[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

Mon Aug 19 14:57:57 PDT 2013

Huw,
I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here.
So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives are
sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity has at its
goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals - and,
thank you for taking my interests into account here!!).
I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition of
"activity."
-greg
p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry described nicely
what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at
its center a sovereign subject. My post questioning the merging of
phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual
concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work.

On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>wrote:

> I don't mind the chatter.  :)
>
> But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve.  Is there something
> you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding social
> situations.
>
> Huw
>
> On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Larry,
> > This is great.
> > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write:
> > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a
> *voice*
> > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a
> > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced*
> > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in
> > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]"
> >
> > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a
> > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about people
> > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in some
> > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly
> like
> > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"?
> >
> > -greg
> > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list since
> this
> > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the list.
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Greg,
> > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities*
> > > He suggests three realms of knowing.
> > > 1] knowing that
> > > 2] knowing how
> > > 3] knowing from or knowing within.
> > >
> > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*.
> > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how
> > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn."
> > >
> > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing
> > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW.
> > > John would say this explanation is composed in a
> > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second
> > kind.
> > >
> > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third
> kind:
> > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms.
> > Knowing
> > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various centers
> of
> > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the permitted
> > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses]
> > >
> > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a
> > *voice*
> > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to
> gain a
> > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced*
> > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that
> in
> > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]
> > >
> > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be
> > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. This
> > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, institution
> > or
> > > society.
> > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving
> > this
> > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice.
> > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the
> > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded and
> > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already
> > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated by
> > the
> > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are
> negotiated
> > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse.
> > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of
> practical
> > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct from
> > the
> > > realm of *framing*.
> > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that the
> > FELT
> > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and
> action.
> > >
> > > Greg, I hope this was clear?
> > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis
> > sensus*
> > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue.
> > > And a section on Vygotsky.
> > >
> > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint action.
> > >
> > > Larry
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson
> > > <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:
> > >
> > > > Larry,
> > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections.
> > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a
> > > cite?
> > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline?
> > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a
> > third
> > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the first
> > and
> > > > second realms were?
> > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is?
> > > > Thanks,
> > > > -greg
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Anti,
> > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves
> > > > together
> > > > > CHAT and frame analysis.
> > > > > Two quick comments.
> > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are
> > > alternatives
> > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency*
> > but
> > > a
> > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating
> > > within
> > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit
> > > > *agency*
> > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance.
> > > > > 2nd
> > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors
> > may
> > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or
> kinds].
> > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of
> > > *seeing*
> > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our
> > > > > anticipations going forward.
> > > > >
> > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as
> > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing]
> > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third
> realm]
> > > > that
> > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight.
> > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is
> > > > entered
> > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*.
> > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of
> > > > *framing*.
> > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within
> > > micro
> > > > > processes.  Mike cautions we are referring to different time
> scales.
> > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain
> > view.
> > > > When
> > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3
> > > types].
> > > > I
> > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured
> in
> > > the
> > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's  metaphor of framing
> > [as
> > > > > previously FORMED frames]
> > > > >
> > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference
> > > then
> > > > a
> > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection.
> > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated
> > > > > Larry
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala <ajrajala@gmail.com>
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame
> > of
> > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the
> > legacies
> > > of
> > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there
> > are
> > > > many
> > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some
> > say
> > > > that
> > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with
> > > > symbolic
> > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology.
> > > Where
> > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach
> > > seems
> > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment
> > > within
> > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded
> > > within
> > > > > an
> > > > > > historically
> > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian
> > > > > perspectives
> > > > > > and
> > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific
> > and
> > > > > > workplace practice
> > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the
> > > > details
> > > > > > of language
> > > > > > use and conversational organization."
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of
> language
> > > use
> > > > > and
> > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in
> > > > particular,
> > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work,
> > we
> > > > > mainly
> > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on
> > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the
> relationships
> > > > > between
> > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of
> students
> > > in a
> > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice
> > > interaction
> > > > is
> > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on
> the
> > > part
> > > > > of
> > > > > > the bird expert.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very
> > > compatible
> > > > > with
> > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being
> > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional
> > > > issues
> > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what
> > > Larry
> > > > > has
> > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder
> > > whether
> > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that
> emphasizes
> > > such
> > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding
> > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger Säljö has explored
> > > > > ethnomethodological
> > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of
> > > > sociocultural
> > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson:
> > > > > >
> > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create
> certain
> > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether
> > > > 'cognitive',
> > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge
> > > > > Greeno's
> > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on
> > > > > emotional
> > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with
> > frames
> > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman).  "This refers to ways in which an
> > > > > individual
> > > > > > is
> > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in
> > > interactions
> > > > > of
> > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental
> session
> > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory
> Bite
> > > on
> > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and
> > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Greg wrote:
> > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which
> > > > motivations
> > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain
> > > > extent"
> > > > > -
> > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames
> bring
> > > with
> > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and
> > individuals
> > > > can
> > > > > be
> > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is
> > > framed
> > > > in
> > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual
> > develops
> > > a
> > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of
> > > > stability
> > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A
> > > colleague
> > > > of
> > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become
> > > > > legitimately
> > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Antti
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation,
> > > along
> > > > > > with
> > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say,
> and
> > > > > > thought,
> > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the
> > > stability
> > > > of
> > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic
> > processes
> > > > of
> > > > > > > sense making capturable with
> > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent."
> Even
> > > > > > dictionary
> > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the
> > > > history
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's
> vocabularies
> > in
> > > > > > > ontogeny.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in
> mind
> > > in
> > > > > > these
> > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
> > > > > > > mike
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > --
> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > >
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > Department of Anthropology
> > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > Brigham Young University
> > Provo, UT 84602
> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> >
>

-- 
Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
Visiting Assistant Professor
Department of Anthropology
883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
Brigham Young University
Provo, UT 84602
http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson