Re: [xmca] Re: One more example: errors in translation/interpretation

From: Mike Cole <lchcmike who-is-at gmail.com>
Date: Sun Mar 30 2008 - 06:25:34 PDT

Andy-- So far as I know there is no real discussion of Levi-Strauss, but I
could easily be mistaken. Others may know of such.

I look forward to your discussion, which, I hope, will be linked to Sasha
Surmava's post with its alternative interpretation of the reasoning of
non-literate parents.

I am unclear,Sasha, about your use of historicism and why LSV's ideas about
recapitulationism are wrong
and why Martin is not making a useful contribution by his pointing to the
phylogeny/ontogeny relation, not
just the ontogenetic one. Perhaps in upcoming Ilyenkov seminar this will
become clearer??
mike

On Sat, Mar 29, 2008 at 8:01 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> I am currently reading Levi-Strauss's "The Savage Mind" (1962), which
> directly contradicts much of the view of the topic amongst the Vygotsky
> School (e.g. that the language of tribal people was poor in abstractions, or
> that their concepts are like complexes). I will raise this topic again when
> I have finished the book, but I'd be interested to know if there has been a
> previous discussion in print by CHAT theorists about Levi-Strauss's
> conception of "The Savage Mind".
>
> Andy
>
> At 06:26 AM 30/03/2008 +0400, you wrote:
>
> > Hi, Martin,
> >
> > you are touching upon the very interesting issue - the Vygotsky's
> > position
> > concerning the problem of interrelation between phylogenesis and
> > ontogenesis. Incidentally that is one of alternative formula of the
> > problem
> > of historicism, and thus one of the most evident demonstration of the
> > lack
> > of genuine historicism in Vygotsky's theorizing.
> > Vygotsky openly rejects Stanly Hall's recapitulation principle as
> > something
> > obviously naïve. We agree with him, it is utterly naïve to try to
> > explain
> > child's play with bow and arrows as a recapitulation of hunters stage in
> > human history or a play with sand pie as a recapitulation of
> > agricultural
> > stage. But he throws the baby out with the bathwater rejecting not only
> > naïve realization of the principle, but the principle as it is. In other
> > words rejecting the principle of recapitulation Vygotsky rejects the
> > historicism in understanding of humans consciousness. And the issue with
> > interrelation of thinking and speech is an obvious demonstration of it.
> > Let's call a spade a spade. Vygotsky realized the very first steps in
> > critical overcoming of old metaphysical psychology so that we can
> > compare
> > his role in the history of psychology with the role of Emmanuel Kant in
> > the
> > history of philosophy. You surely know that overcoming of the old
> > philosophical metaphysics needed in additional theoretic work, in
> > insights
> > of such great figures as Fichte, Shelling, Hegel and Marx. The same
> > situation we meet in psychology. To approach to dialectical psychology
> > we
> > need not to stick in Vygotsky's "cultural-historical theory" (BTW
> > Vygotsky
> > never claimed that he elaborated something that can be estimated as a
> > "theory" and never used the notion "cultural-historic" as the original
> > name
> > of his theoretic approach), but to follow the real history of
> > cultural-historic ideas in psychology after Vygotsky. I mean the ideas
> > of
> > A.N.Leont'ev and E.Il'enkov.
> > But not to sound proofless let's return to our sheep.
> > It is obvious that prior to try to find a dialectical interrelation
> > between
> > thinking and speech researcher needs to have dialectical notion of both
> > sides of interrelation. Otherwise he risks to face insoluble
> > contradictions
> > later.
> > What Vygotsky understood as thinking?
> > It's absolutely evident that he shared the sensualistic interpretation
> > of
> > thinking well-known in formal logic as a process of bringing of
> > sensually
> > perceived single instance under general concept. From this point of view
> > a
> > dull schoolchild who thoughtlessly acquire the skill of formal
> > operations
> > with words and can easily make formal group from words like "aryk"
> > (irrigation ditch in Central Asia), "water", "hoe" and "melon" has a
> > more
> > developed thinking, a thinking approaching the "scientific concepts",
> > whereas an illiterate peasant stands "on more primitive" stage so that
> > his
> > thinking can be estimated as only "thinking in complexes".
> > The same situation from dialectical perspective looks quite oppositely.
> > The
> > peasant who has a real skill of farming melons beyond all doubt has
> > genuine,
> > albeit practical, not theoretical concept (pon'atie) of all listed
> > objects
> > whereas our scholarlike schoolchild has only general notion (obschee
> > predstavlenie), understands only common meaning of words and there is
> > every
> > likelihood that he/she has only one real idea (pon'atie): how to eat
> > melons.
> > Thus the understanding of thinking in Vygotsky's theorizing is far from
> > dialectic not only materialistic dialectic of Marx, but idealistic one
> > of
> > Hegel as well.
> > Now let's consider Vygotsky's understanding of speech.
> > In his " Tool and sign in child's development" Vygotsky tells us highly
> > interesting experiment in which psychologist "plays" with a little child
> > in
> > renaming of objects.
