[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

Tue Aug 20 14:03:29 PDT 2013

Huw,
I wonder if it might be worthwhile to add another "aspect" to it. And
again, to Lubomir's point, I wonder if this is even possible - to bring in
something from a different tradition.
-greg

On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:

> On 19 August 2013 22:57, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Huw,
> > I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here.
> > So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives are
> > sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity has at its
> > goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals - and,
> > thank you for taking my interests into account here!!).
> > I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition of
> > "activity."
> > -greg
> > p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry described
> nicely
> > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at
> > its center a sovereign subject.
>
>
> You disagree with it?  Or you wish to go beyond it?
>
> Do you want a genetic theory or a descriptive method?
>
>
> > My post questioning the merging of
> > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual
> > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work.
> >
>
> The "the notion of sensory fabric" email?  That seems fine to me.  I would
> call that memory.
>
> Best,
> Huw
>
>
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> > >wrote:
> >
> > > I don't mind the chatter.  :)
> > >
> > > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve.  Is there
> something
> > > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding
> social
> > > situations.
> > >
> > > Huw
> > >
> > > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Larry,
> > > > This is great.
> > > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write:
> > > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a
> > > *voice*
> > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to
> > gain a
> > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced*
> > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that
> > in
> > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]"
> > > >
> > > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a
> > > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about
> people
> > > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in
> > some
> > > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly
> > > like
> > > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"?
> > > >
> > > > -greg
> > > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list
> since
> > > this
> > > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the
> > list.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Greg,
> > > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities*
> > > > > He suggests three realms of knowing.
> > > > > 1] knowing that
> > > > > 2] knowing how
> > > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within.
> > > > >
> > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning
> activity*.
> > > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how
> > > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn."
> > > > >
> > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing
> > > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW.
> > > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a
> > > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the
> second
> > > > kind.
> > > > >
> > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third
> > > kind:
> > > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms.
> > > > Knowing
> > > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various
> > centers
> > > of
> > > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the
> > permitted
> > > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses]
> > > > >
> > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a
> > > > *voice*
> > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to
> > > gain a
> > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of
> *unvoiced*
> > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing
> that
> > > in
> > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]
> > > > >
> > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot
> be
> > > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing].
> > This
> > > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation,
> > institution
> > > > or
> > > > > society.
> > > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of
> giving
> > > > this
> > > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice.
> > > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the
> > > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded
> > and
> > > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as
> already
> > > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated
> > by
> > > > the
> > > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are
> > > negotiated
> > > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse.
> > > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of
> > > practical
> > > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct
> > from
> > > > the
> > > > > realm of *framing*.
> > > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that
> > the
> > > > FELT
> > > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and
> > > action.
> > > > >
> > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear?
> > > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis
> > > > sensus*
> > > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue.
> > > > > And a section on Vygotsky.
> > > > >
> > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint
> > action.
> > > > >
> > > > > Larry
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson
> > > > > <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Larry,
> > > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections.
> > > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you
> have
> > a
> > > > > cite?
> > > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline?
> > > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea
> of a
> > > > third
> > > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the
> > first
> > > > and
> > > > > > second realms were?
> > > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm
> is?
> > > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > > -greg
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss <
> > lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Anti,
> > > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she
> > weaves
> > > > > > together
> > > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis.
> > > > > > > Two quick comments.
> > > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are
> > > > > alternatives
> > > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm
> > *agency*
> > > > but
> > > > > a
> > > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and
> participating
> > > > > within
> > > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also
> exhibit
> > > > > > *agency*
> > > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance.
> > > > > > > 2nd
> > > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*.
> > Metaphors
> > > > may
> > > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or
> > > kinds].
> > > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of
> > > > > *seeing*
> > > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides
> > our
> > > > > > > anticipations going forward.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing*
> [not
> > as
> > > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing]
> > > > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third
> > > realm]
> > > > > > that
> > > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight.
> > > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he
> suggests
> > is
> > > > > > entered
> > > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*.
> > > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor
> of
> > > > > > *framing*.
> > > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging
> > within
> > > > > micro
> > > > > > > processes.  Mike cautions we are referring to different time
> > > scales.
> > > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in
> plain
> > > > view.
> > > > > > When
> > > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's
> 3
> > > > > types].
> > > > > > I
> > > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm
> > [captured
> > > in
> > > > > the
> > > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's  metaphor of
> > framing
> > > > [as
> > > > > > > previously FORMED frames]
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a
> > difference
> > > > > then
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection.
> > > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated
> > > > > > > Larry
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala <
> > ajrajala@gmail.com>
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a
> > frame
> > > > of
> > > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the
> > > > legacies
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that
> > there
> > > > are
> > > > > > many
> > > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work.
> > Some
> > > > say
> > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated
> with
> > > > > > symbolic
> > > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological
> > sociology.
> > > > > Where
> > > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological
> > approach
> > > > > seems
> > > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and
> > embodiment
> > > > > within
> > > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process
> > embedded
> > > > > within
> > > > > > > an
> > > > > > > > historically
> > > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both
> Vygotskian
> > > > > > > perspectives
> > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of
> > scientific
> > > > and
> > > > > > > > workplace practice
> > > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on
> > the
> > > > > > details
> > > > > > > > of language
> > > > > > > > use and conversational organization."
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of
> > > language
> > > > > use
> > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in
> > > > > > particular,
> > > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT
> > work,
> > > > we
> > > > > > > mainly
> > > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's
> work
> > on
> > > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the
> > > relationships
> > > > > > > between
> > > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of
> > > students
> > > > > in a
> > > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice
> > > > > interaction
> > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting
> on
> > > the
> > > > > part
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > the bird expert.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very
> > > > > compatible
> > > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and
> > being
> > > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the
> > socio-emotional
> > > > > > issues
> > > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with
> > what
> > > > > Larry
> > > > > > > has
> > > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I
> wonder
> > > > > whether
> > > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that
> > > emphasizes
> > > > > such
> > > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding
> > > > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger Säljö has explored
> > > > > > > ethnomethodological
> > > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of
> > > > > > sociocultural
> > > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika
> > Lantz-Andersson:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create
> > > certain
> > > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether
> > > > > > 'cognitive',
> > > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my
> > knowledge
> > > > > > > Greeno's
> > > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much
> > on
> > > > > > > emotional
> > > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association
> with
> > > > frames
> > > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman).  "This refers to ways in which
> > an
> > > > > > > individual
> > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in
> > > > > interactions
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental
> > > session
> > > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A
> Theory
> > > Bite
> > > > > on
> > > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son
> > and
> > > > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386)
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Greg wrote:
> > > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which
> > > > > > motivations
> > > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a
> > certain
> > > > > > extent"
> > > > > > > -
> > > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames
> > > bring
> > > > > with
> > > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!"
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and
> > > > individuals
> > > > > > can
> > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity
> is
> > > > > framed
> > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual
> > > > develops
> > > > > a
> > > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal
> sense.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement
> of
> > > > > > stability
> > > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A
> > > > > colleague
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become
> > > > > > > legitimately
> > > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Antti
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole <
> lchcmike@gmail.com
> > >
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
> > relation,
> > > > > along
> > > > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to
> say,
> > > and
> > > > > > > > thought,
> > > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the
> > > > > stability
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic
> > > > processes
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > sense making capturable with
> > > > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent."
> > > Even
> > > > > > > > dictionary
> > > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in
> > the
> > > > > > history
> > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's
> > > vocabularies
> > > > in
> > > > > > > > > ontogeny.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales
> in
> > > mind
> > > > > in
> > > > > > > > these
> > > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
> > > > > > > > > mike
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > --
> > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >
>

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Visiting Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson