[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

[Huw Lloyd]

On 19 August 2013 22:57, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:

> Huw,
> I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here.
> So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives are
> sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity has at its
> goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals - and,
> thank you for taking my interests into account here!!).
> I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition of
> "activity."
> -greg
> p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry described nicely
> what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at
> its center a sovereign subject.


You disagree with it?  Or you wish to go beyond it?

Do you want a genetic theory or a descriptive method?


> My post questioning the merging of
> phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual
> concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work.
>

The "the notion of sensory fabric" email?  That seems fine to me.  I would
call that memory.

Best,
Huw


>
>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >wrote:
>
> > I don't mind the chatter.  :)
> >
> > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve.  Is there something
> > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding social
> > situations.
> >
> > Huw
> >
> > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Larry,
> > > This is great.
> > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write:
> > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a
> > *voice*
> > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to
> gain a
> > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced*
> > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that
> in
> > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]"
> > >
> > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a
> > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about people
> > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in
> some
> > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly
> > like
> > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"?
> > >
> > > -greg
> > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list since
> > this
> > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the
> list.
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > > Greg,
> > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities*
> > > > He suggests three realms of knowing.
> > > > 1] knowing that
> > > > 2] knowing how
> > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within.
> > > >
> > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*.
> > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how
> > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn."
> > > >
> > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing
> > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW.
> > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a
> > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second
> > > kind.
> > > >
> > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third
> > kind:
> > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms.
> > > Knowing
> > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various
> centers
> > of
> > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the
> permitted
> > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses]
> > > >
> > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a
> > > *voice*
> > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to
> > gain a
> > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced*
> > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that
> > in
> > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]
> > > >
> > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be
> > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing].
> This
> > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation,
> institution
> > > or
> > > > society.
> > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving
> > > this
> > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice.
> > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the
> > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded
> and
> > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already
> > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated
> by
> > > the
> > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are
> > negotiated
> > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse.
> > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of
> > practical
> > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct
> from
> > > the
> > > > realm of *framing*.
> > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that
> the
> > > FELT
> > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and
> > action.
> > > >
> > > > Greg, I hope this was clear?
> > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis
> > > sensus*
> > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue.
> > > > And a section on Vygotsky.
> > > >
> > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint
> action.
> > > >
> > > > Larry
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson
> > > > <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Larry,
> > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections.
> > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have
> a
> > > > cite?
> > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline?
> > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a
> > > third
> > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the
> first
> > > and
> > > > > second realms were?
> > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is?
> > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > -greg
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss <
> lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Anti,
> > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she
> weaves
> > > > > together
> > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis.
> > > > > > Two quick comments.
> > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are
> > > > alternatives
> > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm
> *agency*
> > > but
> > > > a
> > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating
> > > > within
> > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit
> > > > > *agency*
> > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance.
> > > > > > 2nd
> > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*.
> Metaphors
> > > may
> > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or
> > kinds].
> > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of
> > > > *seeing*
> > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides
> our
> > > > > > anticipations going forward.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not
> as
> > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing]
> > > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third
> > realm]
> > > > > that
> > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight.
> > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests
> is
> > > > > entered
> > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*.
> > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of
> > > > > *framing*.
> > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging
> within
> > > > micro
> > > > > > processes.  Mike cautions we are referring to different time
> > scales.
> > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain
> > > view.
> > > > > When
> > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3
> > > > types].
> > > > > I
> > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm
> [captured
> > in
> > > > the
> > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's  metaphor of
> framing
> > > [as
> > > > > > previously FORMED frames]
> > > > > >
> > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a
> difference
> > > > then
> > > > > a
> > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection.
> > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated
> > > > > > Larry
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala <
> ajrajala@gmail.com>
> > > > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a
> frame
> > > of
> > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the
> > > legacies
> > > > of
> > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that
> there
> > > are
> > > > > many
> > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work.
> Some
> > > say
> > > > > that
> > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with
> > > > > symbolic
> > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological
> sociology.
> > > > Where
> > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these?
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological
> approach
> > > > seems
> > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and
> embodiment
> > > > within
> > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process
> embedded
> > > > within
> > > > > > an
> > > > > > > historically
> > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian
> > > > > > perspectives
> > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of
> scientific
> > > and
> > > > > > > workplace practice
> > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on
> the
> > > > > details
> > > > > > > of language
> > > > > > > use and conversational organization."
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of
> > language
> > > > use
> > > > > > and
> > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in
> > > > > particular,
> > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT
> work,
> > > we
> > > > > > mainly
> > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work
> on
> > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the
> > relationships
> > > > > > between
> > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of
> > students
> > > > in a
> > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice
> > > > interaction
> > > > > is
> > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on
> > the
> > > > part
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > the bird expert.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very
> > > > compatible
> > > > > > with
> > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and
> being
> > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the
> socio-emotional
> > > > > issues
> > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with
> what
> > > > Larry
> > > > > > has
> > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder
> > > > whether
> > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that
> > emphasizes
> > > > such
> > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding
> > > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger Säljö has explored
> > > > > > ethnomethodological
> > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of
> > > > > sociocultural
> > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika
> Lantz-Andersson:
> > > > > > >
> > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create
> > certain
> > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether
> > > > > 'cognitive',
> > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my
> knowledge
> > > > > > Greeno's
> > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much
> on
> > > > > > emotional
> > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with
> > > frames
> > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman).  "This refers to ways in which
> an
> > > > > > individual
> > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in
> > > > interactions
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental
> > session
> > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory
> > Bite
> > > > on
> > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son
> and
> > > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Greg wrote:
> > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which
> > > > > motivations
> > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a
> certain
> > > > > extent"
> > > > > > -
> > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames
> > bring
> > > > with
> > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!"
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and
> > > individuals
> > > > > can
> > > > > > be
> > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is
> > > > framed
> > > > > in
> > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual
> > > develops
> > > > a
> > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of
> > > > > stability
> > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A
> > > > colleague
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become
> > > > > > legitimately
> > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Antti
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
> relation,
> > > > along
> > > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say,
> > and
> > > > > > > thought,
> > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the
> > > > stability
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic
> > > processes
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > > sense making capturable with
> > > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent."
> > Even
> > > > > > > dictionary
> > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in
> the
> > > > > history
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's
> > vocabularies
> > > in
> > > > > > > > ontogeny.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in
> > mind
> > > > in
> > > > > > > these
> > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
> > > > > > > > mike
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > Department of Anthropology
> > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > Brigham Young University
> > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Visiting Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>