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Re: [xmca] Space, neighbourhood, dwelling in, in*formation as notions with a "family resemblance"

To recover some of the past discussion Larry is referring to, we can review his post from March 2010 in the archives here:


I think Andy has since elaborated on the list of approaches to concepts/materiality that appears in that post, but I'm not sure of the best place to find his subsequent elaborations.

On Sat, 24 Sep 2011, Larry Purss wrote:

Hi Christine, Mike, Ivan,  Tony and others exploring the dialectical
interweaving [spiralling] of the concepts of "moving fluidity", "e-motion",
"artifacticity", "sedimentation" "concepts as historically developed ways of
life" "in*formation" etc.

Mike, I would suggest that bringing back emotion [possibly through the
concept of moving fluidity] is one line of concepts which must be
interweaved [as con-text] into the dialogue.
I'm wondering if you have an archived article by Zinchenko that could begin
this line of inquiry.

How "fluidity of movement as ecology of life" and "artifacts" as sedimented
structures or forms  [ "open" boundaries contrasted with "contained"
boundaries] seems to be an evolving topic.

"Matter" [in both senses of matter "as form" and as "mattering
connections"]  is a recurring theme I'm grappling with in trying to grasp
these key concepts.

In particular the noton of "subjectification" as NECESSARY for the
development of a "sense" of subjectivity or center of consciousness. Then we
get into what is "center" in space?  Ivan your bringing in Jay Lemke's
exploration of "parts and wholes" was very helpful.  Andy's notion of
"concepts" as "materiality" [in the sense of interconnections not essences
that are HISTORICALLY developed as social formations] is also intriguing.

Mike, if Zinchenko, Anna Stetsenko, Rey, and others in the CHAT tradition
are re-engaging with notions of "subjectivity" this may be an approach that
can also bridge back to action research as Christine discusses in the other
current post.  It seems ISCAR [the book on Vygotsky in the 21st century and
the seminar] is also grappling with this issue within the tradition of CHT
[and CHAT?]

What do others think
On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 8:03 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:

That is a whole lot to take in, Christine, over even to hold still for

One underlying intuition that seemed to be consistent across your example
thinkers and ideas we that of fluidity, of living movement. This put me
much in mind of
Vladimir P. Zinchenko. VPZ sites various russian scholars including
Bernshtein, who come up with ideas such as "living movement." Bernshtein is
said to have likened living movement to a spiders web waving in the breeze.

there is an issue of journal of russian and east european psych coming out
with several of VPZ's ideas. I'll keep an eye out for it.


PS- re fluidity, you get this kind of statement from Ingold:

an organism can be thought of as "a flow of material substance in a space
that is topologically fluid. I conclude that the organism (animal or human)
should be understood not as a bounded entity surrounded by an environment
but as an unbounded entanglement of lines in fluid space. (p. 64)

Is this a move back from digital models of organic life to analogue? Is it
needed to
give us a way to include emotions in our accounts of cognitive processes?

On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 8:27 AM, christine schweighart <
schweighartgate@hotmail.com> wrote:

Hi Ivan,
 I'm afraid that is a rather multi-faceted endeavour -   it would be
than passing interest' ( as Mike in  the to Swinburne 'design' thread
orients to) - but here this hasn't yet been attempted in a thorough
scholarly way with depth of engagement in the very diverse themes in CHAT
traditions, and using an explication consistent with this form of
perspective. ( An interest that  would refine using inclusional ontology,
reframing with reference to those traditions.)

I can only share my own experience of sticking points where each finds
issue with the others' discourse, at most, but it's difficult to 'pitch'.
mentioned Maturana and I first tried to examine commonalities and areas
where each adds to the other in a paper this summer - I can send an
if you wish. I found that  these ideas were invited for examination
members of the systems community - however  a biological perspective to
difficult 'subject matter'  to attract or engage interest amongst  AT
researchers ( another long story).  What Rayner's contribution offers to
this is an ontology which is dynamic and relational.

This current discussion through Tony's observation of   'shared
as  'experience in which
the experience of others participates in the experience of any one, in
course of the experiencing.' Might have brought out a place for
the somatic and has a lot to do with 'energy' as well as perception
through the nervous system. However the biological knowledge of this kind
catalysis in the body is over-shadowed by the neurological as if it was
only 'system' in the body - not contigous with others in dynamics that we
have insufficient direct knowledge about .
I liked Elinor Ochs petition at ISCAR as it acknowledged that we don't
a grasp of how to study the watershed of experience spanning this living
dynamic.  ( Indexical meaning 'arcs' towards a place where meaning can
to form' and that in actuality awareness of the living moment is
never complete.
Maturana's 'recursions' in languaging relies upon circular closure to
upon empirical experience against a linear
flow ( such as our notion of time) , a relation which is problematic.
Though he does see that the root of social orientation is emotional and
for others.  Recurrence has a spiraling
rather than replicable circular form, each recurrence is revealed by a
capacity ?or hidden inner form which affords new learning (which crafts

I am also reminded of the intense discussion of 'concepts' and Jay
questions of the extent of  theoretical ground in CHAT  in concept
formation, where some researchers have reached out to Schutz (Marianne
Hedegaard for example). At Lancaster a distinction was made that whilst
Schutz bases his work upon Husserl's distinction between a natural
of 'common sense' belief and the phenomenological attitude in which that
belief is suspended, Husserl regarded the everyday world only as a
preliminary to making the 'phenomenological reduction' [ to 'data of
consciousness'],  it is the everyday 'lived in world' that is Schutz's
concern - ie more sociologist that phenomenologist wanting to analyse the
'nature of structures which are taken as given'. It is this attitude that
frustrated by 'incompleteness', as that which is prevailing 'in the
as living isn't purely rational, of course, it is embodied- the analytic
separation of emotion and isolation towards considering rationality in
concept formation is problematic. Imagination, as a phenomenon, goes
emotion though - and articulates through hope ( of course when I say this
I'm drawing on a concept of hope, not the feeling in any living moment).

Perhaps it's in this that  Bruce's comment about Lefebvre's terms  brings
out a place for Alan Rayner's space as presence of 'receptivity' ?
- to go back to the observation:-
 ' the presence or absence of a social space - not necessarily physical
proximity but a medium through which an acting collectivity can form.'
and a quote from Alan Rayner's paper on  analysis using ideas of
completeness which he drew from understanding boundaries in the study of

"The very idea of complete ?whole units? existing anywhere, at any scale
Nature as an energetically
open, fluid system does not make sense. The fluidly variable connectivity
of natural

inclusionality arises from the coming together
(contiguity/inter-connectivity), fusion (confluence/intra-connectivity)
(individuation/differentiation) of energetic paths, corridors or channels
of included space in
labyrinthine branching
systems and networks"Where networks are not constituted as connected
but are dynamic in a process of relational networking. Maturana's
was that we are 'social' through orientation  lead by emotion - our
arises through 'for others' first ( another rich strand in activity
theoretical work).

This messy complex ( that might seem quite ambiguous -  as these
are terms and terms apart)  is why I wanted to express an interest - but
didn't have a sense of how to make a contribution that would make s
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