I don't know exactly, but I was very impressed with Popper's ideas on this
when I last read him. It's a while since I read Popper, and I think he
deserves an educated response.
A
At 20:30 25/09/2000 -0400, you wrote:
>What's the difference between L's Ideality -- wh. exists in "the space of
>human culture independently of the & consciousness of individuals" -- and
>Popper's '3rd world' of critical abstractions?
>
>Judy
>
>At 11:04 AM 9/25/00 -0500, you wrote:
>>Yes, I agree the tension between individual psycholoigism and collective
>>(historical) activity comes through in the work.
>>
>>One element that might be interesting to explore is cultural-historical
>>activity - work, play etc - countered to the activity of historical
>>processes of mind. In the latter perception, memory, creativity etc came to
>>mind as an area of emphasis. Davydov, or at least my take, argues against an
>>approach of the activity of memory, perception etc which as I understand it
>>was one direction of Leontev's work. The other being the work of Zaporzhets
>>and El'konin with an emphasis on "leading activities" such as play, school,
>>emotional contact, work etc. Davydov's seemed to argue that the rightful
>>place to study perception, creativity etc is in cultural-historical
>>activities, not them being activities in themselves.
>>
>>Second, in response to Phillip would not labor or work have a special
>>meaning in relation to Marxism. Its meaning is more than simply one of the
>>activities we engage in. We engage in variety of work, activity, which may
>>not be referred to as such in the everyday sense of the term. I believe it
>>was Helena who mentioned the importance of expanding to work activities such
>>things as parenting and child care. Yet, with labor being an historical
>>product and all, not all activities we engage in are Activity.
>>
>>Lastly, when Phillip says,
>>
>>"this seems a chicken/egg predicament - and i don't know what sort of
>>anthropological/archeological evidence he's using - it runs counter to
>>contemporary thought about the physical structure of the brain and
>>consciousness - (Edelmann, for example)"
>>
>>what comes to the surface is a tension at least philosophically I think. I
>>mean would not Leontev situate the above as metaphsical or idealist. It is
>>not to say physical structure of the brain does not play an important role,
>>of course it does, but studying it outside the context of human activity
>>does not really tell us much. Like Marx's reference to the eye becoming a
>>"human eye" - can't find Leontev's reference at the moment.
>>
>>Phillip, I am not familar with Edelmann - could you elaborate - he might
>>serve as an interesting contrast. It might also make the implications of one
>>view or the other more explicit.
>>
>>Nate
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
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