[Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities

Tue Aug 20 14:15:35 PDT 2013

On 20 August 2013 22:03, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> wrote:

> Huw,
> I wonder if it might be worthwhile to add another "aspect" to it. And
> again, to Lubomir's point, I wonder if this is even possible - to bring in
> something from a different tradition.
> -greg
>

If you're willing to do the philosophical and theoretic work, I see no
reason why not.  The world we are referring to is one.  If one of your
systems of thought doesn't recognise that, then "repairing" that may be
your starting place.

For example, in recent work I have been studying the integration of natural
systems/functional views with Russian Marxian dialectics.  They are
compatible but ones needs to a good amount of work to identify their
relations (to the degree of precision one requires).

Huw

>
>
>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> >wrote:
>
> > On 19 August 2013 22:57, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > > Huw,
> > > I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here.
> > > So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives are
> > > sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity has at
> its
> > > goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals -
> and,
> > > thank you for taking my interests into account here!!).
> > > I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition of
> > > "activity."
> > > -greg
> > > p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry described
> > nicely
> > > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have
> at
> > > its center a sovereign subject.
> >
> >
> > You disagree with it?  Or you wish to go beyond it?
> >
> > Do you want a genetic theory or a descriptive method?
> >
> >
> > > My post questioning the merging of
> > > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual
> > > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work.
> > >
> >
> > The "the notion of sensory fabric" email?  That seems fine to me.  I
> would
> > call that memory.
> >
> > Best,
> > Huw
> >
> >
> > >
> > >
> > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com
> > > >wrote:
> > >
> > > > I don't mind the chatter.  :)
> > > >
> > > > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve.  Is there
> > something
> > > > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding
> > social
> > > > situations.
> > > >
> > > > Huw
> > > >
> > > > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Larry,
> > > > > This is great.
> > > > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write:
> > > > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a
> > > > *voice*
> > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to
> > > gain a
> > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of
> *unvoiced*
> > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing
> that
> > > in
> > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]"
> > > > >
> > > > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have
> a
> > > > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about
> > people
> > > > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist
> in
> > > some
> > > > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd
> certainly
> > > > like
> > > > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"?
> > > > >
> > > > > -greg
> > > > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list
> > since
> > > > this
> > > > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the
> > > list.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com
> >
> > > > wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Greg,
> > > > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities*
> > > > > > He suggests three realms of knowing.
> > > > > > 1] knowing that
> > > > > > 2] knowing how
> > > > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning
> > activity*.
> > > > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS
> how
> > > > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn."
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational
> knowing
> > > > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW.
> > > > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a
> > > > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the
> > second
> > > > > kind.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the
> third
> > > > kind:
> > > > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between
> realms.
> > > > > Knowing
> > > > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various
> > > centers
> > > > of
> > > > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the
> > > permitted
> > > > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses]
> > > > > >
> > > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without
> a
> > > > > *voice*
> > > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were
> to
> > > > gain a
> > > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of
> > *unvoiced*
> > > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing
> > that
> > > > in
> > > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]
> > > > > >
> > > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that
> cannot
> > be
> > > > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing].
> > > This
> > > > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation,
> > > institution
> > > > > or
> > > > > > society.
> > > > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of
> > giving
> > > > > this
> > > > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice.
> > > > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the
> > > > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively
> bounded
> > > and
> > > > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as
> > already
> > > > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is
> fascinated
> > > by
> > > > > the
> > > > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are
> > > > negotiated
> > > > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse.
> > > > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of
> > > > practical
> > > > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice*
> distinct
> > > from
> > > > > the
> > > > > > realm of *framing*.
> > > > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action*
> that
> > > the
> > > > > FELT
> > > > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and
> > > > action.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear?
> > > > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of
> *communis
> > > > > sensus*
> > > > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue.
> > > > > > And a section on Vygotsky.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint
> > > action.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Larry
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson
> > > > > > <greg.a.thompson@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Larry,
> > > > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections.
> > > > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you
> > have
> > > a
> > > > > > cite?
> > > > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline?
> > > > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea
> > of a
> > > > > third
> > > > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the
> > > first
> > > > > and
> > > > > > > second realms were?
> > > > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm
> > is?
> > > > > > > Thanks,
> > > > > > > -greg
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss <
> > > lpscholar2@gmail.com>
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Anti,
> > > > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she
> > > weaves
> > > > > > > together
> > > > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis.
> > > > > > > > Two quick comments.
> > > > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are
> > > > > > alternatives
> > > > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm
> > > *agency*
> > > > > but
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and
> > participating
> > > > > > within
> > > > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also
> > exhibit
> > > > > > > *agency*
> > > > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance.
> > > > > > > > 2nd
> > > > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*.
> > > Metaphors
> > > > > may
> > > > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or
> > > > kinds].
> > > > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes
> of
> > > > > > *seeing*
> > > > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing
> guides
> > > our
> > > > > > > > anticipations going forward.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing*
> > [not
> > > as
> > > > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing]
> > > > > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a
> third
> > > > realm]
> > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight.
> > > > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he
> > suggests
> > > is
> > > > > > > entered
> > > > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*.
> > > > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor
> > of
> > > > > > > *framing*.
> > > > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging
> > > within
> > > > > > micro
> > > > > > > > processes.  Mike cautions we are referring to different time
> > > > scales.
> > > > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in
> > plain
> > > > > view.
> > > > > > > When
> > > > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration
> [Andy's
> > 3
> > > > > > types].
> > > > > > > I
> > > > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm
> > > [captured
> > > > in
> > > > > > the
> > > > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's  metaphor of
> > > framing
> > > > > [as
> > > > > > > > previously FORMED frames]
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a
> > > difference
> > > > > > then
> > > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative
> reflection.
> > > > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated
> > > > > > > > Larry
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala <
> > > ajrajala@gmail.com>
> > > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a
> > > frame
> > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the
> > > > > legacies
> > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that
> > > there
> > > > > are
> > > > > > > many
> > > > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work.
> > > Some
> > > > > say
> > > > > > > that
> > > > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated
> > with
> > > > > > > symbolic
> > > > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological
> > > sociology.
> > > > > > Where
> > > > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these?
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological
> > > approach
> > > > > > seems
> > > > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and
> > > embodiment
> > > > > > within
> > > > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process
> > > embedded
> > > > > > within
> > > > > > > > an
> > > > > > > > > historically
> > > > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both
> > Vygotskian
> > > > > > > > perspectives
> > > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of
> > > scientific
> > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > workplace practice
> > > > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus
> on
> > > the
> > > > > > > details
> > > > > > > > > of language
> > > > > > > > > use and conversational organization."
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of
> > > > language
> > > > > > use
> > > > > > > > and
> > > > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions,
> in
> > > > > > > particular,
> > > > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT
> > > work,
> > > > > we
> > > > > > > > mainly
> > > > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's
> > work
> > > on
> > > > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the
> > > > relationships
> > > > > > > > between
> > > > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of
> > > > students
> > > > > > in a
> > > > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice
> > > > > > interaction
> > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting
> > on
> > > > the
> > > > > > part
> > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > the bird expert.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very
> > > > > > compatible
> > > > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and
> > > being
> > > > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the
> > > socio-emotional
> > > > > > > issues
> > > > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line
> with
> > > what
> > > > > > Larry
> > > > > > > > has
> > > > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I
> > wonder
> > > > > > whether
> > > > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that
> > > > emphasizes
> > > > > > such
> > > > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding
> > > > > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger Säljö has explored
> > > > > > > > ethnomethodological
> > > > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of
> > > > > > > sociocultural
> > > > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika
> > > Lantz-Andersson:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > >
> https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create
> > > > certain
> > > > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether
> > > > > > > 'cognitive',
> > > > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my
> > > knowledge
> > > > > > > > Greeno's
> > > > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that
> much
> > > on
> > > > > > > > emotional
> > > > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association
> > with
> > > > > frames
> > > > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman).  "This refers to ways in
> which
> > > an
> > > > > > > > individual
> > > > > > > > > is
> > > > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in
> > > > > > interactions
> > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental
> > > > session
> > > > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A
> > Theory
> > > > Bite
> > > > > > on
> > > > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to
> Son
> > > and
> > > > > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386)
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Greg wrote:
> > > > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in
> which
> > > > > > > motivations
> > > > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a
> > > certain
> > > > > > > extent"
> > > > > > > > -
> > > > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus,
> frames
> > > > bring
> > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!"
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and
> > > > > individuals
> > > > > > > can
> > > > > > > > be
> > > > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an
> activity
> > is
> > > > > > framed
> > > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual
> > > > > develops
> > > > > > a
> > > > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal
> > sense.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement
> > of
> > > > > > > stability
> > > > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too.
> A
> > > > > > colleague
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to
> become
> > > > > > > > legitimately
> > > > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense.
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > Antti
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole <
> > lchcmike@gmail.com
> > > >
> > > > > > wrote:
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
> > > relation,
> > > > > > along
> > > > > > > > > with
> > > > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to
> > say,
> > > > and
> > > > > > > > > thought,
> > > > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating
> the
> > > > > > stability
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic
> > > > > processes
> > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > sense making capturable with
> > > > > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context
> independent."
> > > > Even
> > > > > > > > > dictionary
> > > > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest
> in
> > > the
> > > > > > > history
> > > > > > > > > of
> > > > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's
> > > > vocabularies
> > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > > ontogeny.
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales
> > in
> > > > mind
> > > > > > in
> > > > > > > > > these
> > > > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to
> do.
> > > > > > > > > > mike
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > --
> > > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > > > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > --
> > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > > > Department of Anthropology
> > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > > > Brigham Young University
> > > > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > > > >
> > > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > --
> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> > > Visiting Assistant Professor
> > > Department of Anthropology
> > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> > > Brigham Young University
> > > Provo, UT 84602
> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
> > >
> >
>
>
>
> --
> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D.
> Visiting Assistant Professor
> Department of Anthropology
> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower
> Brigham Young University
> Provo, UT 84602
> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson
>