Here is the long-awaited (??) second part of my reply to Paul Dillon's
comments on my paper. Before I get on to Ilyenkov and concrete universals,
I'll just say a couple of fundamental things about dialectics, which I
think are relevant here.
There are I think two types of arguments as to why dialectics is a
preferable method of conceptualisation. The first is that its core concepts
(change, contradiction and interconnection) reflect the way that the world
really is and have a real existence which is not captured by commonsense
reasoning or formal logic. In this view, (which to my mind is the only
materialist foundation for dialectics), dialectical method flows from the
need to find ways that make those aspects of the world explicit and
understandable. The method of conceptualisation and the core concepts
therefore flow from generalising how that real existence can best be
captured in thought. Ollman gives a rather extreme version of this view,
writing:
"..nor does it provide a formula that enables us to prove or predict
anything; nor is it the motor force of history. The dialectic, as such,
explains nothing, proves nothing, predicts nothing and causes nothing to
happen. Rather, dialectics is a way of thinking that brings into focus the
full range of changes and interactions that occur in the world. ?it
includes how to organize a reality viewed in this manner for purposes of
study and how to present the results of what one finds to others?"
The second reifies the relationship between dialectic and its object so
that it comes to stand on its own as a collection of categories, rules and
methods, which can guarantee a 'good result' by a mechanical application to
a given problem. This rather easily becomes mystical schematism, as in
Stalinist 'diamat'. The categories and methods, themselves the product of a
high degree of generalisation and abstraction from the world, appear to
take on a life of their own. This is not to say that the categories etc.
cannot be applied, but that as categories, as the movement of thought, they
are themselves one-sided and abstract. For Hegel, these two approaches to
dialectics were identical precisely because he saw the movement of the
categories as the movement of the world. However, this is exactly "the
mystical shell" within which Marx saw "the rational kernel".
I'm not sure that Ilyenkov totally overcomes the dangers of schematism and
certainly when Paul uses expressions like "the concrete universal might be
considered the telos that guides the process of abstraction in Ilyenkov",
certain alarm bells start to ring. Ilyenkov, at least on Bakhurst's
account, seems to be caught between seeing the concrete universal as the
necessary essence of adequate conceptualisation (and hence the
pre-determined goal of dialectical method and analysis) and, on the other
hand, letting the conceptualisation take the path "demanded" (to use
Vygotsky's term) by the subject matter in the course of a critical exami
nation of it. (This again relates to the distinction between 'general
dialectics' and 'dialectics of x' that Vygotsky makes.) Thus, unlike Hegel,
Ilyenkov does not provide a general methodological path towards the
concrete universal beyond a transposition of the method of 'Capital', but
he still insists that in every area of knowledge a concrete universal must
lurk. This is probably because he realises precisely that providing a
universal method would lead back to Hegel-style mysticism (cf chapter 7 of
Dialectical Logic), but still insists that the concrete universal is the
only adequate goal of conceptualisation.
Thus Bakhurst states:
"Ilyenkov is warning the theorist not to try to establish the concrete
universal by appeal to some rule or law derived from logic, dialectics or
by abstract generalisation from the history of science. Rather, the
principle of organisation of the object of study will only be revealed by a
detailed analysis of the object itself?" (p.161)
He then goes on to describe how the method that Ilyenkov advocates in order
to do this:
"?the theorist's starting point is? a historically forged conception of
[the object] derived from the tradition in which he or she is working. It
is thus the object's presentation in this tradition which must form the
basis of the theorist's judgements about its concrete universal? the object
is presented to him or her as something problematic, as something ? not
fully understood. It is by exploring the 'contradictions' in our present
conceptions that the theorist can come to decide that a certain entity is
best seen as the principle of organization of the whole.
"In a sense, the theorist's choice of concrete universal is an intuition?
in the sense that it carries no guarantee of success." (p.162)
Now, coming back to my paper, as Paul points out, this was precisely the
method I used in applying the basic concepts of dialectics to information
systems. Yet I failed to come up with a "concrete universal" or a cell
form, though I think I did define a "concrete totality" (i.e. an adequate,
multi-facetted whole within which information systems modelling takes
place as one moment of the process as a whole) in the section "Modelling as
a dialectical process". There are three reasons why I might have failed to
find the concrete universal of information systems:
(1) Inadequate or incomplete conceptualisation of the subject matter. I
wasn't looking for a concrete universal and perhaps that's why I didn't
find one. Certainly I'll go back and look for candidates, though I'm a bit
doubtful that I'll find a single object that will fulfill that role.
