>Dichotomies, in my experience, are of extremely restricted usefulness in
>general theoretical discussions, whether qual vs. quant, narrative vs
>expository argument, or nominal vs. real. Each of these dyads merely
>indexes the very large spaces of possibilities on many dimensions that
>address their concerns. There are neither just two sexes, nor just two
>genders; all category systems make _multiple_ contrasts on multiple
>dimensions, otherwise they would be pretty useless in practice. Adversarial
>genres of argumentation are the discursive meta-trap that attracts us
>unwisely toward merely symbolic dichotomizations.
But comparisons are dyadic, and most often we proceed in inquiry via
comparisons. Nominalism vs realism for instance is only one type of
ontological comparion but, like the bear named Pooh, i am of such little
brain that i can only juggle one comparative dimension at a time :-)
>"Qualitative" and "Quantitative" are mere placeholders in both the rather
>empty debates over research method and in the more significant issues of
>concrete research practices.
If the debate is only about method, then it is empty. If it is about the
worldviews that prescribe methods, then it is very important. I am well
aware that there are darned few nominalists in the hard sciences. but the
human sciences are full of them. the following thinkers are avowed
nominalists: Rorty, Nelson Goodman, Hilary Putnam, WVO Quine, Jerome
Bruner, Howard Gardner, and on and on. Their ideas certainly matter in the
realm of human sciences!
>When Gary Shank points to the deeper philosophical differences between the
>Schools, he is not, presumably denying that both quantitative and
>qualitative differences are useful and related, even complementary, kinds
>of meanings to make (surely Peirce thought so).
absolutely!
>We need a new _integrity_ for the use of quantitative methods. JAY.
>
one that is not nominalist, i perseveratively add :-)
>