[Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
David Kellogg
dkellogg60@gmail.com
Tue Jan 10 15:24:21 PST 2017
Andy:
A good paradox! Word meaning is a unit, but the spoken word itself is just
an element--a thing. We can see that this is, on the face of it,
impossible: within a single holistic analysis, an element can be a part of
a unit, but a unit can never be a part of an element. So what you are
referring to when you say that the word is a thing is the "sonic" or
"phasal" quality of the word: its "acoustic" properties, its "phonetics".
But not its phonology. The word that Vygotsky uses for "phoneme" refers to
the 1929 work of the Prague Circle, originally the Moscow Circle. He is a
LITTLE coy about this, because the founders, Jakobson and Trubetskoy, were
not very popular with the authorities and Vygotsky already had plenty of
heterodox acquaintances to worry about. Nevertheless, whenever Vygotsky
says "phoneme", we know he really means what Jakobson and Trubetskoy called
"morphophonemes". We know this because the examples he actually
gives--Russian case endings--are morpho-phonemes and not simply phonemes:
so for example in English the sound /s/ is a simple phoneme when I say the
word "self" but if I say "Andy's" the sound /s/ is a morpho-phoneme: a
difference in sounding that makes a difference in meaning. The system (that
is, the paradigmatic menu) of these differences in soundings are what the
Moscow and Prague Circles called "phonology" (as OPPOSED to phonetics), and
this is the kind of "phoneme" that Vygotsky is really talking about.
Still, you can see that it is not what he is talking about when he says
word meaning, because these units are still nowhere near big enough to
describe the kinds of changes which must occur when verbal thinking
develops. I feel the same way about a lot of the examples offered of
"perezhivanie", including Marc's. If MacDuff's grief or Carla's epiphany
about the misbehavior of her kids being due to "outside influences" really
is the unit of personality and experience that Vygotsky wants us to use
when we analyse the ontogenesis of personality, then it is no more
appropriate than using the morpho-phoneme to analyse the whole of verbal
thinking. Just as evolution (of species) requires very different units from
history (of classes), development, whether we are talking about verbal
thinking or the personality as a whole, is going to require very different
units from learning, whether we are talking about MacDuff or Carla. The
units must be able to develop; that is, the relationship of the elements
within them must be susceptible to many changes over time.
Let me give three examples of how this happens in different "perezhivanie".
They are not mine; they are Vygotsky's, and they are all from the
Pedological Lectures.
First, the Crisis at One. Neither the biological nor the social endowment
of the child greatly changes in the acquisition of speech; nevertheless,
the relationship between the personality and the environment, of which
both personality moments and environmental ones are constituent elements,
is entirely transformed. Here we are not talking about phonemes, or even
morpho-phonemes: we are talking about "wordings"--whole utterances. In
Melbourne I presented some data that demonstrated this beautifully--a
child's first word is actually an attempt to imitate a whole conversation.
Second, the Crisis at Three. Vygotsky spends a lot of time discussing the
"Seven Stars"--the symptoms of the "Terrible Twos" and "Threenagehood"
noted by harried parents everywhere. But by the end of his analysis it's
clear that what really happens is a new relationship between wish and
will: in extreme cases, the child actually wishes for one thing (e.g.
compromise) and wills the opposite (the everlasting "No!"). Again, neither
the personality moments as such nor the environmental ones change, but
there is a separation and a sorting which allows the subordination of wish
to will that we see in play. This isn't the kind of "aha" moment that Marc
is offering us at all: Vygotsky actually calls it the "antipode" of future
will, because instead of enabling will it actually paralyzes it. But it is
indubitably a key moment in the development of the relation of personality
to environmental moments that we see in "perizhivanie".
Thirdly, the Crisis at Seven. I think Gonzalez Rey makes a total hash of
this, and I get very cross when I read his article. It is not true that the
essence of perizhivanie remained a mystery to Vygotsky simply because he no
longer subscribes to "the aesthetic reaction" and "catharsis" and other
notions that he toyed with in Psych of Art (he's no longer doing
experiments on changes in breathing rate when people read the works of
Bunin either!). It might be true that he never offered a system of facts
and methodological procedures for perezivanie, but that was only because
one already existed, for example in the work of Wallon and Stern
and others. It is demonstrably not true that when Vygotsky says that the
speech environment of those around him does not change when the child
learns to talk at one, he is not "profoundly contradictory with the concept
of sense": when you read the quotation in context, it is very clear that
what he is referring to are the kinds of absolute indicators used by
Zalkind: how often the parents read the newspapers, the dialect they speak,
and their educational background. These do not change, and if the child
wants to make sense, these are the factors the child will have to relate to.
Vygotsky gives the example of a child who is severely retarded. The child
wants to play with other children and is rejected. The child walks down the
street and the other children follow, laughing. The child is shrieked at,
insulted, but as soon as the humiliation stops, the child is perfectly
happy with himself. Vygotsky points out that the child is not able
to "co-generalize" the "perizhivanie" of the humiliations: each is
unpleasant, but they are entirely separate and cannot be connected with any
internal sense of inferiority. A normal child, however, is able to
"internalize" these humiliations and consequently develops a sense of
inferiority. We can see that what has happened is the insertion of what
Vygotsky calls an "intellectual" moment: an inner layer, which is what
distinguishes later Chaplin movies from earlier ones (again, Vygotsky's
example, not mine!) and what brings about the "loss of directness and
naivete" that we see in pre-schoolers.
I think that the reason people find "perizhivanie" so hard to work with is
the same reason that they find "word meaning" hard to work with: it
develops. The feeling of drinking milk as the infant drinks it is
perizhivanie, and the thought of being humiliated when you are mulling it
over and contemplating revenge is also perizhivanie, and only a profound
analysis which includes ontogenetic development and not just learning will
show the inner link between them. It's for that reason that I think that
"activity" is not a useful unit of analysis and I am much more inclined to
use your word "project", so long as it can include what Vygotsky calls
"inner activeness".
Vygotsky says:
Когда я размышляю, припоминаю и т. д., я имею дело с внутренней
активностью, эта внутренняя деятельность психологических процессов
непосредственно не связана с внешней деятельностью. Вот эта новая форма
внутренней активности в школьном возрасте заключается в том, что, в то
время как в дошкольном возрасте эти внутренние деятельности обнаруживают
непосредственную связь с действием, внешней активностью, в школьном
возрасте мы имеем относительно самостоятельно возникающие, относительно
независимые внутренние активности по отношению к внешней деятельности. Это
уже ребенок, который может размышлять, в то время когда он делает или видит
что-нибудь, тот, у которого возникает дифференциация внешней и внутренней
деятельности.
