Re: qual-quant differences and the difference it makes.....

Pedro Portes (prport01 who-is-at ulkyvm.louisville.edu)
Sat, 15 Nov 1997 11:57:57 -0500

Thank you Gary Shank for sharing your Piercian know-how and clarifying the
issues. I simple wish to add the following comments and ask a question or so.
My comment is that this Great Debate is also fueled by the means
individuals master in their respective communities of practice/training. My
general observation is that those who reject the quantitative do so not
only because of a clear philosophical set of beliefs that run squarely
against the world view of quants, but because they may not have mastered
the means, methods for multivariate stats etc and/or been alienated,
confused, hurt in attempting to do so. In fact, the emotional experience
may precede the search for the world view/philosophy that is to be found in
interpretative, qual communities of practice.
Once the quals are armed with, or master the rich philosophical means of
the interpretative camp, the tension can escalate, since as you point out,
at some level, it is cognitively dissonant to embrace both views.
On the other hand, quant folks who tend to master the methods/means/tools
earlier in communities of practice, who scoff at stereotypes of qual
research, are generally naive with regard to the philosophical
underpinnings of the qual camp. They tend to believe in the superiority of
their complex stats without realizing the complexity involved in doing top
notch qual. research. It is ususally later that quant. folks step beyond
their practice (in the context changes etc) and re-examine other
philosophical positions.
Few tend to master both sets of means, qual and quant but it seems that it
is in the not knowing about the other where the orthodoxy sets in most.
So here I am baking into consideration the identity formation process for
those who develop a research subcomponent/domain which might be linked with
Erikson's ideological domain (Psychosocial theory).
In that model, we have those who start out as naive, diffused and explore
their potential identities. When the exploration becomes too
conflicting/difficult, some foreclose into one position or another and tend
to remain fixed. The social support of a community of practice helps here.
Others keep that stressful, open position and do not fully committ one way
or another but search further before achieving their own epistemic stance
or position. This is a stage before possibly resolving the perceived
conflicts. Later some may become part of a fourth group ("Achieved") which
struggles and comes to a position/identity. They tend to be more open
minded than the foreclosed group where only one set of means/tools were
developed.
So again I have to think that it is the tools that mediate or with which we
mediate research activity that often pull the ideology in actual terms.
I think intransigency, narrowness is more common during the earlier parts
of the journey, seniors of both camps begin to see the quant in the qual
and the qual. in the quant, the relativity and the need to have both sorts
of tools, philsophical and methodological, operating on a given problem. I
think this is where Vera and others see, that in spite of your very
understandable observation about the inherent contradiction involved here,
that integration is possible.

Question. Could you give examples or scenarios of research
problems/qustions to illustrate the things below? pedro

At 02:10 PM 11/13/97 +0300, you wrote:
For Peirce, things can be real in three important ways:
>they can be real as open possibilities, they can be real as existing
>phenomena, and they can be real as mediated entities. In contrast, the
>Nominalist can only take the second category seriously. The first category
>is dismissed out of hand, and the third category is constantly being
>re-defined as aggregates of existing phenomena. When people attack
>quantitative assumptions and models, I think they are really trying to
>attack Nominalist thinking and positions, without being able to articulate
>what it is they want to do. Likewise, qual people are constantly at risk
>of falling into old and familiar nominalist assumptions and thinking
>patterns. It is no wonder the waters are so muddy.....
>
>I could go on and on, but let me sum up here. The so-called qual vs quant
>debate is a debate between nominalism and realism. These positions are
>totally at odds with one another -- to see this consider the vast
>differences between the Realist Peirce and the Nominalist Rorty, in spite
>of the fact that each calls himself a 'pragmatist.' The people, such as
>Graham, who say that the two methods can be reconciled, are simply calling
>for a return to nominalism pure and simple. I think that the idea of a
>genuinely realist and semiotic approach to empirical inquiry is extremely
>exciting, and i have no desire to reach any reconciliation with nominalism
>(which i feel is at heart fatally flawed).
>end of rant :-)
>
>gary shank
>shank who-is-at duq.edu
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P. R. Portes
Professor
Educational & Counseling
Psychology Dept. 310
University of Louisville
KY 40292
Fax- 502-852-0629
Of. Tel. 502-852-0630