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Re: [xmca] Space, neighbourhood, dwelling in, in*formation as notions with a "family resemblance"



Hi Tony and others
Reading today I came across this quote from Merleau-Ponty. It reminds me of
Chrles Taylor's critique of reason ALONE.

"The question of whether science does, or even could, present us with a
picture of the world which is COMPLETE, self-sufficient and somehow closed
in upon itself, such that there could no longer be any meaningful questions
outside this picture. It is not a matter of denying or limiting the extent
of scientific knowledge, but rather of establishing whether it is entitled
to deny or rule out as illusory all forms of inquiry that do not start from
MEASUREMENTS and COMPARISONS and, by connecting particular causes with
particular consequences, end up laws such as those of classical physics."
[Merleau-Ponty]

By privileging science ALONE our lived embodied experience of the world
seems insignificant. M-P's project was to show us that this lived embodied
experience and expression in actuality is the ground of science and reason.
M-P did not reject science as a method, or reject reason as a method, but
"saw it [science] as DERIVATIVE from the more practical demands of worlded
embodiment" [Donna Orange, 2010, Thinking for Clinicians, location 26% on
kindle]

Larry

On Sat, Sep 24, 2011 at 9:04 AM, Tony Whitson <twhitson@udel.edu> wrote:

> To recover some of the past discussion Larry is referring to, we can review
> his post from  March 2010 in the archives here:
>
> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/**xmcamail.2010_03.dir/msg00310.**html<http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2010_03.dir/msg00310.html>
>
> I think Andy has since elaborated on the list of approaches to
> concepts/materiality that appears in that post, but I'm not sure of the best
> place to find his subsequent elaborations.
>
>
> On Sat, 24 Sep 2011, Larry Purss wrote:
>
> Hi Christine, Mike, Ivan,  Tony and others exploring the dialectical
>> interweaving [spiralling] of the concepts of "moving fluidity",
>> "e-motion",
>> "artifacticity", "sedimentation" "concepts as historically developed ways
>> of
>> life" "in*formation" etc.
>>
>> Mike, I would suggest that bringing back emotion [possibly through the
>> concept of moving fluidity] is one line of concepts which must be
>> interweaved [as con-text] into the dialogue.
>> I'm wondering if you have an archived article by Zinchenko that could
>> begin
>> this line of inquiry.
>>
>> How "fluidity of movement as ecology of life" and "artifacts" as
>> sedimented
>> structures or forms  [ "open" boundaries contrasted with "contained"
>> boundaries] seems to be an evolving topic.
>>
>> "Matter" [in both senses of matter "as form" and as "mattering
>> connections"]  is a recurring theme I'm grappling with in trying to grasp
>> these key concepts.
>>
>> In particular the noton of "subjectification" as NECESSARY for the
>> development of a "sense" of subjectivity or center of consciousness. Then
>> we
>> get into what is "center" in space?  Ivan your bringing in Jay Lemke's
>> exploration of "parts and wholes" was very helpful.  Andy's notion of
>> "concepts" as "materiality" [in the sense of interconnections not essences
>> that are HISTORICALLY developed as social formations] is also intriguing.
>>
>> Mike, if Zinchenko, Anna Stetsenko, Rey, and others in the CHAT tradition
>> are re-engaging with notions of "subjectivity" this may be an approach
>> that
>> can also bridge back to action research as Christine discusses in the
>> other
>> current post.  It seems ISCAR [the book on Vygotsky in the 21st century
>> and
>> the seminar] is also grappling with this issue within the tradition of CHT
>> [and CHAT?]
>>
>> What do others think
>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 8:03 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> That is a whole lot to take in, Christine, over even to hold still for
>>> contemplation!
>>>
>>> One underlying intuition that seemed to be consistent across your example
>>> thinkers and ideas we that of fluidity, of living movement. This put me
>>> very
>>> much in mind of
>>> Vladimir P. Zinchenko. VPZ sites various russian scholars including
>>> Nicholas
>>> Bernshtein, who come up with ideas such as "living movement." Bernshtein
>>> is
>>> said to have likened living movement to a spiders web waving in the
>>> breeze.
>>>
>>> there is an issue of journal of russian and east european psych coming
>>> out
>>> with several of VPZ's ideas. I'll keep an eye out for it.
>>>
>>> mike
>>>
>>> PS- re fluidity, you get this kind of statement from Ingold:
>>>
>>> an organism can be thought of as "a flow of material substance in a space
>>> that is topologically fluid. I conclude that the organism (animal or
>>> human)
>>> should be understood not as a bounded entity surrounded by an environment
>>> but as an unbounded entanglement of lines in fluid space. (p. 64)
>>>
>>> Is this a move back from digital models of organic life to analogue? Is
>>> it
>>> needed to
>>> give us a way to include emotions in our accounts of cognitive processes?
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 8:27 AM, christine schweighart <
>>> schweighartgate@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> Hi Ivan,
>>>>  I'm afraid that is a rather multi-faceted endeavour -   it would be
>>>>
>>> 'more
>>>
>>>> than passing interest' ( as Mike in  the to Swinburne 'design' thread
>>>> orients to) - but here this hasn't yet been attempted in a thorough
>>>> scholarly way with depth of engagement in the very diverse themes in
>>>> CHAT
>>>> traditions, and using an explication consistent with this form of
>>>>
>>> biological
>>>
>>>> perspective. ( An interest that  would refine using inclusional