When I think, remember, etc. I am dealing with inner activeness; this
psychological process of inner activity is not directly linked to any
external activity. The new form of inner activeness in the School Age
consists of this: that while during the preschool years these inner
activities demonstrated an immediate link with action, with external
activeness, in the school years we have a relative autonomy which emerges,
inner activeness which is relatively independent of external activities.
Here is already a child who can think, at the same time when he is doing or
seeing something, one in whom has emerged a differentiation of inner and
outer activities.
David Kellogg
Macquarie University
On Sun, Jan 8, 2017 at 10:07 AM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:
> David: "Are words really units?"
>
> Well, firstly, "units" is a *relative* term. That is, the question is: are
> words units of something, some complex process subject to analysis. And
> which?
>
> Secondly, according to Vygotsky, "no." The concept Vygotsky proposes as a
> unit is "word meaning" which he says is a unity of sound and meaning. The
> sound is an artefact, which, detached from its meaningful utterance in a
> transactional context is just a thing, viz., a word. Whereas "word meaning"
> is an arrtefact-mediated action, a unit of human social activity.
>
> It is true that words can be countable or mass according to context, but I
> wasn't talking about words was I? I was talking about word meaning.
>
> Andy
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Andy Blunden
> http://home.mira.net/~andy
> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
> On 8/01/2017 7:59 AM, David Kellogg wrote:
>
>> Are words really units? When we look at their ideational meaning (that is,
>> their logical and experiential content--their capacity for representing
>> and
>> linking together human experiences) they seem to fall into two very
>> different categories: lexical words like "perezhivanie" or "sense" or
>> "personality" of "individual" and grammatical words like "of", or "might",
>> or "is". The lexical words seem to behave like units--they are bounded,
>> discrete, and, as Andy would say, "countable" (the problem is that almost
>> all nouns are both countable and uncountable depending on the context you
>> put them in, so this distinction is really not as essential as Andy seems
>> to assume). But the more grammatical words seem to be elements of some
>> larger unit, which we can call wording.
>>
>> Veresov and Fleer come up against this problem with "edintsvo" and
>> "edintsa". Of course, as they say, the two words are distinct. But this
>> doesn't necessarily mean that the former always corresponds to "unity" in
>> English and the latter is always "unit". If you look at the paragraph they
>> translate on 330, you can see that Vygotsky starts with an idea that is
>> quite "synoptic" and is well expressed by "unit". But in the last sentence
>> there is a sense that "perezhivanie" is a meta-stable unit--one that
>> remains self-similar only through a process of thorough change, like a
>> bicycle whose every part is replaced--and in English is it is better to
>> express this idea with "unity". The problem is that the differences
>> between
>> "edintsvo" and "edintsva" in Russian is a matter of gender (I think) and
>> not simply abstractness, and as a result the English version, which cannot
>> use the resource of gender,has to rely on abstractness, so the words
>> "unity" and "unit" are somewhat more distinct and less linked than
>> "edintsvo" and "edintsva".
>>
>> There are other problems that are similar. When Gonzalez Rey uses the word
>> "final moment" to refer to the final period of Vygotsky's thinking, he
>> leaves the anglophone reader the impression that he is referring to
>> Vygotsky's deathbed thoughts. On the other hand, when Veresov and Fleer
>> use
>> "factor" to translate the same Russian word that Gonzalez Rey is using,
>> they are giving us something more quantitative than Vygotsky intended, and
>> their translation of "dalee nerazloshim'im chastyami etava edinstva"
>> into "vital and further indivisible part of the whole" is quite opaque in
>> English (notice that here Veresov and Fleer use "whole" to translate
>> "edinstva" rather than "unit"!) At some point you have to accept that you
>> can change Russian words into English words as if you were exchanging
>> rubles for dollars, but you still won't be able to buy a samovar at
>> Walmart.
>>
>> David Kellogg
>> Macquarie University
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Jan 8, 2017 at 5:21 AM, Alfredo Jornet Gil <a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>
>> wrote:
>>
>> Larry, all,
>>>
>>> our arguments in the 2014 address a science education literature in which
>>> the constructivist perspective is the leading perspective; We note that
>>> the
>>> assertion that people learn from experience is everywhere taken for
>>> granted
>>> but nowhere accounted for. We resort to pragmatist and phenomenological
>>> literature along with Vygotsky's insights to point out the need to
>>> account
>>> for learning as something that cannot be the result of an individual's
>>> construction; in experience there is always something in excess of what
>>> you
>>> intended, and this is a basic feature of doing, of performing. I take
>>> that
>>> to be your "trans" in the trans/zhivanie word, Larry, which already is
>>> denoted in the word PERezhivanie.
>>>
>>> But I do not wish to move our discussion too far away from Marc's paper
>>> and the Perezhivanie special issue. We also risk disengaging many that
>>> have
>>> not have the privilege we've had to have the time to read so many
>>> articles
>>> in just few days into the new year. I think we are a point in the
>>> discussion where a pretty clear point of agreement/disagreement, and
>>> therefore of possibility for growth, has been reached with regard to the
>>> view of perezhivanie as "an experience" and as the "working over it". I
>>> think that to allow as many as possible to follow, and hopefully also
>>> engage, I think it will be helpful to bring the diverse perspectives and
>>> theoretical accounts to matter in accounting for some actual material.
>>> And
>>> there are a number of cases described in the articles, including Marc's
>>> case of a teacher, as well as everyday facts, such as those brought by
>>> Beth, and in Beth's article...
>>>
>>> I take the task for myself too, but Saturday morning need to attend to
>>> other things!
>>> A
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> ________________________________________
>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>> on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com <lpscholar2@gmail.com>
>>> Sent: 07 January 2017 18:26
>>> To: Andy Blunden; Peter Smagorinsky; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity;
>>> Larry Purss
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>
>>> Andy, Peter, i hope the intention to move beyond politeness to struggle
>>> with this topic materializes.
>>> In this vein i want to introduce exploration of the ‘excess’ of actual
>>> over intended meaning as he sketched his introduction to ‘experience’.
