[Xmca-l] Re: thoughts on Mathematics of Mathematics by Wolff-Michael Roth

[Huw Lloyd]

Being careful again to distinguish various aspects, the notion of a
projection of one's own understandings to the capabilities of others seems
quite logical[1, p.7] when one is thinking in terms of agency, i.e. one's
perspective of the other's performance. That is, if one could understand
the capabilities of others in detail, one would have them available
oneself. But that is not to say that, e.g., the child does not know about
an adult's activities that go beyond their competence. Notions of imputing
different capabilities to others would be rather advanced (i.e. developed)
from this perspective. But note this is not making the other a construction
of the self, it is endeavouring to understand the other by means of one's
faculties. One could equally take another perspective of the other by dint
of one's witnessing their habitual behaviour. Once one understands the
variation in others, as agents, there is more scope. Similarly to recognise
a sophisticated relation between self and other is not problematic with RC.
It is simple enough to recognise that one has arrived at a sophisticated
conception.

On a similar basis non-identification with one's own thoughts is rather
advanced. Two points seem to be interesting here. The first, that that
which is regarded as non-self may previously have been "constructed" by
self, e.g. as with observing a habit. Hence imputing the sophisticated
result ("I am not my thought") as being the original state of things may be
rather inaccurate. Secondly, that the thought may be understood as a
perspective, a self-consistent circuit of consequences (or associations).

I am unclear what you mean by "elemental individuals". I would say that the
recognition of the notion of individuality is learnt or discovered.  More
broadly, and not having read that much of Glaserfield, I am happy with the
central tenets [e.g. 2]. How Glaserfield builds on those is, of course,
available to scrutiny in terms of consistency and thoroughness. In my
experience, for activity and constructivist approaches selves and objects
are rather peripheral entities used to locate phenomena of interest. What
activity and constructivist approaches focus upon are processes of doing.
The significance of the individual manifests as competencies, memories etc.

Re ontology, EvG describes constructivism as goal-directed: "Constructivism
necessarily begins with the (intuitively confirmed) assumption that all
cognitive activity takes place within the experiential world of a
goal-directed consciousness" [2]. I doubt v. much whether this can be
adequately thought of as Newtonian, seeing as RC is related to the
"cybernetics of cybernetics" which recognises the role of the observer as
foundational, and where accounts of observing one's thoughts etc is quite
commonplace. In my experience many authors seem to over step the mark with
respect to categorisation of philosophical positions. Conceiving of the
circumstances in terms of systems can often help penetrate that fog.

Re positioning, the physics metaphor was a reach for me, but perhaps the
notion of sophisticated conceptions applies. Particularly in the sense that
any (cognitive or "genesis of selves") theory would do well to be able to
explain itself, i.e. how one arrives at the theory in terms of the theory.

Best,
Huw

[1] https://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/EvG/papers/122.pdf
[2] http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/EvG/papers/070.1.pdf