(2) Inadequate or incomplete development of the object of study. This was
Paul's suggestion - that the real development of information systems had
not yet reached the point where the relevant entity had become apparent
While I generally like this historical approach, I do not think it holds up
in this particular case (for reasons I'm prepared to go into if anyone's
interested and which are hinted at in the paper on the Crisis of the IS
Discipline).
(3) Concrete universals are not an absolutely necessary feature of an
adequate conceptualisation - as implied by Bakhurst's (also Ilyenkov's?)
view that the search for one carries "no guarantee of success".
Before discussing whether (3) holds, I'll look a bit more at how concrete
universals are defined. Tony Smith ("Value Theory and Dialectics" Science
and Society, 62:3) states:
"In material reality there are systematic interconnections that unite
different elements within complex and dynamic wholes. Such wholes cannot be
adequately understood in terms of their individual moments taken separately
and in external relations to each other. The unity of complex wholes is as
much an ontological reality as the particular moments unified. And so Hegel
introduced the notion of a 'concrete universal' to capture the principle of
unity underlying the material complexity of dynamic wholes."
If all this is saying is that there must be an underlying unifying factor
to justify the choice of particular dynamic wholes as adequate
conceptualisations, then I don't have a problem with it. It seems also to
suggest that the 'principle of unity' may be found in taking the object as
a totality and looking at its processes of development. But Smith's
definition seems quite a way from Ilyenkov's statements which Bakhurst
generalises as "for any object O that is a concrete whole, there will be
some particular component C that determines the position of all the other
components. C is thought of as an elementary form of the whole." This
'cell-form' is "the essence of O." It seems to me that there is no
necessary reason why every area of knowledge should necessarily have this
structure, while, conversely, for Ilyenkov "the conception of a universal
concept underlying the entire system of the categories of science, applied
[in Capital] by Marx, cannot be explained by the specificity of the subject
matter of political economy. It reflects the universal dialectical law of
the unfolding of any objective concreteness?" (The Dialectics of the
Abstract and Concrete, p.224) Leaving aside that this sounds rather
mystical and is counterposed to Ilyenkov's insistence that we study the
specifics of each area of knowledge, his argument as to how we get to the
concrete universal seems to me to be circular. He states: "?the concrete
universal principle.. must be understood in science before any other and
first of all on its own merits, from the internally consistent concrete
universal contradictions. (DA&C, p.219)" If I understand this, it can only
mean that we study the cell-form prior to the object as a whole. But how
then do we know that it is a cell-form? Marx could only arrive at the
commodity as the cell-form of capitalism by studying capitalism as a whole
and showing that the contradictions of the whole were reflected in those of
the commodity.
I'm also far from convinced by his examples in chemistry and biology (DA&C,
p. 224-5), where he seems to me to be saying that to capture essences one
always has to start from the simplest, non-decomposable element of the
whole. But how then does one know where to start without first having a
conception (albeit in his terms an abstract universal) of the things simple
and more complex forms have in common, without at least a hypothesis of the
significance of the whole? So in general I would say that Ilyenkov seems to
be arguing a priori for the necessary existence of concrete universals
without demonstrating why that should be the case.
Perhaps this is connected to a feeling I have that his conceptions of
'concreteness', which he sees as the guarantee of adequate
conceptualisation is too absolute and mechanical. Even the best concrete
totality results from an analysis of some partial, context dependent slice
of reality and can therefore be subsumed in other totalities that are
equally adequate in terms of their own goals and definition. Lukacs'
definition of totality states:
"...first of all the concrete unity of interacting contradictions...;
secondly, the systematic relativity of all totality both upwards and
downwards (which means that all totality is made up of totalities
subordinated to it, and also that the totality in question is, at the same
time, overdetermined by totalities of a higher complexity...) and thirdly,
the historical relativity of all totality... [which] is changing,
disintegrating, confined to a determinate, concrete historical period."
The 'systematic relativity' seems to me to be missing here.
Having said all this, I'm not an Ilyenkov expert and it may be that I'm
missing something. But I think to make the case, it is necessary to do more
than show that the movement of the categories is consistent within its own
framework but to show in specific instances how it enables one to reach a
better understanding of the world.
Bruce
=====================================
Bruce Robinson
Information Systems Research Centre
University of Salford
Salford M5 4WT
UK
Phone / fax: 0161 861 7160
Email: bruce.rob@btinternet.com
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