>>>
>>> Citing Dewey, Alfredo says that this excess of actual learning over
>>> intended learning INCLUDES what Dewey refers to as ‘attitudes’ and these
>>> ‘attitudes’ are FUNDAMENTALLY what count in the future.
>>> Alfredo and Roth then add this summary statement :
>>>
>>> There is therefore, a need to theorize experience in terms that do not
>>> assume control and rationality as the sine qua non of learning. It also
>>> implies a need to develop analytical accounts that retain the
>>> ‘uncertainty’
>>> that is an ‘integral part’ of human experience.
>>>
>>> Where are Alfredo and Roth leading us with this sketch of experience? To
>>> highlight ‘attitudes’ that occur in the excess of actual over intended
>>> learning? The word ‘attitudes’ generates images of (atmosphere) and
>>> (moods)
>>> that ‘flow’ like cascading waterfalls that can be imaged as (force) or as
>>> (receptive). Attitudes that flow to places where they are received
>>> within a
>>> certain attitude of care and concern. Not as forceful an image as moving
>>> only with control and rationality. Describing ‘weaker’ thought that
>>> remains uncertain but that also opens us to the other’s peril and plight.
>>> Possibly a post-analytic motion that exceeds the intended by
>>> living-through
>>> the actual that develops ‘attitudes’ that are fundamentally what count
>>> for
>>> the future.
>>>
>>>
>>> Sent from my Windows 10 phone
>>>
>>> From: Andy Blunden
>>> Sent: January 7, 2017 5:00 AM
>>> To: Peter Smagorinsky; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>
>>> OK Peter, what you say is all very true I am sure, but it
>>> entails conflating activity and action (as mass nouns) and
>>> context and mediation, and makes the required distinction
>>> much like one could find multiple meanings for the word
>>> "and" by listing the different phrases and clauses which can
>>> be linked by "and."
>>>
>>> Andy
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Andy Blunden
>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy
>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>>>
>>> On 7/01/2017 11:42 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
>>>
>>>> Let me try to illustrate.
>>>>
>>>> Reading as mediated action: The cultural-historical
>>>> context of reading mediates how one’s attention and
>>>> response are channeled in socially constructed ways. So,
>>>> in one setting, say at home or reading in the company of
>>>> friends, a novel might bring a reader to tears, or invite
>>>> readers to share personal stories that parallel those of
>>>> the plot lines, or laugh out loud. But another setting, a
>>>> formal school or university class, would have historical
>>>> values and practices that mute emotional and personal
>>>> responses, and promote a more sober, analytic way of
>>>> reading and talking that fits with specific historical
>>>> critical conventions and genres, and discourages others.
>>>>
>>>> Reading as mediating action: The act of reading can be
>>>> transformational. In reading about an talking about a
>>>> character’s actions, a reader might reconsider a value
>>>> system, become more sympathetic to real people who
>>>> resemble oppressed characters, etc. In other words,
>>>> reading a text may serve a mediational process in which
>>>> textual ideas and exemplars enable a reader to think
>>>> differently.
>>>>
>>>> *From:*Andy Blunden [mailto:ablunden@mira.net]
>>>> *Sent:* Saturday, January 7, 2017 6:28 AM
>>>> *To:* Peter Smagorinsky <smago@uga.edu>; eXtended Mind,
>>>> Culture, Activity <xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>> *Subject:* Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>>
>>>> Can you explain in a paragraph or two,. Peter, rather than
>>>> asking us all to read 10,000 words to extract an answer?
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-decision-making
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 7/01/2017 11:23 PM, Peter Smagorinsky wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Andy and others, I tried to work out the mediated/mediating
>>>> question
>>>>
>>> in the area of reading....see if this helps.
>>>
>>>> Smagorinsky, P., & O'Donnell-Allen, C. (1998). Reading as mediated
>>>>
>>> and mediating action: Composing meaning for literature through multimedia
>>> interpretive texts. Reading Research Quarterly, 33, 198-226. Available
>>> athttp://www.petersmagorinsky.net/About/PDF/RRQ/RRQ1998.pdf
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>
>>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@
>>>>
>>> mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden
>>>
>>>> Sent: Friday, January 6, 2017 7:12 PM
>>>>
>>>> To:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu <mailto:xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>>
>>>> I have never understood this supposed distinction, Alfredo, between
>>>>
>>> "mediated activity" and "mediating activity" given that all activity is
>>> mediated and all activity mediates.
>>>
>>>> Also, could you spell out what you mean by the "tension"
>>>>
>>>> between perezhivanie as meaning and perezhivanie as struggle.
>>>>
>>>> Andy
>>>>
>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------
>>>>
>>>> Andy Blunden
>>>>
>>>> http://home.mira.net/~andy <http://home.mira.net/%7Eandy>
>>>>
>>>> http://www.brill.com/products/book/origins-collective-
>>>>
>>> decision-making
>>>
>>>> On 5/01/2017 6:26 PM, Alfredo Jornet Gil wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Thanks Marc for your careful response.
>>>>
>>>> I am familiar to Vygotsky's notion of cultural mediation and I
>>>>
>>> am aware and acknowledge that it was elaborated as a means to overcome
>>> dualism, and that it is not analog to a computational approach.
>>>
>>>> When I brought the computing analogy, I did so with regard not
>>>>
>>> to the concept of cultural mediation in general, but to the way it can be
>>> (and is) deployed analytically. I react to what it seems to me a
>>> dichotomy
>>> between a "meaning" as something that is static (thereby a form of
>>> "representation" or reflection of the relation with the environment
>>> instead
>>> ofrefraction) and the experiencing-as-struggling, which is described
>>> astransformation or change. If so, mediation here would seem to be part
>>> of
>>> a methodological device that first dissects "a type of meaning" from "a
>>> type of activity" (or a given state from the process that changes that
>>> state), and then unites it by adding the term "mediation." And this may
>>> be
>>> my misreading, but in that (mis)reading (which perhaps is mostly due to
>>> the
>>> fact that in your empirical illustration only the initial and end
>>> product,
>>> i.e., perezhivanie, are described, but not the experiencing-as-struggle,
>>> that is, the moving between the two), mediation here seems to do as
>>> analytical concept precisely what you were afraid our monism was doing:
>>> explaining nothing. Only the end products but not the process of
>>> producing
>>> perezhivanie are revealed. This may be problematic if one attends to what
>>> Veresov argues in the paper I shared yesterday, where he defends the
>>> notion
>>> of mediation but also specifies that Vygotsky speaks of *mediating
>>> activity* (as opposed to *mediated* activity). That is, not mediation by
>>> signs as products, but mediating activity as the activity of producing
>>> signs (which again is an activity of producing social relations, perhaps
>>> what you refer as "holistic meanings"?). What do you think?
>>>
>>>> I did not think you were trying to deny the influence of
>>>>
>>> Spinoza, and I do not think we ever said that Perezhivanie was primarily
>>> a
>>> move from Cartesian Dualism to Monism, as you suggest in your post. I
>>> copy
>>> and paste from my prior post: "The fact is that Vygotsky was building a
>>> theory on the unity of the affect and the intellect that was to be
>>> grounded
>>> on Spinoza, and what we try to do is to explore how perezhivanie, as a
>>> concept being developed during the same period (but not finalised or
>>> totally settled!), could be seen from the perspective of the Spinozist
>>> Vygotsky."
>>>
>>>> I totally believe that bringing the distinction between
>>>>
>>> perezhivanie as meaning, and perezhivanie as struggle, is totally
>>> relevant,
>>> and Beth Ferholt's vignettes of Where the Wild Things Are do indeed
>>> illustrate this. We really need to address this tension, which as Beth's
>>> examples and as our own everyday experience shows, is a tension that
>>> matters not just to books and to theories but to living persons
>>> (children,
>>> teachers), a tension that moreover is present and mentioned in all the
>>> articles of the symposium. The papers offer different proposals, and I
>>> think is so great we have the chance to discuss them! I too, as you, am
>>> very interesting in hearing others about the questions you had concerning
>>> sense and meaning.
>>>
>>>> Alfredo
>>>>
>>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>
>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Marc
>>>>
>>> Clarà
>>>
>>>> <marc.clara@gmail.com> <mailto:marc.clara@gmail.com>
>>>>
>>>> Sent: 04 January 2017 22:31
>>>>
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>>
>>>> Thank you very much, Alfredo, for sharing this excellent paper
>>>> by
>>>>
>>>> Veresov, and thanks also for your responses, which really
>>>> helped
>>>>
>>> me to
>>>
>>>> better understand your points. My main doubt about your
>>>> proposal
>>>>
>>>> was/is caused by the statement that the idea of cultural
>>>>
>>>> mediation/mediator implies a cartesian dualism. This shocks me
>>>>
>>>> because, to me, the idea of cultural mediation is absolutely
>>>>
>>> crucial
>>>
>>>> (in fact, the keystone) for the construction of a monist (and
>>>>
>>>> scientific) psychology that does not forget mind –that is, a
>>>>
>>> cultural
>>>
>>>> psychology. From your response, however, I realized that we may
>>>>
>>> be
>>>
>>>> approaching the idea of mediation in different ways. I talk of
>>>>
>>>> mediation and mediators in a quite restricted way. The starting
>>>>
>>> point
>>>
>>>> of my understanding of mediation is a dialectical relationship
>>>>
>>>> (organic, transactional) between the subject and the world
>>>>
>>> (Vygotsky departs from the scheme stimulus-response, from reflexology).
>>>
>>>> This relationship, that Vygotsky calls primitive psychological
>>>>
>>>> functions, would be basically biological. However, in human
>>>>
>>> beings
>>>
>>>> this relationship is mediated by cultural means: signs and
>>>>
>>> tools; or
>>>
>>>> primary, secondary and terciary artifacts. These cultural means
>>>>
>>>> reorganize the primitive functions (dialectic S-O
>>>> relationship),
>>>>
>>> which
>>>
>>>> become then higher psychological functions (S-M-O) (see for
>>>>
>>> example,
>>>
>>>> The problem of the cultural development of the child, in The
>>>>
>>> Vygotsky
>>>
>>>> Reader). Now, the subject, the cultural mediators, and the
>>>>
>>> object form
>>>
>>>> an inseparable dialectical unit, so that the subject acts on
>>>>
>>>> (transforms) the object through the prism of the cultural
>>>>
>>> mediators,
>>>
>>>> the object acts on (transforms) the subject also through the
>>>>
>>> prism of
>>>
>>>> the cultural mediators, and the cultural means are themselves
>>>>
>>> also
>>>
>>>> transformed as a consequence of their mediation in this
>>>>
>>> continuous
>>>
>>>> dynamic dialectical tension. Here, for me, it is important the
>>>>
>>> idea
>>>
>>>> that the cultural means are as material (if we assume a
>>>>
>>> materialist
>>>
>>>> monism) as all the rest of the world; in fact, are parts of the
>>>>
>>>> material world which become signs or tools (and can be
>>>> therefore
>>>>
>>>> socially distributed). This permits the introduction of the
>>>>
>>> scientific
>>>
>>>> study of mind-consciousness (as mediating systems of signs),
>>>>
>>> because
>>>
>>>> mind is not anymore something immaterial and unobservable, but
>>>>
>>> it is
>>>
>>>> as material and observable as the rest of the natural world. It
>>>>
>>> is
>>>
>>>> from this view that, for me, the idea of cultural mediation is
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> keystone of a monist psychology that includes mind. Thus, when
>>>> I
>>>>
>>> speak
>>>
>>>> of mediators, I refer to the cultural means which mediate in
>>>> the
>>>>
>>> S-O
>>>
>>>> dialectics; I am especially interested in signs/secondary
>>>>
>>> artifacts.
>>>
>>>> Here, it is perhaps necessary to insist that when I talk of
>>>>
>>> studying
>>>
>>>> mediators (and their semantic structure), this doesn't mean
>>>> that
>>>>
>>> they
>>>
>>>> are taken out from the activity (the flux of live) in which
>>>> they
>>>>
>>>> mediate (since out of activity they are not signs anymore);
>>>>
>>> here, I
>>>
>>>> think Vygotsky tries again to overcome another old dichotomy,
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>> functionalism-structuralism one. I hope that all this makes
>>>> also
>>>>
>>> clear the difference between this view and that of computational
>>> psychologies (which in general are profoundly and explicitly dualist and
>>> not dialectic).
