>yahoo.com> cc:
>Sent by: Subject: Re: [xmca] Wells article
>xmca-bounces@web
>er.ucsd.edu
>
>
>10/02/2007 02:29
>PM
>Please respond
>to "eXtended
>Mind, Culture,
>Activity"
>
>
>
>
>
>
>Sure and I'm Alexander the Grape.
>
>
>Kevin Rocap wrote:
>That was....
>
>A Gordon Knot?
>
>;-)
>
>Paul Dillon wrote:
> >
> >
> > It just ocurred to me that listserv threads are something akin to Andean
>quipu, threads with knots used to record every kind of information. But . .
>.
> >
> > Maybe Gordon could explain how what he's proposing relates to Habermas'
>theory of communicative action, a fourth level to the Weberian continuum,
>beyond strategic action, communicative action, with its own ideal state,
>oriented to reaching understanding. As far as I can tell, this wheel might
>already have been employed in building various kinds of vehicles. So maybe
>some clarification would be useful.
> >
> > Paul. Dillon
> >
> > "Worthen, Helena Harlow" wrote:
> > Andy --
> >
> > Are you saying you don't see a useful difference between language being
> > used to coordinate actions directed toward a shared goal, and language
> > being used to create something that is not the shared goal of the
> > participants, but something different? I think this is a useful
> > distinction, because the latter would give us a name for the process we
> > would expect to see if we could zoom in on and observe in slow motion
> > (maybe in a transcript) the way words get turned, replaced, defined and
> > re-defined in the process of negotiating an agree-upon text.
> >
> > Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
> > Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations
> > University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
> > 504 E. Armory, Room 227
> > Champaign, IL 61821
> > Phone: 217-244-4095
> > hworthen@uiuc.edu
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
> > Sent: Monday, October 01, 2007 6:15 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: RE: [xmca] Wells article
> >
> > Helena,
> > I took it that Gordon ended up saying that Halliday's distinction cannot
> > be
> > sustained.
> > Here is what he says:
> >
> > "From this work it has becomes apparent that the initial distinction
> > made
> > by Halliday (1978)
> > between ancillary and constitutive discoursing, although useful
> > conceptually, is an oversimplification
> > of actual practice. The first and most obvious complication is that many
> >
> > interactions
> > involve more than one genre, as when a shopper discusses the weather or
> > current events in
> > the course of a purchasing action.
> > A second issue is that the distinction between ancillary and
> > constitutive
> > discoursing is
> > not as clear-cut as Halliday suggested. Taking the football example from
> >
> > earlier, at various
> > points before and during the game, the coach discusses strategy with the
> >
> > entire team and perhaps
> > also with one or more individuals; he will probably also shout from the
> > sidelines. Although the
> > latter might fit Halliday's argument that "any instructions or other
> > verbal
> > interaction among
> > the players are part of this social action" (p. 144), it is not so clear
> >
> > that the strategy talk before
> > the team leaves the dressing room is entirely part of the "social
> > action"
> > of the game itself.
> > However, the most difficult issue is that of determining what goals are
> > involved in any
> > action in which discoursing plays a part. The problem is that
> > participants
> > rarely announce their
> > goals, expecting others to be able to deduce them from the situation and
> >
> > from the genre form
> > they adopt."
> >
> > So I didn't follow this issue any further because I wouldn't support
> > this
> > particular dichotomy at any but a superficial level. I think discourse
> > is
> > always, along with other elements of material culture, part of
> > constituting
> > the project. I see conflict as essentially indistinguishable from
> > collaboration and the material/ideal distinction between project also
> > untenable. Anyway, Gordon gave three reasons for not making this
> > distinction and that was good enough for me.
> >
> >
> > Andy
> > At 02:41 PM 1/10/2007 -0500, you wrote:
> >
> >
> >> Hello, xmca:
> >>
> >> I'll take a shot at the Wells article, as usual, from the point of view
> >> of a labor educator.
> >>
> >> As I read it, he's distinguishing between the use of language as
> >> "ancillary" to an activity and the use of language that actually
> >> constitutes what participants are doing. When people use language to
> >> coordinate activity, that's "ancillary." When the thing that has to
> >>
> > "get
> >
> >> done" is itself made out of language (he gives the example of a meeting
> >> with an agenda and agreed-upon decisions to be made - p. 167) then
> >> that's "constitutive discoursing," the co-construction of "possible
> >> worlds" (he references Bruner). However, he's saying, this distinction
> >> has already been made (by Halliday). Wells then says that the
> >> distinction between the two is not always clear, because people may be
> >> co-constructing with different goals in mind. He lists some examples of
> >> different goals in the middle of page 173.
> >>
> >> At this point, I am thinking that Wells is right but I'd like him to
> >> give an example where people are co-constructing something but have
> >>
> > more
> >
> >> strikingly different goals in mind -- goals more different than the
> >> goals of a trio of researchers observing their own discoursing or even
> >> than the goals of a teacher and three students in a busy classroom.
> >>
> >> Of course I was reading this article keeping in mind the
> >>
> > co-constructive
> >
> >> constitutive discoursing that takes place when workers and employers
> >> bargain a contract. The contract is an example of a "possible world."
> >>
> > It
> >
> >> is built up bit by bit over the years, written down and enforced
> >>
> > through
> >
> >> yards and yards, miles and miles of talk. In fact, both the contract
> >>
> > and
> >
> >> the process by which it is negotiated are negotiated. But most helpful
> >> of all to me, as I try to understand what is actually happening when
> >> people negotiate their conditions of work, was Wells' point that(p 174)
> >> the "the participants are not interchangeable." Constitutive
> >> discoursing (the co-creation of something through language) is
> >> characterized by participants in an itneraction who are not
> >> interchangeable. It is the different perspectives of the parties to the
> >> negotiation that make the co-construction of something possible.
> >>
> >> I'm not convinced that the word "discoursing" is going to get into
> >> popular use. It may be that Wells doesn't expect it to go much further
> >> himself; in fact, he could be putting forth this term ironically, since
> >> by the end of the article he appears to have pulled the plug on the
> >> notion that discoursing is an activity in its own right.
> >>
> >> Is there a significant stream of argument that says that the use of
> >> language for no other purpose (no co-construction, no constitution) is
> >> in itself an activity? Wouldn't that be like carrying a tape recorder
> >> down a busy street or drifting from channel to channel on the TV? But
> >> then we'd be in the realms of art.
> >>
> >> I saw Chris Marker's movie, Les Chats Perches (?) last night. Now
> >> there's a record of co-construction of an emergent text and possible
> >> world.
> >>
> >>
> >> Helena Worthen
> >> Helena Worthen, Clinical Associate Professor
> >> Labor Education Program, Institute of Labor & Industrial Relations
> >> University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
> >> 504 E. Armory, Room 227
> >> Champaign, IL 61821
> >> Phone: 217-244-4095
> >> hworthen@uiuc.edu
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> xmca mailing list
> >> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
> >> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
> >>
> >
> > Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/ tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435,
> > AIM
> > identity: AndyMarxists mobile 0409 358 651
> >
> > _______________________________________________
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> >
> >
> >
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