[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [xmca] Fwd: playzone

Yes, as I think I said in the piece written for the early sociocultural
conf, the relevant bit of which was sent around, I believe that there is a
broad family (or perhaps clan, or perhaps a group of fractious clans) of
ideas held to some degree in common.

This being the century of branding, and in that spirit, I kind of like Li's
label, bio-cultural co-constructivism. Catchy, easy to say. It arose within
the research program of Paul Baltes, a German life-span developmentalist who
died not long ago. Paul was born in a place at a time when it was not clever
of a young West German psychologist to quote Soviet Russian psychologists.
But his ideas about a number of issues certainly sought to study ontogeny as
the emergence of phylogenetic, cultural-historical, and microgenetic time
scales and his attempts to embody that idea in an empirical research
program. So, a not illitimate kin idea might be b-c-c-c...

This way of approaching things might help us keep in mind that the social
and biological are not usefully treated as binary oppositions.

On Sun, Dec 5, 2010 at 3:23 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote:

> Mike
> Thanks for pointing out that my posts were not being directed to the CHAT
> community.  I've included CHAT in this response.
> D. Hutto also has another book that is NOT edited but focuses on his
> hermeneutical narrative approach to folk psychology.  I don't have the
> background to give an in depth answer to Computational models of cognition
> or developing useable computer models.  What is interesting to me is the
> notion that "thoughts" [and propositional structures] are "meaningful" WHEN
> RESPONDED to. If the communication  goes unaddressed then their is no
> meaning.  Therefore notions of "intentionality" and its close cousin
> "agency" are fundamentally [figure & ground] dialogical & perspectival and
> intersubjective.
> When you mention the contrasts between CHAT and SCT theory I'm not sure
> where my thoughts fit in except that Jack Martin's edited book "The
> sociocultural turn in Psychology" is attempting to link notions from CHAT
> with dialogical, hermeneutical, and discursive traditions.  The article you
> posted by Giyoo Hatano also takes this more ecumenical approach when he
> states,
> "I also believe that if we want to establish a generally acceptable
> conception or theory of knowledge acquisition there should be much more
> dialogue (or polilogue) among theories or research programs. This practice
> may lead us to attempt to strengthen one theory by incorporating insights
> from another, which is sometimes considered 'problematic'.... There is no
> reason why Vygotskians cannot incorporate insights from other schools"
> Mike, I believe Hutto's edited volume is just such an exercise in
> socio-cultural theory - focused at the dialogical level - that recognizes
> theory as polilogue. Neo-Piagetians [socio-constructivist] and neo-Meadians,
> and the social representation extensions of Moscovici [ie Ivana Markova &
> Sandra Jovchelovitch] are all exploring similar themes.  Gadamer's
> hermeneutical approach and Lakoff and Johnson's concept of metaphor "as
> thought" also point to issues of addressivity and RESPONSE as fundamental
> [some would call it ontological] issues of epistemology.
> Larry
> On Sun, Dec 5, 2010 at 10:38 AM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I found your description of Hutto's book on folk psychology really
>> interesting, Larry. I think Hobson's ideas have a lot to recommend them but
>> had not thought about them in terms of computational models.
>> With regard to play and morality. Somehow, your note got me thinking about
>> the moral implications of "in the beginning was the deed" (dewey, bakhtin,
>> vygotsky, ...... (must be hegel back there some where?) versus "in the
>> beginning was the word" (various kinds of nativists, stimulus-response
>> theorists, and I do not know who else).
>> Locally, issues of how whether it is possible and how to create useable
>> computer models of non-linear, open, dynamic systems, which we take to be a
>> fundamental characteristic off dialogical systems, are way up our list of
>> attention getters. We believe there are other ways to study artificial
>> intelligence other than their embodiment in networks of silicon. A
>> discussion for a different time/thread.
>> mike
>> PS-- only sent to me? End of quarter busy blues here.
>> mike
>> On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 9:59 PM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>wrote:
>>> Hi Mike
>>> I don't have the requisite background to answer your question on the
>>> centrality of computational theory. However I want to make reference to a
>>> book edited by Daniel Hutto,  "Folk Psychology Revisited" that may speak to
>>> computational theory.  In Hutto's introduction to the book he critiques the
>>> historical roots of the "received view" of our common sense notions of folk
>>> psychology.
>>> Hutto suggests our current notions that "intentional actions" are
>>> performed for reasons described in terms of PROPOSITIONAL attitudes is a
>>> long standing orientation of analytical philosophy.  To "understand" the
>>> basis of intentional actions, an understanding of what CAUSED them is
>>> required.