>>>
>>>> Back to perezhivanie, I'm not obviously trying to deny the
>>>>
>>> influence
>>>
>>>> of Spinoza on Vygotsky's thinking (this is explicit in
>>>> Vygotsky's
>>>>
>>>> writings, especially in “The teaching about emotions”, in the
>>>>
>>> Vol.6 of
>>>
>>>> the Collected Works). But I have doubts that Vygotsky's
>>>>
>>> introduction
>>>
>>>> of the concept of perezhivanie is to be regarded primarily as a
>>>>
>>>> movement towards monism (from a previous cartesian dualism),
>>>> and
>>>>
>>> that
>>>
>>>> this movement questions the concept of cultural mediation.
>>>>
>>> Instead,
>>>
>>>> and I think that this is in line with some of González-Rey
>>>>
>>>> observations in his paper, my impression is that the
>>>>
>>> introduction of
>>>
>>>> the concept of perezhivanie responds more to a movement (a
>>>>
>>> further
>>>
>>>> step) towards holism (something that, in my understanding, can
>>>>
>>> also be
>>>
>>>> found in Spinoza). Thus, I think that the word meaning is still
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> unit of analysis in the last Vygotsky -and therefore, the idea
>>>> of
>>>>
>>>> cultural mediation is still crucial (in fact, in The problem of
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> environment, he connects the concept of perezhivanie, which has
>>>>
>>> just
>>>
>>>> introduced, to the development of word meaning [p.345-346, also
>>>>
>>> cited
>>>
>>>> in my paper]). However, in my view, in the last Vygotsky the
>>>>
>>> focus is
>>>
>>>> not anymore primarily on the word-meaning as formed for things
>>>>
>>> (or
>>>
>>>> collections of things, as in the ontogenetic research with
>>>>
>>> Sakharov), but the focus is now in the formation of meaning for holistic
>>> situations.
>>>
>>>> Best regards,
>>>>
>>>> Marc.
>>>>
>>>> 2017-01-03 19:16 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil<
>>>>
>>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> <mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>:
>>>
>>>> Hi Marc, all,
>>>>
>>>> thanks for joining and for your interesting work, which I
>>>>
>>> follow
>>>
>>>> since I became aware of it. I appreciate the way in your
>>>>
>>> paper you
>>>
>>>> show careful and honest attention to the texts of the
>>>> authors
>>>>
>>>> involved, but perhaps most of all I appreciate that the
>>>>
>>> paper makes
>>>
>>>> the transformational dimension related to struggle and
>>>> change
>>>>
>>>> salient, a dimension all papers deemed central to
>>>>
>>> perezhivanie. And I
>>>
>>>> have learned more about Vasilyuk by reading your paper. But
>>>>
>>> I also
>>>
>>>> see that we have approached the question of perezhivanie
>>>>
>>> differently
>>>
>>>> and I think that addressing the questions that you raise
>>>>
>>> concerning
>>>
>>>> our article may be a good way to both respond and discuss
>>>>
>>> your paper.
>>>
>>>> I am aware that our use of the term monism may be
>>>>
>>> problematic to
>>>
>>>> some, and N. Veresov, who has recently written about this
>>>>
>>> (see
>>>
>>>> attached article), warns against the dangers of simply
>>>>
>>> moving from
>>>
>>>> dualism into an undifferentiating monism that relativizes
>>>>
>>> everything,
>>>
>>>> making development un-studiable. This seems to be the way
>>>> in
>>>>
>>> which
>>>
>>>> you have understood our argument, and of course this is not
>>>>
>>> what we are or want to be doing.
>>>
>>>> Probably many will think that *dialectical materialism*
>>>>
>>> rather than
>>>
>>>> monism is the proper term, and I could agree with them; we
>>>>
>>> do in fact
>>>
>>>> use dialectical materialism there and elsewhere. Yet, we
>>>>
>>> wanted to
>>>
>>>> emphasise the Spinozist influence (an influence that also
>>>>
>>> runs
>>>
>>>> through Marx) and so we found it appropriate to use the
>>>> term
>>>>
>>> monism,
>>>
>>>> a term that Vygotsky uses before arguing that Spinoza
>>>>
>>> "develops an essentially materialistic view"
>>>
>>>> (Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 124). For us, the aim is
>>>>
>>> working out
>>>
>>>> ways to empirically examine and formulate problems in ways
>>>>
>>> that do
>>>
>>>> not reify a mind-body dualism.
>>>>
>>>> Although overcoming dualism is foundational to the CHAT
>>>>
>>> paradigm, I
>>>
>>>> would however not say that Vygotsky did get to solve all of
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> problems that Cartesian dualism had created for psychology,
>>>>
>>> even
>>>
>>>> though he recognised those problems brilliantly as early as
>>>>
>>> in the
>>>
>>>> "Crisis". It should suffice to cite Vygotsky's own remarks,
>>>>
>>> which we quote in the paper (and which A.N.
>>>
>>>> Leont'ev mentions in the introduction to the collected
>>>>
>>> works), where
>>>
>>>> Vygotsky explicitly critiques some of his own prior ideas
>>>>
>>> for failing
>>>
>>>> to overcome dualism. We agree with those who, like F. G.
>>>>
>>> Rey, see
>>>
>>>> Vygotsky's project as a developing rather than as a
>>>>
>>> finalised one.
>>>
>>>> The fact is that Vygotsky was building a theory on the
>>>> unity
>>>>
>>> of the
>>>
>>>> affect and the intellect that was to be grounded on
>>>> Spinoza,
>>>>
>>> and what
>>>
>>>> we try to do is to explore how perezhivanie, as a concept
>>>>
>>> being
>>>
>>>> developed during the same period (but not finalised or
>>>>
>>> totally
>>>
>>>> settled!), could be seen from the perspective of the
>>>>
>>> Spinozist Vygotsky.
>>>
>>>> As you note, in our article we argue that, if one takes the
>>>>
>>> Spinozist
>>>
>>>> one-substance approach, classical concepts used in
>>>>
>>> non-classical
>>>
>>>> psychology, at least in the way they are commonly used in
>>>>
>>> the current
>>>
>>>> literature, should be revised. One such concept is
>>>>
>>> mediation. And I
>>>
>>>> personally do not have much of a problem when mediation is
>>>>
>>> used to
>>>
>>>> denote the fundamental fact that every thing exists always
>>>>
>>> through
>>>
>>>> *another*, never in and of itself. But I do think that it
>>>> is
>>>>
>>>> problematic to identify MEDIATORS, such as "a meaning", as
>>>> a
>>>>
>>> means to
>>>
>>>> account for or explain developmental processes and learning
>>>>
>>> events,
>>>
>>>> precisely because it is there, at least in my view, that
>>>>
>>> dualism creeps in.