On 12 April 2018 at 17:34, Wolff-Michael Roth <wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Huw,
>
> I can't see how the radical constructivist position (e..g von Glasersfeld)
> has anything in common with a radically social take, here I do not mean the
> "social constructivist" version, which is just adding external relations
> between elemental individuals (see, e.g., how Glaserfeld makes the "other"
> a construction of the Self, which externalizes itself as a model on which
> the notion of the other is based).
> In a vast part of the philosophical (and poetic) literature, coming from
> very different traditions, the Self is another (Soi-même comme un autre, as
> Ricœur says, or Rimbaud's famous aphorism, "Je est un autre" etc. etc)
>
> I am trying to understand where to place myself so that these differences
> become the same (like in physics, where the simultaneity is a question of
> position).
>
> But my hunch is that the ontology is object-oriented, and that the
> presuppositions are Newtonian-Cartesian-Kantian.
>
> Michael
>
>
> On Thu, Apr 12, 2018 at 8:59 AM, Huw Lloyd <huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> > Bill, Michael, and others
> >
> > The problem with these pithy statements is that they do not define their
> > terms. For Vygotsky's "general genetic law" one needs to know what is
> meant
> > by a function, process, etc, and also an appreciation for different forms
> > of "internal": the internal of operationalisation, in which there is an
> > atrophy of supporting external signs that are replaced by internal signs,
> > contrasted with the internal dialogue often entailed in thought (though
> > granted internal dialogue may have its own externalised progenitors). For
> > Bruner's (Kay's summative) "doing with images makes symbols", one needs
> to
> > know what is meant by the full connotations of symbol. One might argue
> that
> > neither Vygotsky nor Bruner really knew with clarity what they
> respectively
> > meant by function and symbol (distinct from sign) -- it was part of their
> > exploration.
> >
> > It is not that the "genetic law" is wrong per se, in my view, rather that
> > care needs to be taken in differentiating exactly what is being referred
> > to. In this view I see no contradiction between this law and the
> principles
> > of radical constructivism (which, to me, are rather obvious). The
> > clarification of inner dialogue, for instance, may be exemplified as a
> > dialogue between two perspectives that is no different (logically)
> between
> > a dialogue between two individuals, as exemplified by Pask's
> p-individual.
> > Hence in the realm of invention Vygotsky's genetic law may apply equally
> to
> > the "external" social plane as to the "internal" one. One needs to be
> clear
> > about what one means by internal-external and to heed the functional
> > possibilities from bootstrapping. This leads to a rejection of a naive
> > application of "all new psychological processes originating from
> outside",
> > but not from a sophisticated application.
> >
> > Best,
> > Huw
> >
> > On 12 April 2018 at 07:25, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > > ps. Addition to this comment from me above:
> > > Papert's framing of the turtle as an "object to think with" and
> > > incidentally also Bruner's similar conception of "doing with images
> makes
> > > symbols" do represent a learning theory which combines the kinesthenic
> > with
> > > the visual with the symbolic. Does that gel with your learning theory?
> > From
> > > my reading it does partly but you would be chary about the symbolic
> part,
> > > I'm not sure.
> > >
> > > On page 49, FN 31 Michael cites 2 papers about the emergence of signs
> > from
> > > hands on science. This seems to me to be compatible with Bruner's
> > approach
> > > which he summed up with the slogan "doing with images makes symbols"
> and
> > > also with Seymour's "object to think with" even though he didn't spell
> > out
> > > the signs when he said that.
> > >
> > > My speculation here (to be shot down probably); Michael Roth's theory
> and
> > > Papert / Bruner theory cover the same ground and reach similar
> > conclusions
> > > but they have different names
> > >
> > >
> > > On Thu, Apr 12, 2018 at 11:12 AM, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > >
> > > > hi Michael,
> > > >
> > > > > not so much "socially constructed."
> > > >
> > > > ok, sorry for incorrect summary of your ideas, I guess the
> construction
> > > is
> > > > so hard wired into me that I didn't notice the misrepresentation
> > > >
> > > > > before there was culture, before we used tools, where
> > > > were those tools for constructing anything of the likes that
> > > > constructivists say that we use to construct?
> > > >
> > > > Well, the hand is a tool and Engels essay "The part played by labour
> in
> > > > the transition from ape to man" is one you would know about.
> > > >
> > > > > eclecticism
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for the Leontev reference. I have read a bit and will read