>>> The job of folk psychology is often assumed to be providing
>>> third-personal PREDICTION and EXPLANATION of why others are acting with
>>> intentions.  This orientation assumes folk psychology is best understood as
>>> some kind of THEORY and folk psychology's core FUNCTION was
>>> predictive-explanatory in character. [often termed theory-theory of mind]
>>> Our understanding of mental states from this assumption is at root
>>> theoretical.  If REASONS are understood as the INFERRED CAUSES of action it
>>> is a short step to assuming that EXPLAINING action is a kind of
>>> "theoretical" activity. Hutto calls this theory-theory framework an "out of
>>> sight, INTO mind"  approach.  Intelligent engagements with the world are
>>> MEDIATED by REPRESENTING the REPRESENTATIONS by a process of taking a
>>> theoretical [3rd person SPECTATOR] stance towards engagements.  In
>>> particular, it requires the 3rd person spectator to FORMULATE HYPOTHESES in
>>> the mind that are not open to view.
>>> As Hutto states,
>>> Talk of  'unobservable' EPISODES later gave way to talk of 'abstract' or
>>> 'hypothetical' constructs, namely causally effacacious mental STATES.
>>> Mental states were thought to be entities that occupied causal roles,
>>> interacted with each other in complex ways and were identified in part by
>>> there typical causes and effects.  From this thought about the nature of
>>> mental STATES, it is no great stretch to imagine that the meaning of
>>> mentalistic CONCEPTS might follow a similar pattern, being fixed by having
>>> appropriate links or relations to other concepts.  That is, they might be
>>> defined by there place or role within a wider system of laws or, more
>>> softly, an inferential network.  On this view, the very meaning of a
>>> particular mental concept is determined by the distinctive role it plays
>>> within a network of principles.  In this respect, our familiar mentalistic
>>> vocabulary (i.e. our talk of thoughts, feelings, and expectations) would be
>>> similar in important respects to other theoretically embedded vocabularies
>>> (i.e. talk of electrons, atoms, and gravity)
>>> Hutto is giving an historical narrative of how we have developed a folk
>>> psychology in which mental terms are thought to be "theoretical".  In
>>> philosophical circles theory-theory evolved in response to the failure of
>>> empiricist theories of meaning that grounded mental terms in publicly
>>> observable behaviors OR introspected mental objects.
>>> Theory-theory models contain PROPOSITIONALLY articulated PRINCIPLES,
>>> RULES, or schemas that must be bound together in coherent ways to FORM A
>>> THEORY.  The theory models have an internal STRUCTURE required to navigate
>>> ones way in the world.
>>> As Hutto explains,
>>> The unifying idea behind all of these proposals is that predicting how
>>> another creature might act (or, the flipside, to explain why it acted)
>>> requires representing its complex state of mind, in which certain
>>> PROPOSITIONAL attitudes relate to one another in an appropriately structured
>>> way.... it was pretty universally held that understanding others REQUIRED
>>> having a THEORY of mind."
>>> The FUNCTION of folk psychology, from this theory-theory model is to
>>> provide predictions and explanations of actions. Theories provide powerful
>>> means of anticipating, explaining, and CONTROLLING what happens, precisely
>>> because they tap into the world of the unseen and the abstract.  A good
>>> theory reliably guides expectations, even in novel circumstances.  Folk
>>> psychology's PRIMARY FUNCTION was to provide 3rd personal predictions and
>>> explanations as the best way to understand others.  This functional
>>> presupposition is deeply ingrained in the folk psychology of those schooled
>>> in the analytic tradition.
>>> Hutto asks does theory-theory models actually yield good reliable 3rd
>>> personal predictions and explanations of actions in everyday contexts?  Is
>>> attributing propositional attitudes in the 3rd person the best approach to
>>> understand others?  Is the primary function of folk psychology the
>>> prediction, controlling, and explaining behavior?  Hutto's answer is these
>>> notions are restrictive and questionable assumptions.  This "received view"
>>> of folk psychology is a theory of abstraction which has crowded out other
>>> alternative understandings of folk psychological functions which Hutto's
>>>  edited book addresses.
>>> The authors in the book explore "empathy" that is not seen as a reaching
>>> out to another mind but is an immediate way in which to experience others.
>>> It is to EXPERIENCE BEHAVIOR as EXPRESSIVE of mind. Peter Hobson [who writes
>>> a chapter] states "We Share, therefore We Think" Hobson suggests our
>>> received view places too much emphasis on interpretation of socially
>>> isolated individuals. Social experience and understanding for Hobson are
>>> founded upon patterns of socio-affective relatedness.  Our sense of "what
>>> people are" is constituted by reciprocal affective responsiveness.  The
>>> meanings of expressions and gestures are PERCEIVED rather than INFERRED as
>>> internal causes of behavior.  This is NOT a SIMULATIONIST model where one
>>> employs ONE'S OWN emotional abilities to model or refer to in order to
>>> understand the emotions of the other. Simulation theory assumes we DO
>>> something of which we are aware and reference in self to understand other.