>>>
>>>> For example, I find it paradoxical that you are concerned
>>>>
>>> that our
>>>
>>>> monist approach risks turning perezhivanie into a useless
>>>>
>>> category
>>>
>>>> because it may be used to explain everything and nothing,
>>>>
>>> and yet you
>>>
>>>> do not seem to have a problem using the term mediation to
>>>>
>>> account for
>>>
>>>> the transformation of perezhivanie without clearly
>>>>
>>> elaborating on how
>>>
>>>> mediation does change anything or what it looks like as a
>>>>
>>> real
>>>
>>>> process. How is it different saying that a perezhivanie
>>>>
>>> mediates the
>>>
>>>> experiencing-as-struggle from simply saying that it
>>>>
>>> "affects" or
>>>
>>>> "determines" it? Indeed, if perezhivanie mediates
>>>>
>>>> experiencing-as-struggle, does not
>>>> experiencing-as-struglgle
>>>>
>>> too
>>>
>>>> mediate perezhivanie? And do not both may be said to
>>>> mediate
>>>>
>>> development, or development mediate them? Is not this explaining
>>> everything
>>> and nothing?
>>>
>>>> I do believe you can argue that there is a difference
>>>> between
>>>>
>>>> mediation and classical psychology's cause-effect
>>>> relations,
>>>>
>>> but to
>>>
>>>> show this you need to dig into the dialectical
>>>> underpinnings
>>>>
>>> of the
>>>
>>>> theory. In your paper, you offer a nice analysis of a
>>>> lovely
>>>>
>>> case of
>>>
>>>> a teacher who, in dealing with a challenge with one of her
>>>>
>>> students,
>>>
>>>> changes her perezhivanie. I think you can rightly argue
>>>> that
>>>>
>>> there is
>>>
>>>> a semiotic transformation, and I fully support your
>>>>
>>> statement that by
>>>
>>>> studying discourse we can empirically approach questions of
>>>>
>>>> psychological development. The contradictions you show as
>>>>
>>> being
>>>
>>>> involved and resolved resonate really well with what I
>>>>
>>> experience as
>>>
>>>> a parent or as a teacher in the classroom. Yet, without
>>>>
>>> unpacking
>>>
>>>> what this "mediation" taking place between one perezhivanie
>>>>
>>> and the
>>>
>>>> next one means as a concrete and real, the same analysis
>>>>
>>> could be done taking an information processing approach:
>>>
>>>> there is an situation that is processed (represented?) in
>>>>
>>> one way,
>>>
>>>> which then leads to a (cognitive) dissonance, and then
>>>> there
>>>>
>>> is a
>>>
>>>> cognitive resolution by means of which the situation is
>>>>
>>> presented
>>>
>>>> differently in consciousness (indeed, when seen in this
>>>> way,
>>>>
>>> the term
>>>
>>>> perezhivanie and the term "representation" become almost
>>>>
>>>> indistinguishable). How is mediation, as an analytical
>>>>
>>> concept,
>>>
>>>> helping here? And most importantly to the question of
>>>>
>>> perezhivanie,
>>>
>>>> how is this analysis going to show the internal connection
>>>>
>>> between
>>>
>>>> intellect and affect that Vygotsky formulates as
>>>>
>>> constitutive of the notion of perezhivanie?
>>>
>>>> I believe that the key lies in understanding what Vygotsky
>>>>
>>> means when
>>>
>>>> he says that perezhivanie is a unit of analysis. I will not
>>>>
>>> repeat
>>>
>>>> here what already is written in at least a couple of the
>>>>
>>> articles in
>>>
>>>> the special issue (Blunden, ours), that is the difference
>>>>
>>> between
>>>
>>>> analysis by elements and unit analysis (Vygotsky 1987). A
>>>>
>>> unit
>>>
>>>> analysis approach is consistent with Spinoza, for whom
>>>>
>>> cause-effect
>>>
>>>> explanations were not adequate, requiring instead an
>>>>
>>> understanding of
>>>
>>>> self-development, perezhivanie as a kernel cell for the
>>>>
>>> development
>>>
>>>> of personality. And I think you may be after this in your
>>>>
>>> article in
>>>
>>>> suggesting a form of continuous movement from perezhivanie
>>>> to
>>>>
>>>> experiencing-as-struggle. But perhaps the major difficulty
>>>> I
>>>>
>>> find is that, in positing Vygotsky's perezhivanie as "a type of meaning"
>>>
>>>> and Vasilyuk's perezhivanie (or experiencing-as-struggle)
>>>> as
>>>>
>>> a "type
>>>
>>>> of activity," it is difficult not to see here a division
>>>>
>>> between
>>>
>>>> product and process, a division that then is analytically
>>>>
>>> bridged by
>>>
>>>> the addition of a third term, mediation, that should bring
>>>>
>>> back the
>>>
>>>> real movement between the product and the process.
>>>>
>>>> A different approach involves considering the concrete
>>>>
>>> extension of
>>>
>>>> actual living and lived social relations, and look at them
>>>> as
>>>>
>>>> generative phenomena. What is there in the encounter
>>>> between
>>>>
>>> Carla
>>>
>>>> and the child that leads to change? For it is not inside
>>>> the
>>>>
>>> mind,
>>>
>>>> but in real life, in consciousness as the real relation
>>>>
>>> between people, that Carla is changed.
>>>
>>>> How is the semantic structure that you nicely present and
>>>>
>>> attribute
>>>
>>>> to Carla a product of the social relation between her and
>>>>
>>> the child?
>>>
>>>> I think that to rightfully situate perezhivanie as a
>>>> concept
>>>>
>>> in a
>>>
>>>> Vygotskian framework, we ought to address its relation to
>>>>
>>> the genetic
>>>
>>>> law of development.
>>>>
>>>> There is much more to disentangle, but this is long enough.
>>>>
>>> I hope I
>>>
>>>> have succeeded in making clear these ideas. Thanks so much
>>>>
>>> for
>>>
>>>> engaging in the discussion!