>>>> ontology,
>>>>
>>> in
>>>
>>>> reframing with reference to those traditions.)
>>>>
>>>> I can only share my own experience of sticking points where each finds
>>>> issue with the others' discourse, at most, but it's difficult to
>>>> 'pitch'.
>>>>
>>>  I
>>>
>>>> mentioned Maturana and I first tried to examine commonalities and areas
>>>> where each adds to the other in a paper this summer - I can send an
>>>>
>>> extract
>>>
>>>> if you wish. I found that  these ideas were invited for examination
>>>>
>>> amongst
>>>
>>>> members of the systems community - however  a biological perspective to
>>>>
>>> be
>>>
>>>> difficult 'subject matter'  to attract or engage interest amongst  AT
>>>> researchers ( another long story).  What Rayner's contribution offers to
>>>> this is an ontology which is dynamic and relational.
>>>>
>>>> This current discussion through Tony's observation of   'shared
>>>>
>>> experience'
>>>
>>>> as  'experience in which
>>>> the experience of others participates in the experience of any one, in
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> course of the experiencing.' Might have brought out a place for
>>>>
>>> rethinking
>>>
>>>> the somatic and has a lot to do with 'energy' as well as perception
>>>>
>>> mediated
>>>
>>>> through the nervous system. However the biological knowledge of this
>>>> kind
>>>>
>>> of
>>>
>>>> catalysis in the body is over-shadowed by the neurological as if it was
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> only 'system' in the body - not contigous with others in dynamics that
>>>> we
>>>> have insufficient direct knowledge about .
>>>> I liked Elinor Ochs petition at ISCAR as it acknowledged that we don't
>>>>
>>> have
>>>
>>>> a grasp of how to study the watershed of experience spanning this living
>>>> dynamic.  ( Indexical meaning 'arcs' towards a place where meaning can
>>>>
>>> begin
>>>
>>>> to form' and that in actuality awareness of the living moment is
>>>> never complete.
>>>> Maturana's 'recursions' in languaging relies upon circular closure to
>>>>
>>> work
>>>
>>>> upon empirical experience against a linear
>>>> flow ( such as our notion of time) , a relation which is problematic.
>>>> Though he does see that the root of social orientation is emotional and
>>>>
>>> love
>>>
>>>> for others.  Recurrence has a spiraling
>>>> rather than replicable circular form, each recurrence is revealed by a
>>>>
>>> new
>>>
>>>> capacity –or hidden inner form which affords new learning (which crafts
>>>> meanings).
>>>>
>>>> I am also reminded of the intense discussion of 'concepts' and Jay
>>>>
>>> Lemke's
>>>
>>>> questions of the extent of  theoretical ground in CHAT  in concept
>>>> formation, where some researchers have reached out to Schutz (Marianne
>>>> Hedegaard for example). At Lancaster a distinction was made that whilst
>>>> Schutz bases his work upon Husserl's distinction between a natural
>>>>
>>> attitude
>>>
>>>> of 'common sense' belief and the phenomenological attitude in which that
>>>> belief is suspended, Husserl regarded the everyday world only as a
>>>> preliminary to making the 'phenomenological reduction' [ to 'data of
>>>> consciousness'],  it is the everyday 'lived in world' that is Schutz's
>>>>
>>> main
>>>
>>>> concern - ie more sociologist that phenomenologist wanting to analyse
>>>> the
>>>> 'nature of structures which are taken as given'. It is this attitude
>>>> that
>>>>
>>> is
>>>
>>>> frustrated by 'incompleteness', as that which is prevailing 'in the
>>>>
>>> moment'
>>>
>>>> as living isn't purely rational, of course, it is embodied- the analytic
>>>> separation of emotion and isolation towards considering rationality in
>>>> concept formation is problematic. Imagination, as a phenomenon, goes
>>>>
>>> beyond
>>>
>>>> emotion though - and articulates through hope ( of course when I say
>>>> this
>>>> I'm drawing on a concept of hope, not the feeling in any living moment).
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps it's in this that  Bruce's comment about Lefebvre's terms
>>>>  brings
>>>> out a place for Alan Rayner's space as presence of 'receptivity' ?
>>>> - to go back to the observation:-
>>>>  ' the presence or absence of a social space - not necessarily physical
>>>> proximity but a medium through which an acting collectivity can form.'
>>>> and a quote from Alan Rayner's paper on  analysis using ideas of
>>>> completeness which he drew from understanding boundaries in the study of
>>>> fungii
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "The very idea of complete ‘whole units’ existing anywhere, at any scale
>>>>
>>> in
>>>
>>>> Nature as an energetically
>>>> open, fluid system does not make sense. The fluidly variable
>>>> connectivity
>>>> of natural
>>>>
>>>> inclusionality arises from the coming together
>>>> (contiguity/inter-**connectivity), fusion (confluence/intra-**
>>>> connectivity)
>>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>>> dissociation
>>>> (individuation/**differentiation) of energetic paths, corridors or
>>>> channels
>>>> of included space in
>>>> labyrinthine branching
>>>> systems and networks"Where networks are not constituted as connected
>>>>
>>> nodes,
>>>
>>>> but are dynamic in a process of relational networking. Maturana's
>>>>
>>> position
>>>
>>>> was that we are 'social' through orientation  lead by emotion - our
>>>>
>>> 'doing'
>>>
>>>> arises through 'for others' first ( another rich strand in activity
>>>> theoretical work).
>>>>
>>>> This messy complex ( that might seem quite ambiguous -  as these
>>>>
>>> discourses
>>>
>>>> are terms and terms apart)  is why I wanted to express an interest - but
>>>> didn't have a sense of how to make a contribution that would make s
>>>> difference!
>>>> Christine.
>>>
>>>
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