RE: On Leontiev

From: Judith Diamondstone (diamonju@rci.rutgers.edu)
Date: Mon Sep 25 2000 - 17:30:29 PDT


What's the difference between L's Ideality -- wh. exists in "the space of
human culture independently of the & consciousness of individuals" -- and
Popper's '3rd world' of critical abstractions?

Judy

At 11:04 AM 9/25/00 -0500, you wrote:
>Yes, I agree the tension between individual psycholoigism and collective
>(historical) activity comes through in the work.
>
>One element that might be interesting to explore is cultural-historical
>activity - work, play etc - countered to the activity of historical
>processes of mind. In the latter perception, memory, creativity etc came to
>mind as an area of emphasis. Davydov, or at least my take, argues against an
>approach of the activity of memory, perception etc which as I understand it
>was one direction of Leontev's work. The other being the work of Zaporzhets
>and El'konin with an emphasis on "leading activities" such as play, school,
>emotional contact, work etc. Davydov's seemed to argue that the rightful
>place to study perception, creativity etc is in cultural-historical
>activities, not them being activities in themselves.
>
>Second, in response to Phillip would not labor or work have a special
>meaning in relation to Marxism. Its meaning is more than simply one of the
>activities we engage in. We engage in variety of work, activity, which may
>not be referred to as such in the everyday sense of the term. I believe it
>was Helena who mentioned the importance of expanding to work activities such
>things as parenting and child care. Yet, with labor being an historical
>product and all, not all activities we engage in are Activity.
>
>Lastly, when Phillip says,
>
>"this seems a chicken/egg predicament - and i don't know what sort of
>anthropological/archeological evidence he's using - it runs counter to
>contemporary thought about the physical structure of the brain and
>consciousness - (Edelmann, for example)"
>
>what comes to the surface is a tension at least philosophically I think. I
>mean would not Leontev situate the above as metaphsical or idealist. It is
>not to say physical structure of the brain does not play an important role,
>of course it does, but studying it outside the context of human activity
>does not really tell us much. Like Marx's reference to the eye becoming a
>"human eye" - can't find Leontev's reference at the moment.
>
>Phillip, I am not familar with Edelmann - could you elaborate - he might
>serve as an interesting contrast. It might also make the implications of one
>view or the other more explicit.
>
>Nate
>
>
>
>
>



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