>>>>
>>>> Alfredo
>>>>
>>>> ________________________________________
>>>>
>>>> From:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu
>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>>
>>>> <xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>
>>>> <mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of
>>>> Marc
>>>>
>>> Clarà
>>>
>>>> <marc.clara@gmail.com>
>>>> <mailto:marc.clara@gmail.com>
>>>>
>>>> Sent: 02 January 2017 22:14
>>>>
>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity
>>>>
>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year and Perezhivanie!
>>>>
>>>> Hi, all, and thank you so much, Alfredo, for your kind
>>>>
>>> invitation to
>>>
>>>> participate in this discussion. My paper in the MCA special
>>>>
>>> issue
>>>
>>>> focuses on a distinction between a type of activity, which
>>>> I
>>>>
>>> argue
>>>
>>>> that is what Vasilyuk called *perezhivanie* (experiencing)
>>>>
>>> and a type
>>>
>>>> of semiotic mediator, which I argue that is what Vygotsky,
>>>>
>>> in The
>>>
>>>> Problem of the Environment, called *perezhivanie.* I argue,
>>>>
>>> following
>>>
>>>> Vasilyuk, that in experiencing activities (Vasilyuk's
>>>>
>>> perezhivanie),
>>>
>>>> this type of mediator is profoundly transformed – in fact,
>>>>
>>> that
>>>
>>>> experiencing activities consist of the semiotic
>>>>
>>> transformation of this type of mediator.
>>>
>>>> As Veresov and Fleer argue in their commentary,
>>>> perezhivanie
>>>>
>>> (as a
>>>
>>>> type of
>>>>
>>>> mediator) is for me a psychological phenomenon, one which
>>>> is
>>>>
>>> of
>>>
>>>> course conceptualized from a specific theoretical
>>>> framework.
>>>>
>>> But the
>>>
>>>> phenomenon is also visible from other theoretical
>>>> frameworks
>>>>
>>> as well,
>>>
>>>> as I mention in the paper. This phenomenon is my main
>>>>
>>> interest, and
>>>
>>>> it is from this interest that I arrived at the concept of
>>>>
>>> perezhivanie (not the other way around).
>>>
>>>> Now, the phenomenon is that at least emotion, reasoning,
>>>> and
>>>>
>>> volition
>>>
>>>> (formation of conscious purposes) seem to be decisively
>>>>
>>> mediated by
>>>
>>>> holistic situational meaning. My current research concern
>>>> is
>>>>
>>> trying
>>>
>>>> to find ways to study and understand how this mediation
>>>>
>>> occurs and
>>>
>>>> how these semiotic mediators are transformed and
>>>>
>>> distributed. From
>>>
>>>> this view, I think that experiencing activities (Vasilyuk's
>>>>
>>>> perezhivanie) may provide a good terrain to study these
>>>>
>>> issues
>>>
>>>> (especially regarding the mediation of emotion), as I tried
>>>>
>>> to exemplify in the paper.
>>>
>>>> Studying semiotic mediation, however, is of course not
>>>> easy.
>>>>
>>>> Following Vygotsky, I assume that extended discourse is the
>>>>
>>>> manifestation of thinking within certain psychological
>>>>
>>> conditions
>>>
>>>> (Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, chapter 7), and I also
>>>>
>>> assume the
>>>
>>>> Vygotsky's law of the unity of the structure and function
>>>> of
>>>>
>>> thinking
>>>
>>>> (Vygotsky's Thinking and Speech, chapter 6). From these two
>>>>
>>>> assumptions, I propose that meaning (and its functions in
>>>>
>>> human
>>>
>>>> activity) can be scientifically studied by structurally
>>>>
>>> analyzing the
>>>
>>>> narratives generated by subjects, considering that the
>>>>
>>> discourse
>>>
>>>> produced in the narrative is the point of departure of this
>>>>
>>> study,
>>>
>>>> but that considerable analytical work must be done to move
>>>>
>>> from this
>>>
>>>> discourse to the full characterization of meaning. It is in
>>>>
>>> that
>>>
>>>> point where I find useful the work developed by Greimas,
>>>> the
>>>>
>>> usefulness of which I only suggest in the paper.
>>>
>>>> >From this background, I found many interesting ideas and
>>>>
>>> questions
>>>
>>>> in the
>>>>
>>>> other papers of the special issue. In this first post I
>>>> will
>>>>
>>> propose
>>>
>>>> two of them for possible discussion. The first one was
>>>>
>>> raised by
>>>
>>>> González-Rey, when he introduces, in connection with
>>>>
>>> perezhivanie,
>>>
>>>> the concepts of personality, and especially, of sense. So,
>>>>
>>> which is
>>>
>>>> the conceptual (and-or
>>>>
>>>> phenomenal) relation between perezhivanie and sense?
>>>>
>>> González-Rey
>>>
>>>> suggests that both concepts are somewhat similar (and
>>>>
>>> overcome by the
>>>
>>>> concept of “subjective sense”); my opinion, partly
>>>> expressed
>>>>
>>> in my
>>>
>>>> commentary, is that perezhivanie is a type of meaning,
>>>> which
>>>>
>>> includes
>>>
>>>> different levels of depth, and that sense corresponds to
>>>> the
>>>>
>>> deepest
>>>
>>>> level of meaning (which can be characterized as a system of
>>>>
>>> semic
>>>
>>>> oppositions). Therefore, sense wouldn't be in opposition to
>>>>
>>> meaning
>>>
>>>> (as “a microcosm of human consciousness”, as Kozulin
>>>>
>>> remembers in his
>>>
>>>> commentary), although it would be in opposition to
>>>>
>>> manifested meaning (the surface level of meaning).
>>>
>>>> The second issue was raised by Roth and Jornet, and I think
>>>>
>>> it goes
>>>
>>>> beyond the issue of perezhivanie itself. If I understand
>>>>
>>> them well,
>>>
>>>> they argue that Vygotsky's core proposal of cultural
>>>>
>>> mediation is
>>>
>>>> influenced by the Cartesian dualism (mind-matter), and
>>>> that a
>>>>
>>>> promising approach to Cultural Psychology would be a
>>>>
>>> Spinozist
>>>
>>>> monism. I am actually very interested on the issue of which
>>>>
>>>> epistemological position can best substantiate the
>>>>
>>> construction of a
>>>
>>>> cultural psychology, and that's why I feel inclined to take
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> opportunity to ask for your opinions about that. About the
>>>>
>>> proposal
>>>
>>>> of Roth and Jornet, I have some doubts. First, I don't see
>>>>
>>> why
>>>
>>>> Vygotsky's proposals can be seen as dualist (in the
>>>>
>>> Cartesian sense)
>>>
>>>> -I suspect that it is because of the analytical
>>>>
>>> distinctions?.