> some
> > > > more before commenting.
> > > >
> > > > The reason I'm eclectic is because I read the various learning
> theories
> > > > and find some bits are useful for my teaching practice while other
> bits
> > > are
> > > > not. I'm very impressed by your book in its effort to develop what I
> > > call a
> > > > unified learning theory but it doesn't cover all the bases for me to
> be
> > > > fully persuaded.
> > > >
> > > > Also some of the critiques you make, eg. of constructivism, don't
> match
> > > my
> > > > understanding of what they stand for. The critiques in your book are
> > > > directed at radical constructivism (von Glasersfeld) and Piaget /
> > > > Inhelder. When I read pp 51-53 of your book it didn't sound like the
> > > Piaget
> > > > that has circulated in and out of Australian schools in the 1980s
> when
> > > > Piaget became the preferred flavour of the decade and science
> curricula
> > > > were developed around his ideas.
> > > >
> > > > Specifically you say that constructivists argue that: (I've *bolded*
> > the
> > > > bits where your understanding of Piaget is different to mine)
> > > > "the individual mind is ... *informationally closed* to the
> surrounding
> > > > world" (51)
> > > > "In a constructivist account, she (Melissa) might be said to
> > *incorrectly
> > > > 'interpret'* the object ..." (51)
> > > > "As Piaget, modern day constructivists often characterize children's
> > > > knowing *negatively: as lack, deficit ... or deviance* ..." (52)
> > > > "In the constructivist literature , we can frequently read that
> > > *misconceptions
> > > > ... have to be eradicated* (53)
> > > >
> > > > Piaget's best known observation were about conservation, the tall and
> > > wide
> > > > glasses, and I've never heard children's responses described as
> > > incorrect,
> > > > deficit or misconception but always as a stage that children have to
> > pass
> > > > through. It always seemed me that Piaget respected and understood the
> > > > child's different view of the world.
> > > >
> > > > The version of constructivism that I am most familiar with was called
> > > > constructionism by Seymour Papert, which combines the internal
> > > > constructivism with an external construction. (Papert did spend some
> > time
> > > > working with Piaget). This had real life application in the
> development
> > > of
> > > > logo-LEGO which evolved into Mindstorms LEGO. The idea was that kids
> > > would
> > > > build things out there and make those things do stuff with the logo
> > > > programming language and this would change/develop their minds
> inside.
> > > >
> > > > I'm not saying that Papert's constructionism was without difficulty
> due
> > > to
> > > > the fundamental idealist nature of constructivism but nevertheless I
> > have
> > > > found it very useful in thinking about how kids learn.
> > > >
> > > > Papert described the logo turtle as "an object to think with" and
> > tapped
> > > > into Freud's idea of body syntonic to describe the process. eg. how
> do
> > > you
> > > > draw a square? The teacher pretends to be a robot and asks the
> students
> > > to
> > > > direct him / her to draw a square.
> > > > Student: "walk forward"
> > > > Teacher: robot doesn't understand walk but he does understand forward
> > > > Student: forward
> > > > Teacher: How far?
> > > > Student: forward 50
> > > > etc. etc.
> > > > This leads to development of concepts of directed motion, angles
> (right
> > > > 90) and iteration. Once the square is drawn the teacher goes back and
> > > asks
> > > > students to identify which parts are repeated, and the code
> eventually
> > > > becomes repeat 4[fd 50 rt 90]
> > > >
> > > > Papert's framing of the turtle as an "object to think with" and
> > > > incidentally also Bruner's similar conception of "doing with images
> > makes
> > > > symbols" do represent a learning theory which combines the
> kinesthenic
> > > with
> > > > the visual with the symbolic. Does that gel with your learning
> theory?
> > > From
> > > > my reading it does partly but you would be chary about the symbolic
> > part,
> > > > I'm not sure.
> > > >
> > > > (my initial comment did mention what I see as a tendency to deny the
> > > > internal and I intend to post more later on that issue. Repeating
> what
> > I
> > > > said then "Moreover internal representations or schemas seem to be
> > denied
> > > > because that would be a capitulation to dualism, emphasising brain /
> > mind
> > > > activity whereas the real deal is an integrated thinking body")
> > > >
> > > >  It was because of the idealist nature of constructivism /
> > > constructionism
> > > > that I became more critical of it over time and delved more into
> other
> > > > learning theories. I wrote about this back in 2008 when there was
> some
> > > > discussion about constructivism in the one laptop per child movement.
> > > I'll
> > > > put some links here for completion and my own convenience
> > > > https://billkerr2.blogspot.com.au/2008/08/towards-
> > > > fingernail-definition-of.html