> > Thus a child easily agrees to rename say a pencil into a spoon and acts
> > with
> > the pencil as with a spoon "feeding" a doll.
> > But the same child positively rejects a proposal to rename a knife into
> > a
> > chair. He/she looks at the experimenter with suspicion and "explains"
> > him
> > that it is quite impossible to rename a knife into a chair because it is
> > foolish to sit on the knife.
> > The key is Vygotsky's interpretation of this fact.
> > Vygotsky explains us that a child displays in this experiment the
> > undeveloped character of his/her thinking, that "a child doesn't
> > discovers
> > the relation between a sign and its meaning in the beginnings of speech
> > and
> > long after doesn't come to awareness of this connection" (Nel'zya
> > yasnee
> > vyrazit' tot fakt, chto rebenok ne otkryvaet svyazi mezhdu znakom i
> > znacheniem v samom nachale vozniknoveniya rechi i dolgoe vremya ne
> > prihodit
> > k osoznaniyu etoi svyazi).
> > Paying attention to this issue Vygotsky displays a brilliant researchers
> > intuition as well as complete misunderstanding of this interesting fact
> > from
> > dialectical perspective. From our point of view the child from the very
> > beginning of his/her life demonstrates the object oriented character of
> > his/her thinking. From this perspective the naming is an inalienable,
> > integral part of practical attitude to the object. For a child words are
> > means or tools of collaborative (with another human) object oriented
> > activity and not a mean for formal senseless operations or renaming.
> > Thus
> > his/her "naivety" is much more wise than "sophisticated" position of an
> > adult, playing with conventional meanings of words. Out of the mouth of
> > babes and sucklings... To rename a knife into a chair is a lie, and baby
> > protests against this falsification of reality. (Alas, lately most of us
> > lose this initial wise position and reconcile us to all forms of social
> > lie,
> > forfeiting thus the ability to objective thinking.)
> > In opposition to Vygotsky we insist that (after the age of approximately
> > two
> > months when occurs the complex of animation (kompleks ozhivleniya))
> > there is
> > no stage during which human thinking is not mediated with another
> > person.
> > The only distinction is that in the early age such mediation exists in
> > the
> > form of "real life language" (Marx), while later it supplements with the
> > verbal one. In other words there is no human thinking (acting) without
> > human
> > language as well as there is no human language in abstraction from real
> > object oriented activity = thinking. Thus the idea about separate roots
> > of
> > thinking and speech proves to be quite false, as well as an idea of
> > their
> > encounter and mutual fertilization.
> > Generally the dialectic never deals with "unities" of two different
> > things,
> > but only with identities of oppositions. An alive single whole splitting
> > to
> > opposite contradictory sides is inevitable basis of dialectical
> > movement,
> > its condition sine qua non.
> > And finally I don't really think that we can find the answers to our
> > questions in Vygotsky's texts. I do think that we can acquire it in real
> > process of investigation of urgent psychological and educational
> > problems.
> > Vygotsky sincerely declared his intention to elaborate new materialistic
> > as
> > well as dialectical psychology, which will be based on ideas of Spinoza
> > and
> > Marx and made the first steps in this direction. Our task is to continue
> > his
> > work.
> > Anyhow we, I mean Moscow group of Il'enkov's disciples philosophers and
> > psychologists, find both your articles utterly interesting as a
> > fundamental
> > attempt to settle very urgent problems. Now I am translating both of
> > your
> > articles into Russian (most of my friends knows only German ;-( ). We
> > are
> > planning to discuss them in detail.
> >
> > Sasha
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-bounces@weber.ucsd.edu]
> > On
> > Behalf Of Martin Packer
> > Sent: Saturday, March 29, 2008 8:36 PM
> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
> > Subject: Re: [xmca] Re: One more example: errors in
> > translation/interpretation
> >
> > Alexander,
> >
> > Can't we say that thinking and speech have independent roots within
> > individual ontogenesis, but that in the longer view of cultural
> > evolution
> > both have their origins in human biology? I don't have the texts in
> > front of
> > me, but this seems to me to be the line of Vygotsky's reasoning.
> >
> > Martin
> >
> >
> > On 3/24/08 10:59 PM, "Alexander Surmava" <monada@netvox.ru> wrote:
> >
> > > The first
> > > idea that thinking and speech have different and independent roots is
> > > basically incompatible with the next one concerning their
> > "dialectical"
> > > interaction. Those which are mutually alien are doomed to fruitful
> > > superficial relation and any genuine dialectical relation in this case
> > is
> > > totally impossible.
> >
> >
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>
> Andy Blunden : http://home.mira.net/~andy/<http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy/>tel (H) +61 3 9380 9435, mobile 0409 358 651
>
>
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Received on Sun Mar 30 06:26 PDT 2008

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