>>>
>>>> Anyway, in my understanding, Vygotsky explicitly assumes a
>>>>
>>>> materialist monism (for example in The Crisis), and in fact
>>>>
>>> he constructs his proposal on mediation upon reflexology, which also
>>> explicitly assumed a materialist monism (e.g.
>>>
>>>> Sechenov). Would a Spinozist monism be a better point of
>>>>
>>> departure? I
>>>
>>>> don't know, in my understanding it is a more idealist
>>>>
>>> monism, and I
>>>
>>>> don't clearly see what could be gained. In my opinion, a
>>>>
>>> scientific
>>>
>>>> psychology which includes the study of mind is only
>>>> possible
>>>>
>>> if any
>>>
>>>> type of monism is assumed. However, in my view, for a
>>>>
>>> scientific
>>>
>>>> psychology, the ontological nature of the world is perhaps
>>>>
>>> less
>>>
>>>> important (it is an issue for metaphysics?), and I am
>>>>
>>> inclined to assume a neutral monism (e.g. Russell).
>>>
>>>> So from this view, a materialist monism and a Spinozist
>>>>
>>> monism
>>>
>>>> wouldn't be so different, so from both views it could be
>>>>
>>> assumed that
>>>
>>>> all is of the same nature and all is similarly knowable
>>>>
>>> (including
>>>
>>>> mind) [which is the ontological nature of the world and to
>>>>
>>> what
>>>
>>>> degree it is knowable are issues that can be left to
>>>>
>>> philosophy].
>>>
>>>> However, in my opinion, this does not mean that, while
>>>>
>>> assuming a
>>>
>>>> monism, analytical distinctions cannot be done when
>>>> studying
>>>>
>>> the
>>>
>>>> world. In that sense, I had the impression that Roth and
>>>>
>>> Jornet
>>>
>>>> tended to dilute analytical distinctions in the name of
>>>>
>>> monism; I
>>>
>>>> repeat that I don't know if I understood them well, but if
>>>>
>>> this was
>>>
>>>> the case, in my opinion, analysis would be impossible
>>>> within
>>>>
>>> the new
>>>
>>>> psychology suggested by Roth and Jornet, and, regarding
>>>>
>>> perezhivanie,
>>>
>>>> there would be the danger, noted by Vygotsky in The Crisis
>>>>
>>> and
>>>
>>>> cautioned by Kozulin in his commentary, that by meaning
>>>>
>>> everything, perezhivanie ends by meaning nothing.
>>>
>>>> Best regards and happy new year,
>>>>
>>>> Marc.
>>>>
>>>> 2017-01-02 9:12 GMT+01:00 Alfredo Jornet Gil<
>>>>
>>> a.j.gil@iped.uio.no> <mailto:a.j.gil@iped.uio.no>:
>>>
>>>> Dear all,
>>>>
>>>> I would like to join David, Luisa, Ana, Henry and the
>>>>
>>> others to wish
>>>
>>>> you all a Happy New Year! May it be full of joy, peace,
>>>>
>>> and opportunity.
>>>
>>>> I also would like to begin the year announcing our
>>>> first
>>>>
>>> ?MCA
>>>
>>>> article discussion, ?although in fact corresponds to
>>>> the
>>>>
>>> last issue
>>>
>>>> of the year
>>>>
>>>> we
>>>>
>>>> just passed, Issue 4 on Perezhivanie. This is a very
>>>>
>>> special
>>>
>>>> *special* issue, not only because its topic has raised
>>>>
>>> lots of
>>>
>>>> interest lately in
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>> CHAT community but also because, greatly coordinated by
>>>>
>>> Andy Blunden
>>>
>>>> and the rest of the editorial team, the issue takes the
>>>>
>>> form of a
>>>
>>>> symposium where authors get the chance to present and
>>>>
>>> respond to
>>>
>>>> each others' ideas on the subject. In my view, this
>>>>
>>> allows having a
>>>
>>>> rich and
>>>>
>>>> multidimensional
>>>>
>>>> approach to a subject as important as perezhivanie.
>>>>
>>>> Following with the dialogical spirit in which the
>>>>
>>> special issue was
>>>
>>>> assembled, we will focus on one lead article, but
>>>> hoping
>>>>
>>> to also
>>>
>>>> engage ideas and insights present in or relevant to
>>>> other
>>>>
>>>> contributions in the issue. ?Marc Clarà's "Vygotsky and
>>>>
>>> Vasilyuk on
>>>
>>>> Perezhivanie: Two Notions and One Word" will be our
>>>>
>>> focus. The
>>>
>>>> article very nicely engages the lead work of Vygotsky,
>>>>
>>> but also the
>>>
>>>> less known ??(?in educational literature) but totally
>>>>
>>> relevant works
>>>
>>>> of psychologist ?F. Vasilyuk and semiotician
>>>>
>>>> A.
>>>>
>>>> J. Greimas, mobilising a number of key concepts
>>>>
>>> including those of
>>>
>>>> semiotic
>>>>
>>>> mediation and transformation.
>>>>
>>>> ?In addition to Marc, who will soon join us, I have
>>>>
>>> encouraged some
>>>
>>>> of
>>>>
>>>> the
>>>>
>>>> other authors in the special issue to also join as
>>>>
>>> "relevant
>>>
>>>> others," if time and circumstances allow them. Let's
>>>>
>>> hope that this
>>>
>>>> will help keeping the symposium spirit up.
>>>>
>>>> Marc's article is attached to this e-mail and will be
>>>>
>>> made open
>>>
>>>> access at the T&F pages as soon as people is back from
>>>>
>>> the holidays.
>>>
>>>> The T&F link
>>>>
>>>> is
>>>>
>>>> this:
>>>>
>>>> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10749039.
>>>>
>>> 2016.1186194
>>>
>>>> The link to the MCA Forum pages, where we announce our
>>>>
>>> discussions
>>>
>>>> and other xmca things, is here:
>>>> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/
>>>>
>>>> I wish us all a very productive and interesting
>>>>
>>> discussion.
>>>
>>>> Alfredo
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
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