>>> For Hutto when we experience others we do so effortlessly and are NOT aware
>>> of modelling them or of undergoing a phenomonological shift so as to adopt
>>> their perspective.  The evidence from mirror neurons indicates that actions,
>>> expressions, and gestures are DIRECTLY PERCEIVED rather than understood
>>> through a modelling process that follows and tracks perception OF behavior.
>>> Mike, I'm not sure if this extended historical review of propositional
>>> 3rd person models of folk psychology, [within the tradition of analytical
>>> philosophy] is a partial answer to computational models of theory
>>> construction or just another meandering reverie as I try to understand ZPD's
>>> and dynamic assessments as dialogical relational models.  It does speak to
>>> different presuppositions within various theoretical models and the assumed
>>> "entities" that "inhabit" the theory.  The 1st person, 3rd person, and
>>> emerging dialogical 2nd person perspectives presuppose different "ground"
>>> and "functions" which are HISTORICALLY constituted notions.
>>> I want to end with a thought from Penti's article when discussing
>>> El'Konin's theory of play.
>>> "Play is NOT a process of mastering the forms of human activity or social
>>> roles, which was stressed during the soviet period in particular, but rather
>>> the CONTENTS OF MORAL NORMS.   As Penti emphasizes we have to answer the
>>> question "What develops?" in terms of the MORAL CONTENT OF HUMAN
>>> RELATIONS... It is impossible to think that the content and structure of
>>> play develop separated from each other" (p.6)
>>> I hope my extended reverie speaks to the moral necessity of  dialogical
>>> intersubjective norms that are grounded within socio-affective engagements.
>>> Larry
>>> On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 7:00 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Too much there for me to grok all at one time, Larry, but starting near
>>>> the top I wanted to respond to this:
>>>> *"Why do we emphasize the differences between "play" and "learning"
>>>> which create historically constituted boundaries?  Could a case be made for
>>>> interweaving play and learning into a single dialogical zone of
>>>> intersubjective development?"
>>>> *
>>>> Efforts at environmental design such as the playworlds described in some
>>>> of the MCA publications (one of which was discussed here, as I recall), the
>>>> 5th Dimension project started at LCHC, Eugene's work at Los Redes in
>>>> Deleware, Lois and colleagues Allstars project, as well as recent virtual
>>>> world efforts such as Quest Atlantis try exactly to * interweave  **"play
>>>> and learning into a single dialogical zone of intersubjective development?"
>>>> .
>>>> *Here's a question about all of this work I think needs attention, if
>>>> only to dismiss it : How does design research that creates playworlds
>>>> (broadly construed) as a mode of theory and practice confront John-Laird's
>>>> insistence (reviewing Jim Wertsch's 1985 book on Vygotsky) that if the work
>>>> does not adopt the computational approach as both theory and tool-generating
>>>> methodology, it does not count as useful theory?
>>>> *
>>>> *mike
>>>> *
>>>> *
>>>> On Tue, Nov 30, 2010 at 7:49 AM, Larry Purss <lpscholar2@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>> Hi Mike
>>>>> Thank you for posting this article
>>>>>  I want to draw attention to Penti's article on the creation of ZPD's
>>>>> as a perspective which links up ideas and processes that are so often
>>>>> differentiated into what are considered separate world's of existence.  Her
>>>>> article has also given me a little window into David Kellogg's passionate
>>>>> elaboration of the distinctions between teacher scaffolding of learning and
>>>>> creating "zones" of development.
>>>>> [I will add that Paul Thibault's perspectives {in MCA 2000, Vol. 7,
>>>>> Issue 4, p291-311} are lurking in the background of my thoughts but I'm
>>>>> still trying to develop the background knowledge required to incorporate his
>>>>> ideas as related to ZPD's.
>>>>> The question that is forming as I read David's, Penti's and Paul
>>>>> Thibault's reflexive dialogues on dialogical open ended development is:
>>>>> "Why do we emphasize the differences between "play" and "learning"
>>>>> which create historically constituted boundaries?  Could a case be made for
>>>>> interweaving play and learning into a single dialogical zone of
>>>>> intersubjective development?
>>>>> In other words, could the processes amplified in our notions of play
>>>>> [narrative intersubjective activity] and the processes amplified in our
>>>>> notions of developmental learning [informational propositional cognition] be
>>>>> an artifactual dichotomy of how we structure and form our particular
>>>>> sociohistorical institutional arrangements.
>>>>> Is there a possibility that Playworld ZPD's, and school ZPD's are
>>>>> describing the SAME underlying processes, but different aspects are
>>>>> amplified - and "biased"  as we develop our theories by "looking" for
>>>>> different aspects of a common human dialogical process of living in the
>>>>> world.  As we "leave play behind" and engage in "formal" learning" in
>>>>> "preparation for" WORK are we creating artifactual stages that separate
>>>>> vital human processes that are central to development.