> > > >
> > > > The funny thing was that each new learning theory I looked at offered
> > > > something useful to me as a practicing teacher. I won't go into more
> > > detail
> > > > at this point, there is enough here already for discussion.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Apr 11, 2018 at 9:27 PM, Wolff-Michael Roth <
> > > > wolffmichael.roth@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >> Hi Bill,
> > > >> it is not so much "socially constructed." My key point in the book
> is
> > > that
> > > >> it is social BEFORE there can be any construction. It is social, and
> > > this
> > > >> is where I refer to a Vygotsky that has not been taken up, because
> > > "every
> > > >> higher psychological function ... was a social relation between two
> > > >> people." That is, in this specific case, mathematics is social, was
> > the
> > > >> relation between two people before you see it in individuals...
> > > >>
> > > >> I think the construction metaphor breaks down when you look at our
> > > species
> > > >> becoming human. So before there was culture, before we used tools,
> > where
> > > >> were those tools for constructing anything of the likes that
> > > >> constructivists say that we use to construct? How can a hominid
> > > construct
> > > >> "meaning" of the branch as tool to start digging for roots or
> fishing
> > > for
> > > >> termites? And how do they construct meaning of the first sound-words
> > > when
> > > >> they do not have a system that would serve as material and tool for
> > > >> building anything like "meaning?"
> > > >>
> > > >> So yes, a learning theory has to be able to explain learning from
> > before
> > > >> culture (phylogenesis), before language and meaning (ontogenesis).
> > > >>
> > > >> And about eclecticism---I think we would be a step further if we
> > > listened
> > > >> to and pondered A.N. Leont'ev's complaint about the "eclectic soup
> > > >> [eklekticheskoj pokhlebke] ... each to his own recipe" that
> > > psychologists
> > > >> are trying to cook (in his foreword to *Activity. Consciousness.
> > > >> Personality*).
> > > >>
> > > >> Cheers,
> > > >> Michael
> > > >>
> > > >> On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Bill Kerr <billkerr@gmail.com>
> > wrote:
> > > >>
> > > >> > One interpretation of Vygotsky (Wolff-Michael Roth) argues that
> all
> > > >> > knowledge is socially constructed and that ethnomethodology,
> paying
> > > >> > detailed attention in the now, is the best or only way of
> detecting
> > > and
> > > >> > evaluating what is going on . Human activity can’t be reduced to
> > > >> individual
> > > >> > actions. Anything individual originates in the social, be it
> words,
> > > >> > mathematics or by implication computer science (mentioned not in
> the
> > > >> > original but because it is a current interest of mine). Moreover
> > > >> internal
> > > >> > representations or schemas seem to be denied because that would
> be a
> > > >> > capitulation to dualism, emphasising brain / mind activity whereas
> > the
> > > >> real
> > > >> > deal is an integrated thinking body.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > This world view is critical of other learning theories be they
> > > >> > behaviourist, cognitivist, enactivist or constructivist.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > The question that I want to explore here is the pragmatic one of
> > > whether
> > > >> > and how learning theory (an abstraction) makes a difference in
> > > practice,
> > > >> > for busy, hard working (usually overworked) teachers. An
> alternative
> > > >> > epistemology/ies which might appeal more in practice to real
> > teachers
> > > >> under
> > > >> > pressure is an eclectic one centred around the issue of “what
> > works”.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > I believe I am better read on learning theory than most teachers.
> > See
> > > >> > http://learningevolves.wikispaces.com/learning%20theories
> > > >> >
> > > >> > Up until now I've developed an eclectic / pragmatic approach to
> > > putting
> > > >> > learning theory into practice. Take something from Seymour
> Papert's
> > > >> > constructionism, something from Dan Willingham's cognitivism,
> > > something
> > > >> > from Dan Dennett's behaviourism, something from Andy Clarke’s
> > > enactivism
> > > >> > and roll them altogether in an eclectic mix. The authors in this
> > list
> > > >> could
> > > >> > be multiplied. My underlying belief was that it was not possible
> to
> > > >> develop
> > > >> > a unified learning theory, that human learning was too complex for
> > > >> that. As
> > > >> > Marvin Minsky once said in 'Society of Mind', "the trick is there
> is
> > > no
> > > >> > trick", I think meaning no overarching way in which human's learn.
> > > >> >
> > > >> > One big surprise in reading Wolff-Michael Roth is his serious
> > attempt
> > > to
> > > >> > put an end to such eclectism and develop what appears to be a
> unfied
> > > >> > learning theory.
> > > >> >
> > > >>
> > > >
> > > >
> > >
> >
>