>>>>> Another theme that runs through my question of a single developmental
>>>>> process is the human "desire" for PROXIMITY and the creation of zones of
>>>>> PROXIMITY [intersubjectivity] and the equally powerful "desire" for
>>>>> EXPLORATION and open ended novelty and newness.  This is where my
>>>>> speculations from "attachment theory" come in.  Are the PURSUIT of PROXIMITY
>>>>> [and the metaphor of "containment] and the desire for exploration LINKED?
>>>>> In other words notions such as Winnicott's "holding environment" the
>>>>> creation of "third spaces" etc as ZONES of PROXIMAL CONTAINMENT may be
>>>>> PRIMARY [in time scale] to create the dialogical space in which a capacity
>>>>> for AGENCY is constituted [within top down dialogical scalar level] BEFORE
>>>>> the infant or child VENTURES FORTH in exploration and subjective engagement
>>>>> in the world.
>>>>> I recognize I am making a case to BIAS the PURSUIT of PROXIMITY as
>>>>> foundational in the zones WE [emphasize WE] constitute and from which we
>>>>> venture forth.  In play worlds, when the pursuit of proximity is treatened
>>>>> by rupture and separation the "zone" collapses as the play STOPS [until
>>>>> through dialogue WE negotiate and find OUR way back to a place of
>>>>> CONTAINMENT]  I wonder if LEARNING WORLDS are fundamentally different OR if
>>>>> learning zones also need to accomodate the "desire" for the PURSUIT of
>>>>> PROXIMITY and CONTAINMENT in the formation of an INTERSUBJECTIVE ZONE of
>>>>> learning.  When play AND learning LEAD development is there COMMON GROUND
>>>>> agentic capacity and a "sense of self" is "internalized" developmentally the
>>>>> person is no longer "determined" by the "here & now" pursuit of proximity
>>>>> BUT threaten the self's core intersubjective need for proximity and the
>>>>> result may be that exploration [learning] is put at risk as the person's
>>>>> energy re-orients to attend to the pursuit of proximity.   Play worlds are
>>>>> often described as zones of "exploration" and I agree that for development
>>>>> to flouish play worlds must constitute exploration and creativity.  However,
>>>>> in order for playworlds to constitute exploratory activity there must first
>>>>> be constituted a dialogical zone of PROXIMITY that is intersubjective "all
>>>>> the way down".
>>>>> I think it is easier to make the case for PROXIMITY as the common
>>>>> ground in play worlds.  However, as the young child develops and moves into
>>>>> formal school settings are the desires for zones of proximity "transcended"
>>>>> when "agentic capacity" is "developed" OR does the need for zones of
>>>>> dialogical proximity continue to be the common ground for exploration,
>>>>> creativity, and emergence.  In other worlds [different from the play
>>>>> world]  do our basic needs and desires for zones of proximity become
>>>>> "transcended" or only incorporated into new formations [that are constituted
>>>>> by the socio historical institutional structures of our cultural worlds]
>>>>> I am not sure how "basic" are the needs for "containment" {ie metaphors
>>>>> of community, home, family, common ground} and "exploration" {creativity,
>>>>> imagination etc"} or if they are only my own particular "biases" that have
>>>>> emerged from my particular ontogenetic development.  However, the tensions
>>>>> and relational links between the concepts of zones of intersubjective
>>>>> proximity and the concepts of agentic intentional exploration seem to my
>>>>> biased perspective to be "basic" needs. [AND LINKED at multiple scaler
>>>>> levels -see Paul Thibault]
>>>>> Penti Hakkarainen's and Milda Bredikyte's article posted was the
>>>>> trigger for this extended reverie.
>>>>> Larry
>>>>>   On Sun, Nov 28, 2010 at 6:19 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>>>  The attached paper addresses what is common to play and instruction
>>>>>> such
>>>>>> that they should both
>>>>>> be sites for creation of zopeds. It appeared in the Russian,
>>>>>> Cultural-Historical Psychology.
>>>>>> Pentti is somewhere around xmca I believe
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
>>>>>   On Sun, Nov 28, 2010 at 6:19 PM, mike cole <lchcmike@gmail.com>wrote:
>>>>>>  The attached paper addresses what is common to play and instruction
>>>>>> such
>>>>>> that they should both
>>>>>> be sites for creation of zopeds. It appeared in the Russian,
>>>>>> Cultural-Historical Psychology.
>>>>>> Pentti is somewhere around xmca I believe
>>>>>> mike
>>>>>> __________________________________________
>>>>>> _____
>>>>>> xmca mailing list
>>>>>> xmca@weber.ucsd.edu
>>>>>> http://dss.ucsd.edu/mailman/listinfo/xmca
xmca mailing list